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ABSTRACT. 
The present thesis aims to examine how the Russian General Staff observed and assessed the 
Russian Empire's Asiatic frontier during the period of its greatest extent (between 1860 and 1917). By 
providing an overview of the entire length of the Asiatic frontier it aims to provide an original addition to 
the existing historiogmphy. Through analysis of the original records of the Asiatic Department of the 
Russian General Staff it furnishes insight into areas of response by the Russian General Staff towards crisis 
situations where previously little or no scholarly work has been carried out Thus, to cite just two examples, 
the thesis contains the first detailed coverage on the posting of the first Russian military agents to China 
during the so-called 'lli Crisis' of 1881, and of the response of the Russian General Staff to the revolt of 
Ishaq Khan in northern Afghanistan in 1888. These new additions are complemented by detailed analysis 
of more conventional aspects of the existing historiography. For example, by studying the prelude to the 
Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 it provides for the first time in English a detailed analysis of the specific 
difficulties experienced by Tsarist military intelligence in the Far East in the years immediately preceding 
that conflict. 
The overall form of analysis is in the main geographically determined. but with the sections 
examining individual sections of the Russian Asiatic frontier preceded and followed by more general 
chapters surveying the development of doctrinal, organizational and ideological currents within the General 
Staff as a whole at both the beginning and end of the period under review. Cba}:ter one in its first part 
surveys the development of the General Staff system itself in the Russian army. It provides in addition an 
analysis of available sources alongside a basic military history of the expansion of Russia' 5 AsUltic 
frontiers across this period. The first part of chaJter two provides an overview of the instruments and ideas 
that bad evolved and that were available to the Russian General Staff in its study Asia on the eve of the 
major Central Asian conquests of the 18605. The second section of chapter two analyses how some of these 
currents, both cultural and doctrinal. intermingled and responded between app-oximately 1859 and 1873, 
with ~ character of Prince Bariatinskii, Viceroy of the Caucasus during tbis ~ providing a central 
focus and case study. Chapter three examines how some of the purely tactical and technical tools employed 
" . 
by the Russian army in its Asiatic conquests evolved over'time.and again looks at the role of individual 
thinkers in this evolutionary process. Cha~r four, the main body of the work, in three major sub-sections 
analyses the fully developed use of all these instruments and trends in the Russian General Staff's plans and 
threat-assessments for the three major areas of their Asiatic frontier- the Far East, the Caucasus, and the 
region of Central Asia-Afgbanistan. 
The conclusion seeks to contribute a new perspective to current levels of analysis by setting the 
Tsarist military's orientaIist activities within the context of the current debates regarding European 
colonialism and the nature of orientalism in general. In doing so it also seeks to draw together the three 
underlying themes running throughout the work - the development of the General Staff's analysis of Asia 
by 1917, the still unresolved conflict of centre-periphery relations that afflicted evety aspect of Russian 
Asiatic policy, and the growing consciousness of a 'knowledge crisis' that afflicted the Tsarist General 
Staff as a whole, a crisis reflected in the press and academic organs of the day. This last phenomenon, 
along with many of the tools and approaches to tackle it, would form one ofTsarist Russia's largest 
legacies to the Soviet Union. The thesis will prove useful to students ofmilitaty histoty, Russia-Asia 
diplomatic relations, and those interested by the development and evolution of the 'knowledge-state' 
between the late eighteenth and early twentieth centuries. Above all it seeks to provide a prism through 
which the reader can annciate many of the difficulties attached to the development of military intelligence 
and the modem 'knowledge economy', difficulties that continue to afflict many states, not least Russia, 
even today. 
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EPIGRAPH. 
'If a larger view is taken of what may be termed as 'Greater Central Asia', that is a cultural area distinct 
from both the Middle East and South Asia, notwithstanding a certain overlapping due to entrenched 
political borders, then we are confronted with a much larger region, stretching along the southern latitude 
all the way from Mongolia to the Caspian Sea and eastern Turkey. This Central Asian region is 
chaIacterised by several centuries of continuity in Islamic cultural ethnic patterns and affinities of the 
Irano-Turkic and Mongol peoples that spread from Inner Asia to the Mediterranean and from Siberia to the 
Indian Ocean. The Russian element, first as adventurous Cossack fur hunters and only later as agricultural 
settlers, began to expand eastward into Siberia behind the Ural barrier from the 161h century onward. Two 
centuries later the Russian invasion and migration was diverted southward to penetrate the Kirghiz steppe 
and Turkestan: the Dar ai-Islam was jXOgressively turned into Dar ai-Barb (world of war).' 
Milan Hauner 'Central Asian Geopolitics in the Last Hundred Years: 
A Critical Survey from Gorcbakov to Gorbachev' CAS 8 (1, 1989) p.4. 
A NOTE ON SPELLING AND DATES. 
Achieving consistency of translation for the variety of place-names and titles employed along the length of 
the Russian Asiatic frontier is an almost insurmountable task. Where p>ssible I have used the most correct 
systems of translitemtion (always from the Russian) available, even in regard to some well known 
characters-Vitte rather than the more commonly used Witte for example. In regard to the Turkic place 
names and minor characters I employ a standard translitemtion of terms used in contemp>raIy Russian 
documents and records, leading to use of 'zh' for example to represent the sound often expressed in an 
anglicized translation as 'j' (Andizhan=Andijan). I have however made an exception in anglicizing the 
names of the Russian Emperors in the belief that the proper direct transliterations of their names-Aleksandr, 
Nikolai- would merely form a distraction for the English-speaking reader. Where a place name in the text 
has since changed its title, for whatever reason, I retain the spelling and label most commonly employed 
during the period of study-Tillis rather than 1bi1isi, and Peking rather than modern-day Beijing. As far as 
dates are concerned, unless indicated otherwise, all dates given in the present thesis conform to the Julian 
calendar in use in Russia before 1917. 
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1. INTRODUCTION. 
1.1 The Russian General Staff. 
The ideal organization of a General Staff is that all officers should have the 
same doctrine, and W1der similar circumstances should all do the same thing. 
Do not try to fmd fantastic solutions born of your own imagination, but follow 
the principles which you have been taught between these walls. The best 
General Staff that ever existed throughout history was the Prussian General 
Staff in 1870. 
Advice given to Russian Staff officers on graduating from the 
Nikolaevskaia General Staff Academy, early twentieth century.1 
In the nineteenth century the Russian Empire underwent a period of rapid expansion and change 
that forced it to assess its Asiatic commitments more intensively than ever before. Whilst the burden of 
much of this analysis fell upon the Foreign Ministty's Asiatic Department, creating what many have seen 
as a division in the very foreign policy making process itself 2, the Russian Army also assumed an 
increased burden in both conquering and policing a new, predominantly Islamic frontier. The institutional 
fracture apparent in the Foreign Ministty therefore came to be repeated to a certain extent in the army 
General Staff itself. The work: of the Asiatic Department of the Russian General Staff in dealing with these 
new frontiers forms the focus of the present study. 
The General Staff of the Russian Army was a rather late development in the Tsarist military 
system, but the doctrine and traditions developed by it filtered down into the Soviet General Staff and 
1 General P. A PolovtsofI [polovtsov], Glory and Downfall. Reminiscences of a Russian General Staff 
Officer. (London: G. Bell and Sons Ltd. 1935) p.52. 
2 Theodore Taranovski, 'Institutions, Political Culture, and Foreign Policy in Late Imperial Russia' in C. 
Evtukhov, G. Gasparov, A. Ospovat & M. Von Hagen (eds.), Kazan, Moscow, St. Petersburg: Multiple 
Faces of the Russian Empire. (Moscow: 0. G. I. 1997) pp.53-70. Taranovski argues that the Asiatic 
Department was a 'stepchild' of the Foreign Ministry establishment on the basis of the background in 
'European' diplomacy of many of its leading personnel: p.69, footnote 24. However, certain leading figures 
within the department did gain their authority on the basis of specifically Asiatic experience. E. P. 
Kovalevskii had travelled extensively in Siberia, Egypt, China and Central Asia before he became head of 
department in 1856-61, whilst his successor, N. P. Ignat' ev, had experience both of Central Asia and of 
Chinese diplomacy by the time he came to office. On the division of late Imperial Russian foreign policy 
into 'GermaniclEuropean' and 'Asiatic' schools of thought see Alfred J. Rieber, 'Persistent factors in 
Russian foreign policy: an interpretative essay' in H. Ragsdale (ed.), Imperial Russian Foreign Policy. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1993) pp.315-359. 
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remain a vital part of the Russian military inheritance today. The concept of a staff officer had been known 
in Russia since at least 1763, but for a long period remained a fairly flexible term, often only applying to a 
general's aide or entourage rather than to a trained professional. Yet the need for a large and fairly efficient 
military administrative system was particularly pressing in the Russian case, since in the wake of the 
Napoleonic Wars Russia. unlike the other European powers, in effect did not demobilize, but maintained 
her forces under arms at three times their prewar peacetime size.3 Nonetheless, not till the foundation of the 
Nikolaevskaia General Staff Academy in 1832 under the auspices of Tsar Nicholas I and Baron A H. 
Jomini, one of the foremost military thinkers of the day, did Russia even have an institution for the 
reguJarized training of such personnel. Two central models for the creation of such an institution existed; 
the PrussianKriegsakademie set up at Berlin in 1810 and the French Ecole Superieur Militaire set up at St. 
Cyr in 1803. Such academies reflected the increasingly technical and broad-ranging scope of warfare of the 
day, and aimed both to produce intelligent, vocationally trained officers and to serve as centres for the 
development of strategic theory. They were motivated by the belief firstly that war was now a specialized 
profession and secondly that the essentials of war were fundamentally teachable. Analytical history was 
now 'to pare out the dead wood of circumstantia1 phenomenality of past military events to reveal eternally 
recurring patterns or truths. ' 4 Consequently the first concerted attempts to enunciate the basic principles of 
war- concentration at the decisive point, economy of force, the superiority of interior over exterior lines of 
communication- date from this period.5 This growth in the field of military education was accelerated by 
the general move in European armies from being long-standing professional bodies to short-term conscript 
forces capable of rapid wartime expansion via their reserve cadres. Such a move was only possible in 
Russia following the abolition of serfdom in 1861, and only finally came into force with the Statute on 
Universal Military Service of 1874. The training of civilians to wartime standards within a relatively short 
3 Frederick W. Kagan, The Military Reforms of Nicholas 1. The Origins of the Modern Russian Army 
(London: Macmillan 1999) p.2. 
4 Carl Van Dyke, Russian Imperia/Military Doctrine and Education. 1832-1914 (USA: GreenwoodPress 
1990)p.14. For an old but useful survey of the development of military general staffs in Europe and 
America across this period see J. D. Hittle, The Military Sta.ff.lts History and Development (Connecticut: 
Greenwood Press 1944/1975). 
5 The principles of war most often cited down to the present day are: the offensive, concentration of forces 
(mass), economy of force, manoeuvre, unity of command, security, surprise. simplicity, planning and 
command However, the exact number of principles varies according to the writer, Jomini spoke of only 2, 
Marshal Foch of 4. Clausewitz of 4 rules with 3 general principles of defence, 14 for offence, 8 for troops 
period of peacetime service required a well-educated officer corps. So too did the task of analyzing and 
assessing the increasingly rapid technological developments of the latter part of the nineteenth century, 
which saw a changeover from muzzle-loading musket to the magazine rifle within the space of a single 
generation Within Russia however the General Staff for numy years lacked both the prestige associated 
with other European military staffs and the full strategic planning capability associated in particular with 
the Prussian model of a 'capital staff'. Only after the debacle of the Crimean War did the Russian General 
Staffundergo much-needed reform under War Minister D. A. Miliutin, and only from the 1880s onwards 
did Staff officers come to assume a distinct professional identity within the army as a whole. 6 
Miliutin pursued his reforms on the French model, subordinating under the wings of the War 
Ministry a whole series of separate departments, including the Military-Topographical Deplrtment, the 
3 
Nikolaevskaia Academy and, eventually, the Inspectorate to form, by 1866, the Main Staff(Glavnyi Shtab). 
Increasing entrance requirements, by cutting the numerical burden of students on the teaching staff, raised 
academic standards at the Nikolaevskaia Academy. 7 The merger of the Main Directorate (Glavnoe 
Upravlenie General 'nogo Shtaba or GUGSh, created 1863) with the Inspectorate Department of the War 
Ministry in 1865 created a central directive organ combining the functions of administration and 
operational planning. This did however create dilemmas of planning and administrative priority that would 
continue to dog the General Staff for much of the remainder of the nineteenth century. Thus, the war plan 
for the conflict with TUIkey in 1877-78 was the concept not so much of the concentrated analysis of the 
staff as a whole but of one man, Miliutin's aide and head of the Military Scientific Committee from 1867, 
General N. N. Obruchev.8 War planning remained limited by the slow mobilization rate of the Russian 
Army, railway development being nowhere nearly as advanced as in Prussia, leading to war plans still only 
being formed in general outline right into the 1880s. In addition Alexander III to some degree reversed the 
and 17 for use of terrain. C. Bellamy, The Evolution of Modem Land Warfare. Theory and Practice 
(London: Routledge 1990) pp.13-15. 
6 M. Mayzel, Generals and Revolutionaries. The Russian General Staff during the Revolution: A Study in 
the Transformation of a Military Elite (Osnabruck: Bibillo Verlag 1979) pp.16-19. For a useful overview of 
this extremely complex period in Russian military administration, see the entry 'Administrative System and 
Policy-Making Process, Central Military (Before 1917)' in David R Jones (ed.), The Military-Naval 
Encyclopedia of Russia and the Soviet Union Seven. incomplete vols. (Gulf Breeze, Florida: Academic 
International Press 1978-97) Vol.2 pp.34-169. 
7 Van Dyke, Russian Imperial Military Doctrine and Education, 1832-1914 p.58. 
8 Bruce W. Menning, Bayonets before Bullets. The Imperial Russian Army, 1861-1914. (USA: Indiana 
University Press 1992) pp. 17, 52-4. 
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trend towards advancement by merit and educational-based assessment in the army begun by Miliutin by 
his reversal of policy in the military academies andjunkers schools.9 Civilian instructors were removed 
from the military academies and academic standards in the junkers schools declined in quality, whilst the 
teaching of literacy to the common soldier was no longer compulsory. The retention of senior commanders 
into extreme old age, and a return in emphasis to parade-ground style manoeuvres under Nicholas II all 
resulted in an officer corps that was still too heterogeneous by the turn of the century to fully meet the 
challenge of modem warfare.10 
The Asiatic Department by 1869 was one of seven branches of the Imperial Main Staff. The 
other six were the General Staff, the Military-Topographical Section, the Committee for the Movement of 
Troops and Military Cargoes by Railway (created 1868), the Committee for Prepuing Data on the 
Mobilization of Troops, the Military Scientific Committee and the Military Historical Commission The 
shape of the Main Staff was subject to periodic minor reform, much of it a result of the increasingly 
complex functions undertaken by it in the sphere of logistics and mobilization. In 1875 for example the 
Mobilization Committee was created to aid the work of the Military-Scientific Committee. In 1892 
General-Quartermaster sections were created in the military district staffs of border districts, for the 
gathering of data regarding both the district itself and the nearest localities in the bordering countries. 11 In 
1903 the Main Staff was reorganized into five directorates: First Quartermaster General, Second 
9 For a more detailed analysis of this process, and the issue of professionalism as a whole, see: William C. 
Fuller, Civil-Military Conflict in Imperial Russia 1881-1914 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 
1985) pp.3-75. For the personal (and critical) perspective of one who saw these events at first band, and 
who himself respected War Minister Vannovskii, see: Aleksandr Rediger, Istoriia Moei Zhizni. 
Vospominaniia Voennogo Ministra T.I (Moscow: "Kanon-Press-Ts" "Kuchkovo Pole" 1999) pp.157-8, 
261-2. 
10 Miliutin's decision to subordinate the General Staff to the War Ministry has traditionally come under 
attack by modem historians, both Western and Soviet, who see the development as having perpetuated 
inefficiencies and hindered an advance towards modem 'operational art' in Russia [Menning, Bayonets 
before Bu/lets.,p.17~ P. A Zaionchkovskii, Voenny Reformy1860-70 godov v Rossi; (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo 
Moskovskogo Universiteta, 1952) p.l06] Within a country as large and autocratic as Russia, however, the 
arrangement undoubtedly possessed some advantages as well, particularly in a period of peacetime 
administration In the Soviet period there was a renewed attempt to make the army the 'school of the 
nation'. In addition, the mechanization carried out in the first Five-Year Plan from1928 onwards indicates 
how administration continued to be centralized, and the army shaped by broad change initiated from the 
central command across the whole of society. See particularly Mark Von Hagen, Soldiers in the 
Proletarian Dictatorship. The Red Army and the Soviet Socialist State, 1917-1930 (Ithaca & London: 
Cornell University Press 1990) andLennan Samuelson. Plans/or Stalin's War Machine. Tukhachevskii 
and Military-Economic Planning, 1915-1941 (London: Macmillan Press Ltd. 2000). 
11 E. Iu. Sergeev & N. A Ulunian, Ne podJezhit' oglasheniiu. Voennye agenty Rossiis/co; Imperii v Evrope 
; na Balkanakh. 1900-1914. (Moscow: Institut Vseobshchei Istorii, RAN 1999) p.20. 
Quartermaster General, Adjutant General, Military Communications and Military Topography, with the 
Asiatic 'section' (otdel) as one half of the two-section First Quartermaster General. This Asiatic section 
took on purely administrative responsibility for the Asiatic military districts.12 The gaining of intelligence 
regarding the military potential of foreign opponents was now assigned the VII1h section (Military-
Statistical Study of Foreign States) under the Second Quartermaster-General. This section in 1905 had 17 
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officers of the General Staff working in it.13 However, the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 
saw a further bout of organizational reform. In 1905 the Main Directorate of the General Staff (GUGSh) 
gained independence from the old Main Staff and the War Ministry, only to rejoin the War Ministry in 
1909.14 During this interval a body designated the 'Asiatic Section' remained on the organization of the 
Main Staff, but this unit again bore little resemblance administratively to its pre-I 903 forebear. Above all, 
it lacked almost any intelligence-gathering function, being responsible purely for the bureaucratic 
administration of the Asiatic military districts. When Baron Mannerheim was swnmoned to conduct his 
famous two-year intelligence-gathering trip through China in 1906, it was to General Palitsyn, head of 
GUGSh, not to the Main Staff, that he reported.15 This period marked a brief attempt to create an 
independent General Staff on the German model, subordinate directly to the Emperor and responsible 
purely for operational planning. The sections responsible for processing intelligence gathered in Asia in this 
interim were formed under the Third Over-Quartermaster under the General Quartermaster Directorate.16 In 
this period the defence of Russia in Asia also filtered into a more general debate about how to formulate a 
unified defence policy for Russia as a whole, debate being particularly vigorous during the period of 
existence (1906-08) of the State Defence Council under the Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich. Despite its 
failure to retain its existence as a separate institution, the GUGSh that re-entered the War Ministry in 1909 
retained control over all officers of the General Staff and played a significant role in shaping the Russian 
Anny that entered the World War, not least via continued intelligence-gathering. In particular, the GUGSh 
12 Menning, Bayonets before Bullets p.98~ 1. D. Hittle, The Military Staff p.252. 
13 A Ill. Shelukhin, 'Razvedyvatel'nye organy v stJukture vysshego voennogo upravleniia rossiiskoi 
imperii nachala XX veka (1906-1914 gg.)' VMU 8 (3,1996) p.I7. 
14 Menning, Bayonets before Bullets p.218. A Kavtaradze, 'Iz Istorii Russko,!o General'nogo Shtaba' VIZh 
7 (1972) pp.87-9: Due to resistance from the Ministry of Finance only on 22 April 1906 did GUGSh 
become an independent operational organ, almost a year after it was first proposed. 
15 C. G. E. Mannerheim & Count Eric Lewenhaupt, (trans.) The Memoirs of Marshal Mannerheim (New 
York: E P Dutton & Company, Inc. 1954) p.25. 
16 Kavtaradze, 'Iz Istorii .. ' VIZh 7 (1972) pp.87-9. 
produced its own Sbornik from 1909 onwards presenting all the most important details on the armies and 
military preparations of the countries of Europe and Asia. From 1911 onwards this published details only 
on areas where change had occurred since the last issue.17 Noting this provides a good point on which to 
review the other sources available on the period. 
1.2 Sources and PersonneL 
In any historical project, the sources available to the researcher are clearly delineated from the 
outset into primary and secondary material. In relation to the secondary literature on Russian militmy and 
diplomatic relations with Asia, work conducted in this field, whilst extensive, is often highly specialized 
and segregated. Studies of Sino-Russian relations, for example, usually deal only fleetingly with Russian 
relations with Japan. and practically never at all with Russian involvement in Central Asia. Similarly, only 
6 
one major study by a trinity of Russian historians deals with Russian expansion into both the Caucasus and 
Central Asia in this period.I8 One of the purposes of the present work is to present an overview of how the 
Russian General Staff assessed the whole length of the Asiatic frontier. An approach of this scope is 
relatively rare and will therefore form an original contribution to the existing historiography. 
Within the field in the west, one of the best existing works attempting to present a strategic 
overview of the Tsarist Empire is that of William C. Fuller Jr., Strategy and Power in Russia 1600-1914. 
Without fOCUSing specifically on the field of Russian-Asian relations, Fuller provides an admirable 
overview of both the strategic concerns of the Tsarist state and the manner in which resources and materiel 
were mobilized by that state to meet perceived threats. Fuller's work, along with that of John L. H. Keep, 
Soldiers of the Tsar, forms the foundation in the modem English-language historiography in terms of 
providing an overview on the development of the Tsarist army. 19 More recent studies bave intensively 
studied shorter periods of time, often leading to revisionist assessments of the nature of the Tsarist General 
17 A. Kavtaradze, 'Iz Istorii Russkogo General'nogo Sbtaba' VIZh 12 (1974) p.84 Unsurprisingly perhaps, 
Kavtaradze implies that most emphasis rested on Germany and Austro-Hun~. Certainly according to A. 
A. Samoilo, a prominent contemporary of this process, the main operational-statistical sections of GUGSh 
were considered to be those concerned with Germany, France, and Austro-Hungary: Sergeev & Ulunian, 
Ne podlezhit' oglasheniiu. p.22. 
18 N. S. Kiniapina, M. M. Bliev & V. V. Degoev, Kavkaz i Srednaia Aziia vo vneshnei politike Rossii 
(Vtoraia polovinaXVIIl-8O-e godyXIXv.) (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Moskovskogo Universitata 1984) 
19 John L. Keep, Soldiers of the Tsar. Army and Society in Russia 1462-1874 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 1985) 
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Staff itself, but fail to match these earlier works in both chronological breadth and thematic scope. After a 
long period of neglect therefore, the Tsarist military now has some claim to be one of the better-studied 
institutions of Tsarist Russia amongst historians, but the performance and attitudes of that army in its 
Asiatic campaigning remains understudied. The present study sets out to review a shorter time period than 
either Fuller or Keep, but within the context of a very broad geographical scale. 
Tsarist foreign policy, meanwhile, remains probably the best studied aspect of the prewar Russian 
governmental system in the West, research having been facilitated by open access to late imperial Russian 
foreign policy documents preserved in both French and American archives.20 Two excellent thesis 
dissertations exist on the Asiatic Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry, although the department 
remains a disappointing blank spot in the existing openly printed historiography. 21 A further gap exists in 
the absence of any satisfactory institutional study of the Russian Foreign Ministry as a whole in the West, 
although this is pu1ially explained by the fact that many pre-1900 Foreign Ministry documents are only 
available in Russia, with the concomitant problems of access for western scholars. Western researchers are 
therefore still reliant on the considerable accomplishments of Russian historiography in this field, including 
the recently published series A History o/Russian Foreign Policy (Istoriia vneshnei politiki Rossii).22 
Regarding Russian relations with individual Asian states, the western researcher is still best advised 
meanwhile to consult the numerous Russian document collections and monographs in this field, including 
for example the two-volume document collection on Russian-Indian relations recently published through 
the Russian Academy of Science.23 Far from all of the most valuable Russian research in this field is 
modem; mention in particular should be made of the Soviet historian A. I. Popov, whose work in the 1920s 
20 The two most outstanding examples of this genre, both using documents preserved in foreign (non-
Russian) archives, but reaching rather different conclusions on the driving motivations behind the 
formation ofTsarist foreign policy, are: David MacLaren McDonald, United Government and Foreign 
Policy in Russia, 1900-1914 (Cambridge, Mass./London, England: Harvard University Press 1992) andD. 
Lieven, Russia and the Origins o/the First World War (London: Macmillan 1983) 
21 G. B. Ritchie, 'The Asiatic Department during the reign of Alexander II, 1855-1881.' Unpub. Ph.D diss. 
(Columbia University 1970) and 1. T. Koot, 'The Asiatic Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry and 
the Foundation of Policy toward the Non-Western World, 1881-1895.' Unpub.Ph.D.diss. (Harvard 
University 1980). 
22 Istoriiavneshnei politiki Rossii T.I-3 (Moscow: "Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia" 1996-1999) 
23 P. M. Shastitko (ed.), Russko-Indiiskie Otnosheniia v XIXv. Sbornik Arkhivnykh dokumentov i 
materia/ov. (Moscow: Izdatel'skaia firma "vostocbnaia literatura" RAN 1997) andP. M. Shastitko & T. N. 
Zagorodnikova (eds.), Russko-Indiiskie Otnosheniia v 1900-1917gg. SbornikArkhivnykh documentov i 
materialov (Moscow: Izdatel'skaia firma "vostochnaia literatura" RAN 1999) 
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and 1930s was in the main concerned with Tsarist Russia's relations with various Asiatic states. Invariably 
based on impeccable archival research, Popov's numerous articles from this period contain a wealth of data 
and analysis that remain invaluable to the modern scholar. 
Whilst the Asiatic Department of the Foreign Ministry usually receives some brief commentary in 
western surveys ofTsarist foreign policy, the very existence of the Asiatic Department of the General Staff 
by contrast has rarely if ever been touched upon. The almost complete absence of any examination in the 
western or Russian historiography on the existence and purpose of this department means, for example, that 
one table presented in the following study represents the first time the heads of this institution have ever 
been chronologically catalogued in any non-contemporary source. Studies of Russian military involvement 
in Asia meanwhile, both Russian and western, have overwhelmingly focused on battles and campaigns-the 
Russo-Japanese War in particular-rather than on administrative methods or the development of deep long-
term future-orientated strategical thinking in this sphere.24 The one shining exception to this rule is the 
Ph.D thesis of E. G. Bitof from 1974, an excellent study incorporating much material from the Sbomik .. po 
Azii (on which more in a moment), but limited in chronological scope and lacking important supplementary 
evidence only now available from work in the Russian central state military-historical archive. Equally, 
Bilof's work makes no specific analysis of the role of the Asiatic Department of the General Staff. Indeed, 
Bitof appears to have been unaware of certain relevant facts regarding the department's role in this sphere-
for example that L. N. Sobolev, whom he quotes, was at one point head of this department during his 
period of study. 25 
Russian primary sources on military policy in Asia across this period, meanwhile, are inevitably 
shaped by the characteristics and personnel of the Russian governmental administration of the time. Within 
this period two major strategic conferences were held, one in 1873 and one in 1910, surveying and 
evaluating the security profile of the Russian Empire. The input of district staffs, military attaches and 
General Staff officers concerned with Asiatic theatres in these important conferences will form one focus of 
24 See for example: J. N. Westwood, Russia Against Japan, 1904-05. A New Look at the Russo-Japanese 
War (London: Macmillan Press Ltd 1986). 
25 E. G. Bitof, 'The Imperial Russian General Staff and China in the Far East 1880-1888 A Study of the 
Operations of the General Staff. 'Unpub. Ph.D.diss. (Syracuse University 1974.) 
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study in the present work. Another will be the output, opinions and role of the leading personnel of the 
General Staff Asiatic Department and its successors over the whole period 1860-1917 at the central policy-
making level. Information on both these topics is in the main to be found in the central state Military-
Historical Archive of Russia (Rossiiski gosudarstvennyi voenno-istoricheskii arkhiv, hereafter in footnotes 
RGVIA). 
The central state archive in Moscow is not the sole source of Imperial Staff assessments on Asia 
however. In 1883 the Military-Scientific Committee of the Russian Main Staff decided to publish material 
on Asia at its disposal gathered by General Staff officers, military agents, and diplomats abroad. This was 
intended 'to facilitate the study and further examination of our Asiatic districts and in particular China, 
Japan, Persia, Turkey, Mghanistan, BukhaIa, Khiva and so on ,26 The resulting Sbomik geograficheskikh. 
topograficheskikh i statisticheskikh materialov poAzii (St.Petersburg, 1883-1914), contains the collected 
studies of staff officers travelling through or residing at consuls within Asiatic countries on the arc 
stretching from the Caucasus to the Pacific. In addition the Sbomik came to print large amounts offoreign 
material in Russian translation, mostly from English or German periodicals, concerning the latest political 
or military events in Asia. Each volume in the series was intended to be ordered along one of two general 
area divisions, one covering the area from the Caucasus to Central Asia (the areas known as Central Asia 
and Asia Minor), the other from Central Asia to the Far East (Siberia). Publication was based upon mass of 
accumulated material, resulting in an irregular publication pattern- from two to eight editions a year in the 
first few years to a single annual edition by the start of the twentieth century. The last year of publication, 
1914, saw publication of the Sbomik's 8th issue. The reports and material contained within each volume in 
the series are extremely diverse in terms of length, quality and value, and selective quotation from the 
volumes will inevitably imply a greater sense of order and priority than does in fact actually exist.27 
26 Foreword, Ith August 1883 in: Sbomik geograficheskikh. topograficheskikh i statisticheskikh materialov 
po Azii I (1883). Hereafter in footnotes designated SGTSMA. On the history of the collection's publication, 
see also: A A Kozhukovskaia (00.), 1storiia Otechestvennogo Vostokovedeniia s serediny XIX veka do 
1917 goda. (Moscow: RAN Izdatel'skaia firm "Vostochnaia Literatura" 1997) pp.152-53. 
27 'The articles val)' in importance as they do in caliber. Moreover, an examination of the Sbomik leads to 
inferences rather than to definite proofs.' Warren B. Walsh. 'The Imperial Russian General Staff and India: 
A Footnote to Diplomatic History.' RR 16 (2, 1957) p.54. 
Local governor-generalships in both the Caucasus and Central Asia were themselves prolific 
producers of analytical and statistical information, thanks in part to the decision made in 1860 to create 
statistical committees in all the gubemator and oblast 'towns of Russia. In Turkestan alone from 1869 
onwards Governor-General Kaufman commissioned a collection of every article relating to Central Asia, 
which in 10 years had, in 300 issues, catalogued more than 4,000 publications on the region. 28 The 
Turkestanskii Sbomik however, remains today in its place of origin-Tashkent- rather than in a central 
10 
archive. The same rule also applies, although not invariably, to much of the statistical material produced in 
the Caucasus and Far Eastern military districts. Vital as such collections are therefore to evaluating the 
administrative characteristics of Russia's military governors in those provinces, reference to them here will 
be limited to those reports duplicated for administrative purposes within the central military archive or 
reported in Russian secondary sources. Finally, use will be made of the prolific military newspaper and 
joumalliterature of this period-the Voennyi Sbomik in particular- to try and assess what lessons the army 
might have been trying to absorb from its Asiatic theatres. Also of particular relevance in this area will be 
study of the courses run at the Nikolaevskaia Academy by one of Miliutin' s chief aides, and professor of 
military statistics, Lieutenant-General A 1 Maksheev (1828-1891). Inspired by his fourteen-month tour of 
Turkestan in 1847, Maksheev ran a series of courses at the academy with a strong Asiatic orientation, 
covering plains warfare, ethnography, statistics, the careers of the great Asiatic commanders, and the 
political and economic features of China, Central Asia, Afghanistan and Persia. In addition he encouraged 
the introduction of courses on Arabic, Farsi, Turldsh and Tatarl, helping institute a cash prize of 1,000 
roubles for the graduating officer producing the best Persian manuscript. These courses would be the 
formative experience of many men that went on to work at the Asiatic Department of the General Staff in 
the 1870s and 1880s.29 
28 Daniel R Brower, 'Islam and Ethnicity: Russian Colonial Policy in Turkestan' in D. R Brower, & E. J. 
Lazzerini (eds.), Russia's Orient. Imperial Borderlands and Peoples, 1700-1917. (Indiana: Indiana 
University Press 1997) p.91 In a similar category is much of the collection of intelligence information 
relating to countries bordering the Turlcestan military district, p-oduced by officers of that district and 
known under the acronym SKSSTVO (Sveden;;a, kasaiushchies;a stran, sopredel'nykh s Turkestanskim 
voennym okrugom). 
29 Van Dyke, Russian Imperial Military Doctrine and Education. 1832-1914 pp.67-8. David A Rich, 
'Imperialism, Reform & Strategy: Russian Military Statistics, 1840-1880.' SEER 74 (4, 1996) pp.629-30. 
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Before moving on to consider personnel more generally, one final major source of information on 
Russian General Staff activity in Asia deserves serious attention. This is the work of the Military-Historical 
Committee of the Russian General Staff to produce an official history of the Russo-Japanese War?O 
Beginning its work in 1906 and finished by 1910, the Committee over the course of those four years 
reviewed 12,000 documents to eventually produce a nine-volume history of the war incorporating 525 
maps and plans. This is a serious study of the course of the war on land, which contains a great mass of 
primary material still valuable to the historian today. Particular use in the present study has been made of 
the first volume, which covers in minute detail political and military events in the Far East preceding the 
war itself, including the Japanese and Russian military build-ups and Russian strategic assessments of 
Japan. Although to some degree inevitably an exercise in exculpation, the official history is unusually 
honest in its analysis of Russian shortcomings, a product perhaps of the fact that the war was unsuccessful 
for Russia and clearly contained lessons that needed to be learned. 
Utilizing these sources then, the present study aims to analyze and evaluate the character and 
significance of the Asiatic Department of the Russian General Staff in a period of dramatic expansion and 
change along Russia's Asiatic frontiers. Within this overall period however three main figures also played a 
prominent role in Russian Asiatic policy, necessitating repeated reference to their influence and opinions. 
These figures were Field-Marshal Prince A I. Bariatinskii, (1815-79) the final conqueror of the Caucasus, 
General K. P. fon Kaufman, (1818-82), the first Governor-General of Central Asia, and General A N. 
Kuropatkin, (1848-1925), at one time a head of the Asiatic Department, War Minister in the period 1897-
1904, commander-in-chiefin the Russo-Japanese War, and the final Tsarist Governor-General of Central 
Asia in 1916-17. Each man served to energize and sum up Russian Asiatic policy of his day and played 
some important though not always explicit role in influencing his successors. Kaufman served under 
Bariatinskii in the Caucasus, and Kuropatkin received some of his earliest strategic assignments whilst 
serving on Kaufman's staff in Central Asia. Of them all, Kuropatldn played perhaps the greatest role in 
analyzing and attempting to assimilate Russia's Asiatic and European strategic commitments, serving in 
Central Asia, the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78, and on the Main Staffwith Obruchev reviewing European 
30 Russko-Iaponskaia Voina 1904-1905gg. Rabota Voenno-Istoricheskii Kommissii po opisaniiu Russko-
Iaponskoi Voiny. T. 1-9 (St Petersburg: TipogIafiia AS. Suvorina 1910) 
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war plans in the 1880s. In this assimilatory role he incorporated both his own Asiatic experience and a 
system of comparative analysis available to a man who had both studied other empires deeply and had 
actually briefly served in Algeria with the French Saharan corps, becoming an honourary legionary. On his 
taking up the post of War Minister, in his own words: 
I found many schemes actually in progress, and numerous others-worked 
out and marked as urgent- for the execution of which money had not been 
available. As there was no co-ordinated programme between the War and Navy 
Departments, I was forced to spend my first two years in office in framing an 
exhaustive statement for our guidance. In this I traced out and summarized the 
achievements of Russian arms in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 
showed which had been finished and which had been left over for completion 
to the twentieth century, and pointed out the sacrifices made by the nation 
towards this result. I reviewed the condition of each of our frontiers, indicated 
the numbers and or~ation that would be necessary for the different probable 
theatres of war, and estimated the power of offence of our most likely 
adversaries. Having thus arrived at some logical conclusions as to what had to be 
faced in the coming century, it remained to draw up definite proposals for the 
improvements necessary in the organjzation for war of the army.31 
The result of this review, a product of the genemi trend towards unified military doctrine at the 
Staff Academy at the time, was perhaps the largest geostrategic survey of all time.32 The majority of this 
analytical work, with accompanying political commentary, was reproduced in Kuropatkin's immense 3-
volume Zadachi Russkoi Armii produced in S1. Petersburg in 19lO, and sections were also reproduced in 
Kuropatkin's work on the Russo-Japanese War printed abroad and translated into English by Captain AB. 
Lindsay in 1909. It is a formidable piece of research, invaluable to any student of Russian military history, 
and reference to it will be found continually throughout the present study. Kuropatkin in this field was in 
many ways only the successor however to General N. N. Obruchev (1830-1904), who guided Russian 
31 AN. Kuropatkin& Capt. A B. Lindsay (trans.), The Russian Army and the Japanese War Volume 1 
(London: John Murray, 1909) pp.xxiii-xxiv. 
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strategic policy continuously from 1867 to 1897.33 Obruchev, as will become evident in the fourth section 
on strategic planning, was responsible in large put for the stress Tsarist strategy lay upon preparation of the 
European theatre throughout much of this period. He was also by proxy however responsible for some of 
the Asiatic war planning that occurred, not least the aforementioned war-planning for the Russo-Turkish 
conflict of 1877-1878 which saw fighting in both European and Asiatic Turkey. 
Also active both professionally and to a lesser degree in terms of lasting literary testament of 
course were those officers whose knowledge of Asiatic conditions grew out of long-term service 
experience rather than staff training. Such individuals could come to occupy high positions in the 
administration, becoming patrons of the generation of trained staff officers who would succeed them 
(Bariatinskii is the main example here) but many also served all their lives at brigade level or below, 
continuing to carry out district command functions well into the 1880s. General I. D. Lazarev (1819-1879) 
is a good example of a product of Russia's military' Asiatic school' on the ground An Armenian born in 
Shusha, Elizavetopol (he visited St Petersburg for the first time only after the war of 1877-78), he joined 
the Caucasus Corps at an early age. Showing a talent for languages and native affairs, he became guardian 
of the infant ruler of Mechtulin in the Caucasus for a period in the 1850s. He then went on to distinguish 
himself at the siege ofGumb (1859)34, in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, and died whilst on campaign 
in Central Asia, fighting the Tekke Turkmen of what would shortly become Russia's Trans-Caspian 
province. Amongst the natives of the Caucasus he was apparently known as the 'Bateer-Sardar' or 
'Warrior Chief.' Such men were vital component elements of the Russian military's Asiatic experience. 
32 On the intellectual climate and trends at the Nikolaevskaia Academy at the time see: Van Dyke, Russian 
Imperial Military Doctrine and Education, 1832-1914pp.91-130. 
33 Unlike Kuropatkin however, Obruchev was never War Minister- he J¢ned his authority first as head of 
the Military Scientific Committee and later as Chief of the Main Staff. As Menning points out, Obruchev 
under P. S. Vannovski (War Minister 1881-1897) was in a difficult position-'he had access to information 
and high persons without the full trust and authority necessary to implement measmes he deemed 
appropriate for the anny's continued welfare and development.' Menning, Bayonets before Bullets, p.90. 
Undoubtedly the two most significant studies of Obruchev's work in recent years have been David A Rich, 
The Tsar's Colonels. ProfeSsionalism, Strategy, and Subversion in Late Imperial Russia (Cambridge, Mass: 
Harvard University Press 1998) and 0. R Airapetov, Zabytaia kar 'era "Russkogo Mol'tke. " Mkolai 
Nikolaevich Obruchev (1830-1904). (St Petersburg: Izdatel'stvo "Aleteiia" 1998). 
34 He was in fact personally responsible for persuading Sbamil to surrender: J. F. Baddeley, The Conquest 
of the Caucasus (London: Curzon Press [reprint] 1908/1999) p.482. 
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Only one individual of this type left a truly lasting impression of the history of staff thinking towards Asia 
however, and a profile of Prince Bariatinskii will be presented in the next chapter.35 
1.3 The Asiatic Frontier. 
The present study has chosen to encompass such a broad geographical scale for two reasons. 
Firstly, from the practical perspective, only by dealing with Russian relations with China, Japan, Central 
Asia, Afghanistan and Turkey can one faithfully claim to represent the work of the Asiatic Department of 
the Russian General Staff as a whole. It was the labours involved in attempting to balance and assimilate 
priorities in these strategic regions that ~ve that General Staff department its distinctive character. 
Secondly however, the geographical breadth of the study has been motivated by the author's personal belief 
that the very broad responsibilities borne by the Asiatic Department were not simply the product of a 
convenient bureaucratic coincidence (an aesthetically neat division of 'Asiatic' from 'European' strategic 
concerns) but rather reflected existing cultural and political ties across the region. These links significantly 
bound this area together and continued to be felt as Russian influence expanded in the region. Although not 
personally a Eurasianist in the classical meaning of the term36, or even a believer in the dominating 
importance of geopolitics, the author would agree with David Christian upon the validity of 'Inner Eurasia' 
as a geographical and cultural concept-in short, that: 
the entire region can usefully be treated as a single, coherent unit of 
historical analysis. The geography and ecology of the region have shaped 
its history from prehistory to the present. They have done so by posing 
distinctive problems that demanded distinctive solutions.37 
Taking this approach, the present author would of course particularly agree with Professor Christian that 
these conditions also entail that 'Inner Eurasia .. .is a natural unit of military history.,38 This area 
35 For Lazarev's 1879 expedition and character details see C. Marvin, The Eye-Witness Account o/the 
Disastrous Russian Campaign against the Akhal Tekke Turcomans (London: W. H. Allen & Co. 1880) 
rr,.52-136. 
For a brief survey of the historiographical development of Eurasianist thought in the 19205, see: N. B. 
Narbaev, Rossiia; Evraziia. Problemy gosudarstvennosti vtoraia polovina XlX-nachalo XX veka. 
(Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "NAUKA" 1997) pp.59-97; N. V. Riasanovsky, 'The emergence ofEurasianism.' 
CSS 4 (1967) pp.39-72 and Dya Vinkovetsky, 'Classical Eurasianism and its Legacy.' Canadian-American 
Slavonic Studies 43 (2, 2(00) pp.125-39. 
37 D. Christian, A History o/Russia, Central Asia and Mongolia. Volume 1: Inner Eurasia from Prehistory 
to the Mongol Empire. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1998) p.4 
38 Ibid, p.5. 
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incorporated the space occupied by the present-day states of the Russian Federation, the Central Asian 
states, and Outer Mongolia. 
This region was approximately demarcated by the ecological factors of aridity, extreme cold and a 
continental as opposed to a coastal climate, and by the geographical factors of the Caucasus, Tien-Shan, 
Pamirs, Altai and Hindu Kush mountain ranges, amongst others, delineating its southern frontier. 
Commercial trade routes, which also formed the paths taken by invading armies, ran predominantly from 
east to west. The most significant river systems by contrast run on a north-south axis, flowing into the 
Baltic and the frozen Arctic Sea. Tributaries of these river systems did however facilitate Russian 
penetration into Siberia from the sixteenth century onwards, and the Amur River, flowing into the warmer 
waters of the Pacific, formed an important exception to the general rule. The line of the Ural mountains, the 
traditional dividing line between Europe and Asia in classical geography, was an arbitrarily selected point 
given the fact that this range was too insignificant to ever hinder the movement of peoples and cultures 
across it. 39 More significant from a historical perspective was the ecological dividing line between the vast 
grasslands of the Eurasian steppe, and the more meagre grazing afforded by the soils of Eastern Europe, the 
effects of which arguably stopped the Mongol invasion in the thirteenth century. Like the forces of every 
other nomadic pastoralist empire, the Mongol army was dependent upon the ability of the local terrain to 
sustain its horseS.4O 
Russia advanced into this region of Inner Eurasia by contrast as a predominantly sedentary 
society, taking advantage of those technological changes that had tipped the strategic balance between 
sedentary and nomadic cultures in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Its advance was 
undeniably influenced by the geographical and climactic factors noted above, but these did not playa 
predetermining role. It advanced also as a peripheral power in a coherent geopolitical and ecological 
cultural system, the military aspect of which had already been felt in Russian experience of the Mongol 
yoke.41 The unity of this Inner Eurasian geopolitical sphere found expression not only in its earlier 
39 M. Bassin, 'Russia between Europe and Asia: the ideological construction of geographical space.' SR SO 
(1,1991) pp. 2-3,6. 
40 The absence of traditional pasturage does not, however, appear to have hindered Mongol penetration of 
China and the Middle East. For a discussion of this point, see: Greg Rogers, 'An examination of historians' 
explanations for the Mongol withdrawal from East Central Europe' EEQ XXX (1,1996) pp.3-26. 
41 For studies on the major sequence of events in this process that have influenced the present author, see: 
Michael Kbodarkovsky, Where Two Worlds Met. The Russian State and the Ka/myk Nomads, 1600-1771. 
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spasmodic political unification under predominantly nomadic warrior societies-Chinghiz Khan, Tamerlane-
but also in centuries of trade links, the most prominent expression of which in the pre-railroad epoch was 
the famous Silk Road. It was also a sphere defined by the efforts of other empires and civilizational blocks 
to lock it out using either natural terrain features or artificial constructions such as the Great Wall of China. 
Developments in one part of the region invariably carried powerful repercussions elsewhere, even where 
two areas were not directly contiguous. The appearance of the Huns in the west during the 4th centwy AD, 
for example, was almost certainly linked to the 1 at centwy AD collapse of the Hsuing-nu Empire in 
northwestern China and Mongolia. Whilst not seeking to deny that war, famine, civil strife, epidemics and 
societal collapse isolated whole sections of this geographical region from their neighbours for prolonged 
periods of time, it is nonetheless sustainable to argue that sufficient trade and cultural links had been 
created by the time of the major Russian expansion to create a sense of administrative unity, overlap, and 
continuity in many areas. On advancing into Central Asia in the latter part of the nineteenth century for 
example, the Russians were designated as representatives of the 'White Tsar' (Ak Padishakh) by the locals, 
or in other words, according to some interpretations, as the politically legitimate successors to the Mongol 
White Horde (the confederation often referred to in Russian sources as the 'Golden Horde,).42 The role 
performed by the Asiatic Department of the General Staff in attempting to monitor this vast region was 
therefore merely a further symptom of an already inherent, preexistent web of economic, strategic and 
cultural interconnectedness. 
Given this sporadic but significant sense of governmental and cultural continuity within the region 
of Inner Emasia, reinforced by centuries of natural trade links, the one obvious anomaly within the Russian 
(Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press 1992); B. D. Grekov, & A Iu. Jakobovskii, Zo]olaia orda i ee 
padenie (Moscow !Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo Akademii Nauk SSSR 1950); Alton Donnelly, The Russian 
Conquest ofBashkiria 1552-1740. A Case Study in Imperialism. (New Haven & London: Yale University 
Press 1968); George V. Lantzeff & Richard A Pierce, Eastward 10 Empire: Exploration and Conquest on 
the Russian Open Frontier to 1750. (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press 1973) and Andreas 
Kappeler & Alfred Calyton (trans.), The Russian Empire: A Multiethnic History (England: Pearson 
Education Ltd. 200 1). 
42 R G. Landa, Islam v istorii Rossii (Moscow: Izdatel'skaia Firma "Vostochnaia Literatura" RAN 1995) 
pp.44, 70. In the earlier period Ivan IV (Ivan Groznyi, or in common Western translation 'Ivan the 
Terrible') was related to Chinghiz Khan, but by the maternal, not the paternal line-i.e. in the Twkic-
Mongol tradition he could not be considered the direct descendant of Chinghiz Khan and hence the direct 
inheritor of his authority. The link carried moral rather than judicial significance. The greatest advocates for 
the significance of such links were the Eurasianist historians George Vernadsky and N. S. Trubetsk.oi. See 
in this connection: N. S. Trubetzkoy, The Legacy ofGenghis Khan and Other Essays on Russia's Identity 
(USA: Ann AIbor 1991). 
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experience was their expansion beyond the natural borderline of the North Caucasus mountain chain down 
towards the Wlstable border area of the Transcaucasus. The Caucasus as a whole had traditionally formed a 
border area between empires rather than an integrnl element of them~ local resistance and environmental 
conditions had deterred even the Arab conquest.43 The Caucasus mountain chain differed markedly from 
the natural biosphere of the Inner Eurasian plain. the latter being so strongly characterized by the three 
dominant terrain elements of forest, tundra and steppe. In contrast to the fur trade of Eastern Siberia, no 
natural economic magnet existed here to dmw Russian settlers southwards independent of the central 
government's desires. Russian forces became involved in the Tra.nscaucasus not from any desire to protect 
economic migrants but from a combination of a desire to assist their coreligionists in Georgia alongside 
balance-of-power considerations in regard to the European political scene of the day. 44 
Russian expansion into Asia therefore, whilst it owed much to the growing technological gap 
between Europe and Asia at the time, was also destined to be very much shaped by the enormous individual 
difficulties the Russian state faced in subjugating and ruling the Caucasus. The Caucasus in many ways 
formed an obstacle to further expansion of a type that other, overseas, empires, did not encounter-hence the 
recurrence in Russian strategic thought of the image of the Caucasus as a bridge or window to Asia.45 
Russia Wlderwent the longest sustained struggle for superiority over a foreign, Islamic population 
experienced by any European colonizing power-62 years as opposed to the French 26-year war to subjugate 
Algeria46 and the British 42-year experience in achieving military dominance in India (1757-1799).47 The 
43 The Arab Empire did however lay the roots for the subsequent Islamization of the North Caucasus: Anna 
Zelldna, In Quest for God and Freedom. The Sufi Response to the Russian Advance in the North Caucasus 
(London: Hurst & Company 2000) pp.26-32. For a survey of the Arab conquests by a military historian 
well qualified by practical experience to assess them, see: Lt-General 1. B. Glubb, The Great Arab 
Conquests (London: Hodder & Stoughton 1%3) 
44 Christian, A History of Russia, Central Asia and Mongolia. Volume 1: Inner Eurasia from Prehistory to 
the Mongol Empire pp.4-16 and D. Lieven, Empire. The Russian Empire and its Rivals (London: John 
Murray 2000) pp.212-14. On the essential pre-nineteenth century legacy of Russian policy in the Caucasus, 
see also: M. Khodarkovsky, 'Of Christianity, Enlightenment, and Colonialism: Russia in the North 
Caucasus, 1550-1800.' JMH 71(1999) pp.394-430. 
45 la. T. Starapuu, 'Kavkazskii Vopros vo vzgliadakh i deiatel'nosti D.AMiliutina.' VMU 3 (1998) p.7S 
See also below, Section 2.2, views of D. I. Romanovskii. 
46 A N. Kuropatkin, Zadachi Russkoi Armii Tom ll. (St Petersburg: Sklad V. A Berezovskogo, 
Kommissionera voenno-uchebnykh zavedenii 1910) pp.74-5 
47 1757 Battle ofPlassey, 1799 Battle of Seringapatam and death ofTipu Sultan. The British fought two 
further main wars in India, the First and Second Sikh Wars, in the 18408, but these can be seen as further 
wars of annexation rather than as wars to ensure actual military and governmental survival. The Great 
Mutiny (1856-7) did of course offer a significant challenge to the British system and underlined the need 
for governmental reform. However, in no sense did Britain's conflicts in India in the nineteenth century 
extreme duration of this struggle can be attributed both to the skill of the mountaineer resistance, 
particularly under the Muridlmam Shamil (1796-1871), and to the inadequacies of the Russian army in 
responding to local terrain, climate and culture. The combination of fanatical Muslim resistance and 
difficult mountain terrain led Proconsul Ennolov's Chief of Staff, General Vel'iaminov, to liken the 
Caucasus to a fortress, which had to be closely and carefully invested.48 Despite this flash of strategic 
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insight in 1828, Russian efforts continued to be hampered by a lack of system and a desire to achieve swift 
results. The appointment by Nicholas I of Prince M. S. Vorontsov, one of his most trusted advisors, to the 
new post of Viceroy of the Caucasus with full civil and military authority in 1844 marked the beginning of 
Russian governmental recognition that the Caucasus required a specialized military and political 
approach.49 However Vorontsov's tenure began disastrously with one of the severest defeats to Russian 
arms, the Dargo Campaign of 1845, in which Russian columns having attacked positions the enemy had 
already abandoned were continually harassed and sniped at during a long and bloody retreat. 50 Russian 
match the sustained intensity of the eighteenth, particularly as European competition within the theatre (the 
French) was no longer a factor. 
4811ris expression became famous in subsequent nineteenth-century Russian military literature and was 
used to describe the 'correct' method of subjugating the Caucasus. Twentieth century scholars have gone 
on to use it to sum up the Russian approach. See: A. A. Vel'iaminov, 'Sposob uskorit' pokorenie gortsev 
(Memoriia generat-leitenant Vel'iaminov, predstavlennaia v 1828-m gody).' KS 7 (1883), fIP.67-77. N. Sh. 
'General Vel'iaminov i ego znachenie dlia istorii kavkazskoi voiny.' KS 7 (1883) pp.I-155. 
49 In his biography of Vorontsov, L. H. Rhinelander stresses throughout that it was Vorontsov's special 
relationship of trust to the Tsar that allowed such a significant devolution of power: L. H. Rhinelander, 
Prince Michael Vorontsov. Viceroy to the Tsar. (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press 1990). Moshe 
Gammer argues however that Vorontsov 'was ... well aware that the emperor did not particularly trust him 
and like him.' Moshe Gammer, Muslim Resistance to the Tsar: Shamil and the Conquest ofChechnia and 
Daghestan. (London: Frank Cass & Co.Ltd. 1994) p.210. Gammer however offers no more details to 
substantiate this claim. 
50 Baddeley, The Conquest of the Caucasus remains a set text on Russian wars in the Caucasus at this time. 
Moshe Gammer's Muslim Resistance to the Tsar offers a more modern account based on a greater array of 
sources but remains indebted to the earlier work. For a particular focus on Dargo from the British 
perspective, see M. Gammer, 'Vorontsov's 1845 Expedition against Shamil: A British Report.' C4S 4 
(4,1985) fIP.13-33. Amongst Russian accounts of the Caucasus War, undoubtedly two of the most 
outstanding are also amongst those most recently published. The work ofM. M Bliev and V. V. Degoev, 
Kavkazskaia Voina (Moscow: "Roset" 1994) represents the fruits of over ten years of research. The 
dazzling work ofN. I. Pokrovskii meanwhile, Kavkazskie Voiny i lmamat Shamilia (Moscow: Rosspen 
2000) is a much older work, dating back in first draft to the 1930&, but not published during Pokrovskii's 
lifetime due to political considerations. In the Tsarist period the most thorough and detailed account of the 
conflict was without question that ofN. F. Dubrovin: Istoriia vo;ny i vladychestva russkikh na Kavkaze. 
(St. Petersburg: TipografiiaDepartament Udelov/ V. A Berezovskogol I. N. Skhorokhodova 1871-86) T.l-
6. 
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losses on this occasion came to 4,000 men, including 3 generals and 200 officers, giving some impression 
of just how costly this type of warfare could become. 51 
Amongst the sharpest critics of Russian policy in the Caucasus in the 1840s were D. A Miliutin, 
the future Minister of War, and N. N. Murav'ev, the future governor-general of Eastern Siberia. Both men 
were serving in the Caucasus line at the time. Miliutin stressed that conditions in the Caucasus demanded a 
tactical emphasis on fortifying heavily contested terrain whilst showing greater political respect for local 
Muslim customs and rituals. 52 Prince Bariatinskii, a childhood friend of the future Alexander II who on his 
appointment to Viceroy of the Caucasus in 1856 made Miliutin his Chief of Staff, shared these views. 
Utilizing his special relationship with the Emperor to the full, Bariatinskii carried out a campaign of 
military and political reform that within a remarkably short space of time (1856-9) brought victory to 
Russian arms and the capture of Shamil himself. In the process he influenced both the reforms Miliutin was 
later to carry out in the army as a whole and a generation of officers looking to further Tsarist expansion in 
Central Asia. Prominent amongst these officers was D. I. Romanovskii, a general who both wrote on the 
Caucasus and took part in the early campaigns in Central Asia as a reliable protege of Miliutin, by then 
War Minister. 
The war in the Caucasus did not end entirely with Shamil's submission however; resistance in the 
western half of the theatre continued after Bariatinskii' s departure as Viceroy in 1862, leading eventually to 
one of the largest exoduses of people to occur before the twentieth century. The vast majority of the 
Circassian population departed for the Ottoman Empire, to be replaced by Russian settlers, a peace 
settlement being concluded in 1864. At least 400, 000 Circassians, and more than a million individuals in 
all, departed Russian shores. 53 The Circassians remained a powerful hostile diaspora who would continue to 
51 Paul B. Henze, 'Fire and Sword in the Caucasus: The 19th Century Resistance of the North Caucasian 
Mountaineers.' CAS 2 (1,1983) p.19. Gammer considers 1843 to have been Sbamil's most effective year of 
campaigning against the Russians, Shamil having married technology to his own guerrilla tactics to cost the 
Russians 2,620 casualties, 27 guns, 2, 152 muskets, 13,816 shells, 35,000 bullets, 368 armories and 
hundreds of horses. Gammer, Muslim Resistance to the Tsar p.I46. 
52 The memoranda of D. A Miliutin, in particular that of 1854, 'Thoughts on the Means for the 
Establishment of Russian Domination in the Caucasus' drew the attention of Prince Bariatinskii and led 
directly to Miliutin later being appointed Bariatinskii's Chief of Staff. See: Dr. Robert F. Baumann, 
Russian-Soviet Unconventional Wars in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Afghanistan. (Ft. Leavenworth, 
Kansas: Leavenworth Papers No. 20 1993) p.26 andP. A Zaionchkovskii, 'Biograficheskii Ocherk' in 
Dnevnik D. A. Miliutina Tom I. (Moscow: Gosudarstvennaia ordena lenina biblioteka SSSR 1949) p.l 0 
53 Paul B. Henze, 'Fire and Sword in the Caucasus: The 19th Century Resistance of the North Caucasian 
Mountaineers.' A'.34-5 and his 'Circassia in the Nineteenth Century. The Futile Fight for Freedom.' In: 
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raid the Russian border and provide irregular cavalry for Russia's main enemy, Turkey, particularly in the 
war of 1877-78. Visible symbols of this exile could still be seen until very recent times in the Circassian 
bodyguard of the royal house of Jordan, who retained their traditional 'Cossack' style of dress (the 
Cossacks having of course adopted their own uniform from that of their Muslim opponents). Bariatinskii's 
career, meanwhile, was on the wane following Shamil's capture; a marriage disapproved of by the court 
and the lack of any obvious peacetime post for a soldier who now held the highest military rank in the 
Russian empire led to a frustIating limbo in his fortunes. The course of military reform undertaken by 
Miliutin after 1862 led to a break between Bariatinskii and Miliutin that eventually became one of the most 
infamous and bitter bureaucratic feuds oflate nineteenth century Russian history. However, Bariatinskii's 
concerted attack on Miliutin's reforms at the strategic conference of 1873 led to the defeat of his party. 
Most have interpreted this feud as a result of bureaucratic rivalry- Bariatinskii being jealous of Miliutin's 
overarching powers as War Minister. Bariatinskii sought a staff organization on the Prussian model with an 
independent Chief of Staff reporting directly to the sovereign- a role for which he himself was the most 
obvious suitable candidate. Others have attributed this dispute to personal differences between the two 
men. 54 Bariatinskii died in 1879 still alienated from the court, having never found another active role to 
match that of his period as Viceroy of the Caucasus. 
Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, Gilles Vmstein, S. E. Wimbush (eds.) Turco-Tatar Past. Soviet Present 
(Paris: Editions Peeters and Editions de 1 'Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales 1986) p.273. 
Shamil himself had earlier engaged in population transfers in order to create an area of 'scorched earth' 
between himself and the Russians: Gammer, Muslim Resistance to the Tsar p.150 and Baddeley, The 
Russian Conquest of the Caucasus pp.444-45. A Ph.D dedicated to this whole subject, unseen by the 
present author at the time of writing, is Marc Pinson, 'Russian Expulsion of Mountaineers from the 
Caucasus, 1856-66 and Its Historical Background-Demographic Warfare-An Aspect of Ottoman and 
Russian Policies, 1854-66.' Unpub. Ph.D. diss. (Harvard University 1970.) See also V. V. Popov, 
'Imperator Aleksandr II: " .. delo polnogo zavoevaniia Kavkaza blizko uzhe k okonchaniiu.'" VlZh 6 
(1995) pp.71-77; Alan Fisher, 'Emigration of Muslims from the Russian Empire after the Crimean War' 
JGO 35 (1987) pp.356-371and Brian Glyn Williams, 'Hirja and forced migration from nineteenth-century 
Russia to the Ottoman Empire. A critical analysis of the Great Tatar emigration of 1860-1861' CMR 4111 
(2000): 79-108. 
54 Zisserman, Bariatinskii's biographer, believed the Bariatinskii-Miliutin conflict to be essentially a 
personal, not a political issue. A. L. Zisserman. Fel'dmarshal kniaz' Aleksandr Ivanovich Bariatinskii. 
1815-1879. Tom III (Moscow: Universitetskaia tipografia, 1890) p.208. The cause of the dispute has also 
been dealt with by Rieber in Alfred J. Rieber (ed.), The Politics of Autocracy: Letters of Alexander II to 
Prince Bariatinskii 1857-64 (Paris: Mouton & Co. 1966) p.68. More recently Gudrun Persson has come 
down on the side of the personal factor in the cause of the feud, arguing that Miliutin's pursuit of a French 
model in his reforms was essentially pragmatic. She also points out that the Prussian 'alternative' did not 
imply an independent Chief-of-Staffat the time of Miliutin's taking up the post of War Minister. Gudron 
Persson, 'The Russian Army and Foreign Wars 1859-1871' Unpub.Ph.D. diss. (London School of 
Economics and Political Science, 1999) pp.52-55. See also Menning, Bayonets before Bullets pp.I5-16. 
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Russian infringement on Central Asia had begun seriously in the early 1850s but had been set 
back by the Crimean War. 55 In the early 1860s the Russian border was still troubled by raiding parties from 
the independent khanates of Khiva, Kokand and Bukhara, with the occasional abduction of Russian settlers 
to serve the Central Asian slave trade proving a pu1icular source of aggravation. The decision in February 
1863 to close a gap that had developed between the Syr-Darya and West Siberian frontier lines was 
intended to provide some solution to this problem, in the form of a finn border. However, the actions of a 
local soldier, Major-General MG. Chemiaev, in then going on to annex Chimkent and Tashkent, parts of 
the Kokandian khanate, in 1864 and 1865, respectively, created the conditions for further strategic debate. 
Though his actions did not meet the complete approval of all his contemporaries, Cherniaev was applauded 
and urged on by his personal friend at the time, Colonel V. A. Poltoratskii, the latter then serving as the 
first head of the Asiatic Department of the General Staff. Cherniaev would later invite Poltoratskii to join 
him and help develop a new administration for the territories he had helped annex.56 Although Cherniaev 
was subsequently relieved of his post as military governor following his failure to take the Bukharan town 
ofDzhizak, being replaced by D. I. Romanovskii in 1866, a significant section of the Russian policy-
making administration, most notably Miliutin himself, now favoured taking a firmer line in Central Asia. 
Romanovskii continued the conflict with Bukhara begun by Chemiaev, and governmental realization of the 
need for a more organized administration in this expanding new province of 'Turkestan' led in 1866 to the 
Recently David Rich has argued that the Russian Main Staff, whilst French in form, was adopting Prussian 
methods and becoming an agency of independent command within two decades of its creation. This implies 
those alleged differences in the Russian staff over 'French' or 'Prussian' systems were a mirage: Rich, The 
Tsar's Colonels p.67. Obruchev's most recent biographer, meanwhile, has attributed the cause of the 
Bariatinskii-Miliutin feud to changes in Miliutin's own views, implying that Miliutin once in office became 
overly defensive of his own authority as War Minister. Airapetov, Zabytaia lear 'era "Russkogo Mol 'tke" 
Ps %~oUgh full of lively prejudices and deeply controversial in its own day, M. A. Terent' ev's history of 
the Russian conquest of Central Asia remains unrivaled up to the present in its depth of detail: M A. 
Terent'ev, Istoriia zavoevanie Srednei Azii s kartami i planami (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia V.v. Komarova 
1906) T.I-4. The work of A G. Serebrennikov meanwhile represents a dense collection of documents on 
Russian policy in the area compiled on the suggestion of War Minister Kuropatldn. Unfortunately the 
chronology of the published series only runs up until the mid-l860s., but it remains nonetheless an 
invaluable source. A. G. Serebrennikov (ed.), Sbornik materialov diia istorii zavoevaniia Turkestanskogo 
krai (Tashkent: Tipografiia Shtaba Turkestanskogo Voennogo Okruga 1908-1915) T.I-10. In the Western 
historiography, see: R Pierce, Russian Central Asia, 1867-1917: A Study in Colonial Rule (Berkeley, 
California: University of California Press 1960) and D. MacKenzie, The Lion of Tashkent. The Career of 
General M G. Cherniaev (Athens: University of Georgia Press 1974). In Russian meanwhile, the modem 
workofN. A. Khalfin,Prisoedinenie SredneiAzii kRossii (60-9O-egodyXIXv.) (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo 
"NAUKA" Glavnaia RMaktsiia Vostochnoi Literatury 1965) is essential. 
56 MacKenzie, The Lion of Tashkent. pp.31, 52. 
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creation of the Steppe Commission. Amongst the members of this body was A P. Protsenko (1836-19?), an 
army officer who would go on to gain the unique distinction of twice serving as head of the Asiatic 
Department of the General Staff. Having up until this point been attached as a staff officer to the West 
Siberian military district, Protsenko's service on the Steppe Commission would appear to mark the 
beginning of his rise to prominence as one of Russia's most trusted and experienced officers on Asiatic 
affairs.57 In 1867 as a result of this body's council the governor-genemlship of Turkestan was created, and 
the first Govemor-Geneml, K. P. fon Kaufman, despatched with extensive civil and military powers much 
on the model of Vorontsov and Bariatinskii in the Caucasus. Kaufman concluded the war with Bukbara in 
1868, leading to that khanate becoming a protectorate of the Russian Empire, but remained dissatisfied by 
his relations with Khiva. A camplign against that khanate however, situated near an oasis within miles of 
barren desert, required better lines of communication, and to this end a port at Krasnovodsk on the eastern 
bank of the Caspian was built in 1869. This enabled forces from the Caucasus to participate in campligns 
in CentIal Asia, a situation which caused considerable worry to the British in India, by now concerned at 
the growing proximity of the Russian border to northern Afghanistan. Kaufman's camplign against Khiva 
in 1873 resulted in the fall of the city itself and the establishment of that khanate as a second protectorate. 
Continued unrest within the Kokand khanate meanwhile, disintegrating internally even before the Russians 
arrived, resulted in its complete absorption into Turkestan in 1875, and Kokand vanished from the map. 
However the Turlanen of the Akhal-Tekke oasis to the south continued to cause concern by their raids, and 
the Caucasus command under the Grand Duke Mikhail Nikolaevich undertook its own campaign to 
subjugate these traditional tribal nomads. The initial campaign by Geneml Lomakin against Denghil-Tepe 
in 1879 (also known by the name of the acljoining fort, Geok-Tepe) resulted in the worst failure Russian 
arms encountered in Central Asia, due to an insufficient care for supplies and tactical errors during the 
siege. In particular, in the eyes of contemporaries, Lomakin ignored 'a maxim in Caucasian warfare' -that of 
always leaving a line of escape open to a besieged opponent Russian losses were around 450 men, 
Turkmen losses almost 4,000.58 It was left to one of Kauftnan's most brilliant proteges, General M D. 
57 Narbaev, Rossiia i Evraziia pp.114-115. 
58 Marvin, The Eye-Witnesses Account ... pp.224, 268-9. The battle was notable for the vast expenditure of 
ammunition on the Russian side: two hundred rockets, five hundred shot and shell, and two hundred and 
forty six thousand rounds of ball cartridge. 
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Skobelev, to complete the conquest of Geok-Tepe the following year, in a campaign in which General 
A. N. Kuropatkin, the future Minister of War, took part as his Chief of Staff. The visit of a deputation of 
Turkmen elders to the spectacular coronation ceremony of Alexander III in 1883 and the personal efforts of 
officers Komarov and Alikhanov in negotiations at Merv led to the submission of the remaining Turkmen 
tribes to the Russian empire without further bloodshed. 59 
The Anglo-Indian government in British India meanwhile was increasingly concerned by the 
advancing Russian frontier in Central Asia Having witnessed the failure of its attempts by political intrigue 
to form a bastion from the Turkmen tribes to the Russians, Lord Rippon's Indian administration granted an 
annual subsidy of 1, 200, 000 rupees to the Amir of Afghanistan, 'Abd aI-Rahman, to modernize his army 
and fortify the border of northern Afghanistan. In 1885 the collision of Russian forces under General 
Komarov with Afghan troops by the river Kushk (cause of the so-called 'Penjdeh Incident') formed the last 
major clash of arms encountered during Russian expansion in Central Asia. 
Anglo-Russian political tension in Asia continued however, and across this period three reported 
troop concentrations in Central Asia caused particular concern. In 1878 three columns had been 
concentrated in Turkestan by General Kaufman in what was assumed, in the wake of the Stoletov mission 
to Kabul, to be a prelude to a Russian military advance.60 The British launched the Second Afghan War by 
way of a preemptive strike, and the Amir they deposed, Shir Ali Khan, sought Russian protection. The 
British could not settle the country any more than any other invader in its history however, and retired 
leaving their own representative, 'Abd ai-Rahman, on the throne, subsidizing that ruler in return for 
controlling Afghanistan's foreign policy. Ironically' Abd ai-Rahman was himself originally an agent of 
Russian foreign policy, having originally entered re-entered Afghanistan after a comfortable 12-year period 
of residence in Russian-held Samarkand, funded on his return by a Russian subsidy and Russian rifles. His 
defection once in Afghanistan to the British cause was still bitterly referred to by one Russian as a 'dark 
59 For an official history of these campaigns, see: N. I. Grodekov, Voina v Turkmenii (T.I-4) (St. 
Petersburg: Tipografiia V. S. Balasheva 1883-4). The best modem summary of this whole process remains 
M. N. Tikhomirov, Prisoedinenie Merva kRossii (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Vostochnoi Literatury 1960) but 
see also M. Saray, The Turkmens in the Age o/Imperia/ism: A Study o/the Turkmen People and Their 
Incorporation into the Russian Empire (Ankara: Turkish Historical Printing House Society 1989). 
60 Prince A. Lobanov-Rostovsky, 'The Shadow of India in Russian History' History XIV (1930) p.222 
page' of Russian foreign policy in the area over twenty years later.61 In 1888-8920,000 troops were 
reported to be moving in Central Asia in connection with the security crisis created by the Amir (see 
below) and in 1905 reports of Russian manoeuvres in the aftermath of the Dogger Bank episode again 
caused alarm in British circles. 
In the 1890s Russian influence again stretched forward into the Pamirs, military scouting parties 
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causing further Anglo-Russian diplomatic friction and leading to a further border delimitation in 1895 that 
granted Russia influence over part of Badakhshan. Here again the military played a significant role in the 
policy-making process. At a conference on the Pamirs question held in January 1892, Colonel Protsenko, 
head of the Asiatic Department of the General Staff at the time, presented a report arguing Russia's right to 
extend its influence into the Pamirs region. By the end of the conference however the military were talked 
down from dispatching significant forces there, limiting themselves to the activity of the aforementioned 
Cossack mounted patrols whilst keeping a larger force of 400 Cossacks, four guns and a battalion of 
infantry in reserve. According to the deputy minister of the MID at the time, War Minister Vannovskii 
complained that the General Staff's Asiatic Department was supporting the Tu.rlrestan governor-general in a 
forward policy against the wishes of the War Ministty as a whole.62 
Throughout this period however local rulers also played a more significant role than bas 
previously been thought The whole of north Afghanistan was in fact historically contested terrain between 
the Bukharan and Afghan ruling dynasties, a contest prone to become three-sided with frequent Persian 
intervention, as occurred with the invasion of Nadir Shah in the eighteenth century. More recently in regard 
to the period under present review, in 1818 the Bukharan Emir bad again annexed Balkh on the left bank of 
the Amu-Darya, that town during the reign of the Bukharan Astrakhaniddynasty (1599-1756) having 
formed the second capital of the Bukharan emirate. Bukharan power retained a purely token local political 
presence however, and the following seventy years were marked by the gradual conquest and annexation of 
this northern region by the Afghan Amirs, beginning with the reign of Dost Mohammed onwards. The 
61 P. A. Rittikh, Avganskii Vopros' (voenno-geograficheskii i politicheskii etiudy) (St. Petersburg: 
Tipografiia Sbtaba Voisk Gvardii i Peterburgskago Voennago Okruga 1905) p.1S. For practically the only 
open discussion of these events from the Tsarist period, see A. A. Semenov, '''Begstvo'' Abdur-Rakhman-
khana iz Tashkentav Afganistan' in: Kaufmanskii Sbornik, izdannyi v pamiat' 25 let', istekshikh so dnia 
smerti pokoritelia i ustroitelia Turkestanskago kraia General-ad'iutanta K. P.fon-Kaufmana i-go. 
(Moscow: Tipo-litografiia T-va I. N. Kushnerev 1910) pp.l00-117. 
imperial policies of both Russia and Britain were in many ways shaped by the actions of local rulers 
pursuing this 'Ancient Supremacy. ,63 This would lead to dramatic population shifts still felt in Central 
Asian politics today. Britain, pursuing the 'Alexandrine chimera' of a frontier on the Oxus (the ancient 
name for the Amu-Darya), supported the claims of the Afghan Durrani dynasty under the Amir 'Abd al-
Rahman to Balkh, or 'Afghan Turkestan. ' Historically however the governors of the lands immediately 
north of the Hindu Kush range were Uzbeks and the population more Uzbek, Tadjik and Turkmen than 
Afghan. In the 1880s Rahman's state policy of 'Afghanization' of the northern territories via the mass 
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transfer of literally thousands of families created administrative chaos and led directly to the rebellion led 
by his cousin, and sardar of these territories, Ishaq Khan. Although Ishaq Khan allegedly sought Russian 
sponsorship-the Russians having already had experience of northern Afghanistan's divided loyalties from 
General Komarov's dealings with the locals64 -no solid aid materialized and the revolt was crushed in short 
order.65 The purge then carried out under Rahman against the last remnants of the (Uzbek) Chingizid 
dynasty of Balkh led to thousands dying by torture and execution, and pressure from refugees fleeing this 
reign of terror fell upon the Russian frontier. The Tsar angrily denied supporting the Amir's rivals while 
62 Koot, 'The Asiatic Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry and the Foundation of Policy toward the 
Non-Western World, 1881-1895.' pp.406-19. 
631. L. Lee, 'The Ancient Supremacy' Bukhara, Afghanistan and the Battlefor Ballch, 1731-1901 (Leiden 
New York: E.1.Brill Borders 1996) offers the best English-language overview of this complex nexus of 
local and imperial interests. On the historical background see pp.14-91. On British policy pp.142-75, 599. 
For an excellent Russian study incorporating both English and Russian source material, see the candidate 
dissertation ofN. I. Semenova, 'Zavoevanie Afgantsami 1evoberezh'ia Amu-Dar'i v 30-80-ykh g.g. XIX 
veka' Dissertatsiia na soiskanie uchenoi stepeni kandidata istoricheskii nauk (Moscow: Institut 
Vostokovedeniia Akademii Nauka SSSR 1951). For a brief survey of one of the local nationalities 
involved, see: Kh. Khashimbekov, Uzbeld SevernogoAfganistana (Moscow: RAN Institut Vostokovedeniia 
1994). 
64 As well as from their own diplomatic history, the Russians having received a friendly diplomatic greeting 
from the independent Khan ofBalkh as early as the seventeenth century: Lobanov-Rostovsky, 'The 
Shadow oflndia ... ' pp.219-20. 
65 George Curzon, later Viceroy of India but at this time travelling through Central Asia, was unable at first 
to meet Colonel Alikhanov as this officer was engaged in intelligence work in northern Afghanistan. 
Curzon noted that the Russian press had 'the most exaggerated and fantastic estimates of the Afghan 
Pretender's chances of success. These reports were so absurdly biased as to leave no doubt, not merely that 
Is-hak [sic] Khan had the clandestine sympathy of the Russian Government, but that he was publicly 
regarded as the Russian candidate to the Afghan throne ... what I afterward heard at Tashkent made it clear 
that there was a considerable massing of Russian troops upon the Afghan border, and that a forward 
movement must even have been contemplated. ' G. N. Curzon, Russia in Central Asia (London: Longmans, 
Green & Co. 1889) pp.122-4. 
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accusing Rahman of threatening the whole security of the region, and Britain had to ask the Amir to back 
down from any collision with the Russian forces reportedly massing on the border. 66 
The annexation of part ofBadakhshan to Russian influence after 1895 in tum led to equally savage 
persecution of the local Isma'ili population by the Bukharan Sunni regime until Russia was driven by a 
Pamiri revolt in 1904-5 to assume direct administrative responsibility for this remote region 67 The Isma'ilis 
remained a source of concern however in that they owed their allegiance to the Aga Khan. widely seen at 
this time as a British puppet Diplomatically however, European events pushed Britain and Russia into 
more or less settling their differences, a course culminating in the Anglo-Russian convention of 1907. 
The Russian army had gained extensive experience in conquering and ruling Asiatic possessions 
by the tum of the century therefore, though its policies were to be severely challenged by the Central Asian 
revolt of 1916. Expansion in both the Caucasus and Central Asia was complemented by the gaining of new 
commitments in the Far East, where the combined efforts of Governor-Geneml N. N. Murav' ev and N. P. 
Ignat'ev, the Russian diplomatic envoy to Peking, led to the Russian border with China moving 
dramatically southward to the Amur river. Here Russia absorbed seveml hundred thousand square miles of 
new territory, gaining a riverine boundary that led to the sea and antagonizing China just as she was slowly 
beginning to emerge from over a decade of civil war. The development of a Russian rail route across 
Siberia by the 189Os, and in particular the creation of the Chinese Eastern Railroad, a Russian railway line 
crossing Chinese Manchuria along a strip of land demarcated as extraterritorial, would raise the prospect 
before long of Russia potentially annexing the whole of northern Manchuria. What lessons therefore, both 
tactical and strategic, did the army and the Geneml Staff's Asiatic Department in particular learn and seek 
to re-apply from this whole experience? To what extent were Russia's European and Asiatic military 
commitments balanced by the Russian army and how far did the army's involvement and activities in these 
regions contribute to geographical and scientific knowledge as a whole? Only a detailed study of the Tsarist 
66 Lee, 'The Ancient Supremacy'p.564 The abuses of Rahman's reign carried out in the name of 'state 
modernization' were justified by Rahman by reference to his favourite historical character, Peter the Great. 
Lee, by far the foremost recent chronicler of this period, has summed up Rahman's state policies generally 
as more 'garrotte and stick' than 'carrot and stick': Lee, 'The Ancient Supremacy' p.526. 
67 L. N. Khariukov, Anglo-Russkoe Sopernichestvo v Tsentral 'noi Azii i Ismailizm. (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo 
Moskovskogo Universiteta 1995) 1'1'.102-3. B. I. Iskandarov Iz istorii Bukharskogo emirata (vostochnaia 
Bukhara i zapadnyi Pamirv kontseXIX veka) (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Vostochnoi Literatury 1958) pp.105-
126. 
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army's Asiatic experience and the response of staff officers to it can answer such questions. The 
administrative and analytical tools available to the Russian state on the eve of its Central Asian conquests 
form the substance of the next chapter. 
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2. mE GRAND STRATEGY OF EXPANSION. 1714-1885. 
2.1 Ideas, Institutions and PersonneL 
The three years in the Staff College were one 
uninterrupted string of examinations: solving of 
tactical problems, mapping, sketching, etc. The 
things one was supposed to know and remember 
were appalling; all the details of the important 
battles, from Alexander the Great's campaigns to 
the modern wars, all the organisation of the 
different European annies, etc. But the worst 
were statistics. l 
Until the nineteenth century, Russian strategic planning towards the East, both military and 
administrative, lacked any outstanding proponents or sponsors within Russian governmental policy-
making. The reasons for this were twofold First, there was still the absolute dominance of the ruling 
monarch in decision-making, a position not significantly challenged till the 1860s. Thus, the expeditions 
mounted by Peter the Great to the AmI and Caspian Seas and the disastrous expedition to Khiva in 1714-17 
came about, it has been suggested, largely through the personal interest of the Tsar as a mercantilist in 
exploration and expanding trade.2 Such interest could wax and wane fairly rapidly, as it did after Peter's 
death, though it could prove temporarily very influential. As late as 1801 Russian troops could still be 
dispatched on a suicidal mission to invade India purely on the personal whim of Paul 1.3 
The second factor restricting the capacity of Asiatic interests to create a fracture in strategic 
decision making was the presence of unified strategic councils, in which the interests and advice of the 
various military and diplomatic groups of the administration were regularly reconciled in a single body. 
1 Polovtsoff [Polovtsov], Glory and Downfall. Reminiscences of a Russian General Staff Officer p.48. 
2 Alton S. Donnelly, 'Peter the Great and Central Asia' CSP 17 (1975) pp.202-17. Evgenii V. Anisimov & 
John T. Alexander (ttans.), The Reforms of Peter the Great. Progress Through Coercion in Russia 
(Annonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe 1993) pp.255-263. 
3 For a summary of these events using contemporary records, see: Lt. Colonel Batorskii, 'Proekt ekspeditsii 
v Indiiu, predlozhennykh' Napoleonom Bonaparte imperatoram Pavlu i Aleksandru I v 1800 i v 1807-1808 
godakh.' SGTSMAXXID (1886) pp.l-l04. 
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Such emergency conferences were a vital factor in Russia's eighteenth-century imperial successes. These 
two conditions-Tsar and konferentsiia- served, in practice, to concentrate government attention and military 
affairs to the west, to the absorption of Poland and the Ukraine, and Paul's schemes on India were in fact a 
good indicator of that particular monarch's own madness, the cause of his subsequent assassination. 
Below the level of strategic decision-making however, Peter's incursions to the East, however 
militarily disastrous, did start a trend towards oriental studies (vostokovedenie) in Russian cultural circles, 
and V. V. Bartol' d (1869-1930), perhaps the greatest Russian exponent of this science, dated its beginnings 
to this period.4 In particular it was from this time, through the journeys of Russian travellers, the Russo-
Turkish wars, the Persian expedition of 1721-22 and the mediation of Russian envoys that Russia began to 
acquire a significant stock of manuscripts in eastern languages, many kept in Peter's 'Room of Rarities. ' 
However, Peter's interest in eastern affairs grew out not so much through Muscovy's traditional links to 
Muslim states as through his own 'Westernization' project for Russia- 'Peter tried to understand the Orient 
in tenns ofWestemEurope,5. Through the efforts of scholars such as Professor Georg -lakobKer (1692-
1740) and Vasilii Kirillovich Trediakovskii (1703-69) Russia by mid-century had translations of many 
important eastern texts, including the Koran, either from the original or from other (European) translations. 6 
Ker sought the creation of an Asiatic Academy, a theme to be taken up, again unsuccessfully, by future 
Minister of Education S. S. Uvarov in 1810. Ker wanted academy-trained orientalists to be part of every 
Russian mission to both the East and Europe, to acquire manuscripts. He linked the proposal to create the 
academy with a plan for the Russian conquest of Turkey and Central Asia- an early indication of how the 
Russian quest for knowledge and rationalization of the unknown often tied itself to military instruments for 
its attainment Peter's reign also saw the extension of Russian contacts further east, the dispatch of two or 
4 B. V. Lunin, Sredniaia Aziia v dorevoliutsionnom i Sovetskom vostokovedenii (Tashkent: Izdaterstvo 
"NAUKA" Uzbekskoi SSR 1965) p.69 
5 Richard N. Frye, 'Oriental Studies in Russia' in Wayne S. Vucinich (ed.), Russia andAsia. Essays on the 
Influence of Russia on the Asian Peoples. (Stanford California: Hoover Institution Press 1972) p.35. A 
useful review of this process with particular reference to Siberia and the peoples of the Arctic North is 
given in: Yuri Slezkine, Arctic Mi"ors. Russia and the Small Peoples of the North. (Ithaca & London: 
Cornell University Press 1994) pp.47-71. 
6 Lunin, SredniaiaAziia v dorevoliutsionnom i Sovetskom vostokovedenii, pp.69-71. 
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three monks to China in 1716 to learn the Chinese and Mongolian languages laying the basis for a 
permanent Russian religious mission in Peking that was also active in scholarly WOrk.7 
Following Peter's death Russian policy towards the East became more static, the reigns of Anna 
Ivanovna and her successor Elizabeth Petrovna being chiefly marked by Christianization campaigns run 
through the 'Commissions of the Newly-Baptized. ' The rule of Catherine the Great however saw a policy 
of more liberal re-engagement with the East allied to a period of renewed imperial expansion. Catherine's 
general policies, in contrast to Peter's, saw a redevelopment of the older Muscovite policy of a 'special 
approach' to the East. Catherine herself saw the eastern half of her empire as a distinct area, requiring a 
different political and administrative approach. Fascinated by the reports of local governors on native 
customs and habits, reports themselves part of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment's fascination with the 
discovery of the 'other', Catherine sought to incorporate her eastern empire not through expulsions and war 
but through an intimate knowledge of local conditions and trade. As a result, she famously embarked on a 
mosque-building program, seeking to replace local tribal loyalties with a wider community loyalty to 
Islam. 8 Her 1773 Edict of Religious Tolerance, recognizing Islam and allowing the free practice of certain 
essential religious rites, set a standard in Russian-Muslim relations that succeeding regimes would respond 
to with varying degrees of compliance. In 1787 the Empress directed the Academy of Science to print a 
complete Arabic text of the Koran, an edition reprinted in 1789,1790,1793,1796 and 1798. By the first half 
of the nineteenth century the number of Korans produced from Russian presses ran into the thousands, 
achieving a wide distribution not only within the Russian Empire but also across the Muslim world as a 
whole.9 In 1788 Catherine also established the first Muslim religious administration at Ufa and in 1794 a 
further 'muftiat' was organized in the Crimea. Montesquieu's belief that peoples were shaped by local 
conditions, requiring accommodation by the central regime, though not shared by all Enlightenment 
figures, would continue to filter through to those Russian nineteenth-century bodies attempting to rule and 
7 Frye, 'Oriental Studies in Russia' p.3S. It was one of the members of this Ecclesiastical Mission, the 
Archimandrite Palladi, who was eventually responsible in the nineteenth century for developing the 
Cyrillic-Chinese transliteration system still in use today. For details on the development of Russian 
Sinolo&v, see: D. Wolff, To the Harbin Station. The LiberalAlternative in Russian Manchuria, 1898-1914. 
(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press 1999) pp.I46-167, 181-190. 
8 On Catherine see Dov B. Yaroshevski, 'Imperial StIate&v in the Kirghiz Steppe in the Eighteenth 
Century.' JGO 39(2,1991) pp.221-224. 
9 Landa, Islam v istorii Rossii p.13S. 
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master the East. Most notably this would influence the Imperial Geographical Society and the Asiatic 
Department of the Russian General Staff. This trend underwent a subtle shift however; from Catherine's 
day, when the Muslim birthrate was seen as advantageous to the Russian Empire, to the last decades of the 
nineteenth century when the large Muslim population came to be regarded as a threatening, potentially 
subversive force. In short, there occurred a shift in the psychological undercurrent from rationalist self-
confident expansionism to a form of strategic paranoia. 
One of the most prominent early nineteenth century bureaucrats following the Catherinian line of 
flexible integration was Mikhail Speranskii, who played a large role in attempting to integrate Russia's 
Asiatic possessions via a unified legal code. Speranskii, from 1819 to 1822 responsible for the 
administration of Siberia, and seated on the Asiatic Committee formed in 182010, incorporated into his law 
codification the Kazakh customary law, or Adat, contained in Khan Tanke's Jhety Jharga. Speranskii's 
reform of 1822 marlced a significant new level of Russian incursion into the Kazakh nomadic way of life, 
attempting to both accommodate and alter that system. The Adat law was maintained in adjudicating 
disputes but Speranskii divided the Kazakh territory up into new administrative districts and attempted to 
encourage the Kazakhs to become sedentary fanners via land incentives. This attempt however created 
difficulties that foreshadowed the later Russian experience in Central Asia; the new administrative 
divisions creating chaos along the traditional migration routes whilst Russian maintenance of local sultan-
administrators bred corruption and local resistance. I I Speranskii' s policy of trying to strike an 
administrative balance of regulation with rather restricted intervention in Siberia has been judged 
'moderately successful' by later historians, but attempts to pursue a similar policy in the Caucasus, Finland 
10 This committee, formed to deal with relations with the Khan ofKhiva and the Ka:mkbs, and chaired by 
the director of the Foreign Ministry's Asiatic Department held session frequently between 1820 and 1824, 
ceasing to meet after 1847 with the subjugation of the Kazakhs. Edward Allworth, 'Encounter.' in E. 
Allworth (ed.), Central Asia. 130 Years of Russian Dominance, A Historical Overview. Third Edition 
(USA: Duke University Press 1994) pp.55-56. 
II Martha Brill Olcott, The Kazakhs. (Stanford, California: Hoover Press 1987) pp.1S, 58-62 and see also 
Yuri Slezkine,A,.dc Mirrors pp.73-92. The attempt to provide a codification oflocallaw was never 
completed, Nicholas I being unwilling to accommodate cultural traditions differing widely from Russia's, 
particularly in the case of Poland. On Speranskii and the law codification see: Marc Raeff, Michael 
Spe,.ansky. Statesman of Imperial Russia. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 1957) pp.320-44 and his earlier 
Siberia and the Reforms of 1822 (Seattle: University of Washington Press 1956). Like Ermolov in the 
Caucasus, Speranskii later came under suspicion in that many of his co-workers proved to be Decembrists. 
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and Central Asia were to prove more problematic.12 At a deeper level however Speranskii' s statute of 1822 
served to pennanently encode in fixed judicial terms the demarcation in terms of rights and privileges 
between the 'inorodtsy' or non-Russians and the 'natural' (prirodnye) inhabitants of the empire. 
Nationalities in the former category thereafter came to be regarded by some through the same type of lens 
with which contemporary Europeans looked at 'Asiatics' as a whole. The inorodtsy became an object of 
considerable scientific and ethnographic curiosity, their study as a distinct group by organizations like the 
Imperial Geographical Society and the Russian General Staff now sanctioned and given further impetus by 
their legally distinct status within the empire. Speranskii's statute therefore marked a fault-line in the longer 
term between the pre-modem and modem Russian visions of the imperial sptee.13 
At the same time, an informal series of contacts between court and army formed a group 
increasingly advocating a firmer Russian policy in the East generally. Minister of Internal Affairs L. A 
Perovskii for example, an important early patron of the generation of bureaucrats who would reform the 
Russian state in the 186Os, long exp-essed concern over the vulnerability of the eastern borderlands whilst 
his younger half-brother, General V. A Perovskii, carried out Russian Central Asian policy on the ground 
itself from the governor-generalship of Orenburg. This relationship undoubtedly led to the Minister 
arranging for one of his recruits, the young vostokoved V. V. Grigor'ev (1818-1881) to serve in Orenburg 
under his brother from 1851 onwards in a series of posts. These ranged from organizer of the campaign 
chancellory for the Kokandian campaign of 1853 to chairman of the Orenburg border commissiOn.14 This 
would be a fair exchange, since Lev Perovskii 's closest assistant, the philologist V. I. Dal', bad entered his 
service after having first served under his younger brother during the Khivan campaign of 1839-40.15 Such 
12 Marc Raeff, 'Patterns of Russian Imperial Policy' in E. Allworth (ed.), Soviet Nationality Problems. 
(New York: Columbia University Press 1971) p.37 
13 Kappeler & Clayton (trans.), The Russian Empire: A Multiethnic History. 1'1'.170-1. The law codification 
marked the culmination of an increasingly complex process by the modem state to classify the difference 
between 'self' and 'other' by a barrage of physical, spiritual, verbal and observational tests; how a 
nationality ate, how they smelt, physical appearance, their attitude to sexual relations and so on. On the 
situation before 1822, see: Yuri Slezkine, 'Naturalists versus Nations: Eighteenth-Century Russian Scholars 
Confront Ethnic Diversity' in Brower & Lazzerini (eds.), Russia's Orient pp. 27-57. 
14 For a highly intelligent analysis of Grigor'ev's mission, set within the framework of modem --day 
'Orientalist' discourse, see: Nathaniel Knight, 'Grigor'ev in Orenburg, 1851-1862: Russian Orientalism in 
the Service of Empire?' SR 59 (1, 2(00) pp.74-100. A debate on Knight's arguments can be found in the 
journal Kritika. Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History under the heading 'Orientalism and Russia': 
Kritika 1 (4,2000) pp.691-727. 
15 W. Bruce Lincoln, In the Vanguard of Reform. Russia's Enlightened Bureaucrats 1825-1861. (DeKalb: 
Northern Illinois University Press, 1982) p.87. 
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arrangements indicate the increasingly sophisticated network: between specialist governmental, military and 
academic institutions in Russian Asiatic affairs of this period. Grigor'ev himself would later cite the 1820s 
as marking a crucial positive turning point in the development of Russian vostokovedenie and Russian 
knowledge of the East in general.16 The key members of the group supporting such developments at a 
governmental level in the Nicholaevan era (1825-1855), advocates of an active policy in both Central Asia 
and the Far East. were the Perovskii brothers, Minister for State Properties Pavel Kiselev, and the future 
head of the Asiatic Department of the Foreign Ministry, E. P. Kovalevskii. This group was united in 
general by a vision of a reformed, rejuvenated Russia, and along the road to this goal, in their eyes, a turn 
away from Europe towards Russia's 'natural' sphere of influence in Asia played a large part. I 7 
The start of the nineteenth century had seen the establishment of a number of Asiatic-orientated 
bureaucratic institutes who were to become competitors for resources with more Western-orientated 
departments as the eighteenth-century legacy of strategic conferences was subsumed to bureaucratic inter-
departmental rivalry from Alexander II's reign onwards. Prominent amongst these developments was the 
granting of total autonomy in 1819 to what had already become a separate department of the old college 
(ministry) of Foreign Affairs in 1797, the Asiatic Department. This innovation was designed to help 
provide a unified administration for Russia's Asiatic possessions, its immediate predecessor having neither 
the cadres, the money nor the experience to deal with Russia's growing involvement in the Near and 
Middle East.IS As well as dealing with mountaineer affairs in the Caucasus and handling correspondence 
regarding relations with the Kazakh Hordes, this department also took under its wing the Ecclesiastical 
Mission in Peking. Such a state of affairs regarding China continued until the formalization of Sino-
Russian diplomatic relations in 1861, after which the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission assumed the purely 
religious function its title implied.19 Sections within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in this period also 
16 S.Y Sop1enkov, Doroga v Arzrum: rossiiskaia obshchestvennaia mysl' 0 Vostoke (pervaia polovinaXlX 
veka). (Moscow: Izdatel'skaia firma "Vostochnaia Literatura" RAN 2000) p.24. 
17 M. Bassin, Imperial Visions. Nationalist Imagination and Geographical Expansion in the Russian Far 
East, 1840-1865 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1999) pp.123-25. 
18 John P. LeDonne, The Russian Empire and the World, 1700-1917 The GeopoliticsoJExpansion and 
Containment (New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press 1997) p.117. M. A Lobyntseva, 'K voprosu 0 
sozdanii Aziatskogo departamenta Ministerstva inostrannykh del Rossii' in N. A Kuznetsova (ed.), Iran 
(Sbornik statei) (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "NAUKA" GlavnaiaRedaktsiia Vostochnoi Literatury 1971) pp.84-
9l. 
19 Koot, 'The Asiatic Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry and the Foundation of Policy toward the 
Non-Western World, 1881-1895.' p.28l. 
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handled the enciphering of correspondence and code-breaking, a task that included the encoding of 
correspondence regarding eastern affairs and Central Asia. This reflected the Foreign Ministry's continued 
dominance in the intelligence field in the first half of the nineteenth centuIy, although by the 1840s the War 
Ministry was also beginning to develop its own codes.20 By its very nature, being a gathering centre of 
orientalists, cartographers, linguists and diplomats, the Asiatic Department of the MID was destined to be 
an important player in Russian eastern policy, as well as an ambiguous partner to the European-orientated 
Russian foreign policy establishment R R Rosen, a Russian diplomat of the period, opined that: 
the Asiatic Department ... was considered, from the social point of view, 
inferior to the Chancellory [but). .. the Balkan Peninsula and Egypt, as 
well as the whole American continent belonged to the domain of this 
department whose very name seemed to indicate ... that after all Asia was 
considered or instinctively felt to be the real and most important field for all 
the activity of Russia's foreign policy. 21 
Given this viewpoint, it is unsurprising that Rosen himself, as a graduate of the Asiatic Department, would 
later come to embody some of the conflicts of interests that members of this establishment could have with 
the main Chancellory. In his memoirs, written after 1917, he recalled that, for him, from an early age: 
two convictions were formed in my min¢ first, that the expansion of the 
Russian Empire on the Continent of Europe had reached its extreme limit 
... and secondly, that the true interests of Russia lay in the development 
of her Siberian Empire and her possessions in Central Asia?2 
The Asiatic Department of the MID was not the only section of that ministry concerned with the 
study of the East by the first half of the nineteenth century. In 1823 the Academic Department of Eastern 
20 T. A Soboleva, Tainopis' v istorii Rossii. (lstoriia lcriptograjicheskoi sluzhby Rossii XVI11- nachale XX 
v.) (Moscow: "Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia" 1994) p.165~7. 
21 R R Rosen, Forty Years of Diplomacy Vol. 1 (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1922) p.1S. See also 
however the recollections of A D. Ka1mykov, who recalled that members of the Turkish and Balkan 
sections within the department' .. considered themselves part of European diplomacy and looked down on 
us who transacted the correspondence within the far away regions of Asia.' AD. Kalmykow (Kalmykov), 
Memoirs of a Russian Diplomat. Outposts of the Empire, 1893-1917 (New Haven & London: Yale 
University Press, 1971) p.19. 
22 R R Rosen, Forty Years of Diplomacy Vol. 1 p.18. (Emphasis added). On Rosen and the Russian foreign 
policy establishment, see also: Lieven, Russia and the Origins of the First World War 1'1'.83-101. 
Languages of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was established, its first director, G. M. Vlangali (1781-
1834), being an expert in the Persian and Turkish languages who had earlier (from 1820) served as first 
translator to the High Commander in Georgia, General A P. Ermolov.23 
The first half of the nineteenth century saw a period of great organization and cataloguing of 
eastern texts through the emergence of new university institutions. Amongst the most important were the 
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Asiatic Museum established by S. S. Uvarov in 1818, based on Tsar Peter's 'Room of Rarities' and headed 
by the Near Eastern expert Kh. D. Fren (1781-1851), the Eastern Department of St. Petersburg University 
(est. 1819), and the Lazarevskii Institute (est. 1815-16) in Moscow. The last was originally a private school 
for Armenians that came to be used for the language training of government officials serving in the 
Transcaucasus. It was also the school at which I. A Zinov'ev (1835-1917), a future head of the Foreign 
Ministry's Asiatic Department, received his first training. All of these developments, a product of the new 
university statute of 1804, marked a significant step forward, both in organization and scientific training, in 
the practice of vostokovedenie as a Russian academic science.24 Academic knowledge continued to advance 
hand-in-hand with Russian arms, the fall of Ardebil to Russian forces in 1828 for instance leading to the 
valuable library in the mosque of that town being sent to St Petersburg. The famous vostokoved Senkovskii 
had already written a memorandum forwarded to Count Paskevich suggesting that such ancient manuscripts 
be part of the war indemnity from the Persians.25 A proposal by Professor Fren that Arabic, Persian and 
Turkish manuscriIXs also be collected from captured Turkish towns led to an equally rich harvest of 
academic material being gained through the assistance of the military arm the following year, during the 
Russo-Turkish war of 1828-29.26 
23 G. F. Kim & P. M Shastitko (eds.), Istoriia Otechestvennogo Vostokovedeniia do serediny XIX veka. 
(Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "NAUKA" Glavnaia Redaktsiia Vostochnoi Literatury 1990) pp.155-56. 
24 Lunin, Sredniaia Aziia v dorevoliutsionnom i Sovetskom vostokovedenii pp.71-2; M S. Kapitsa, 
'Vostokovedenie kak rossiiskaia nauka' VO 1, (1994) p.6. 
25 Baddeley, The Russian Conquest of the Caucasus, p.175, see also pp.198-9. Osip Ivanovich Senkovskii 
(1800-58) professor in eastern languages at St Petersburg University from 1822. For brief notes on his 
character and career see Lunin, SredniaiaAziia v dorevoliutsionnom i Sovetskom vostokovedenii, pp.77-8. 
For details on the acquisition of the Ardebil collection, see: Ill. E. Borshchevskii, 'Istoriia priobreteniia 
ardebil'skogo sobraniia rukopisei Rossiei' in: N. A Khalfin (ed.), Formirovanie gumanisticheskikh traditsii 
otechestvennogo vostokovedeniia (Moscow: Izdatel' stvo "NAUKA" Glavnaia Redaktsiia Vostochnoi 
Literatury 1984) pp.204-217. 
26 M. R. Ryzhenkov, 'Rol' voennogo vedomstva Rossii v nlzvitii otechestvennogo vostokovedeniia v XIX-
nachale XX vv. (Opyt istochnikovedcheskogo issledovaniia dokumentov Tsentral'nogo gosudarstvennogo 
voenno-istoricheskogo arkhiva SSSR)' Dissertatsiia na soiskanie uchenoi stepeni kandidata istoricheskikh 
naule. (Moscow: Institut Vostokovedeniia Akademiia Nauk SSSR 1990) p.95. Although inevitably not fully 
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Russian interest in eastern studies ran parallel with a growing interest in anthropological 
expeditions and the discovery of 'lost civilizations' by Europeans in general, important discoveries being 
made in Egypt, Java and Turkey in the same period. In the process of what one scholar has termed the 
'Oriental Renaissance' of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Russia played a fully active 
role.27 Scientific excitement was mirrored by a cultural growth within the contemporary 'Romantic' genre 
literature in which writers like Goethe and Herder presented the Orient as the exotic and mysterious source 
of all human knowledge. When the future Russian Minister of Education S. S. Uvarov drew up his proposal 
for the establishment of an Oriental Academy in S1. Petersburg in 1810, Goethe was amongst its most 
enthusiastic backers. Uvarov himself, proposing the Academy as one means to make Russia 'the mediatrix 
between European civilization and Asian wisdom', lavished praise on the work of European scholars, 
including the Calcutta Society, German Biblical scholars and the translators of Sanskrit, and made clear 
that he shared their view that the Orient was 'the cradle of all civilization in the universe. ,28 A similar 
desire to celebrate Russia's unique geopolitical position by the acquisition and categorization of its rich 
cultural, ethnographic and archaeological inheritance within a single scientific framework lay behind the 
calls for a 'national museum' that were voiced a few years later. The motivation behind these proposals 
was both patriotic (in the Imperial sense) and cosmopolitan; the petitioners were non-Russians working in 
the Russian bureaucracy, who envisaged a Russian national museum emerging in parallel to a similar pan-
European trend in the development of such institutions elsewhere.29 The French fashion in this period for 
all things Chinese meanwhile, reflected in the term chinoiserie, had its natural Russian counterpart in the 
elite infatuation with kitaishchina. When this European intellectual movement began to move from seeing 
the Orient in general as Herder's 'soil of God' towards a position of contempt towards societies so clearly 
stagnant and decayed, many Russians also followed this trend 30 Nonetheless, in the p-oces:s Russia gained 
comprehensive, Ryzhenkov's work forms the best existing written guide to this particular area of War 
Ministry activity. Significant sections of this work are incorporated into the two-volume Istoriia 
Otechestvennogo Vostokovedeniia published through RAN in 1990 and 1997. 
27 Raymond Schwab, The Oriental Renaissance. Europe's Rediscovery ojImJia and the East 1680-1880 
(NY: Columbia University Press 1984). 
28 Cynthia H. Whittaker, 'The Impact of the Oriental Renaissance in Russia: The Case of Sergej Uvarov' 
JGO 26 (1978) p.5H. 
29 Kevin Tyner Thomas, 'Collecting the Fatherland: Early Nineteenth-Century Proposals for a Russian 
National Museum' in: J. Bmbank & D. L. Ransel (eds.), Imperial Russia. New HistOries jor the Empire 
(Indiana: Indiana University Press 1998) pp.91-107. 
30 Bassin, Imperial Visions pp.49-52. 
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an academic infrastructure of considerable intellectual standing, whilst Russia's unique position between 
Europe and Asia often led Russian Orientalism to pursue unique cultural courses differing from the general 
European trend 31 By the mid-1850s, university institutions in Russia with chairs in eastern studies, 
increasingly clustered around StPetersburg itself, were recognized as leaders in their field not only at 
home, but also worldwide. 
At the same time, the Russian General Staff, developing its own 'culture of knowledge' by the 
1830s, based on a drive to quantify and objectify the surrounding world, effectively divided its scientific 
attention between Europe and Asia, many officers undertaking travels to the East to expand geographical 
knowledge. The first officially recorded activity by Russian staff officers operating in an intelligence-
gathering caplcity in Asia dates to 1792, when staff officers accompanied the diplomatic mission of M. I. 
Golenishchev-Kutuzov to Constantinople, gathering and developing materials still used decades later in the 
Russo-Turkish war of 1828-29.32 An important early role in Staff activities in Asia was played by the 
institution of the Quartermaster service, 19 of the 175 members of this force on the lot July 1805 serving in 
the Transcaucasus, Orenburg and the Far East.33 Russian staff officers of the cartographical section 
conducted a topographical sketch of the Transcaucasus in 1801-3, whilst staff officers conducted field trips 
in Kazakhstan in 1803-4 and accompanied the diplomatic mission of Iu. A Golovin to China in 1805-7. 
Continued geographical and cultural ignorance played a large role however in Russian military errors and 
reverses during the first Russo-Turkish and Russo-Iranian wars of the nineteenth century (1806-1812 and 
1804-1813, respectively). 
Undoubtedly the single most important figure in raising the level of the staffs geographical 
knowledge and scientific capability was the honourary father of the Russian General Staff, Prince Petr 
Mikhailovich Volkonskii (1776-1852). A veteran of the Napoleonic Wars and arguably one of the major 
organizers of victory in the campaigns of 1812-14, Volkonskii's impact on the Russian stafIbegan with his 
appointment to the Quartermaster section in 1810. In that year on the proposal of the Prince there was 
established a Staff of the Chancellory of the General-Quartermaster, with a corresponding attached library 
31 On the manner in which the writings of several Russian orientalists differed from the stereotype of this 
science created by Edward Said, see: Nathaniel Knight, 'Grigor'ev in Orenburg, 1851-1862: Russian 
Orientalism in the Service of Empire?' 1'1'.88-97. 
32 N. P. Glinoetskii, /storiia Russkogo General'nogo Shtaba Tom I. 1698-1825 (St.Petersburg: Voennaia 
Tipografiia 1883) 1'1'.120-121 
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and a significant collection of astronomical and mathematical instruments. Appointed Chief of the Main 
Staff of His Imperial Highness in 1815, Volkonskii's seven-year reign in that post would have its most 
lasting testament with the creation in 1822 of the Corps of MilitaIy Topographers. This innovation served 
to put the practice of militaIy topography on a fully scientific basis for the first time and created a cadre 
system designed to avoid the delays in topographical work due to lack of trained personnel that had been 
experienced in the past A guide by the director of the Corps, F. F. Shubert, published in 1826-7, testified to 
the new level of organization in the conduct of such work, containing amongst other things a complete 
collection of all astronomical points calculated up until that period in the Russian Empire.34 In 1818, 
meanwhile, Prince Volkonskii charged K. F. Tol', the Quartermaster-General of the Main Staff, to compose 
a comprehensive collection of information about the fortifications and armed forces of all the major 
European states, including Turkey.35 The consequence of this was a series of important intelligence-
gathering trips by Russian officers to Constantinople and Asia Minor, including significant work by 
Adjutant-General P. D. Kiselev (the future Minister for State Properties) and Count F. F. Berg, the positive 
results of which were reflected in Russia's war against Turkey in 1828-29.36 This tradition of closer study 
of the Near East was continued by M. P. Vronchenko, an outstanding linguist and member of the 
Quartermaster section of the General Staff who during his three-year appoinbttent to the consulate in 
Smyrna in the 1830s studied the country in depth and logged 100 new points of astronomical observation. 
A brief alliance with Turkey in this period also expanded the interests of the Russian General Staffbeyond 
their traditional geographic sphere, Russian Staff officers visiting Syria and Palestine to map the country 
and follow the progress of the contemporary Egyptian revolt under Mohammed_Ali.37 What was most 
striking about the activities of the General Staff overall meanwhile was not merely the new level of 
organization gra<hJally being acquired in its study of Asia, but the qualitative difference between that 
33 Kim & Shastitko (eds.), Istoriia Otechestvennogo Vostokovedeniia do seredinyXlX veka p.174. 
34 Istoricheskii Ocherk deiatel'nosti Korpusa Voennykh Topografov. 1822-1872 (St Petersburg: Izd 
Glavnogo Shtaba 1872) pp.84, 97-105. 
35 B. M. Dantsig, Blizhnii Vostok v Russkoi nauke i literature (Dooktiabr'skii period) (Moscow: 
Izdatel'stvo "NAUKA" 1973) p.148. 
36 However, on continued flaws in the Russian military machine exposed by this conflict, see in particular: 
Frederick W. Kagan, The Military Reforms of Nicholas 1. The Origins of the Modern Russian Army pp.l02-
31. 
37 M. R. Ryzhenkov & I. M Smilianskaia, Siri;a, Livan i Palestina v opisaniakh rossiiskikh 
puteshestvennikov, konsul'skikh i voennykh obzorakh pervo; poloviny XIX veka (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo 
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knowledge and what was known before. This held true even regarding territories with which Russia had 
been territorially contiguous for centuries. In 1832 A. I. Levshin, developing a new map from the recent 
topographical surveys of Russian officers in the Kazakh steppe, commented that the new data now 
emerging demonstrated that all previous maps of that territory, with one individual and recent exception, 
contained significant faults and even completely inaccurate details. Mountains bad been shown in the past 
where it was now clear there were plains, lakes where there was no water, and even rivers flowing in the 
wrong direction. 38 Thus the 1820s marlred as much a fundamental turning-point in the knowledge 
possessed by the Tsarist military of the East as they did for Russia's other departments of state. 
The increasing activation of Tsarist foreign policy in the Near and Middle East and the 
accompanying build-up of increasingly experienced and specialized cadres of staff officers was reflected 
most strongly in the career of I. F. Blaramberg (1800-1878), an officer who in effect spent his entire career 
engaged in the study of Asiatic states. Having served in the Russo-Turkish war of 1828-29, Blaramberg 
went on to work in the Caucasus Corps, later composing a major military-statistical portrait of that area of 
the Empire. Appointed in 1837 as military advisor to the consulate of Major -General Simonich in Persia, 
Blaramberg witnessed the Persian siege ofHerat in 1838 at first hand, and during his period of service there 
dispatched numerous reports back to the General Staff in St Petersburg on contemporary conditions in 
Persia and Mghanistan. This culminated in his massive 1841 statistical portrait of Persia, covering nearly 
every aspect of the contemporary life of that state. Transferred to the Orenburg corps under General 
Perovskii in 1840, he went on to direct the first siege of Ak-Mechet' in 1852 before returning to St 
Petersburg and being made head of the Military-Topographical Department, going on to become head of 
the Corps of Military Topographers in 1866.39 
By the start of the 1840s therefore the Russian General Staff had already evolved a highly 
developed tradition of staff work and topographical studies within the often-inhospitable environment of 
Inner Asia The scientific structure under which these missions carried out their tasks became fully 
"NAUKA" Glavnaia Redaktsiia Vostochnoi Literatury 1991) pp.168-81 and Ryzhenkov, 'Rot' voennogo 
vedomstva Rossii v razvitii otechestvennogo vostokovedeniia v XIX-nachale XX vv.' pp.99-100. 
38 Soplenkov, Doroga v Arzrum: rossiiskaia obshchestvennaia mysl' 0 Vostoke (pervaia po[ovina XIX 
veka). p.16. 
39 N. A. Khalfin, 'Zhizn' i trudy Ivana Fedorovicba Blaramberga' in: I. F. Blaramberg, Vospominaniia 
(Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "NAUKA" Glavnaia Redakstiia Vostochnoi Literatury 1978) pp.I-24. 
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developed under D. A Miliutin, the future Minister of War, who created the Staff Academy's Department 
of Military Statistics almost single-handed in 1846-7. Miliutin' s efforts would help to see the initiation of a 
programme in 1847 that two decades later resulted in the first military-statistical portrait of the entire 
Russian Empire.40 A personal proponent of the statistical method, Miliutin' s later service as Chief of Staff 
in the Caucasus would be marked by the belief that 'without knowledge, control was impossible. ,41 Like 
Speranskii before him therefore, Miliutin and his followers saw in the enumeration, quantification and 
statistical rationalization of scientific data a means to harmonize and administer the Russian Empire.42 In 
the period immediately following the Crimean War, it was recognized that Russian statistical data and 
intelligence gathering was in a state of chaos-a victim of the same crisis of management organization that 
gripped the rest of the Russian bureaucracy. 43 Data about the availability and quantity of Russia's basic 
resources was often lacking, and data was not collected or analyzed with a view to its intrinsic value but 
simply gathered in without prioritization, resulting in repetition of effort and a dangerous level of strategic 
ignorance. From the beginning of Alexander II's reign onwards, reform proposals led to statistical data 
being published and hence opened to critical examination (glasnost). This marked the military's 
recognition, shared with the rest of the Russian bureaucracy, that expertise was only useful if information 
was freely available. Within the field of the General Staff's burgeoning interest in Asiatic studies, a policy 
of glasnost' had pu1icular significance in that previous travellers accounts were now open for officers like 
Baron Mannerheim to consult before they undertook their own trips.44 This helped them review the level of 
previously gained knowledge and suggested new avenues for investigation, making intelligence-gathering 
missions generally more effective, though the growing burden of reading soon became too much for any 
one individual and made some consequent repetition of effort, though reduced to a bare minimum, 
40 On Miliutin's activities in the Staff Academy, see in particular: E. Willis Brooks, 'D. A Miliutin. Life 
and Activity to 1856' Unpub. Ph.D Dissertation Stanford University 1970 pp.1l2-14. 
41 Rich, 'Imperialism, Reform & Strate&V: Russian Military Statistics, 1840-1880.' p.629. 
42 Rich, The Tsar's Colonels. pp.15, 74. Speranskii's law codification in fact served as a model of 
inspiration for Imperial statesmen, military and civilian, till the twentieth century: Lincoln, In the Vanguard 
o[Reform p.48. 
4 On the heights of bureaucratic inefficiency visible within the civilian ministries for much of the first half 
of the nineteenth century see in particular: Lincoln, In the Vanguard of Reform pp.19-2S. 
44 Bilof, 'The Imperial Russian General Staff and China in the Far East 1880-1888. A Study of the 
Operations of the General Staff. ' p.xx. 
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inevitable. 45 A similar discipline dominated the contemporaneously-blooming sciences of map-making and 
botany- 'observed data are not complete until they are reconstituted within the archive of knowledge. ,46 
On Miliutin's detachment to the Caucasus in 1856 the course in Military Statistics at the General 
Staff Academy was taken over by two of his proteges, Lt -Colonel A I. Maksheev and Guards Captain N. 
N. Obruchev.47 Maksheev taught that section of the course related to the statistical study of Russia itself 
whilst Obruchev dealt with foreign, primarily Western European states. Maksheev's experiences in the 
statistics course led him in the 1860s to present reform proposals on the manner in which Russia's 
statistical data was collected. His policy, largely accepted and followed thereafter, by setting fixed 
parameters according to function on necessary information, rationalized the chaotic gathering process of 
the past into a pattern the staff would continue to pursue well into the 1 880s. 48 At the same time. the 
introduction from 1865-66 of cartography lectures into the general curriculum for staff candidates 
(previously only compulsory for students of the geodesic section) meant that all graduates were better 
equipped, at least in theory, to carry out the type of work Maksheev's new parameters demanded. 
However, Maksheev also petitioned for an expanded section within the course on Russia's Asiatic 
possessions, and began giving lectures on Russia's relations with the Central Asian states from 1865 
onwards. To aid this effort, Maksheev was commandeered to the Turkestan military district for six months 
study in 1867.49 Maksheev's proposal to then form a new academy course covering the military history, 
ethnography, statistics and economies of China, the Central Asian khanates, Persia and Afghanistan was 
45 This crisis of information management, in which volume of information threatens to overwhelm coherent 
rationalization, continues to affect many bureaucracies today, the transfer of recording methods from paper 
to computer data having destroyed or at least distuIbed the prioritization systems developed by most 
professions since the mid- nineteenth century. At the same time, at the military level, the development of 
'Information Technology' - systems for aiding rapid command decision given the new data processing 
burdens modern warfare imposes- are creating what some have seen as a new revolution in military affairs 
(RMA). Analysis of the 'staff revolution' in Europe in the nineteenth century poses a question mark over 
how innovative this new development really is however. For a survey, see: Jacob W. Kipp, 'The Contours 
of Future Armed Conflict and their Interpreter: Implications for National and International Security Policy' 
in: General Makhmut Gareev, If War Comes Tomo"ow? The Contours of Future Armed Conflict (London: 
Frank Cass & Co. Ltd. 1998) pp.I-45. 
46 Matthew H. Edney, MappingAn Empire. The Geographical Construction o/British India, 1765-1843. 
WSA: University of Chicago Press 1997) p.96. 
7 N. P. Glinoetskii, Istoricheskii Ocherk Nikolaevskoi Akademii General'nogo Shtaba (StPetersburg: 
Tipografiia shtaba voisk' gvardii i Petelburgskago voennago okruga, 1882) pp.162-3 
48 Rich, The Tsar's Colonels pp.73-6. 
49 Glinoetskii, Istoricheskii Ocherk Nikolaevskoi Akademii General'nogo Shtaba, pp.272-3. Maksheev's 
record of the trip is recorded for posterity in: 'Prebyvanie v Vemom i vstrecha Kaufmana. (Iz chetvertogo 
puteshestviia v 1867 A I. Maksheev)' Soobshch. N.AMaksheeva RS T.lS3 KnJ (1913) pp.644-49. 
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rejected by the Academy, fearful of the burden of teaching such a vast new mass of information which 
would only prove useful in the activities of a minority of officers. The need to bolster teaching on Asiatic 
countries at the Academy was recognized however, and to this end a separate course of non-obligatory 
lectures was instituted from 1875. Invited to give these was Colonel Mikhail Ivanovich Veniukov (1832-
190 1), a full member of the Russian Imperial Geographical Society who had already from 1870 delivered a 
series of non-obligatory lectures at the Academy on the military forces of China and Japan and the military 
significance of Russia's Asiatic frontiers. 50 Veniukov was well qualified to speak on these matters, having 
joined and worked alongside Murav'ev-Amurskii in the Far East as soon as he graduated from the Staff 
Academy in 1856 and having gone on under the patronage of Miliutin to visit both China and Japan 
personally. In his memoirs Veniukov made clear that the first lectures were given largely as a means to help 
him out of serious financial difficulties, but remarked that they were well attended, and included some 
adjutant-generals in the audience.51 
As implied above, the input of the cadres built up by these new military and university institutions 
was complemented by the efforts of the Imperial Geographical Society, (!ROO, est. 1845) which despite an 
official non-political stance often sponsored missions to investigate strategic questions as much as to 
expand geographical knowledge. The influence of the military upon the Geographical Society was strong 
from the very outset. Two of its founding members, F. F. Berg and M P. Vronchenko, had first honed their 
geographical skills, as we have seen, in military service, whilst D. A Miliutin, the future Minister of War, 
served on the Society's governing council between 1849 and 1852. In the keynote address that inaugurated 
the very opening of the society in 1845, Admiral Litke cited the Topographical Department of the General 
Staff and the Naval Ministry's Hydrological Department as natural partners in the society's activities. 52 A 
key early mission of the Geographical Society was to improve the scientific community's geographical and 
cultural knowledge of Asia, based initially upon a drive to republish and supplement (and, implicitly, to 
improve upon) the work already done by the famous German scientist Carl Ritter.53 This early interest did 
so Glinoetskii, Istoricheskii Ocherk Nikolaevskoi Akademii General'nogo Shtaba., p.274. 
51 M. I. Veniukov,Iz Vospominanii. Kniga Vtoriaia 1867-1876 (Amsterdam: no pub. 1896) pp.144-45. 
52 Nathaniel Knight, 'Science, Empire, and Nationality: Ethnography in the Russian Geographical Society, 
1845-1855' in: Burbank & Ransel (eds.), Imperial Russia. New Histories for the Empire p.ll0. 
53 P.P. Semenov [Tian-Shanskii), Istoriia poluvekovoi deiateJ 'nosti Imperatorskogo Russkogo 
Geograficheskogo Obshchestva 1845-1895 Chast' 1 Otdel I, II & ill (StPetersburg: Tipografii V. 
Bezobrazova i Komp. 1896) pp.88-92. On the impact of European science upon Russian geographical and 
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not abate with that task complete, and the Geographical Society's most famous later beneficiary, General 
Przheval'skii, could rest assured that: 
as long as Semyonov-Tyan-Shansky [sic] was at the Imperial Geographic 
Society and Milyutin [sic] at the Ministry of War, [he] got whatever he asked for. 54 
The Imperial Geographical Society also served as a tool through which the Asiatic Department of the 
Foreign Ministry spread its influence, several important individuals such as E. P. Kovalevskii, Baron 
Osten-Saken and N. V. Khanykov serving as members of both institutions. 55 The role of the Naval Ministry 
and its head, the Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich, in reinvigorating the very principle of empire 
through the dispatch of ethnographic missions in the 1850s, served as an important precursor to these later 
combined War Ministry-Geographical Society missions.56 Not least, they set the precedent for military-civil 
cooperation in the working of empire which some imperial servitors, notably General Kaufman, would seek 
to build upon and encourage. The end result of these cross-disciplinary developments would be a new 
branch of military science itself, a branch that General Andrei Evgen'evich Snesarev (1865-1937) would 
pass on to the Soviets under the title 'Military Geography.' Snesarev saw in this branch of the military art 
four main areas of study: 
( 1) Territory (On a broad scale, including climate) 
(2) Population (Ethno-demographic and socio-political analysis) 
(3) Means of war (the economy of the country and its links with the world economy.) 
(4) Armed forces. 57 
oriental studies, see also: Kalpana Sahni, Crucifying the Orient. Russian Orientalism and the Colonization 
0/ Caucasus and Central Asia (Thailand: White Orchid Press 1997) pp.18-20. On the significance of Ritter 
and his magnum opus, Die Erkunde, see: Geoffrey 1. Martin & Preston E. James, All POSsible Worlds. A 
History o/Geographical Ideas ThiId Edition (USA: John Wiley & Sons Inc. 1993) pp.126-132 
54 D. Rayfield, The Dream o/Lhasa. The Life o/Nikolay Przhevalsky (1839-88) Explorer o/CentralAsia 
(London: Paul Elek 1976) pp.11l-12 
55 Ritchie, 'The Asiatic Department during the reign of Alexander ll.' pp.231-2. 
56 Catherine B. Clay, 'Russian Ethnographers in the Service of Empire, 1856-1862' SR 54, (1,1995) pp.45-
62. The Imperial Geographical Society served as an important gathering point for a generation of liberals, 
many of whom were to go on to shape policy in the period of the Great Reforms. Studies of its personnel 
and influence are made in Lincoln, In the Vanguard o/Re/orm pp.91-10 1. A less often noted but equally 
important relative of the IRoo was the Russian Archeological Society (RAO), established in 1846 in St. 
Petersburg. 
57 A. M. Rialx:hik:ov, 'A E. Snesarev kak geograf.' In: V. V. Balabushevich & Grigory C. Kotovsky, (eds.) 
Andrei Evgen 'evich Snesarev. (Zhizn' i Nauchnaia DeiateJ 'nost) (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "NAUKA" 
Glavnaia redaktsiia vostochnoi literatury 1973) p.80.This definition of 'Military Geography' corresponds 
almost exactly to the modem understanding of 'Military Intelligence.' For biographical details on Snesarev, 
Area studies based on these principles would blossom during the latter nineteenth century on 
Russia's new territories in the East as Russia pursued, in parallel with other empires of the day, the 
'scientific and rational construction of space. ,58 With their fascination with statistics, chans, and minute 
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analysis, many of these texts in fact read eerily like later Communist works-an indication of just one of the 
levels of continuity apparent between many aspects of the Tsarist and Soviet military systems. 
Undoubtedly the most important military department coordinating the efforts of this new 
generation of statisticians, geographers, translators and ethnographers, however, was the Asiatic 
Department of the Russian General Staff. In 1856 there had been created a temporary section, or 
committee, for dealing with the affairs of the Caucasus army, the independent Orenburg and Siberian corps, 
and the forces deployed in Eastern Siberia. In 1863 a permanent or~ation, the Asiatic Department, 
replaced this temporary section within the General Staff. This department was charged with the military-
political administration of the Caucasus, the Orenburg krai, Western and Eastern Siberia, control over the 
movement and reinforcement of all forces dispositioned there, and all proposals relating to the development 
of forts and lines of communication within those districts. 59 The department took its position in the 
command structure for much of this period from the reforms carried out by Miliutin in 1862-7 of the Main 
Staff, and lasted in this basic form until 1903. Until the full establishment of the Asiatic Department 
alongside the Military-Scientific Section in 1863, intelligence collection in Russia had traditionally been 
laid at the door of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, although the Tsar's "Instructions to Agents dispatched 
abroad" of June 1856 had already effected some change in this direction.60 Like the Military-Scientific 
Section, the Asiatic Department underwent several name changes over the years (from chast' to otdel to 
de/oproizvodstvo), none of which marked any significant alteration in its basic form or function Unlike the 
Military-Scientific Section, the precise parameters of the Asiatic Department's intelligence-gathering 
activities were never defined by statute. Headed by a Colonel or a Lieutenant General, the Asiatic 
see: E. A Snesarev, 'Andrei Evgen'evich Snesarev' NAA 4 (1986) pp.117-22 and V. Dudnik, & o. 
Smimov, 'Vsiazhizn'-nauke' VIZh 2 (1965)pp.47-57. 
58 Edney, Mapping An Empire p.36. See also pp.I-36 on imperialism and geographical studies as a tool of 
control. 
59 RGVIA F.400 Op.l 0.1060 dl.4ob-5. Zaionchkovskii, Voennye Reformy 1860-1870 godov v Rossii 
~101. 
M. Alekseev, Voennaia Razvedka Rossii ot Riurika do Nikolaia 11 (Moscow: Izdatel'skii dom "Russkaia 
razvedka" 1998) (Kniga I.) pp.5S-59. The dispatch of military agents abroad by Russia actually dated back 
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Department came to be concerned with almost every aspect of the military's relationship with the Muslim 
peoples of the East, from the gathering of military intelligence to the regulation of trips abroad by Muslims, 
including the monitoring of pilgrimages to Mecca and other countries.61 As a consequence of the empire's 
growth the department's responsibilities continually expanded, a new statute of 1886 setting out a more 
extended range offunctions than the statute of 1869, with a slightly increased workforce, and a report of 
1894 marking a further expansion again. Each expansion reinforced the position of the Asiatic Department 
as a distinct branch of the central intelligence network. 62 Its activities were regulated alongside and to some 
degree shared with the Asiatic Department of the Foreign Ministry. While the General Staff department 
was concerned both with internal order and external war planning and intelligence, however, the Foreign 
Ministry section was concerned purely with foreign, predominantly Balkan, affairs. Consuls of the Asiatic 
Department of the Foreign Ministry might still be tasked with gathering military intelligence were a 
military agent not specifically present, and individual agents might help coordinate Asiatic opinion with the 
military's campaigns. 63 The most outstanding example of the latter case were the actions of the Foreign 
Ministry Asiatic Department representative in Persia, Zinov'ev, in gaining Persian logistical support for 
Skobelev's 1880-81campaign against the Twkmen.64 In a similar way, the reports of the military 
department's foreign attaches were often shared with the Foreign Ministry, officer's reports on local events 
and their assessments of foreign governmental personnel, in particular, often proving of wider general 
diplomatic value. However, the Foreign Ministry Asiatic Department lost ground to the War Ministry in 
areas where the Russian Anny was actively advancing, so that by 1873, for example, the Foreign Ministry 
to the 1830s, but was dogged by bureaucratic difficulties; see also Persson, 'The Russian Anny and Foreign 
Wars 1859-1871' pp.61-7. 
61 Podpolkovnik S.M. Nebrenchin, 'Musul'manskaia Vostok i Russkaia Anniia' VIZh 4 (1995) pp.37-8. On 
the explosion in Muslim pilgrimage created by more efficient European transport systems-the railway and 
the steam liner-and on the specific response of the Tsarist bureaucracy, see: Daniel Brower, 'Russian Roads 
to Mecca: Religious Tolerance and Muslim Pilgrimage in the Russian Empire' SR 55 (3, 1996) pp.567-585. 
More generally, see: F.E. Peters, The Hajj. The Muslim Pilgrimage to Mecca and the Holy Places (NJ: 
Princeton University Press 1994) pp.266-30 1 and Kemal H. Karpat, 'The hirja from Russia and the 
Balkans: the process of self-definition in the late Ottoman state' in: Dale F. Eickelman & 1. Piscatori (eds.), 
Muslim Travellers. Pilgrimage. migration. and the religious imagination (London: Routledge 1990) 
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Alekseev, Voennaia Razvedka Rossii (Kniga I.) pp.70-1. 
63 Ritchie, 'The Asiatic Department during the reign of Alexander II.' p.391 
64 Ibid .• pp.185,425. Zinov'ev was also crucial in persuading the Russian government of the need to launch 
the expedition; in this he was strongly supported by the Grand Duke Mikhail Nikolaevich, Viceroy of the 
Caucasus. See Firuz Kazemndeh, Russia and Britain in Persia 1864-1914 A Study in Imperialism (NY: 
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Asiatic Department virtually ceased to have responsibility for the peoples of Central Asia. 65 In tum, and in 
naturnl consequence, the War Ministry then became engaged in almost constant bureaucratic conflict with 
the Russian Interior Ministry (MVD) over the correct administration of what were meant in effect to be 
integral parts of the Russian Empire. The refusal of General Kaufman to allow the establishment of a 
Muslim muftiat in Russian Turkestan, for example, was linked at least in part to the fact that such 
institutions in Ufa and the Transcaucasus served in practice as tendrils of MVD influence.66 
Furthermore, the Asiatic Department of the General Staff and the Military-Scientific Committee 
took administrative responsibility for the cadres of 'officer-orientalists' who did so much of the military's 
analytical work on the East. A particularly significant facet in this regard of course was the selection and 
posting by the Military-Scientific Committee of formal 'military agents' to consulates abroad, a practice 
used by the Russian General Staff in Europe and Asia alike. The number of military agents disposed of by 
the War Ministry rose across this period, from only four in 1856 (only one of whom, Staff-Captain Frankini 
in Istanbul, could be considered to work in an 'Asiatic' country) to over fifteen, including aides, in Europe 
and the Balkans alone by 1914.67 A statute of 1864 finally gave military agents an officially sanctioned 
position within Russian embassies abroad, with all the diplomatic rights and privileges, including 
diplomatic immunity, that came with that status. The Russian Staff often attempted to gain information 
through both 'secret' and 'open' military agents, the former being officers officially retired from the 
military service and appointed to secretarial posts in foreign consulates, the latter retaining their official 
military position within foreign consulates. However, the use of 'secret' military agents proved 
problematic. Aside from the security difficulty attendant upon appointing apparently over-qualified men to 
fairly low consular posts, the 'secret' military agents often had an acrimonious relationship with their 
official 'public' counterparts. The 'secret' military agent appointed in 1896 to China for instance, Colonel 
Desino, lacked even desultory diplomatic cover due to his aide being an active army officer, and had a poor 
relationship with the official military agent there, Colonel K. I. Vogak. The situation was only finally 
Yale University Press 1968) p.58. Zinov'ev went on to become head of the Foreign Ministry Asiatic 
I>epartment. 
65 Ritchie, 'The Asiatic Department during the reign of Alexander ll.' p.229. In 1856 the Foreign Ministry 
Asiatic Department had already been relieved of jurisdiction over Kazakh relations. Allworth, 'Encounter.' 
in: Allworth (ed.), Central Asia 130 Years o/Russian Dominance. A HistoricalOverviewp.56 
66 Petr Petrovich Litvinov, Gosudarstvo i Islam v Russkom Turkestane (1865-1917). (po arkhivnym 
materialam). (Elets: Epetskii gosudarstvennyi pedagogicheskii institut 1998) pp.65-67. 
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resolved by Desino's promotion to being the second 'public' military agent to Shanghai in 1899.68 At the 
same time, when discussing these military agents, it is necessary to remember that officers so assigned 
received no special training in covert intelligence work, such a course only being established at the Staff 
Academy after the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05. One contemporary recalled that until then at the 
Academy secret intelligence had been regarded as a rather 'dirty' occupation, the province of undercover 
policemen and other 'shady characters.' 69 Post-I905 attempts to lay a greater burden of responsibility upon 
the military agents in terms of covert intelligence gathering led to protests amongst some of the leading 
military agents of the day, several complaining that they were too closely watched in their country of 
placement to carry out such tasks. However, the lack of any General Staff cadres to supplement their work 
by operating covertly in foreign countries led to the main burden of such work continuing to be laid upon 
the military agents despite their complaints. 70 
An important additional element in this form of work of course was the degree of linguistic 
training given Russian officers in oriental languages across this period. The opening of the Nepliuevskii 
military college in Orenburg in 1825 marked the first establishment of a medium-level rnilitary-scientific 
establishment for the teaching of eastern languages in Russia. In this institution there was taught the Tatar, 
Arabic and Persian languages, but the number of graduates was relatively small and the effect felt only at a 
local level. The teaching of languages at the General Staff Academy in St Petersburg in the first half of the 
nineteenth century, meanwhile, was of a poor quality and overwhelmingly European-orientated, although 
the future War Minister D. A Millutin did recall that some of his classmates studied eastern languages in 
their spare time.71 In 1849 the War Ministry finally investigated the possibility of introducing eastern 
languages into the curriculum of the Staff Academy and consulted the former professor of the Eastern 
Department of St. Petersburg university, O. I. Senkovskii, on the issue. Senkovskii drew up a programme 
for a three-and-a-halfyear academy course in Arabic, Persian and Turkic-Ottornan, whilst A I. Maksheev, 
67 Sergeev & Ulunian, Ne podlezhit' oglasheniiu p.44. 
68 Alekseev, Voennaia Razvedka Rossii (Kniga I.) pp.90-4. 
69 I.V. Derevianko, 'Russkaia agentumaia razvedka v 1902-1905gg.' VIZh 5 (1989) p.76. The view was 
that of Major-General A A Ignat'ev. For a similar appraisal, see: Polovtsoff [Polovtsov], Glory and 
Downfall. Reminiscences of a Russian General Staff Officer p.55. 
70 Shelukhin, 'Razvedyvatel'nye organy v strukture vysshego voennogo upravleniia rossiiskoi imperii 
nachala XXveka (1906-1914gg.), pp.27-28. 
71 D. A. Millutin, Vospominaniia. Tomsic, 1919 (Newtonville, Mass.: Oriental Research Partners 1979) 
pp.119-20. 
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recently returned from Central Asia, helped institute a cash prize for the officer-graduate producing the best 
Persian manuscript.72 A series of63 lectures given at the Staff Academy in 1853-54 (on the eve of the 
Crimean War) in the Turkish language by the equally distinguished orientalist Professor A K Kazem-Bek 
did not improve the overall situation, which was only eased in the wake of the Miliutin reforms of the 
1860s. The education officers received at the Nikolaevskaia Academy of the Imperial General Staff, 
including (for some) courses in Arabic, Turkish, Persian and Tatari, then came to be supplemented by 
language courses through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, courses at the Eastern Institute in Vladivostok, or 
studies in Tashkent itself. Officers completing the course begun with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 
1883 onwards and covering the Arabic, Persian, Turkish and Tatar languages had to serve for at least four 
and a half years in either the Turkestan or Caucasus military districts. Between 1886 and 1898 this 
programme produced 55 Jinguistically trained officers. Specialist schools in Urga and Kul'dzha (though at 
the latter only in the period 1880-1896) served to further ttain officers in Chinese.13 In 1897 the staff of the 
Turkestan military district began running a course on Urdu. in which outstanding officers were sent to India 
to perfect their mastery of the language. On this foundation there was fonned in 1908 the Tashkent 
officers' school, in which apart from languages there was also studied history, geography and military 
statistics. Sixty-six officers finished the course on Urdu run between 1897 and 1909. Over time, the 
English, Persian, Uzbek, Afghan and Chinese languages were also taught through this institution, alongside 
instruction on Muslim law.14 From 1906 onwards meanwhile, around 20 officers graduated annually from 
the Eastern Institute in Vladivostok, trained in the Japanese, Chinese, Korean, Mongolian, Manchurian, 
French and English languages. Established in 1899, the Eastern Institute was an academic institution that 
accepted four, six, and eventually eight officer-students each semester in return for a significant subsidy 
from the War Ministry. In addition the army or the consular service took four to eight students from the 
Institute annually to carry out fieldwork. Practical experience showed this system to have positive, although 
72 RGVIA F.544 Op.l D.321 dl.12-23ob. 
13 L. G. Beskrovnyi, Russkaia armiia i flot v XIX veke. Voenno-ekonomicheskii potentsia/ Rossii (Moscow: 
Izdatel'stvo "NAUKA" 1973) p.I90~ R. K I. Quested, 'Matey'Imperia/ists? The Tsarist Russians in 
Manchuria 1895-1917 (Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong Press 1982) pp.32, 339, footnote 51~ P. A 
Skacbkov, Ocherki istori; russkogo kitaevedeniia (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "NAUKA" Glavnaia Redaktsiia 
Vostochnoi Literatury 1977) pp.242-45. 
14 Shastitko (ed.), Russko-Indiiskie Otnosheniia v XIXv. p.331 footnote 1, p.334 footnote 5~ N. A Khalfin & 
P. M. Shastitko (eds.), Rossi;a; Indiia (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "NAUKA" Glavnaia Redaktsiia Vostochnoi 
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strictly limited, results. Eight of the eleven interpreters in Japanese available to the Russian anny during the 
war of 1904-05 were graduates of the Eastern Institute. It was recognized after the war however that this 
number of interpreters had proven grossly inadequate for the sheer scale of the task facing them. 
Furthennore, the General Staff remained dissatisfied by the quality of student being produced from 
Vladivostok, GUGSh noting in 1909 that officer graduates were knowledgeable only in language theory 
and were insufficiently versed in practical communication.75 Although efforts in this direction increased to 
meet a growing need across this period therefore, such efforts remained very much on an ad hoc blsis with 
continual financial restraints. Typical in this regard were the details behind the courses begun for officers 
through the Foreign Ministry after 1883. 
M. A Gazamov, responding to the petition of a particular officer to enroll in the Academic 
Department, had first raised the issue of running oriental language courses for officers with the War 
Ministry as early as 1881. The concept was welcomed and developed by the Military-Scientific Committee. 
A statute on this issue was then fonnulated and subsequently approved, but the War Ministry's lack of 
funds to recompense the language professors for their work led to the act being delayed. Only Gazamov's 
notifying the War Ministry in 1883 that his employees were willing to offer their services free of charge for 
this task led to the courses then being initiated, and even then initially only for Guards officers.76 Problems 
then developed over finding suitable places for graduates of this three-year course, officers finding the 
training they had received inadequate for the understanding of local dialects and being overwhelmed by the 
bureaucratic tasks they were asked to perform. Appointments to be military agents abroad were the 
exception to the rule, many graduates having to be content with lowly pristav positions in local 
governmental administrations. The lack of prestige and social advantage attached to such a career 
necessitated the introduction in 1885 of a statute compel/ing graduates to work in the Asiatic districts for 
the fixed period outlined above. 77 
The inadequacy of such ad hoc arrangements in the eastern-language training of Russian officers 
became evident to all both during the Russian military intervention in the Chinese Boxer Rebellion of 1900 
Literatury 1986) p.194; A N. Kononov, Istoriia izucheniia tiurkskikh iazy!wv v Rossii. Dooktiabr's/di 
~eriod (Leningrad: Akademiia Nauk SSSR Institut Vostokovedeniia 1982) pp.192-93. 
5 Alekseev, Voennaia Razvedka Rossi; (Kniga 2) p.46. 
76 M. Pevtsov, 'Ofitserskie kursy vostochnykh' iazykov' pri aziatskom departamente ministerstva 
inostrannykh' del' i ikh vospitanniki. (Kratkii ocherk').' VS 2 (1902) pp.I86-187. 
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and with even more serious consequences during the course of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05. The 
lack of officer-interpreters in this field became a minor public scandal after the latter conflict, openly 
discussed in the press, and led to concerted attempts by the Asiatic Department of the General Staff to 
introduce for the first time a unified programme of language training across Russia's Asiatic military 
districts. The course and consequence of these efforts at reform will be more fully discussed in chapter five 
of this work, in the context of the general crisis of confidence that seized Russian military vostokovedeni e 
in this later period. 
Such therefore were the material and intellectual foundations upon which the Asiatic Department 
of the General Staff could draw. A tabular breakdown of the General Staff Department's structure and 
personnel is given on pages 52-56 . Reports to the Asiatic Department of the General Staff took three 
general forms: 
(1) Travellers and ethnographers' accounts based on the discipline of 'Military 
Geography.' The majority of such reports are contained in the 87-volume 
Sbomik geograjicheskikh, topograjicheskikh i statisticheskikh materialov po Azii 
(St.Petersburg, 1883-1914), printed through the Military-Scientific Committee, 
and with each edition marked 'secret.' Typical are the reports ofPrzheval'skii 
who, on the basis of his extensive journeys in Mongolia, Manchuria and Siberia 
made recommendations on potential routes of attack in the event of war with 
China. 
(2) Military-Historical Descripions (Opisaniia). The Russian Asiatic expert, 
General Ivanin (ISO 1-73), recommended studying the campaigns of past 
conquerors in Asia-Tarneriane, Nadir Shah, Chinghiz Khan-with a view to 
learning lessons for the contemporary situation.78 Such studies therefore aimed 
not only at general education but also at studying lines of march, sources of 
supply, and the psychology of the participants. The study carried out for example 
77 Ibid, pp.I94-195. 
78 C. Bellamy, 'Heirs of Genghis Khan: The Influence of the Tartar-Mongols on the Imperial Russian and 
Soviet Armies.' RUSI, 128 (1983) pp.57-8. Contrary to Chris Bellamy's implication in this article, study of 
Asiatic commanders by the Russian General Staff did predate lvanin's comments- the courses run by 
Lieutenant-Colonel Maksheev from the 18605 at the Nikolaevskaia Academy for instance. 
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in 1817 by Lieutenant Enegol'm on Persia 'from Kim to Alexander of Macedon' 
focused on the geographical aspects of that theatre and the character of the 
PersianlIranian army. 79 
(3) Political/Cultural Portraits. Understanding the growth and pattern of both 
foreign and internal religious movements and sects formed an important part of 
the Asiatic Department's work in monitoring the internal order of their Islamic 
borderlands. 
The General Staff's Asiatic Department coordinated its efforts with the Chancellery of the 
Military-Scientific Committee, the War Ministry (naturally), and with the Chief of Police and Ministry of 
Internal Affairs. The MVD in particular helped collate summaries of the foreign press related to Asiatic 
affairs, ranging from newspaper articles to the latest books. 80 
79 Nebrenchin, 'Musul'manskii Vostok i...'VlZh 4, (1995) p.41; Kim & Shastitko (eds.), Istoriia 
Otechestvennogo Vostokovedeniia do serediny XIX veka pp.175-6. It must be borne in mind that at this time 
the belief that national psychological characteristics were unchanging over time was the ruling orthodoxy. 
80 Nebrenchin, 'Musul'manskii Vostok i... 'VlZh 4, (1995) pp.38, 42. The Russian army was far from alone 
in intelligence-gathering in Asia-such activities formed an important part of the Anglo-Russian 'Great 
Game'. On the British case, see: I. P. Morris, 'British Secret Service Activity in Khorassan' HJ XXVII (3, 
1984) pp.657-75, Derek Waller, The Pundits. British Exploration o/Tibet and Central Asia (Kentucky: 
University of Kentucky Press 1990) and Richard J. Popplewell, Intelligence and Imperial Defence: British 
Intelligence and the Defence o/the Indian Empire 1904-1924 (London: Frank Cass 1995). For a discussion 
of British India's Political Department, see W. Murray Hogben, 'British Civil-Military Relations on the 
North-West Frontier ofIndia' in A Preston & P. Dennis (eds.), Swords and Covenants. Essays in Honour 
o/the Centennial o/the Royal Military College o/Canada, 1876-1976 (Canada: Rowman & Littlefield 
1976) pp.123-47. In North Africa the French' Arab Bureau' performed a similar specialized military-
political function 
Heads of Asiatic Department. Russian General Staff to 1918.81 
Heads of Department Dates of Service 
V. A Poltoratskii 1863-1867 
A. P. Protsenko 1868-1878 
A. N. Kuropatkin 1878-1879 
L. N. Sobolev 1879-1882 
G.!. Ivanov 1882-1887 
L. F. Kostenko 1887-1891 
A. P. Protsenko 1891-1898 
D. V. Putiata 1898-1902 
F. V. Vasil'ev 1902-1906 
S. V. Tseil' 1906-1913 
M. M. Manakin 1913-1917 
A. A A Davletshin 1917-1918 
81 RGVIAF.400 Op.l 0.4347 dl.119-20, 158-160. K. I. Velichko, and others (eds.) Voennaia 
Entsiklopediia T.X, XIII. XVIII (St.Petersburg: Tipografiia T-va. I. D. Sytina 1912, 1913, 1915). Spisok 
Generai'nogo Shtaba (St. Petersburg: Voennaia Tipografiia 1897-1914). Alekseev, Voennaia Razvedka 
Rossii (Kniga 1) p.278. 
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Military Agents in Asia. 1860-1914.82 
Not shown: military agents in Korea. Also not shown-secret agents serving in the 
Transcaucasus under diplomatic cover and agents in Persia. Naval agents are not 
shown since they came under the jurisdiction of the Naval Ministry. 
Turkey. Dates of Service 
Lt.-General V. A Frankini 1856-1871 
General A S. Zelenyi 1872-1879 
Colonel V. N. Filippov 1880-1886 
Colonel N. N. Peshkov 1886-1895 
Colonel Peshkov; arrival of aide 1896 
Lt. Colonel V. N. Shebeko 
Colonel Peshkov & Shebeko 1897-1898 
Colonel E. Kh. Kalnin 1899-1900 
Colonel Kalnin & aide Lt Colonel 1900-1901 
M. N. Leont' ev 
Colonel (later Major-General) 1902-1903 
Kalnin 
Lt.Colonel A P. Alekseev 1904-1906 
Lt.Colonel (later Major-General) 1906-1912 
1. A Khol'msen. 
Major-General M N. Leont'ev 1913-1914 
82 RGVIAF.401, Op.4, D.56 dl.I-2, andF.447, Op.l, 0.11, dl.10-200b. Alekseev, Voennaia Razvedka 
Rossii (Kniga l)pp.316-17, 319-20 (Kniga2) pp.519-20. 
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54 
China Dates of Service 
Lt. -Col. Bodisko 1880-1883 
Colonel N. Ia Shneur 1883-1885 
Colonel D. V. Putiata 1886-1892 
Colonel K. I. Vogak 1892-1893 
Colonel K. I. Vogak, military agent in 1893-1896 
China and Japan 
Colonel K. I. Vogak, military agent in 1896-1900 
China 
Vogak~ arrival of Colonel K. N. Desino 1900-1902 
as official aide. 
K. I.Vogak & K. N. Desino 1903 
Vogak & Desino~ arrival of Colonel F. 1904 
E. Ogorodnikov 
F. E. Ogorodnikov~ K. N. Desino, aide. 1905 
Ogorodnikov & Desino; arrival of aide 1906 
Captain S. V. Manas' ev 
Ogorodnikov & Afanas'ev. Desino 1907 
leaves~ arrival of aide, Colonel Val'ter. 
Departure of Ogorodnikov~ arrival as 1908-1909 
military agent of Colonel L. G. 
Kornilov 
Kornilov, Afanas'ev & Val'ter. 1910 
Kornilov & Val'ter; Afanas'ev leaves; 1911 
arrival as aide Captain V. V. Blonskii 
Kornilov leaves; Val'ter made military 1912-13 
agent, Blonskii and Lt. -Colonel A M 
Nikolaev, aides. 
Colonel (later Major-General) Val'ter, 1913 
with aides: Blonskii, Niko1aev. 
Major General Val'ter and Blonskii. 1914 
Nikolaev leaves; arrival as aide ofLt-
Colonel A A Tatarinov 
Japan Dates of Service 
Colonel K. I. Vogak; served 1895 
simultaneously in China (See 
above). 
Departure of Vogak; arrival of 1896 
Colonel N. I. Ianzhul 
Colonel N. I. Ianzhul 1897-1900 
Lt.Colonel G. M Vannovskii 1900-1902 
Lt.Colonel V. K. Samoilov. Left 1903-1906 
1905; returned 1906-made 
Colonel. 
Colonel Samoilov; arrival of aide 1907 
Lt. Colonel B. A Semenov 
Colonel Samoilov; B. A Semenov 1908-1912. 
Colonel Samoilov; aide Lt. Colonel 1912-1914. 
N.M.Morel' 
STRUCTURE 
The Asiatic Department of the General Staff was comprised for most of its existence of three 
general sections. The first two sections dealt directly with the Asiatic military districts. The third section 
was concerned with the problems of Russian military action in Asia, military statistical work and the 
funding of agents and exploratory missions abroad. The Department, according to a report of 1894, was 
comprised of one chief, three desk heads, four aides, two bureaucrats and a 'topographical officer. ,83 
Financial constraints meant that officers placed on special detachment from the Main Staff often 
supplemented the work of these men outwith the general expansions to the department noted above. 
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In 1903 the department was reorganized on the basis of the burden of work it was now 
undertaking. Whilst the second section continued to manage the Near East and Persia and subsections dealt 
with China, Japan and India. a new fourth Section was created on the Caucasus and Turkestan. This year 
saw a division in the Asiatic Department's traditional functions, intelligence-gathering on all foreign 
countries now being assigned to the VJth Section of the Second Quartermaster-General. Subsequent 
military reforms served to increase this centralization process in intelligence operations. 
56 
During the existence of the GUGSh of 1905-1909 there occurred for the first time a bureaucratic 
divide in the procedures of gathering and processing intelligence. Intelligence acquisition on foreign 
countries was assigned to the 5th (Intelligence) Department of the 1 at Quartermaster-General and was 
conducted under General Staff Colonel N. A Monkevits. Analysis of incoming information by contrast was 
farmed out to the second and third Quartermaster-Generals, desks under the 3rd Quartermaster-General 
handling Asiatic countries.84 On the return of the GUGSh to the War Ministry in 1908-09 this division 
continued, a special 'Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence' section remaining in place, whilst the 2nd 
Quartermaster-General section after September lot 1910 maintained a processing role in studying 'questions 
on Asiatic theatres of operation and the forces and means of Asiatic states. ' With minor changes that had no 
effect on the General Staff's analysis of Asiatic states, it was with this structure that the Russian army 
entered the First World War. 
The actions of this emerging network of official departments were supplemented in the early 
1860s by the individual enthusiasms of officers produced by service in the Caucasus, men whose voices 
continued to be heard and respected in eastern affairs until around the mid-1870s. It was the input of these 
men that inspired a new round of geopolitical debate on the role and tasks facing Russia in Asia during and 
immediately following her period of major expansion in Central Asia, and that served too to maintain the 
impetus of Russian military studies of Asia begun in the 1820s. The Caucasus had served as a theatre in 
which deliberately to 'blood' young officers of the then still-nascent Russian General Staff, it being the 
only military district where combat could be guaranteed in 'peacetime', and Nicholas I dispatched officers 
there with this specific intent from the 1830s onwards. 85 As a result of Nicholas' injunction of 1836, 
combined with a natural wave of volunteers, there were never less than 25-33 officers of the General Staff 
83 Alekseev, Voennaia Razvedka Rossii ot Riurika do Nikolaia II (Kni~ I.) p.71. 
84 Shelukhin, 'Razvedyvatel'nye organy v strukture vysshego voennogo upravleniia rossiiskoi imperii 
nachala XXveka (1906-1914gg.)' p.18. 
85 E. Willis Brooks, 'Nicholas I as Reformer: Russian Attempts to Conquer the Caucasus, 1825-1855' in: 
Nation and Ideology. Essays in Honour o/Wayne S. Vucinich (NY: Columbia University Press 1981) p.25l. 
G1inoetskii, Istoriia Russkogo Genera/'nogo Shtaba Tom II. 1826-1855 (St Petersburg: Voennaia 
Tipografiia 1894) pp.200-266 and his earlier articles 'Sluzhba general'nago shtaba pri kavkazskikh 
voiskakh s 1832 po 1853' VS 7-8-9 (1888) pp.38-66, 249-266, 30-60. 
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serving in the Caucasus at anyone time between 1833 and 1855.86 Much of the work of these officers was 
in statistical, ethnographic and topographical work, often attended by extreme risk. 87 The expedition of 
Baron Tomau to the Black Sea coast in 1836 for instance resulted in his being captured by a Kabardian 
prince and held to ransom. On another occasion, a survey party sent to work in the Kuban region under 
cover of being a convoy was repeatedly attacked by mountaineers; one topographer was wounded by a 
bullet in the chest, several Cossacks were killed, and the plane-table and topographical instruments were 
themselves badly damaged by the mountaineers' swords, a vivid expression of local feeling against the 
scientific instruments that sought to encompass them. Another survey party in Avaria in 1838 led by Lt.-
Colonel Berengeim of the General Staff was completely wiped out by mountaineer attack. Awards for such 
work were correspondingly high. Baron Tomau. a typical example, on his release from caJXivity was given 
promotion, the order of St Vladimir Fourth Class, and a 4,000 rouble monetary grant The cuJmination of 
this scientific enterprise by the General Staff came in 1854 with the formation of an independent military-
topographical section attached to the Caucasus Corps. This section had at its disposal both geodesic 
instruments, an archive of maps and plans, and the use of Tillis' magnetic observatory and the stations 
under its jurisdiction. 88 Whilst many officers still sought relocation to the Caucasus inspired by the 
romantic tales of Lermontov, Pushkin and Bestuzhev-Marlinsky therefore89, a significant by-product of the 
Caucasus experience was a small cadre of staff officers inclined not only to take their profession seriously, 
but with a specific interest in Asiatic imperial affairs. Although the General Staff's official historian may 
have lamented that the experience of officers in the Caucaus failed to translate into reforms in the wider 
army, unlike the French officer corps in Algeria, the input of these staff officers did pJay a role in 
ultimately shortening the conflict.90 Officers in the Caucasus and Jater Central Asian corps in addition soon 
came to have their own distinct identity within the army and to form distinct lobby groups. This was 
86 Glinoetskii, Istoriia Russkogo General'nogo Shtaba Tom II. pp.200-1. 
87 For a review of the literary legacy of some of these expeditions, see: Pokrovskii, Kavkazskie Voiny i 
Imamat Shamilia pp.41-53. For an individual example of their work, see: Polkovnik Rakint, '''Kratkii 
istoricheskii ocherk khristianstva kavkazskikh gortsev so vremen Sv. Apostolov do XIX v." (Publikatsiia 
V. A Zakharova)' in: I. A. Nastenko (00.), Sbomik Russkogo Istoricheskogo Obshchestva 2 (150) 
(Moscow: Russkaia Panorama 2000) pp.15-38. 
88 Istoricheskii Ocherk deiate/'nosti Korpusa Voennykh Topografov. 1822-1872p.I96. 
89 Zisserman, Bariatinskii's biographer, left an account of his own entry into the Caucasus Corps citing the 
inspiration of these very writers; for details and the more generalliterarylRomantic background see: Susan 
Layton, Russian Literature and Empire. Conquest of the Caucasusfrom Pushkin to Tolstoy. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 1994) p.127. 
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exacerbated by the tendency of officers in these theatres to make their career there, leaving only to retire or 
take promotion to the War Ministry.91 The most prominent graduates of the Caucasus school were destined 
to be at the forefront of imperial strategic decision making in the second half of the nineteenth century; they 
included D. A Miliutin himself, K. P. fon Kaufman, N. N. Murav' ev (later Murav'ev-Amurskii), and D. I. 
Romanovskii. The bonds forged between individuals in the Caucasus would often be preserved long into 
later life in often very diverse state service, through both informal communication and social events like the 
'Caucasus evenings' held in StPetersburg in the early 1860s. These latter events were attended by, 
amongst others, Romanovskii and War Minister Miliutin. 92 Undoubtedly the father figure of this whole 
school, however, was the final conqueror of the Caucasus, Prince Aleksandr Ivanovich Bariatinskii. 
2.2 Expanding into Muslim Asia: Prince Bariatinskii and the GeopoliticalDebgte. 1856-1873. 
The figure of Prince Bariatinskii proves a difficult one to fully encompass in the present study; he 
deserves, indeed, an individual biographical study of his own. This difficulty is created, on the one hand, by 
the very scope of his personality itself; on the other, by the undeniable seesaw of his own career, from 
being both popular and influential at court and in the army, to falling out of favour by the very early 186Os. 
However, Bariatinskii's influence not only on the military thinking but also on the cultural mindset of 
Russia's succeeding generation of imperialists was profound Whilst the emphasis here will be on his 
strategic influence therefore, it is necessary also to note in passing his personal influence on the Slavophile 
movement within the army. 
Bariatinskii's Slavophile tendencies emerged most strongly during the Polish crisis of the 1860s, 
but he also had a direct personal influence on the individual who would later emerge as the army's most 
ardent Slavophile campaigner, General Cherniaev.93 Slavophilism would in fact continue to prove a potent 
90 Glinoetski~ Istoriia Russkogo General'nogo Shtaha Tom II. pp.200-4. 
91 Peter Morris, 'The Russians in Central Asia, 1870-1887.' SEER 3, (133, 1975) p.536 
92 L. G. Zakharov (ed), Vospominaniia General-Fel'dmarshala Grafa Dmitriia Alekseevicha Miliutina 
1860-1862 (Moscow: Rossiskii fond kultuIy studiia ''TRITE'' Nikity Mikhailova "Rossiiskii Archlv" 1999) 
pp. 37-8 on the initiation of these social functions in 1861 where Caucasus veterans would meet to exchange 
reminiscences. 
93 See for instance the letter of Cherniaev to Bariatinskii in: Zisserman, Fel'dmarshal' kniaz' Aleksandr' 
Ivanovich ' Bariatinskii Tom.Ill pp.343-5 and also MacKenzie, The lion of Tashkent pp.26-28. In arguing 
the primacy of the conquest of the Caucasus in the formation of this ideology in the imperial context, I 
follow the argument deployed by Thomas Barrett in: 'The Remaking of the Lion ofDagestan: Shamil in 
Captivity. 'RR 53 (1994) 1'1'.353-366. 
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ingredient in the New Russian Imperialism of the late nineteenth century, as the figures of Generals 
Skobelev, Fadeev and E. P. Kovalevskii also demonstrate.94 Fascination with the East amongst Slavophiles 
eventually mutated to produce an ideological movement, the Vostokniki ,some of whose members and 
supporters, Prince Ukhtomskii and Minister of Finance S. Iu. Vitte in particular, were actually to briefly 
guide Russian state policy in the 1890s and early 1900s.9s 
Bariatinskii's key significance to the Russian school of eastern strategy lies, however, in two 
aspects: in his personal actions in the Caucasus and in the influence he had on the small cadre of officers he 
gathered around himself there. Bariatinskii was an individual possessing, as one scholar recently put it, , a 
penchant for promoting the most diverse strategic, diplomatic, domestic and foreign policy projects. ,96 
Whilst the wildness of some of these schemes was undoubtedly one factor in his later fall from favour, 
during his period as Viceroy of the Caucasus he was also responsible for inspiring a generation of soldiers 
with a vision of Russia's potential in the East in a way very few others had. 
Perhaps one of Bariatinskii 's most distinctive traits was his ability to see both the Caucasus and 
Central Asia as plrt of a united strategic sphere demanding special interest and care. Thus he was among 
the first to see a link between Russian reverses in the Black Sea and Britain's position in India- that 'the 
road to Constantinople lay through Herat ,97 
Whilst this would become an article of faith with Russia's eastern strategic school in later years, 
culminating in a number of offensive plans based upon this principle in 1878, Bariatinskii's earliest plans 
were actually defensive. The Crimean War had created a paradigm that was to guide Russian strategic 
94 Hans Rogger, 'The Skobelev Phenomenon: the Hero and his Worship.' OSP IX (1976) pp.46-78. At 
around the same time that General E. P. Kovalevskii, head of the Foreign Ministry Asiatic Department 
(1856-61) was advocating expansion in Central Asia. he was attempting to recruit Ivan Aksakov to produce 
a Pan-Slavic journal: M B. Petrovich, The Emergence of Russian Pan-Slavism. 1856-1870 (NY: Columbia 
University Press 1956) pp.115, 120-1. Chris Bellamy makes the point that Slavophilism could encoUIage 
study of Russia's Asiatic heritage in militaIy works since this experience formed pan of Russia's unique 
and hence distinctive cultural heritage: Bellamy, 'Heirs of Genghis Khan .. ' pp.56-9. 
95 On the Vostokniki see A. Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy. 1881-1904 with special emphasis on 
the causes of the Russo-Japanese War (Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press 1958) 
pp.41-50 and David Schimmelpennick VanderOye, 'The Asianist Vision of Prince Ukhtomskii' in 
Evtuhov, Gaspu-ov, Ospovat, & Von Hagen (eds.), Kazan. Moscow. St.Petersburg: Multiple Faces of the 
Russian Empire pp.188-202. The latter article is based in put on Van del Oye's comprehensive thesis on 
the vostokniki, which significantly increases existing knowledge on the subject: '''Ex Oriente Lux" 
Ideologies of Empire and Russia's Far East, 1895-1904' Yale Doctoral Dissertation 1997. 
96 V. G. Chernukha, 'Imperator Aleksandr II i fel'dmarshal kniaz' A. I. Bariatinskii' in A A Fursenk.o 
(ed.), Rossiia v XIX-XX w.Sbornik statei k 70-letiiu so dnia rozhdeniia Rafaila Sholomovicha Ganelina 
(St.Petersburg: Izdatel'stvo "Dmitri Bulanin" 1998) p.1l3 
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policy till 1870, that of a naval coalition attacking Russia on its coastal borderlands. This posed as grave a 
threat in Asia as in the Baltic and Black Sea.98 Indeed, the Crimean War had seen small-scale but 
significant action by an Anglo-French naval force bombarding the Russian port ofPetropavlovsk-na-
Kamchatke in the Far East 99 Fearing a British strike from the East in 1856, Bariatinskii recommended 
establishing friendly relations with the Turkmen, opening relations with the rulers of Central Asia 
generally, building observation points on the Caspian and renewing relations with Persia.JOo To help 
accomplish these schemes he recommended dispatching a military-scientific mission to the Central Asian 
khanates to gather information-the genesis of the Ignat'ev Mission of 1858.101 Ignat'ev's mission was 
destined to be one of three intelligence 'probes' deployed by the War Ministry with the aid of the Asiatic 
Department of the Foreign Ministry and the Imperial Geographic Society in 1856-58, the other two being 
the trip of N. V.Khanykov to Iran and Herat and that of the Kazakh explorer Captain Chokan Valikhanov to 
Kashgar. However Ignat'ev in particular, brought to the Tsar's attention by Bariatinskii, was to become one 
of the major inheritors of Bariatinskii's eastern legacy. As head of the Asiatic Department of the Foreign 
Ministry he and War Minister D. A Miliutin were to oversee the first stages of the later annexation of 
Central Asia, a movement for which Ignat 'ev was an impassioned proponent. 1 02 
Bariatinskii also initiated in 1857 some of the first actua1 staff feasibility studies on Russian 
strategy in the East, utilizing the talents of two staff officers of the Caucasus military district- Lieutenant-
General A A Neverovskii (1818-64) and Major General E.!. Chirikov (1805-62), whilst Lieutenant-
General S. A Khrulev (1807-70) also contributed an independent study on his own initiative. These men 
were characteristic of the types of staff officer interested in Asiatic affairs who would go on to typify 
97 Rieber, The Politics of Autocracy. Letters of Alexander II to Prince A. 1. Bariatinskii 1857-1864 p.73 
98 William C. Fuller, Strategy and Power in Russia 1600-1914 (New York: The Free Press 1992) pp.265-8, 
458. Andrew D. Lambert, The Crimean War. British grand strategy, 1853-56 (Manchester & New York: 
Manchester University Press 1990) pp.341-347. 
99 For details, see: John J. Stephan, 'The Crimean War in the Far East' MAS III (3, 1969) pp. 257-277 
100 Zisserman, Fel'dmarshal kniaz' Aleksandr lvanovich ' Bariatinskii Tom IT pp.120-121. A similar fear of 
British designs lay behind the slightly earlier urgings of Murav'ev-Amurskii to pursue a more active policy 
in Siberia: S. C. M. Paine, Imperial Rivals. China, Russia and their Disputed Frontier (Armonk, New 
York: M.E.Sharpe 1996) pp.36-9 
101 For an English translation ofIgnat'ev's account of this mission see J. L. Evans, (trans., ed.)Mission of 
N. P. 19nat 'ev to Khiva and Bukhara in 1858 (Newtonville Ma: Oriental Research Partners 1984). For an 
overview, see: N. A KhaIfin, Tri Russkie Missii. lz lstorii vneshnei politiki Rossii na Srednem Vostoke vo 
vtoroi polovine 60-kh godov XIX veka. (Tashkent: Izdatel' stvo SAGU 1956). 
61 
personnel at the Asiatic Department of the General Staff. Neverovskii, a staff graduate of 1838, had served 
in the Caucasus in 1840-45, taking part in many expeditions and going on to publish in the 'Military 
Journal' articles such as 'A Historical View on Dagestan' and 'On the Beginning of Unrest in Northern and 
Central Dagestan'. Chirikov was a staff officer equally experienced in Asiatic affairs, having served in the 
Russo-Turkish war of 1828-29 and mediated in delimiting the Russo-Turkish and Russo-Persian borders in 
1848 and 1856-58. Khrulev meanwhile had directed the siege and stonn of the Kokandian fort of Ak-
Mechel' (renamed Perovskii) in 1853 and had served in the Caucasus Corps since 1856. 
Neverovskii wrote a cautious presentation on a possible Russian expedition to India, urging that 
the Russians must detennine whether they wished to conquer the country or merely drive the English out. 
He set out four preconditions he regarded as essential, including a Persian alliance and the certainty that 
war would not erupt in Europe. Only exceptional circumstances, such as an uprising against the English, 
could justify so risky a venture as a Russian advance on India Chirikov, dividing Anglo-Russian rivalry in 
Asia into three categories-political, commercial and military- concluded that an armed collision was 
unlikely, although in that event he foresaw Kokand as a supply area and Bukhara as a forward base for 
Russian forces. The creation of a Caspian flotilla caplble of landing Russian troopS on the Persian bank, 
perhaps at Astrabad, (present-day Gorgan) could have important political effects in tenns of securing 
Persia's loyalty. Examining at the same time the situation in the Persian Gulf, Chirikov again recommended 
political over military measures- manipuJating American and French interests in the region for instance- to 
forestall English goals of local hegemony. In particular he recommended the patronage of Muslim pilgrims 
from the Transcaucasus as a possible means for the Russian military to gain intelligence agents in Baghdad, 
Bushire, Shiraz and Mohammer.103 Khrulev's memorandum meanwhile, submitted independently during 
the course of the Crimean War itself, and largely reiterated during the Polish crisis of 1863, remained the 
most visionary. He outlined a march from Astrakhan to Peshawar and Atok that would take either 82 or 109 
days depending on the precise route of advance, through either Khiva or Persia, respectively. 104 
102 N. S. Kiniapina, 'Sredniaia Aziia v planakh i deistviiakh Rossii v 60-80-e gody XIX veka.' In: S. L. 
Tikhvinskii (ed.), Rossiia i strany blizhnego zarubezh 'ia: Istoriia i Sovremennost' (Moscow: IRI RAN 
1995)p.130. 
103 Shastitko (ed.), Russko-Indiiskie Otnosheniia v XIXv pp.87-93. 
104 Ibid, pp.128-35. Khrulev made reference to the plans of Napoleon, who had set himself the even more 
radical timetable of a 55-day march. 
These early staff studies on Russian strategy in the East initiated by Bariatinskii were decisively 
rejected by the Foreign Ministry and War Minister N. 0. Sukhozanet. The latter in particular wrote a 
62 
lengthy report to the Tsar on the impracticality of a Russian expedition to India, particularly given Russia's 
parlous financial condition In this memorandum he portrayed Britain as an all-powerful manipulator, 
infinitely capable of avoiding battle whilst buying off Persia, Turkey and Afghan tribesmen till the moment 
came when they could fallon the weakened Russian armies, taking advantage of their over-extended 
supply line. Even a limited expedition to seize Hera!, in his view, could not really promise decisive political 
results in Russia's favour.105 He recommended measures closer to home, including the stockpiling of 
Astrakhan and Baku with military supplies and the more rapid rearmament of the Caucasus corps with 
rifled carbines and percusSion arms as a means of attaining security in the East. In particular he 
recommended the creation of a general reserve in the Volga area, composed of the yth and IV" army 
corps, a strategic theme the General Staff would return to in 1910. The mpiddispatch of these forces in 
wartime he assigned to river traffic mther than to mil lines however, and to this end he also urged an 
increase in military and commercial traffic on the Volga river and Caspian Sea. Though prone to 
exaggemtion and displaying shortcomings in geographical knowledge, these studies indicate that Russian 
staff officers had begun to seriously consider the geopolitical significance and difficulties of their Asiatic 
frontiers long before the full conquest of Central Asia was even undertaken. In this regard, as in so much 
else, the Crimean War served to sound a strategic warning for Russia's policy-forming elites, and 
Bariatinskii led the way in highlighting the dangers that had emerged and focusing attention on corrective 
measures.106 
Bariatinskii's influence was not merely strategic however, but administrative. Another officer who 
served under him and who went on to serve in Central Asia was D. l Romanovskii. The two had initially 
met in 1847, when Romanovskii came to the Caucasus to gain combat experience prior to his enlisting at 
the Staff Academy. 107 Later, Bariatinskii would visit Romanovskii at the academy to discuss with him his 
own ideas on warfare in the Caucasus, comparing the Prince's plans with the lectures on the Caucasus that 
105 Ibid, pp.94-100 
106 Milan Hauner, What is Asia to Us? Russia's Asian Heartland Yesterday and Today (Boston: Unwin 
H~ 1990) p.79 
10 D. I. Romanovskii, 'General Fel'dmarshal kniaz Aleksandr Ivanovich Bariatinskii i Kavkazskaia voina. 
1815-1879' RS XXX (1881) pp.268-270. 
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Romanovskii was then receiving at the academy from D. A .Miliutin. Romanovskii's service in the 
Caucasus gave him opportunity to observe strategy being made there at the highest level, and some 
indication of the confidences he was let into is evident in a letter Bariatinskii sent to Miliutin in 1856: 
I dispatch to you, by way of a plenipotentiary envoy, Captain 
Romanovskii, to pass to me and receive from you explanations, which 
might escape or be difficult to express on the page; he is to me a person I 
can trust and I dare to think that he might manage to win your trust as 
On writing his lectures on warfare in the Caucasus in 1860, Romanovskii praised Bariatinskii as the only 
commander to have grasped the torch of understanding dropped since the death of Vel'iaminov- the only 
general to see the Caucasus as essentially an administrative problem akin to a siege.109 These lectures were 
based in part both upon Romanovskii's first-hand observations of the Caucasus and upon personal talks he 
had had with Shamil, the defeated rebel leader, when Romanovskii was head of the General Staff's 
temporary Asiatic Department in 1859.110 Romanovskii' s lectures, which in the new-found spirit of the 
times aspired to be a 'military-statistical portrait,lll, with accompanying emphasis on geography and 
ethnography, shared Bariatinskii's view on Russia's future in the East: 
If Peter the Great founded St Petersburg to break through 
a window through which Russia could look at Europe, then 
in our time by pacifying the Caucasus we break through a 
window for the whole of Western Asia, for Persia, Armenia, 
Mesopotamia, sunk in an age of torpor. 112 
In writing his lectures then, Romanovskii was striving very much to formulate a strategic 
paradigm from the Caucasus experience that might be usefully applied as Russia sought to expand its 
108 Zisserman, Fel'dmarshal kniaz' Aleksandr Ivanovich ' Bariatinskii, Tom IT p.l05 
109 D. I. Romanovskii, Kavkaz i Kavkazskaia Voina. Publichnyia lektsii chitannyia v zale passazha v 1860 
~od (StPetersburg: Tipografii Tovarishchestvo "Obshchestvennaia pol'za" 1860) pp.412-13 
10 Romanovskii, 'General Fel'dmarshal kniaz Aleksandr Ivanovich Bariatinskii i Kavkazskaia voina. 
1815-1879' p.286. 
III Romanovskii, Kavkaz i Kavkazskaia Voina. Publichnyia lektsii p.2 
112 Ibid, p.48 A similar metaphor was used around this period for Governor-General Murav'ev's seizure of 
the Amur, see Bassin, Imperial Visions pp.158-9. 
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influence over other Muslim lands. Bariatinskii' s strength as Viceroy in the Caucasus lay in the fact that he 
was the first commander-in-chief there to have spent all his previous campaigning years in the Caucasus. 
He brought to the job a wealth of tactical and cultural experience which the likes of Paskevich and 
Vorontsov lacked, and was welcomed by officers and soldiers of the Caucasus Corps as one of their own. I \3 
Between them, Bariatinskii and Miliutin rearranged the Caucasus military system on a more logical supply 
and command pattern of military districts- a pattern Miliutin would repeat of course in his later, wider 
reform of the Russian Empire. Such a pattern reinforced the distinction of the Caucasus and Central Asian 
annies from the metropole- Bariatinskii establishing in law what Vorontsov had already achieved in theory, 
that the Caucasus demanded an 'independent high command ,114 The military district system sanctioned 
local staff networks to supplement the St.Petersburg centre with their own expertise, a system unlikely to 
have been formally instituted had not Bariatinskii proven its worth in defeating Shamil. Miliutin himself 
went on to acknowledge in his memoirs the importance of the Caucasus experience on his own later 
development of the concept. I IS In the words of one recent scholar, there grew up out of the Caucasus 
experience a military staff system across the empire with 'its own geography of talent, which 
complemented its emerging culture of talent ,116 Stress upon individual drill and ttaining in the Caucasus 
Corps including fencing, gymnastics, literacy and arithmetic produced a crack force that Miliutin, again, 
would try to reproduce in his later wider reform of the army. 
This remarkable burst of administrative effort was reinforced by the emphasis Bariatinskii placed 
upon accurate analysis of the social problem of the Caucasus, best demonstrated in his report 'on the 
internal condition of the Caucasus.' 117 Having attributed the strength of Shamil' s revolt to the Russians' 
initial misunderstanding of the balance between clan and clergy, Sharial andAdat law, Bariatinskii 
proposed that the creation of long-tenn peace in the Caucasus would rest on sepamting civil from spiritual 
society, so weakening the temporal powers of the Muslim clergy. This would turn the people gradually 
towards embracing the legal civic role of Russian nationality whilst- and this was a pet project of 
Bariatinskii's- a reinvigorated Armenian Christian church would gradually take the place of the Islamic 
113 Romanovskii, Kavkaz i Kavkazskaia Voina. pp.407-8 
114 Ibid. p.407-8 
115 Zakharov (ed.), Vospominaniia GeneraJ-FeJ'dmarshaJa Grafa Dmitriia Alekseevicha Miliutina 1860-
1862p.266 
116 Rich, The Tsar's Colonels p.71 
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faith in people's spiritual lives. Whilst containing elements that were Bariatinskii's own, this formula 
foreshadowed Kaufman's later policy of officially ignoring the Muslim religion in Central Asia rather than 
directly intervening, and marked a stark contrast from the spasmodic attempts at forced conversion 
attempted by the Russian state in the Muslim borderlands in the past. I 18 This policy of attempting to create 
what Romanovskii termed a 'modus vivendi' of imperial accommodation with the local Muslim population 
would become the governing policy of the Asiatic Department in subsequent years. Bariatinskii's belief 
that in supporting local nobility the Russians had driven the population into the hands of the fanatical 
clergy would prove a particularly influential point of view just a few years later. That later period saw the 
formulation and introduction of what one scholar has termed 'citizenship strategy' in the eastern 
borderlands during the Great Reforms. In this reform Miliutin, amongst others, would support a direct 
break from traditional Russian military-political policy in the past. From now on along its Asiatic frontiers 
the Tsarist administration would desist from issuing medals and awards to traditional tribal nobility, 
favouring instead the establishment of new institutions of self-government and reformed courts. It is 
difficult to interpret this new policy instituted from 1868 onwards as anything other than a direct legacy of 
Russia's Caucasus experience. I 19 
The lessons Romanovskii himself drew from Bariatinskii's campaign were that subjugation of 
Muslim lands should rest on clearly attainable military goals appropriate to a strategic siege in conjunction 
with conciliatory political measures. These measures would be designed to avoid local unrest and at the 
same time to create new bonds of civic loyalty to Russia. Examining the results of the recent revolt by the 
'unwarlike' Indian people against the British, Romanovskii pointed out that the use of measures of 
'excessive constriction' in the Caucasus, so much more warlike and inaccessible, would lead to a 'war of 
annihilation' which 'would demand sacrifices that Russia in its present condition could barely sustain ,120 
Romanovskii also came to actually apply some of the administrative experience of the Caucasus during his 
own period of command in Central Asia, guided by his mentor during that later period, War Minister D. A 
117 Zisserman, Fel'dmarshal kniaz' Aleksandr Ivanovich' Bariatinskii,Tom.II A>.277-9 
118 In the Caucasus War, the Russian administration in the past had also however attempted to utilize the 
Muslim clergy against Shamil. See for example: L. Klimovich, Islam v tsarskoi Rossii. Ocherki (Moscow: 
Gosudarstevennoe Antireligioznoe izdatel'stvo 1936) pp.26-7. 
119 Dov Yaroshevski, 'Empire and Citizenship' in: Brower & Lazzerini (eds.), Russia's Orient pp.69-70. 
Yaroshevski does not establish the link with Bariatinskii' s views, although he does mention Miliutin. 
120 Romanovskii, Kavkaz i Kavkazskaia Voina, p.366 
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Miliutin. Utilizing Bariatinskii' s actions in the Caucasus as his model, Romanovskii reinforced and 
reorganized the power of native courts (mekhkettas) in order to challenge and undermine the power of the 
traditional Muslim clergy.121 
The mekhketta is a useful symbol of how the Russian Army attempted to understand and adopt 
local customs and then apply them across a broad scale. Such secular courts had first spread with the Arab 
Empire, but with its passing had steadily lost ground and influence to the Islamic clergy. Seeking any 
traditional civil structure that would undermine the clergy's dominance, Russian forces in the Caucasus had 
first re-instituted these courts during the reign ofErmolov, but it took the efforts ofBariatinskii to get them 
enough funding to escape charges of corruption and abuse of power. Bariatinskii had consciously based his 
actions here both upon the precedent earlier set by Ermolov and upon the use made by the French of similar 
institutions in Algeria. l22 Study of the French experience for comparison was by no means a novel 
approach on Bariatinskii's put. As early as the 1840s the head of the Caucasus Committee had drawn up 
for Nicholas I a comparative study of Russian and French administrative policies in the Caucasus and 
Algeria, respectively. 123 Once they had earned a reputation for fairness meanwhile, demand for the courts 
Bariatinskii promoted in the Caucasus in this later period spread enormously, creating an active 
counterbalance to the rougher justice of Shamil's naibs. With Miliutin's support. Romanovskii promoted 
the use of such courts in Central Asia on the same principle, and instituted two parallel systems, one for the 
urban Sarts based on Shariat andAdat laws, and one for the less deeply indoctrinated nomad population 
based largely on traditional custom. Members of the court were elected, disputed decisions were to be 
referred to the Russian governor-general, whilst in the Tashkent mekhkettas there was to be one 
'indispensable' member- the kazi, or traditional judge. Within the Central Asian context however, as later 
121 D. I. Romanovskii, Zametki po Sredne-Aziatskomu voprosu (St.Petersburg: Tipografii Tovarishchestvo 
«Obshchestvennaia pol'za» 1868) pp.259-261. 
122 'Thus, this peculiarity is used both by us in the Caucasus and by the French in Algeria. '- Romanovskii, 
'General Fel'dmarshal kniaz Aleksandr Ivanovich Bariatinskii i Kavkazskaia voina. 1815-1879' p.283. 
Bariatinskii was also influenced by comparison of the mekhketta system used in Chechnia to Russian policy 
in the Transcaucasus: V. N. Ivanenko, Grazhdanskoe upravlenie Zakavkaz 'em ot prisoedineniia Gruzii do 
namestnichestvo Velikogo Kniazia Mikhaila Nikolaevskaia. Istoricheskii ocherk (Tiflis: Tipogmfiia 
Kantselerii Glavnonachal'stvuiushchogo grazhdanskoiu chast'iu na Kavkaze, Loris-Melikovskaia ulitsia, 
dom kazennyi. 1901) pp.437-48. On the extent to which Russian experience in the Caucasus, Siberia and 
Kazakhstan was used in the formation of the administration of Turkestan see also: D.V. Vasil'ev, 
'Or~atsiia i funktsionirovanie glavnogo upravleniia v Tutkestanskom general-gubernatorstve (1865-
1884 gg.) VMU 3 (1999) pp.48-61. 
critics have noted, the Russian adoption of such institutions in practice had as much a disruptive as 
placatory effect. The fonnal election of kaz;s replaced the older system of having these men appointed by 
khans, and led to governmental corruption in consequence.124 Local unrest led to the mekhketta system 
being abandoned and contributed indirectly to Romanovskii' s replacement as the local commander-in-
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chief. Nonetheless the principle of legislative toleration for local law and custom continued to be pI3ctised 
by the Russian army in its Asiatic military districts and other spheres of influence in Asia, notably in 
Manchuria.125 
The Caucasus War, therefore, had a deep and long-lasting influence upon Russia's succeeding 
generation of Asiatic experts in both geopolitical and administrative terms. Administratively, it firmly 
embedded in the Russian military consciousness an undoubtedly already latent respect for, and abiding 
fears regarding, 'Muslim fanaticism.' In strategic terms meanwhile, with a few notable exceptions such as 
Lomakin's 1879 expedition to Geok-Tepe, the Russians in this latter period deployed their troops to 
attainable goals, aiming at the type of gradual strategic envelopment advocated by Vel'iaminov and 
Romanovskii. This was a policy guided not only by the Caucasus experience but also by the simultaneous 
steppe expeditions of the 1840s and 50s. The desert proved as unforgiving as mountain terrain to attempts 
to fight lightning campaigns, as Perovskii's 1839 expedition against Khiva demonstrated. Russian thinkers 
came to lay stress on the virtues of this finn but gradualist approach by comparing it favourably to the 
British policy on the North-West Frontier of India; to many Russians it became another symbol of their 
greater understanding and superiority in dealings with AsiatiCS.126 So closely was this pattern of gradualism 
123 I. P. Petrushevskii (ed.), Kolonial 'naia politika rossisskogo tsarizm v Azerbaidzhane v 20-6O-kh gg. 
XIXv. (Chast' 2) (MoscowlLeningrad: Izdatel'stvo Akademii Nauk SSSR 1937) pp.286-90. 
124 Seymour Becker, 'The Russian Conquest of Central Asia and Kazakhstan: Motives, Methods, 
Consequences.' In H. Malik (ed.), Central Asia. Its Strategic Importance and Future Prospects (London: 
Macmillan Press Ltd. 1994) p.27. Count Pahlen, author of the largest Tsarist report on the administration in 
Turkestan, felt the attempt to undermine the force of the Shariat by deference to 'local custom' was 
misguided in that the absence of just such 'local custom' amongst the natives merely allowed native judges 
to follow their own arbitrary will: D. S. M. Williams, 'Native Courts in Tsarist Central Asia' CAR 
XIV(l,l966) p.10. 
125 Quested, 'Matey' Imperialists? The TsaristRussians in Manchuria 1895-1917p.115. 
126 Marvin compared Russian methods of 'advancing, punishing and remaining' to a British policy of 
'alternately advancing and retiring.' Both General Chemiaev and Semenov Tian-Shanskii supported the 
Russian method as superior. C. Marvin, The Russian Advance on India. Conversations with Skobeleff, 
Ignatieff and other distinguished Russian generals and statesmen on the Central Asian Question. (London: 
Sampson, Low & Co. 1882) pp.130, 145. 
followed, in fact, that some scholars both then and since attributed the conquest of Central Asia to a 
deliberate geostrategic masterplan-a distinctive, four-stage pincer movement. 1 27 
Geopoliticians have always been eager to attribute Russia with Machiavellian cunning on the 
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southern frontier ever since the myth of 'Peter the Great's Testament' first gained currency. In actual fact, 
the seemingly calculated logic of Russian expansion in Central Asia arose from divergent factors. The 
majority of the participants in the conquest did have experience in 'Asiatic' or steppe warfare, so therefore 
we can say that their actions were to a degree coordinated simply by virtue of common training and the 
aforementioned 'Caucasus legacy.' This was evident in the preference for limited, fixed objectives and 
close tactical formations discussed in the next chapter, alongside the administrative preferences towards 
subjugated peoples that we have already noted. The generals operated with the explicit support of Miliutin 
and the War Ministry, often against the advice of the Foreign Ministry and its Asiatic .Department, creating 
an understandable image of deliberate diplomatic duplicity in the eyes of foreign observers. l28 On the other 
I 
hand, the early stages of the conquest were carried out under the influence of individuals, most notably the 
impetuous General Cherniaev, going beyond the remit of their instructions. 
Having said all this, military insubordination should not be interpreted as the sole driving force 
behind every movement in Central Asia however; on the contrary, after 1865-66 it often served as a 
convenient cover for the Russian govemment.l29 The overriding factor in Russian policy was therefore 
opportunism, at both the strategic and operational levels. In geopolitical terms, the shape of this pincer 
movement was formed at least in part not by strategic harmony but by competition within the 'Asiatic' 
127 See for instance John P. LeDonne, The Russian Empire and the World 1'1'.130-33. Much geopolitical 
theory on this matter is merely a slightly revised version of the thought of late Victorian strategic thinkers 
in British India such as Sir Henry Rawlinson, who saw Russia as gradually advancing by strategic parallels 
against India rather as an army would tactically invest a fort. In this matter Prince Lobanov-Rostovsky gave 
the soundest rebuff to such concepts over sixty years ago. ' ... had the Russian government possessed the 
faculty for overcoming so easily all the moral and material frictions resulting from the difficult art of 
governing, and had it been capable of carrying out so vast a scheme in so clockwise a manner, it would by 
now have ruled the world' However, 'Such romantic generalizations have an appeal for certain minds.' 
Lobanov-Rostovsky, 'The Shadow of India ... " p.225 
128 Ignat'ev's successor as Head of the Foreign Ministry Asiatic Department, P. N. Stremoukhov (served 
1864-75) was opposed to a specifically military conquest of Central Asia, preferring the route of 
commercial expansion. Miliutin overruled him, though his pet project for establishing a base at 
Krasnovodsk was accepted: Ritchie, 'The Asiatic Department..' pp.324-8 and D. Mackenzie, 'The 
Conquest and Administration of Turkestan, 1860-85' in M Rywkin (ed), Russian Colonial Expansion to 
1917 (London: Mansell Publishing Ltd 1988) pp.212-13. 
129 Hauner, What isAsia to Us? p.45. E. L. Crean, 'The Governor-Generalship of Turkestan under K. P. 
von Kaufmann, 1867-1881.' Unpub. Ph.D. diss. (Yale University 1970) p.23 
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army- by the efforts of Caucasus forces to earn glory in Trans-Caspia equal to that attained by General 
Kaufman's forces in the north of the country. Caucasus generals like Ermolov had expressed a strong 
strategic interest in the eastern bank of the Caspian since the 1820s.130 This process resulted in the anomaly 
that until 1899 the Trans-Caspian oblast' formed part of the Caucasus Military District. The conquest came 
about then from a combination of coordinated plans - the conquest ofKhiva. for instance, being in the end a 
significant operational achievement- and the unplanned factors of rivalry and personal ambition. Although 
the geopolitical advantages of expansion to the East had been understood by Bariatinskii and officers of the 
Russian General Staff before the 186Os, the conquest itself did not unfold in the ways they had foreseen or 
recommended l31 Noting these factors does not invalidate the general conclusion that a distinct' Asiatic 
lobby' of military and diplomatic personnel was now a genuine influence in Russian policy making. The 
form this lobby group took was especially marked in Central Asia during the governor-generalship of K. P. 
fon Kaufman, himself an enthusiastic patron of scientists and Asiatic experts.132 
General Kaufman, like Romanovskii before him, was an officer with Caucasus experience (in 
Kaufman's case, thirteen years), who had worked closely with Bariatinskii there. Indeed, either he or his 
brother had been part of the special corps of liaison officers-referred to by Bariatinskii as 'otbornye', 
implying a hand picked elite- that kept the Prince in contact with the actions of his local commanders.133 
Kaufman went on in the 1860s to help Miliutin implement the military district system across the empire. As 
Governor-General in Central Asia Kaufman gathered around himself a group of Asiatic experts, some 
military and some civilian, who were tasked with studying the strategic, ethnographic, geographic and 
statistical aspects of the Turkestan theatre. During Kaufman's reign this came to include both academic 
personnel and officers working for the Asiatic Department of the General Staff, marking the crossover from 
enthusiasts to deliberately trained military professionals in this sphere. The overall increase of General 
Staff-trained officers serving on the Asiatic frontiers was noted by the Staff Academy's official historian, 
130 Kiniapina, Bliev & Degoev, Kavkaz i Srednaia Aziia vo vneshnei politike Rossii (Vtoraia polovina 
XVIII-80-e godyXIXv.J pp. 221-226. 
131 Bariatinskii for example had advocated a railway linking the Aral and Caspian Seas. On such projects, 
alongside their commercial implications, see: Khalfin, Prisoedinenie Srednei Azii k Rossii (60-90-e gody 
XIXv.) pp. 88-101. 
132 At the end of the 1860s for example Kaufman invited the Russian 'Society for the Lovers of Natural 
Science' to send experts to study his newly-conquered region: A P. Fedchenko, Puteshestvie v Turkestan 
(Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo geograficheskoi literatury 1950) p.9. 
133 Zisserman, Fel'dmarshal kniaz' Aleksandr lvanovich' Bariatinsldi, Tom.II. p.214 
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particularly after Alexander n allowed officers of the Caucasus military-political administration to enroll in 
the General Staff after 1865.134 Some of these men however, such as for example A. N. Kuropatkin, were 
also proteges of men like Kaufman, marking the complicated line between growing professionalism and the 
continuing importance of patronage networks characteristic of most modernizing armies of the time. 
The discord the Asiatic lobby had displayed during the conquest of Central Asia did not bode well 
for their future work together however, in contrast to the 'Western' strategic lobby for whom the menace of 
Germany after 1870 became an unchallenged strategic orthodoxy, favouring unified effort.135 In the end 
only the Far East or Turkey would come to pose a similar focus to Russia's school of Eastern strategists. 
and even here a firm commitment to either one or the other created a clear divergence of strategic interests. 
Before going on to consider the wider strategic commitments examined and undertaken by this new 
generation of Asiatic experts however, a look at the tactical level-the tools through which any proposed 
strategic plan had to operate- seems appropriate. Such a tactical study forms the substance of the next 
chapter. 
134 Glinoetski, Istoricheskii Ocherk Nikolaevskoi Akademii General'nogo Shtaba p.35 1. 
135 Rich, The Tsar's Colonels pp.86-114. 
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3. THE INSTRUMENTS OF EXPANSION. 1714-1885. 
Asiatic crowds may inconvenience us, but they cannot 
hinder us in the accomplishment of our designs. We have 
reached the stage in which, with judicious and systematic 
action- possessing artillery and ammunition beyond the 
proportions needed in European warfare- we can strike 
with effect in the open field and in the mountains. In a 
word, with our present experience ... there is no Asia 
capable of preventing us carrying out the broadest 
strategical designs which we might conceive. 
Geneml Skobelev, 1877.1 
The annies that Russia sent to conquer, guard and govern its Asiatic frontiers in the nineteenth 
century were often both metaphorically and literally armies of exile. Throughout much of the period under 
review, the rail network in the Asiatic provinces was even weaker than in European Russia, ifnot entirely 
non-existent Consequently much of the tactics and strategy developed by the annies on the Asiatic 
frontiers aimed at achieving the greatest results with the least possible numbers. In Centml Asia even in 
1875, reinforcements might take a year to arrive, marching on foot, and War Minister Miliutin noted in his 
diary that assigning reinforcements there could prove a pointless exercise, since they might easily arrive too 
late to be effective.2 Such conditions lay behind the extensive civil and military powers granted Governor-
Geneml Kaufman during his reign there. A degree of administrative autonomy proved the most logical 
option in the Caucasus, on the other band, due not so much to long lines of communication as to the sheer 
complexity of governing the local multi-ethnic community. 
Although Russia's Asiatic frontier by the end of the nineteenth century was governed by climactic 
extremcll- from Adzhariia in the south-west Caucasus, the warmest part of the Russian Empire, to the 
frozen Sitierian taiga of the Far East- in general the border terrain could best be summed up by the terms 
mountain atid stepPe. Mountainous terrain limited lines of approach, whilst the steppe was dominated by 
I H. Suther1and .~ ... , . ,. . R~~. RfJ Projects Against India. From the Czar Peter to General Skobeleff. 
(London: Remi*(\i.t II . ~liprs 1885) p.284. 
2 Zaionchkovskii (ed.), nevrilk p. A. Miuutina 1873-1875 T.l p.86 
\\1" 
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the opposite characteristic- complete freedom of movement, restricted only by the great aridity of the land 
and the extent and capacity of local water resources. In general, geographic differences on either side of the 
border were nowhere so dramatic that analysis of past difficulties would have been fruitless in the 
formation of future war planning.3 Nonetheless the explorer Mikhail Veniukov complained that mountain 
and steppe warfare was comparatively ignored by the Russian tacticians of his day, despite the fact that 
'both these types of warfare in Russia's borders are continual.' Veniukov credited A I. Maksheev with 
producing the first work on steppe tactics in both his lectures to the Staff Academy and in an entty on the 
subject in the Military-Encyclopedic Lexicon.4 Veniukov's own article on the subject was intended to 
widen debate on the area in Russian military circles, but in the years that followed, commentary on the type 
of warfare Russia encountered on its Asiatic frontiers remained comparatively scanty, easily dwarfed by 
coverage of contemporary European military developments. The general balance of interest at the Russian 
General Staff Academy is reflected in a catalogue of that Academy's library from 1879, when the library is 
recorded as containing 3297 books. Under the category of 'wars in Asia from ancient times to the present 
era' the library had 100 works in various languages. This collection included diverse and often instructive 
material, such as an 1800 account of the English war in India against Tipu Sultan, a study of British 
operations in the Mahratta War of 1817-19, General Wolseley's account of war in China in 1860 and 
Kaye's history of the First Anglo-Mghan War. That collection was dwarfed however by the section in the 
library of holdings on 'wars in Europe from the Classical period to the present' which contained 2313 
works. On the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 alone the library contained 296 works- i.e. there were more 
than twice as many works on that one war alone as there were works on wars in Asia 5 Against this 
background, undoubtedly the two foremost campaigners within Russian military circles for greater study of 
steppe campaigns and Asiatic warfare were Lt. -Colonel A I. Maksheev and General M. I. Ivanin. 
Both of these men were veterans of Russian warfare in the steppe in the 1830s-40s who had risen 
to serve in prominent posts by the time of Russia's major expansion in Central Asia in the 1860s and 
3 For an effective geographic summary of this terrain, see: Christian, A History o/Russia, Central Asia and 
Mongolia. Volume 1,' Inner Eurasia from Prehistory to the Mongol Empire. pp.3-19 and Robert N. Taafe, 
'The geographic setting' in: D. Sinor (ed.), The Cambridge History o/Early Inner Asia (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 1990) pp.19-40. 
4 M. Veniukov, 'Zametki 0 stepnykh' pokhodakh v Srednei Azii' VS XVI (1860) p.269-70. 
5 Sistematicheskii Katalog' biblioteki Glavnogo Shtaba (St.Petersburg: Tipografiia Golike, Nevskii No. 
106, 1879) pp.416-20. 
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1870s. Of the two, Maksheev had the greater claim to be influential given his holding of a teaching post in 
later life at the Nikolaevskaia Staff Academy. The single overriding principle that both Ivanin and 
Maksheev strove to inculcate in their listeners and readers was that Asiatic warfare demanded special 
techniques and careful study. Although heat, aridity and disease posed major obstacles to the movement of 
large bodies of troops in Asia, study of the campaigns of past conquerors-Chinghiz Khan, Tamerlane, Nadir 
Shah-proved that these obstacles were far from insurmountable. In his study of General V. A Perovskii' s 
Khivan campaign of 1839 (in which he puticipated), Ivanin pointed out at the outset that the purely 
seasonal factor of winter in the steppe should not be considered the sole overriding explanation for the 
failure of the expedition. As evidence he reminded his readers that both Chinghiz Khan and Tamerlane had 
campaigned successfully in the steppe in wintertime in the past.6 Ivanin attributed the failure of the Russian 
campaign primarily to disorganization and corruption in Perovskii' s own supply train, a fact that apin 
pointed indirectly to the need to study and organize for such campaigns more seriously and scientifically. 
The greatest scientific legacy Ivanin would himself leave was destined to be a comprehensive study of the 
campaigns and military tactics of Chinghiz Khan and Tamerlane. Based both upon eastern texts and the 
works of leading orientalists of the day, this work included campaign maps and diagrams of Mongol and 
Timurid battle-drill, and came to be published posthumously by the Russian General Staff.7 In their 
activities both Ivanin and Maksheev also played some small role as progenitors of a school demanding the 
creation of a distinct and uniquely 'Russian' military art. As Maksheev wrote to a friend in 1858: 
To me it seems that one of the main insufficiencies of our academy 
comprises this, that it takes on entirely military science from the West 
and does not direct sufficient attention to the peculiarities of our own 
Russian historical experience and mission The academy talks a great deal, 
for example, about Turenne and Montecuccoli and so on and, if I am not 
mistaken, not one word is said about Chinghiz-Khan, Tamerlane, Nadir-
Shah and others, and particularly about Ermak, at a time when for a long 
6 M. Ivanin, Opisanie zimniago pokhodv Khivu 1839-1840 (St Petersburg: Tipografiia Tovarishchestva 
"obshchestvennaia pol'za" 1874) pp.5-7. 
7 M. I. Ivanin, 0 voennom iskustve i zavoevaniiakh ' Mongo/-Tatar i Sredne-Aziatskikh narodov pri 
Chingis-khone i Tamer/one. (St Petersburg: Tipografiia Tovarishchestva "obshchestvennaia pol'za" 1875) 
time we have not fought on the model of Montecuccoli and are regularly 
continuing the business ofErmak. They say, that in the actions of the 
Asiatic commanders and our Cossack-heroes, conquering Siberia, there 
is no military art, no science. This is true, according to the model of 
German systemization and dogmatic infallibility, so current amongst 
us in the last war (in 1855)-there is none really, but there is a science, 
lively and practical, which is experienced in Asia by those who are 
successful participants in our movement to the East.8 
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Maksheev and Ivanin were destined to be the leaders of a very small sect in Russian military-philosophical 
thought however. In the development of a school of 'Russian' military art that grew apace at the Staff 
Academy in the 1890s the role of steppe warfare would play no real part, overshadowed by memories of 
the military glories associated with Suvorov, the cult of the bayonet, and the war of 1812.9 Nonetheless a 
study of the output of academy pupils during Maksheev's main period of employment there would suggest 
that his efforts in transmitting his personal concerns to his listeners was not entirely fruitless. 
In 1855 it was decided that officers enrolled in the Academy, aside from their course work, be 
asked to compose annually presentations on military-scientific themes. In 1860 the Academy resolved to 
assess these presentations on a scale of marks, the authors having to defend their works publicly before an 
examining board much in the manner of a viva for modem-day postgraduate students at any major 
university. At the same time it was decided to print collections of the best such presentations for the benefit 
of the wider military public. Maksheev served as editor on the first collection, a study of actions in the 
Transcaucasian theatre during the Crimean war. More unusual however was a piece contained in the 
collection published the following year, a detailed study by Lt. Khakovskii on the seventeenth-century wars 
of Bogdan Kbmel 'nitskii against the Crimean Tatars. This study was accompanied by detailed diagrams of 
the make-up and deployment formations of the Tatar forces, thus giving a full overview of traditional 
nomad tactics. Khakovskii justified his unusual choice of subject on two main grounds, both of which 
8 A 1. Maksheev, Puteshestviia po Kirgizskim Stepiam i Turkestanskomu Kraju (St.Petersburg: Voennaia 
Tipografiia (v zdanii Glavnogo Shtaba) 1896) p.2. 
9 On the formation of this intellectual current in the Staff Academy, see: P. A Zhilina (ed.), Russkaia 
VoennaiaMysl' konetsXIX-nachaloXXv. (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "NAUKA" 1982) pp.l47-189. 
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echoed Maksheev's concerns. Firstly, the tactics employed by the study's main protagonist, Khmel'nitskii, 
differed significantly from those employed in the rest of western Europe of the time, but were no less 
effective for all that. The Ukrainian commander's tactics were an entirely original. home-grown 
phenomenon through which he had nevertheless gained significant victories over the Polish forces, and this 
despite the latter being seen by contemporaries at the time as no less militarily advanced than those of 
Gustav Adolphus. Study of such phenomena demonstrated therefore that the 'Russian' school of military 
art was in no way inferior to its European counterpart, and need not slavishly borrow from the West. 
Secondly, study of Khmel'nitskii's campaigns against the Tatars could in Khakovskii's view carry over a 
direct practical application for the present-
allowing into our tactics a section on mountain warfare, we must not forget 
that war in the steppe has its own characteristic peculiarities .. .It will not be 
superfluous to study wars conducted in the steppes.IO 
Such declarations indicate that Maksheev's urging the study of relevant past campligns against Asiatic 
opponents in order to prepare directly for the present was therefore not falling entirely on deaf ears. 
A lively interest in geographical conditions in Asia and European methods of colonial rule there 
would inform all of Maksheev' s work: meanwhile, including his trips abroad to Algeria and Egypt. I I As 
early as 1856 Maksheev wrote a study of steppe warfare for the leading Russian military gazette of the day, 
striving to draw lessons from 'my own personal observations and experiences.' This study covered nearly 
every aspect of warfare in Russia's Centtal Asian theatres, from transport to fortifications, whilst also 
pointing the reader in the direction of Ivanin's earlier writings on Cbinghiz Khan and Tamerlane. In short, a 
full ten years before the period of major expansion by Russian forces in Centtal Asia even began, 
Maksheev was already seeking to establish an organized and systematic method for studying warfare in 
such theatres.12 Much of what follows therefore owes a large debt both to his own works and to those of a 
10 Poruchik Khakovskii, 'Opyt' izucheniia voin' Bogdan Khmel'nitskogo. Sostoianie voennogo iskusstva v 
Krymskikh Tatar' i Zaporozhtsev. Pervyi pokbod' Bogdan Kbmel'nitskogo do pribytiia ego pod Beluiu 
tserkov.' In: Sbornik sochinenii ofitserov Nikolaevskoi akademii General'nogo Shtaba Kn. 2 (St. 
Petersburg: V tipografiia V.Golovina 1863) p.S8. 
II Maksheev, Puteshestviia po Kirgizskim Stepiam i Turkestanskomu Kraiu pp.2-3. 
12 A. I. Maksheev, Stepnye Pokhody (lz No.19-go i 20-go "Russkogo Invalida" 1856) (SlPetersburg: 
Voennaia Tipografiia 1856). 
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tiny band of followers who categorized lessons from combat in Central Asia retrospectively after the major 
period of expansion there. 
Most of the conflicts Russia fought in expanding its Asiatic frontier fell under the contemporary 
category of 'small wars' (malye voiny). This was a term well understood in Russia, an officer of the 
General Staff having produced a work of that title as early as 1850.13 Russia had enormous experience of 
fighting partisan conflicts ranging from its conflicts with Poland to border clashes with the Chinese 
stretching back to the sixteenth century. Nonetheless the majority of analysis on this subject concentrated 
on irregular warfare within the context of larger, regular-style conflict (such as the Franc-Tireurs of the 
Pranco-Prussian War of 1870). Such operations were of great interest to the Russian General Staff since, 
based both on study of the cavalry raids of the American Civil War and on the writings of the famous 
Russian partisan leader Denis Davydov from 1812, their war plans for Europe for much of this period were 
orientated upon a partisan-style cavalry raid upon the German rail network. Planning for putisan-style 
actions also played a role in Russian war planning for the Par East, particularly during the Russo-Japanese 
War. On that occasion, the Russians planned to utilize 'partisan detachments' of 200 officers and men each 
to operate in the Japanese rear in the event of a Japanese breakthrough in the Primor'e military district. This 
overall emphasis meant that Russian experience in actually combating irregular opponents received by 
contrast relatively meagre attention. 
Given these proclivities, what characteristics did the Russian army therefore exhibit in the realm 
of tactics during its campaigns in Asia? Great distance and isolation could breed suspicion and distrust 
between periphery and metropole in the Russian Empire, just as it did in other, overseas empires. This 
alienation often expressed itself in direct visual and cultural terms. Early on in the Caucasus, the arrival of 
the new Viceroy, Vorontsov, brought at the same time a shining collection of staff-officers from St 
Petersburg, whose expensive, inapp-opriate uniforms and refined manners contrasted sharply with the 
hardened, practical and more ragged Caucasus Corps.14 This same feature was visible later in Central Asia, 
where the group of young officers out to gain rapid promotion from attending a single campaign were 
13 See 'Malaia Voina' in K. I. Velichko, v.P. Novitskii, etc. (eds.), Voennaia Entsiklopediia (Moscow: Tip. 
T-val. D.Sytin 1914)pp.136-7. 
14 Baddeley, The Russian Conquest of the Caucasus, p.392. 
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contemptuously referred to asfazanii ['pheasants') by the long-suffering Turkestantsy.15 For its part, the 
metropolitan army held officers who had gained all their experience and promotion fighting in Central Asia 
in low regard, wondering what possible virtue could be attached to defeating the 'nightgowns'. 
General Kuropatkin, himself of course a 'Turlrestanets', felt that Central Asian officers had a 
closer bond to their men than the regular line officer, due to the greater call for sanitation precautions and 
the need to use every available blade and bayonet in battle.16 Conditions in the Caucasus in the early part of 
the century were even more primitive, the Caucasus Corps becoming renowned for dividing its time 
between warfare, agriculture, and building its own accommodation on the ground, with a self-sufficiency 
ethic that recalled the Roman legions.17 Yet not everybody saw the administrative independence developed 
by the armies in the borderlands as a benefit. General M. I. Dragomirov felt that Central Asia was a 'vast 
factory for upstarts' where 'technique [had) been spoiled by the experience of small expeditions'. The very 
virtues noted by Kuropatkin regarding the predominant importance of sanitation were viewed by 
Dragomirov as vices, leading Dragomirov to fear the results should these officers encounter a tactically 
more imposing foe. 18 For the same reason a Russian officer confided to the English newspaper 
correspondent David Ker that: 
Turkestan is to us what Algeria has been in France- a kind of training school 
for more serious work. A good many of our young officers willieam their first 
lessons [here) ... and will be all the better for i~ but taken all together Asiatic 
warfare is hardly a good school for European soldiers .. 19 
The Russian Asiatic experience did however produce a generation of soldier-ethnographers and 
geographers- Komarov, Kostenko, Sobolev, Maksheev, Kuropatkin, Przheval'skii, Veniukov- whose 
expertise and career path lay precisely in this very area of Asiatic warfare. 
Like most armies of the period, the Russian army never codified its Asiatic experience, partly 
from the difficulty of collating first principles from widely differing local conditions, partly from the 
15 Marvin, The Eye-Witness Account of the Disastrous Russian Campaign against the Akha/ Tekke 
Turcomans pp.167,294 
16 Kuropatkin, Zadachi ... Tom.IT p.143 
17 Baddeley, The Russian Conquest of the Caucasuspp.127-8 
18 VanDyke, Russian Imperia/Military Doctrine and Education, 1832-1914 p.137. 
19 Baumann, Russian-Soviet Unconventional Wars in the Caucasus, Central Asia and Afghanistan pp.76-7. 
78 
already-noted predominance given to European warfare throughout this period. 20 Maksheev himself 
assigned the crucial learning curve in the Russian army's tackling of steppe warfare to the period 1847-63, 
a perhaps natural preference given that his own period of active military service in Central Asia dated from 
that time. Maksheev appears to have felt that the efforts of his own generation in mapping and studying 
conditions in Central Asia, laying down the roots of later victories, had been overshadowed by the more 
superficially spectacular (in terms of both political excitement and territorial gains) campaigns of 1865-73. 
During his trip to Central Asia in 1867 to prepare a new series of lectures for the Staff Academy, 
Maksheev's hottest and most bitter argument with Kaufman concerned the neglect shown by the latter 
toward a local memorial commemorating those who had fallen in the Ak-Mechet' campaign of 1853?! His 
emotional commitment to his own generation's achievements aside, Maksheev's argument for the 
campaigns of 1847-63 as a turning point in tactical training had a serious factual foundation In the 
aftermath of the failed Khivan campaign of 1839-40, which was carried out in winter explicitly on the 
belief that the steppe was impassable in summertime, the Orenburg and West Siberian forces had entirely 
altered their approach, and set about finding out how to march in the hot dry desert conditions of the 
Kazakh steppe. From 1847 onwards annual campaigns were conducted along the Syr-Darya in place of the 
infrequent and unfocused probing expeditions of the past, and through this punishing regimen of regular 
campaigning seasons there was accumulated a large body of hard practical experience by the local unit 
commanders. General V. A Obruchev, head of the Orenburg krai and a distant relative of the future Chief 
of the General StaB: drew up a regulation for steppe expeditions that allowed his men to march in 
shirtsleeve order, carrying only a musket and a bag of ammunition across the shoulder. Their greatcoats and 
satchels were carried on carts or across artillery gun carriages and the men were allowed to march freely, 
without observing the rigid marching-step associated with the 'paradomania' that elsewhere characterized 
20 Of publications of the day intended to provide general guidance to an army officer in the colonial sphere 
based on study of past tactical and strategic situations, only the British Small Wars by C. E. Callwell, first 
published in 1896, revised in 1899 and 1906, aimed to be in any way comprehensive. Recently reprinted: 
Small Wars. A Tactical Textbookfor Imperial Soldiers (London: Greenhill Books 1906/1990). On the 
British experience, and the conflict over European and colonial war-fighting techniques, see also: T. A 
Moreman, The Army in India and the Development of Frontier Warfare, 1849-1947 (London: Macmillan 
Press Ltd. 1998). The American frontier army in its wars with the Indians presents another typical picture 
of accumulated experience often being represented in the actions and writings of individuals rather than in 
the production of doctrine: Robert M Utley, Frontiersmen in Blue. The United States Army and the Indian, 
1848-1865 (Lincoln & London: University of Nebraska Press 1967) p.57. 
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Nicholas I's army. Obruchev's successor, Perovskii, improved matters yet further by agreeing to all 
suggestions regarding the reform of unit transport that were brought before him based on the experience 
and lessons of previous campaigning seasons. In this way the capacity of the future Twkestan forces to 
endure and even march great distances across the steppe in the height of summer increased rapidly. 22 
A further factor in the Russian development of steppe warfare was of course the evolution of 
certain distinctive tactical forms.23 A prominent substitute for mnnbers early on became the triumvirate of 
mass, discipline and manoeuvre. Russian armies in both the Caucasus and Central Asia demonstrated a 
clear preference for solid formations in the face of their more mobile opponents. This approach was not 
without its critics, particularly in the Caucasus, where Russian columns were often a perfect target for 
Chechen marksmen. It was an inheritance from Russia's eighteenth-century wars with the Turks, the 
Russians having adopted squares as a means of repulsing their more numerous opponents, and also perhaps 
a legacy of the amalgamation of the Ukrainian land militia with the regular army and the methods 
developed by the former for dealing with Tatar raiding parties?4 
In the Caucasus, the Russian forces perfected the technique of <canying the column in a box' as 
the only way to avoid defeat in detail25~ during his campaign against the Turkmen in Central Asia, General 
Skobelev insisted that <The main principle of Asiatic tactics is to observe close formations. ,26 Skobelev saw 
the discipline of the close formation as Suvorov had, as being in itself a force multiplier, in this respect. he 
insisted that in Turkestan conditions even a company was the equivalent of a <moving Strasbourg.' 27 Other 
men whose tactics in Central Asia were drawn directly from the Caucasus experience supported his views 
on the advantages of discipline and organization. General Komarov, advancing on Merv in 1884, confided 
to one of his fellow officers that he felt little to fear: 
21 Maksheev, <Prebyvanie v Vemom i vstrecha kaufman (iz chetvertogo puteshestviia v 1867 A. I. 
Maksheev) p.648. 
22 A. I. Maksheev, Istoricheskii Obzor Turkestana i nastupatel'nogo dvizheniia v nei russkikh 
(St.Petersburg: Voennaia Tipografiia (v zdanii Glavnogo shtaba) 1890) pp.I71-218. 
23 On the British counter-case, see again: Moreman, The Army in India pp.l-30. 
24 For a discussion of the development of the square and the Russian Asiatic military experience see: Fuller, 
Strategy and Power in Russia 1600-1914 pp.161-64 
25 Baddeley, The Russian Conquest of the Caucasus, pp.269-70. The vulnerability of these dense columns 
in the Caucasus was mitigated to some extent by the use of sharpshooter companies who served as a 
security cordon around them. In the dense forests of Chechnia however such sharpshooter groups were 
often ambushed and overwhelmed, hence the reason why eradication of the forests formed such an 
important part of Russian tactical policy in the Caucasus throughout this period. 
26 'O.K.', Skobeleff and the Slavonic Cause (London: Longmans Green & Co. 1883) p.201. 
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from his wide acquaintance with local customs and native warfare, 
gained by him in the Caucasus ... these robber-tribes have no organized 
commissariat and cannot remain concentrated in one spot for any length 
oftime?8 
During his converging advance on Khiva, General Kaufman's columns marched without any 
continuous defended lines of communication, moving rather like ships at sea, a policy which preserved his 
own numbers but made life distinctly precarious for newspaper correspondents attempting to catch up with 
his troops?9 
In Central Asia expeditionary columns, designed to ward of attack from all sides, became a 
tactical commonplace (see diagrams overleaf). The advance guard marched within view of the main 
column, in contrast to normal European military practice. Immediately behind it came a sapper company, 
for the clearing of the route and the repair or even construction of roads and bridges. On all sides of the 
main column marched pickets of infantry or Cossacks, all defending the transport upon which Asiatic 
warfare depended, local resources being either meagre or non-existent.3O Nighttime bivouac camps were 
similarly disposed to fonn defensive fields of fire, the transport being wheeled round to fonn a natural fort 
(vagenburg) on the steppe. Russian writers explicitly compared such formations and modes of fighting to 
those developed and used by the French in Algeria 
27 Baumann, Russian-Soviet Unconventional Wars ... p.72 
28 N. V. Tcharykow [ChaIykov], Glimpses of High Politics. Through War & Peace 1855 *1929 (London 
George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1931) pp.173 
29 The news correspondent MacGahan set off to meet Kaufman armed with two shotguns, three revolvers, 
one double-barreled rifle, a Winchester rifle, and 'a few knives and sabres.' J. A MacGahan, Campaigning 
on the Oxus and the Fall of Khiva. Fourth Edition (London: Low, Marston, Searle & Rivington 1876) p.30 
30 L. F. Kostenko, Turkestansldi Krai. Opyt' voenno-statisticheskago obozreniia. (St. Petersburg: 
Tipografiia i khromolitografiia ATranshelia 1880 Tom ill.) pp.276-8. 
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The raising of transport was a prodigious effort, the Khivan expedition of 1839-40 demanding for 
instance over 10, 000 camels, whilst its 1873 successor demanded for one detachment alone over 8, 800 
camels.3) Such demands created dissatisfaction amongst the local population having to provide both camels 
and camel guides (Iauchi), whilst also alerting Russia's opponents of the onset of a Russian expedition It 
was for these reasons that General Ivanin recommended in 1873 the formation of a permanent camel 
transport service on the model of the French in Algeria or the British in India.32 The expense of a large 
corps could be avoided if even a cadre system were to be set up in peacetime to avoid the disruption caused 
by creating a camel transport on the outset of war. Kuropatkin, a young officer at the time who had made a 
trip to Algeria in 1875, also spoke out in favour of the establishment of such a system on the basis of his 
own observation of it in practice at the French forward fort of Laguat. 33 It might be especially helpful, he 
hypothesized, at a forward post like Petro-Aleksandrovsk, which was required to constantly dispatch flying 
columns against raids of the predatOlY Turkmen. Ivanin's proposals, submitted to the Military-Scientific 
Committee of the General Staff and the Turkestan district staff, were rejected on the grounds that Russian 
expeditionary columns had to be routinely larger than anything used by the French in Algeria The camel 
transport question was laid aside, eventually overtaken by the appearance of railroads in Central Asia The 
only progressive reform made was that noted by L. F. Kostenko, that camels were better hired on the more 
expensive contract rather than warrant system, since this ensured that both healthier camels and more 
experienced camel leaders were provided. 34 Russian interest in the transport methods of the other European 
powers in their colonies continued however, the Sbornik ... po Azii of 1885 containing a translation of a work 
on military transport by the Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General of London. This study reviewed 
British experience in this field ~ed during both the Abyssinian campaign of 1867-68 and the Second 
Afghan War of 1878-1880.35 
The burden borne by all this precious transport was of course overwhelmingly devoted to the 
maintenance of the soldier himself, local conditions being too poor to sustain large bodies of troops. Even 
in areas where the local soil was not completely barren, the restrictions and expense of local production 
3) Ibid, p.130. 
32 Ibid. p.130. For details on lvanin see also Bellamy, 'Heirs of Genghis Khan ... ' pp.57-8. 
33 Kapitan A N. Kuropatkin, Alzheriia (St Petersburg: Tipografiia V. A Poletiki 1877) p.309. 
34 Kostenko, Turkestanskii Krai. Opyt' voenno-statisticheskago obozreniia Tom.1ll p.133. 
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could still act as a limitation on the size offorce that could be deployed there. Veniukov noted that in the 
Amur region in the Far East the price for every type of local bread actually rose continuously between 1866 
and 1869 due to the still low level of local agriculture.36 The majority of supplies had to be carried 
therefore, a situation that continued everywhere until the gradual introduction of the railway. Few studies of 
steppe warfare were complete without a listing of the rations- dried rusks, meat, dried cabbage, oats, brick 
tea, salt, sugar, biscuits- regarded as essential to the maintenance of the Russian fighting man. The pepper 
and vinegar issued troops to ward off fever in the damp subtropical conditions of the Black Sea coast were 
regarded as potentially harmful irritants in the dry conditions of the steppe.37 Tinned conserves, the lifestuff 
of the colonial soldier by the turn of the century, were still too unreliable at the time of the major Russian 
expansion in Central Asia to be recommended except in case of dire necessity for flying columns. The 
British experiment in Abyssinia with large mobile field ovens to produce fresh bread was noted with 
interest by the Russians, but rejected on the grounds of both expense and practicality. Rusks remained 
cheaper than bread, and the field ovens had proven so cumbersome that only pack-elephants could move 
them in the field. 38 Alcohol was regarded as an extremely useful stimulant in hot, arid conditions, and so 
just as the French soldier had his absinthe and the British trooper his rum ration, so the Russian was issued 
a wine portion to sustain him. Since, however, 'immoderate application' of such spirits in these conditions 
was held to cause 'derangement of mind, complete paralysis and sometimes ... instantaneous death' the 
portion was reduced across the period, from over a cup a day at the time of Prince Bekovich-Cherkasski's 
expedition to Khiva in 1717 to around fourhalf~ps a month by 1873. The use of alcohol as a stimulant 
was gradually replaced by the greater application of tea, introduced as a regular ration in 1871.39 The small 
scientific parties that scouted Russia's Asiatic borderlands of course experienced all the same problems that 
affected large expeditionary columns even more intensely. Amongst the many other scientific legacies left 
by Major-General N. M Przbeva1'skii from his expeditions in Central Asia was a guide for his fellow 
General Staff officers and successors as to how best to tmvel in such country. Przheval'skii recalled that on 
35 'Izvlechenie iz sochineniia Fersa 0 voennom oboze "Military Transport by Lieut. Col. George Armand 
Furse. Deputy Assistant Quarter Master-general, London'" SGTSMA XIX (1885) pp.1-SO. 
36 M. I. Veniukov, Opyt Voennogo Obozreniia Russkikh ' Granits' v Ani Vypusk. I. (St. Petersburg: 
Tipografiia Y.Bezobrazov i Komp.1873) p.139. 
37 Veniukov, 'Zametki 0 stepnykh' pokhodakh v Srednei Azii' p.280-1. 
38 V. Potto, '0 StepDykh' pokhodakh' (Publichnyia lektsii, chitannyia pri Orenburgskom' iunkerskom' 
uchilishche, v. 1872)' VS 5 (1873) p.31 
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his fourth expedition the party departed bearing, amongst other rations, 24 bottles of cognac, 12 jars of 
pickles, 25-30 small bottles of cranberry extract, 15-20 cans of condensed milk and 140 cans of sardines 
and other preserved fish. Alongside a catalogue of the instruments required for such reconnaissance work, 
including thennometers, binoculars, hypsometers, a compass, a good chronometer and a quantity of 
mercwy, Przheval'skij noted that he provisioned his parties heavily with weaponry, each man bearing a 
Berdan infantry rifle and a Smith & Wesson revolver with 500 rounds of ammunition per rifle. All such 
precautions, as he pointed out, were conditioned by the fact that 'the handful of men that is an expedition, 
flung into the depths of Asiatic deserts, is more isolated than a boat at sea from the rest of the world. ' These 
conditions also justified in his opinion the entirely military character of such enterprises, with Cossacks and 
Russian regular troops complementing each other's abilities. 40 
If local conditions made life difficult for infantry, they were even harder upon cavalry. Throughout 
this period the only fonn of cavalry Russia deployed along her Asiatic frontiers were the Cossacks, who in 
many areas closer approximated irregular forces rather than regular, disciplined troops. The Cossack served 
the dual function of both soldier and military settler, the later role being seen as a vital one by many 
administrators along Russia's Asiatic frontier for much of this period. Both M. N. Annenkov, commander 
of the Siberian Corps in 1853, in his review of the Semirech'e region in that year and A I. Bariatinskii, 
viceroy in the Caucasus in 1858, stressed the importance of military settlements in pacifying these distant, 
restless frontiers. Cossack settlements in the Caucasus after 1850 were supplemented by groups of retired, 
married, soldiers with 15 years' service in the Caucasus Corps, and by large groups of 'undesirable 
elements' -religious schismatics like the Dukhobors and Molokans. As late as 1874 meanwhile Alexander II 
authorized the despatch of 100 Cossack families of the West Siberian forces to settle the crucial strategic 
region with China around Lake Zaisan and Kuchum. 41 Nonetheless Russian Asiatic administrators 
throughout much of the latter nineteenth century expressed grave doubts over the continued utility of 
Cossacks, in direct contrast to Western observers who saw the Cossacks as the uniquely advantageous 
aspect of the Russian imperial system. General Vel'iaminov had complained of the poor impact made by 
the Cossacks against Shamil's men in the Caucasus, attributing the superior horsemanship and 
39 Ibid, p.31-2. 
4ON. M. Przheval'skii, 'Kakputeshestvovat' po Tsenttal'noi Azii' SGTSMA XXXII (1888) pp.145-163. 
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swordsmanship of the Murids to the fact that they were not required to divide their time between military 
training and agriculture as the Cossacks were. 42 In one of his many analyses of the Caucasus as a young 
officer, D. A Miliutin admitted that Cossack settlement near tribal areas seemed the only sure method of 
interdicting mountaineer raiding parties, but felt that the Cossacks' own 'carelessness' rendered them less 
than wholly efficient in such work. 43 Later, as War Minister, Miliutin almost immediately used the 
opportunity to come forward with proposals to reduce the size of the Cossack service. The Cossacks, he 
believed, were useful as irreguJar cavalry but defeated the main purpose of their existence in that even 
though they partially equipped themselves they were costly rather than economic to maintain. Only the 
renewed need for a large body of cavalry on the western frontier to meet the perceived growing menace of 
Germany persuaded Miliutin, by expediency, of the need to retain a system of universal military service 
amongst the Cossack voiskos.44 
Poor Cossack tactical performance was repeated on other stretches of the Asiatic frontier. In 
Central Asia Cossack forces were no match for the Turkmen in individual combat and, being outnumbered, 
often dismounted to en~ge their opponents with gunfire rather than launch the uaditional sabre charges of 
the past, mirroring the experience of contemporary European soldiers in other parts of Asia.45 Skobelev 
forbade his cavalry to attack unshaken Turkmen horse and ordered rigid formation discipline, to the extent 
of knee-to-knee charges, to make up for the Cossack's deficiency in single combat.46 These orders were 
striking enough to elicit surprised comment from at least one British contemporary then en~ged in a study 
of irregular warfare. 47 
In contemporary European eyes the epitome of the Russian Asiatic character therefore, in Russian 
eyes the Cossack was ironically often not 'savage' enough. Equally problematical, though less often stated 
in official accounts, was the question of the Cossacks' reliability and political loyalty . One recent study of 
the Terek Cossacks in the North Caucasus identifies a continuous incidence of Cossack defections and 
41 A. M. Plekhanov, "'Prntivupostavit' sil 'neishii oplot ... pokusheniam inozemtsev .. " 0 perselenicheskoi 
g:>litike Rossii v XIX veke' VIZh 2 (1997) pp.66-71. 
2 See Baddeley, The Russian Conquest o/the Caucasus, pp.1l4-116. 
43 Starapuu, 'Kavkazskii Vopros vo vzgladakh i deiatel'nosti D.AMiliutina.' p.84. Miliutin did however 
attribute this quality to the Russian people as a whole, underlining his general criticism at the time that 
Russian policy in the Caucasus lacked method 
44 Robert H. McNeal, Tsar and Cossack, 1855-1914. (Oxford: Macmillan Press Ltd. 1987) pp.33-8. 
45 Kostenko, Turkestanskii Krai. Opyt' voenno-statisticheskago obozreniia Tom III p.287. 
46 'O.K.' Skobeleff and the Slavonic Cause p.203. 
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desertions, some Cossacks repeatedly changing loyalties between mountaineer rebels and the Russian 
government to the extent of even changing religious faith. Cossack settlements traded continually with their 
supposed Muslim enemies and relied upon the mountaineers for the best weapons, cloaks and horses. Upon 
the conclusion of hostilities with Shamll, the Russian War Ministry eventually had to issue an amnesty to 
no fewer than 642 lower ranks that had joined the mountaineer cause.48 Reviewing the Russian forces that 
would be available for a campaign against China meanwhile, General Przheval' skii felt that the Cossack 
troops formed by far the weakest element of Russian forces on this section of the frontier, for moral and 
cultural as much as for technical reasons. Przheval'skii felt that 
not one of the Cossack forces [available] can satisfy the demands of 
wartime. Such a sorrowful phenomenon is caused by the complete 
absence over years (even centuries in the case of the Siberians) of 
military training and by the very poor composition of the officer corps. 
Highly critical reports on the fireanns drill conducted amongst the Amur Cossack forces in both 1882 and 
1899 suggests that Przheval'skii's criticisms were far from unfounded. 49 The horrifying conclusion 
Przheval'skii reached on reviewing Cossack settlements on this frontier was that: 
we do not influence Asiatics by our culture, but the other way about. 
The Cossacks adopt the language and customs of their inorodets 
neighbours ... the Cossack parades in Chinese clothes, speaks in Mongol or 
Kirghiz; everywhere is preferred tea and the milk-beer [kumus] of the nomad. 
Even the physique of our Cossack degenerates and more frequently resembles 
the appearance of his neighbour. so 
Such local conditions were inimical to a Russian General Staff that saw itself as the proponent of a 
'civilizing' mission in Asia Consequently, after 1864 the Cossacks were increasingly sidelined, their 
former political and cultural role on the Asiatic frontier now taken up by the Russian regular army and by 
the department specifically charged with regulating relations there, the Asiatic Department of the General 
47 Callwell, Small Wars pp.414-15. 
48 Thomas M. Barrett, At the Edge of Empire. The Terek Cossacks and the North Caucasus Frontier, 1700-
1860. (USA: Westview Press 1999) p.l76. 
49 O. I. Sergeev, Kazachestvo na russkom dal 'nem vostoke v XVII-XlXvv. (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo 
"NAUKA" 1983) p.88. 
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Staff. In Centml Asia, Genernl Kaufman set the new trend in colonization by his explicit preference for 
Russian civilian settlers as opposed to the Cossack settlements of the past. The Cossacks themselves were 
either increasingly 'regularized' into the wider anny, or co-opted to provide escorts for the new generation 
of scientific explorers charged with monitoring the Russian Asiatic frontier. This latter task proved to be 
the last sphere in which the Cossacks' traditional linguistic and cultural versatility continued to prove 
useful. By the time he came to deliver his lectures at the Staff Academy in 1871, Veniukov would 
emphasize to his listeners the strictly auxiliary role of the Cossacks in preserving Russia's Asiatic frontiers, 
the basic security there resting, as he stressed, on the 'regular forces, namely the line battalions. ,51 In the 
Russian Far East meanwhile, whilst the size of the Cossack forces by both peace and wartime establishment 
continued to increase across the latter half of the nineteenth century, by the start of the twentieth century 
the proportion of Cossack to regular forces in the region was nearing the balance pertaining everywhere 
else in the empire. 52 
A further characteristic of Russia's 'Asiatic' theatres of war, and another mark of the Russian 
preference for deliberation, was the reliance their forces came to put upon siege tactics and the taking of 
fixed positions. Siege conflicts met the question of how to bring Russian and Asiatic troops to a point of 
direct contact and make Russian technological superiority decisively felt. Paskevich's masterful wars 
against the Turks and Persians in 1827-29 were marked by an almost eighteenth-century dedication to the 
importance of siege and supply. During the war with Shamil, siege techniques proved an important factor 
in the taking of the Murids' numerous auls [mountain villages]. Shamilleamt to respond to siege rapidly, 
demanding corresponding countermeasures. Low sheltered positions were built by the mountaineers, less 
vulnerable to artillery fire than the high towers of the past, and on occasion whole villages were turned into 
deathtraps for the Russian troops.53 At the same time, following the siege of Akbulgo in 1839, Shamil 
actively sought to avoid being himself trapped within a besieged area, and the Russians did not again catch 
him in such a fixed position until Gunib in 1859. In the later conquest of Centml Asia, the whole conquest 
came to turn on the taking of fixed positions and local capitals. The taking of capitals, of course, led local 
50 N. M. Przbeval'skii, 'Ovozmozhnoi voine s Kitaem' SGTSMA 1(1883) pp.299-300. 
51 M. Veniukov, 'Obshchii obzor' postepennogo rasshireniia russkikh' predelov' v Azii i sposobov' 
oborony ikb.' v.s 2 (1872) pp.211-212. (Emphasis in the original.) 
52 Sergeev, Kazachestvo na russkom dal 'nem vostoke v XVII-XIXw. pp.82-91. 
S3 Gammer, Muslim Resistance to the Tsar p.97 
89 
elites and nobility to fall into Russian hands, leading to more rapid subjugation of the surrounding 
countryside by means of 'indirect' rule. Sieges in Central Asian warfare were very much more haphazard 
affairs than in the Caucasus of course, due to the generally much lower quality of local resistance. 54 
Realization of the inadequacy of Central Asian fortifications led to the abandonment of the pUnstaking 
investments of the 1850s for a policy, under Cherniaev, of direct escalade of the city walls. This approach 
led to comparatively high casualties however, and was itself later replaced by a system of always creating a 
breach in the walls for a storming party using closely positioned artillery. 55 In the most fiercely contested 
and closely-studied Central Asian siege of the period, that of Geok-Tepe, General Skobelev went to the 
extent of digging parallel approach trench lines and mining under the walls to achieve success. Colonel C. 
E. Callwell picked up on the importance Russians attached to the taking of the fixed position in Asiatic 
warfare in his advice to colonial officers on the importance of solid objectives. Callwell praised the 
Russians in that: 
They compassed the downfall of the khanates [of Central Asia] by 
gradually absOIbing the cities ... the capture of one city was generally 
held sufficient for a year, but it thereupon became a Russian city. 
Such is the military history of the conquest of Central Asia. It is a 
record of war in which desultory operations were throughout 
conspicuous by their absence. 56 
Technological superiority proved vital in these direct battlefield encounters with Asiatic 
opponents, and Russia, much like the other European powers, at times found its Asiatic provinces a useful 
testing ground for the latest equipment in a period of unprecedented technological change. During the 
1820s in the Caucasus, before Sharnil acquired cannon and trained personnel to serve them, General 
Ermolov boasted that Russian guns so overawed the naive mountaineers that the expenditure of a few token 
rounds assured peace in the camps at night. 57 As early as the 1850s Prince A I. Bariatinskii was requesting 
the latest rifled carbines for his troops to compete with the weapons of the mountaineers, some of which 
54 To the extent where General Chemiaev could take Tashkent, a city of 30, 000 inhabitants, with juSt 1, 
951 men and twelve guns in 1865. 
55 Kostenko, Turkestanskii Krai. Opyt' voenno-statisticheskago obozreniia Torn III p.288 
56 Callwell, Small Wars. p.37 
57 Baddeley, The Russian Conquest of the Caucasus, p.l07-8, 125. 
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came from the British.58 Contemporaries, rightly or wrongly, attributed much of the fmal success in the 
Caucasus to the new issue of rifled weaponry. 59 Whilst the very earliest campaigns in Central Asia were 
notable for the significant results achieved with equipment which by European standards was outdated. the 
later conquests were all achieved by troops equipped in the most scientific manner then available, including 
the machine gun and the hand grenade. Rifled cannon. in particular, made a quicker job of destroying the 
clay fortifications of Central Asia than the smoothbores of the past. 60 The Russians used rocket batteries 
from an early stage in their Central Asian flying columns, these being both powerful and lighter to transport 
than conventional guns, and particularly effective in shattering the attack of Asiatic cavalry. Consequently 
most writers agreed that a rocket battery should accompany even the smallest Russian detachment 61 
Mounted rocket companies also added to the effectiveness of the Cossacks. General Romanovskii 
attributed the victory of Irdzhar (1866) to the power of the Russian cavalry's organic firepower: 
For the first time in Central Asia our Cossacks moved in formation and 
in mass as a regular cavalry with its own artillery and rocket launchers.62 
General Skobelev, another firm believer in the power of artillery to terrify Orientals, utilized petroleum-
filled shells in his siege of Geok-Tepe as a form of primitive prototype napalm bombardment In studying 
the use of artillery in this theatre, Skobelev claimed that Asiatics judged the size of an enemy army from 
the number of field-guns it deployed. By this measure therefore the presence of a large artillery train 
accompanying Russian forces in Central Asia was bound to have a particularly devastating moral effect 
58 One of the earliest childhood memories of the Russian diplomat A. D. Kalmykov was being shown a 
pistol captured from a North Caucasus mountaineer and bearing the maker's stamp 'Birmingham' on the 
barrel. Kalmykow [Kalmykov], Memoirs of a Russian Diplomat p.3. 
59 Moshe Gammer has argued that the influence of rifles was overrated. and political developments the 
more significant factor, the mountaineers having proved highly adaptable to new techniques used apinst 
them in the past. Both Bariatinskii and his subordinates praised the rifle highly in their reports to the Tsar. 
Russian experience in the Caucasus probably did reinforce the perception created in the Crimea that the 
whole army now needed this new weaponry. See Gammer, Muslim Resistance to the Tsar pp.286-90 and 
Zisserman. Fel'dmarshal' kniaz' Aleksandr' Ivanovich ' Bariatinskii Tom.TII pp.309-10. See also: V. 
G ... n', '0 vvedenii nareznago oruzhiia v Kavkazskoi Armii' v.s' 6 (1859) pp.l71-6. This experienced 
Caucasus campaigner actually opposed the full introduction of rifles in the Caucasus on the grounds of the 
training complications they would introduce. Also, in dense woods, where in his view rapidity of fire was 
of more import than accuracy, the musket was equal to the rifle. 
60 E. U. , 'Stepnaia voina v Turltestanskom krae' v.s' 7 (1880) pp. 91-3 
61 Veniukov, 'Zametki 0 stepnykb' pokbodakh v Srednei Azii' p.285 
62 D. MacKenzie, 'The Conquest and Administration ofTurkestall, 1860-85' in M Rywkin (ed.), Russian 
Colonial Expansion to 1917 p.21S. Romanovskii's after-action report, which praises the role of artillery 
throughout the battle, has recently been reprinted: Podpolkovnik S. B. Pavlenko (ed.), "Poslednii oplot 
vlasti Emira ... vziat shturmom" VIZh 1(1998) pp.35-6. 
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upon the natives.63 Whether correct or not, such views and the actual practical experience of campaigns in 
Asia further underlined for the Russians the importance of artillery, an ann which, as many foreign 
observers across the centuries have noted, always formed one of the largest and best-organized branches of 
the Russian anned forces. 
Scientific methods, therefore, interacted with a Russian concern to maintain prestige and inflict a 
cult of fear upon their opponents- the view that 'Asiatics react only to material force' being one commonly 
held at the time.64 In this respect Russian reliance on making warfare dramatically and with maximum 
destruction was not mere grandstanding but had actual psychological effect- one British observer reported 
Turkmen cowering on hearing a military band playing at a Russian ceremonial opening. The last occasion 
they had heard such a noise was during the storm of Geok-Tepe five years before.65 The Russians were 
quite conscious of the effect of their methods and of the importance of display, of banners and flags, in 
keeping Asiatics in awe of the 'White Tsar.' State Councilor Vain berg wrote in 1878: 
It is difficult to overestimate the importance of the parade to the history 
of the domination of Russian anns and intelligentsia in Central Asia 66 
Another British commentator of the early twentieth century noted that: 
It may be gathered ... that Russia's position and prestige amongst her 
Central Asian subjects rank very high and go far to consolidate her 
position there.67 
The demands of the Central Asian and Caucasus corps for the latest equipment and other resources 
had of course wider strategic consequences. As late as the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, the Caucasus 
Corps was the only army group outside the elite Corps of Guards to be completely issued with the new 
Berdan No.2 rifle, perhaps the most elegant weapon ever made, and at that time the best Russian troops had 
63 N. I. Grodekov, Voina v Turlonenii (f.3) p.199. 
64 See for instance N. P. Ignat'ev in Evans (trans., ed.),Mission ofN.P. Jgnat'ev to Khiva and Bukhara in 
J858p.30. 
65 Curzon, Russia in Central Asia p.84. 
66 Nebrenchin, 'Musul'manskii Vostok i Russkaia Amilia' VlZh 5 (1995) p.39. 
67 Captain Gervais Lyons, Afghanistan: The Buffer State. Great Britain and Russia in Central Asia. 
(Madras-London: Higginbotham & Co. -Luzac & Co. 1910) p.96. 
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ever received. 68 With its metallic cartridges and bolt-action system, the American Berdan design, in the 
words of one study, inaugurated 'the beginning of the era of high-power small bore rifles with great range 
and accuracy and relatively flat trajectory.' It was also symbolic of the benefits Russian weapons 
technology gained at this time from a unique period of cross-fertilization with the American small arms 
industry and the accompanying acquisition of the new machine-making tools that were revolutionizing the 
whole arms market in this period. The Berdan rifle itself was praised by a future participant in the Russian 
annexation of Khiva, and in Russian hands saw its first active service in Turkestan in 1870. Exactly a year 
later the Russian government acquired four hundred examples of another type of American weapon 
destined to later prove useful in Central Asia, with a license to manufacture more, namely the Gatling 
machine gun.69 
In Central Asia, meanwhile, whilst the commitment of army personnel represented only a 
relatively small fraction of the army's whole throughout this period- certainly compared to the Polish 
theatre- it remained a far higher military commitment, per head of local population, than the British had in 
India at the time.70 The Russians remained haunted by the Caucasus experience, where Shamil's revolt had 
only finally been ended by the commitment of nearly 300,000 men, and garrisoned their Asiatic frontiers 
comparatively heavily in consequence.?) The strategic debates created by these circumstances will be 
discussed in subsequent chapters. 
The final most obvious tactic of the Caucasus and Central Asian army corps, and one connected to 
the interest in capitals mentioned above, was their tendency to adopt political measures towards the local 
population, to attempt to gain the aid of local elites and special interest groups. As Romanovskii wrote of 
the Caucasus: 
if it is difficult to imagine the subjugation of the Caucasus without the 
68 F.V. Greene, (First LtCorps of Engineers U.S. Army and lately military attache to the United States 
Legation at St Petersburg) The Russian Army anditscampa;gns in Turkey in 1877-1878. Second Edition 
(London: W. H. Allen & Co. 1880)p.53. 
69 John Bradley, Guns for the Tsar. American Technology and the Small Anns Industry in Nineteenth-
Century Russia (DeKalb, Illinois: Northern Illinois University Press 1990) pp.108-116. Bradley is 
fundamental on the remarkable American-Russian trade in skills, ideas and weaponry in this period. 
70 MacKenzie, 'The Conquest and Administration ofTwkestan, 1860-85' p.231 
71 General Sherman, visiting Russia in 1872, remarked of the Caucasus: ' .. in the case of a European war, 
she [Russia] could not withdraw these forces, as the natives would surely rise.' Norman E. Saul, Concord 
and Conflict: The United States and Russia, 1867-1914 (Kansas: University of Kansas 1996), p.74 cited by 
Persson, 'The Russian Army and Foreign Wars .. ' p.148. 
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use of arms, it is also not easy to imagine when its subjugation could 
have been completed if our actions were based solely on arms. 72 
The record of the latter campaigns in the Caucasus was carried on into Central Asia. Sarnarkand was 
surrendered without a battle in 1868 in part through the diplomatic efforts of the Jewish and merchant 
community within the city walls; 73 Andizhan fell in 1875 not only to force of arms. but from the 
dissatisfaction of the local religious authorities with the Russians' main opponent 74 The Russian attempt to 
advance their cause through colonial 'subalterns', whilst it had its most spectacular example in the Russian 
treatment of Shamil's eldest son. Dzhemrnal-Eddin. (captured at the age offour and given a Russian 
military education), was repeated in the later subjugation of Central Asia This period offers two 
particularly striking examples of the virtues and dangers of such a policy. Lt.-General Alikhanov-Avarskii 
(1846-1907), the first governor-general of Merv, was a Lesghian born in Dagestan. allegedly to a father 
who had fought the Russians in the Caucasus War. His Muslim background later rendered him perfect for 
conducting reconnaissance work for the Russian General Staff in Central Asia, where he played a key role 
in the annexation of Merv. Returning to the Caucasus in 1890, he went on to become closely associated 
with the policies of the Viceroy, Count Vorontsov-Dashkov, in repressing the local revolutionary 
movement. Becoming one of the most hated symbols of the Tsarist autocracy, this Muslim officer was the 
victim of at least two assassination attempts by terrorist bombs, of which the second in 1907 succeeded in 
its goal.75 
For every loyal servant and ally of the Russian state like Alikhanov however, there was a Mussa 
Kundukhov to demonstIate the dangers of such a policy. Kundukhov, an Ossetian promoted to the rank of 
Major-General in the Russian service, managed to persuade the commander of the Terek oblast', Loris-
Melikov, to let him organize the emigration of almost five thousand Muslim villagers from the north 
72 Romanovskii, Kavkaz i Kavkazskaia Voina. p.366 
73 D. N. Logofe!, 'Zavoevanie Srednei Azii' in: Istoriia Russkoi armii i jlota vol. 12 (Moscow: Tipografiia 
Russkogo Tovarishchestvo "Obozrenie" 1913) p.87 
74 Nebrenchin. 'Musul'rnanskii Vostok i Russkaia Arrniia' VIZh 5 (1995) p.37 
75 'Alikhanov-Avarskii' in K. I.Velichko, V. F Novitskii, etc. (eds.), Voennaia EntsikJopediia (1911) 
pp.330-332. As if to stress the complexity ofloyalties within this family, Alikhanov's brother, himself a 
Tsarist officer, died during the course of a Muslim uprising in the Caucasus following the Russian Civil 
War, perishing whilst fighting alongside the Muslim resistance against the Bolshevik forces. See: M. B. 
Broxup, 'The Last Ghazawat: The 1920-1921 Uprising' in Marie Beonigsen Broxup & A Avtorkhanov, 
(eds.), The North Caucasus Barrier. The Russian advance towards the Muslim World. (London: Hurst & 
Company 1992) p.142. 
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Caucasus to Turkey in 1865. Subsequently however Kundukhov himself defected to the Turks, leading a 
mountaineer contingent against the Russians in the war of 1877-78.76 Individual failures like this did not 
undennine Russian belief in the value of recruiting local elites however. Perbaps the ultimate irony came at 
the end of the period, when it fell to a Muslim officer serving in the Russian General Staff, Colonel Abdul 
Aziz Davletshin, to oversee the running-down of the Asiatic Department of the General Staff. 77 
By the latter nineteenth century therefore, many of the problems hindering Russian military 
success in the steppe and other Asiatic theatres in the past- tenuous supply lines, barren local conditions, 
climactic extremes and the difficulty of how to conduct war against tribal populations-had been analysed 
and steadily overcome. Such an achievement came about both through a practical learning process acquired 
over decades and to a lesser extent through analysis by some staff officers of the difficulties encountered 
both by past military commanders and by other colonial powers operating in similar theatres of war. In 
their tactics and approach to subjugating and ruling their respective spheres, the Russian armies of the 
Caucasus and Central Asia shared many similarities, a fact no doubt connected to the tendency of personnel 
from one theatre to serve in the other. In their longer-term approach to ruling and administering these 
territories and defending them, however, the Russian colonial army and its staff mechanism proved to be an 
equally fruitful source of strategy. 
76 Austin Lee Jersild, 'From Savagery to Citizenship: Caucasian Mountaineers and Muslims in the Russian 
Empire.'in Brower & Lazzerini (eds.), Russia's Orient. pp.102-3 and Karpat, 'The hirja from Russia and 
the Balkans: the process of self -definition in the late Ottoman state' in: Eickebnan & Piscatori (eds.), 
Muslim Travellers. Pilgrimage, migration, and the religiOUS imagination p.14S. 
77 For details, see the chapter marked 'Conclusion.' 
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4. DEFENCE OF THE REALM: WAR PLANS ON THE ASIATIC FRONTIER. 1860-1914. 
By the time the Russian Army had completed the majority of its conquests in Central Asia, with a 
sound though by no means entirely satisfactory border with Afghanistan by 1885, it had come to inherit, as 
Bariatinskii had foreseen. a unified strategic sphere stretching from the Black Sea to Herat. This sphere, 
united as it was by its geopolitical position and the common Islamic faith of its inhabitants, overlapped two 
further spheres. In the western, Caucasus theatre, the continual threat of war with Turkey threatened also to 
draw in the European powers, as was underlined by the Berlin Congress of 1878. Turkey was seen further 
as an external sponsor to possible internal instability in the Caucasus, much as British influence was feared 
in northern Afghanistan, both situations requiring constant political and military intelligence. To the East, 
the Central Asian theatre, by virtue of its unstable border with China. overlapped its area of responsibility 
with the Far Eastern theatre. Thereby, as late as 1910, Kuropatkin continued to view a possible war with 
China or JaIlUl as a joint planning priority of the Central Asian and Siberian forces.! However, for much of 
this period, war planning upon the Asiatic frontier was not a high priority with the Tsarist General Staff, 
being overshadowed by European concerns. 
As a result of the strategic conference of 1873 (the prelude to the introduction of Universal 
Military Service in Russia), Russian war plans for Europe were largely defensive for most of this period, 
with stress laid upon fortification of the vulnerable Polish salient. Fuller has argued along with many others 
that the conference of 1873 was vital in creating a 'Eurocentric' approach in the Russian War Ministry, 
since analysis on a technical rather than a political level indicated that Germany and Austria-Hungary were 
the main threats to Russia's national security: 
It did not matter whether Berlin or Vienna was currently planning a war against 
Russia or not The fact was ... they had the power to defeat Russia. The consequences 
of a potential defeat in Central Europe were particularly grave because if Russia lost 
there it might lose everywhere.2 
This was certainly the view of General N. N. Obruchev, Russia's leading strategist of the period, who in 
1885 in response to a letter of Alexander m wrote a memorandum, The Basic HistOrical Missions of 
1 Kuropatkin Zadachi .. Tom II pp.I46-7 
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Russia, which was to guide state security policy for the next ten years.3 It amounted in the main to a 
summary of the views that Obruchev himself had held and promoted since at least 1864. In it, he compared 
Russia to a comet, with a still underdeveloped European core and 'a horrifying Asiatic tail, stretching from 
Tillis to Vladivostok' that drained away much-needed material and moral strength. In order to pursue a 
policy reflecting Russia's true priorities, he consistently argued his own view of the basic missions facing 
the Russian state- a framework within which 'the Caucasus, Central Asia, Siberia ... are only adjuncts, 
having a point only until [there is established] a living and whole strictly national Russian body. 
Consequently, our first concern must be-to stand finn in Europe. ,4 Obruchev identified the two main 
dilemmas facing Russian security policy to be the Polish and Eastern Questions-'only for the Bosphorus 
and Cart»thian Rus could Russian blood be unconditionally shed. ,5 It was as a direct consequence of such 
thinking that between 1881 and 1894 over 4S percent of the Russian peacetime army were concentrated in 
the Western provinces, placed there to compensate for the superior mobilization rates of the German and 
Austro-Hungarian forces.6 Russia after 1880 pursued a twin offence-defence strategy in Europe, planning 
to attack Austria whilst defending against Germany. The offensives planned in Asia may therefore be seen 
as a way of more rnpidly staving off the danger of joint commitment were a crisis to simultaneously 
develop in Europe, where the defensive position was considered much more grave for most of this period. ? 
How this viewpoint came to change, at first gradually and then, after the Russo-Japanese War, 
dramatically, and the role of the Asiatic Department of the General Staff in that change, forms the theme of 
the following three sections. 
2 [Emphasis added} Fuller, Strategy and Power pp.297-8 
3 Airapetov, Zabytaia /car 'era "Russkogo Mol 'tke" pp.246-2S2. 
4 Vladimir Zolotarev Voennaia Bezopasnost' Otechestva (lstoriko-pravovoe issledovanie) (Moscow: 
Kanon-Press 1998) pp.2S2-4. 
5 Ibid, p.265. 
6 William C. Fuller 'The Russian Empire' in Ernest R May (ed.), Knowing One's Enemies. Intelligence 
Assessment Before the Two World Wars (NJ: Princeton University Press 1984) p.l09. On the manner in 
which these dispositions affected army morale, see also Fuller's later work Civil-Military Conflict p.lS. 
? One of the best surveys of Tsarist planning for European warfare remains A M Zaionchkovskii' s 
PodgotovkaRossii kMirovoi Voine (planyvoiny) (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Voennoe Izdatel'stvo 
1926). Norman Stone's The Eastern Front 1914-1917 (London: Hodder & Staughton 1975) is still the best 
English-language account of Russia's experience in the First Wqrld War. Stone is particularly damning of 
the Tsarist army's views on fortification and cavalry. See also N. Stone 'The Historical Background of the 
Red Army' in J. Erickson & E. J. Feuchtwanger (eds.), Soviet Military Power and Performance (London: 
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4.1 China, Europe. and the 'YeUow Peril'. 
The threat to Central Asia from Chinese aggression in the late nineteenth century was interlinked 
with the policies of the Siberian Governor-General, N. N. Murav'ev-Amurskii (1809-1881), in the Far East. 
The diplomatic history of Sino-Russian relations has had many commentators in the past 8, and any 
summary here will be restricted to the immediate security implications. Murav'ev-Amurskii was a relative 
outsider in the school of Russian military Asiatic experts in the nineteenth century. He had served long 
enough in the Caucasus in the 1840s to appreciate the Russian Army's poor understanding of the Muslim 
community there9, but being viewed as something of a maverick, was reduced to transmitting his own plans 
for subjugating the Caucasus via his brother in the hope they would somehow gain official attention in St 
Petersburg. \0 Before long however he was tmnsferred to the Far East, where by virtue of a series of 
remarkable diplomatic treaties with China between 1858 and 1864 he and N. P. Ignat'ev, the Russian 
diplomatic agent in Peking, rapidly annexed to Russia around 665,000 square miles of territory. \1 
Murav'ev's approach to maintaining this theatre remained defiantly unorthodox however, as almost alone 
amongst late nineteenth century Russian administrators he maintained a faith in the virtues of the traditional 
Cossack -colonist. The results of his policies were to do much to discredit this policy of settlement on the 
Asiatic frontier. Murav'ev dispersed the Amur Cossack Host in a manner designed more for symbolic than 
practical effect, and communication lines remained grossly inadequate. Plans to tum the Amur river line 
into a self-sufficient grain basin came to grief upon the actualities of the local climate, and mids in the 
1860s by Chinese bandit gangs (the Manza population forming 'Hunhoses') exposed the vulnerability of 
Macmillan Press 1979) pp.3-17 and I. I. Rostunov, Russkiifront pervoi miravoi voiny (Moscow: 
Izdatel'stvo "NAUKA" 1976). 
8 See for instance Paine, Imperial Rivals; Malozemoff, Russian For Eastern Policy; Quested, 'Matey' 
Imperialists? The Tsarist Russians in Manchuria 1895-1917; O. Edmond Clubb, China and Russia. The 
"Great Game" (NY & London: Columbia University Press 1971); B. A Romanov & Susan Wilbur Jones 
(trans.),RussiainManchuria (1892-1906) (Michi~: Ann Arbor 1952). Foran overview: JohnJ. Stephan, 
The Russian Far East. A History (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press 1994). 
9 Not to be confused with the identically named N. N. Murav'ev (later Murav'ev-Karskii) who served as 
commander in the Caucasus between Vorontsov and Bariatinskii. 
10 N. N. Murav'ev 'Zapiska 0 predlagaemykb voennykh deistviiakh protiv Shamilia' In Ivan Barsukov 
(ed.), GrafNikolai NikoJaevich ' Murav 'ev-Amurskii. Po ego pis 'mam ',ojitsial 'nym dokumentam " 
razskazam sovremennikov i pechatnym istochnikam' (Afaterialy dlia biograjii). (Moscow: Sinodaln'naia 
Tipografiia 1891) Tom II. pp. 1-17. For character details see also: W. Bruce Lincoln, The Conquest o/a 
Continent. Siberia and the Russians (London: Jonathan Cape 1993) 1'1'.189-196. 
11 Paine, Imperial Rivals p.352. Murav'ev ceased to be East Siberian Governor-General in 1860. Ignat'ev 
persuaded the Chinese to sign the Treaty of Peking that same year, though the western delimitations 
implicit in that treaty were not settled till the Treaty of Tarbagatai in 1864. 
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the Cossack perimeter defence. Przheval'skii's visit to one Trans-Baikal Cossack settlement in the late 
1860s filled him with disgust-he found a settlement in decay, dank with 'filth, hunger and paupery. ,12 The 
Cossacks' weaponry was in many cases inferior even to that wielded by the Manza miders. When the 
Russian geographer M. I. Veniukov wrote his work on Russia's Asiatic frontiers, based upon lectures given 
at the Russian Staff Academy, and itself intended to educate the General Staff officer on the geography and 
strategic points of Asiatic Russia, he made it clear that he regarded the Far East as the most vulnerable 
sector of Russia's frontier. So great did he feel this danger to be that he devoted a special section in his 
work to Manchuria, writing that 'Manchuria is not a neighbour like other Central Asian lands; from here 
one can expect great danger. ,13 
Most appalling to Veniukov in 1873 was the unfortified state of the Far East; a situation he blamed 
both on Russian financial constraints after the Crimean War and, explicitly, upon the vacillation of local 
commanders in selecting strategic strong points.14 Local forces, meanwhile, performed more manual labour 
than they did military training, and Veniukov considered the local dismounted Cossack forces practically 
untmined. The existence of a single land communication line with European Russia, the Amur and Ussuri 
river lines, which also formed the state frontiers, and the Jack of any lines of retreat to the north, meant that 
a Chinese army based on the Lesser Kltingan range only had to march a few miles north to cut off the Amur 
krai entirely from Russia itself. To counter this threat, Veniukov urged the maintenance of screw-propeller 
ships on the Amur and the establishment of larger military depots with a central, stone-fortified depot at 
Khabarovsk lS 
Veniukov's views did not meet complete agreement within Russian governmental circles; 
Veniukov himself noted in his memoirs that diplomats of the Foreign Ministry's Asiatic Department 
considered him an a1armist.16 The chief of staff of Western Siberia meanwhile, General I. F. Babkov, had 
12 Rayfield, The Dream of Lhasa pp.27-8. See also: Steven G. Marks, Road to Power. The Trans-Siberian 
Railroad and the Colonization of Asian Russia 1850-1917 (London: I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd. 1991) pp.14-27 
on Cossack settlements and living conditions in the Far East, and Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy 
pp.l-19. The most comprehensive treatment of Russian disillusionment with the Far East, including 
Murav'ev-Amurskii's personal fall from grace, is given in Bassin, Imperial Visions pp. 233-73. 
13 Veniukov, Opyt Voennogo Obozreniia Russkikh • Granits' v Ani Vypusk. I. p.168. 
14 Ibid. p.95. 
15 Ibid. pp.137-39. 
16 Veniukov, Iz Vospominaniia. T.2 p.145. Veniukov had a particularly acrimonious relationship with the 
director of the Asiatic Department of the MID, Stremoukhov, whom he labelled 'a fop' who 'always 
damaged the Russian cause' (Ibid .• pp.162, 168.) 
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suffered the criticism ofVeniukov, Poltoratskii and others in the 1860s over the form of the western 
frontier he had helped demarcate with China in 1864-8 through the treaty of Chuguchak (also known as the 
Treaty of Tarbagatai). As both a staff officer and head of the West Siberian branch of the Imperial 
Geographical Society, Babkov clearly felt that both his professional and scientific capabilities were under 
attack, and later devoted the greater put of his unfinished memoirs to a scathing rebuttal of his critics. In 
particular, writing from the hindsight of the Boxer Rebellion of 1900, following which Russia came to 
politically and militarily dominate Manchuria, Babkov confidently asserted that ' ... the Chinese danger 
threatening our settlements in the Ussuri krai and Vladivostok itself, of which Veniukov scared the public, 
in reality does not exist and, as we see, was not observed before. ' I 7 
Veniukov's views nonetheless reflected genuine concerns at the time, and these perceived failings 
in the Far East came to have increased relevance in the period after 1870 when the possibility of conflict 
with China at some future date grew, a possibility heightened by General Kaufman's actions in the Di 
Crisis (1871-81). By the 1880s Russia was engaged in urgent reinforcement of the Far Eastern theatre, 
issuing the troops there with rapid-fire rifles and the latest steel long-range ordnance alongside a significant 
increase in their numerical strength. This policy cost the overstretched Tsarist exchequer over eleven and a 
half million rubles. I 8 Administrative reform that was aimed at strengthening Russia's position in the Far 
East also resulted in the creation of the Priamur military district with its own governor-generalship, 
wielding extensive military and administrative powers, in 1884. The first Governor-General, Baron Korf, 
immediately upon arrival set about a study of the readiness of the newly created district in regard to the 
military front of Mongolia and Manchuria.19 This military buildup continued at the turn of the century-
between 1892 and 1903 Russia's military strength east of Lake Baikal increased from 23 to 89 battalions, 
from 13 to 35 squadrons and from 8 to 25 batteries.20 This process was accompanied by a degree of 
engineer work in the proposed theatre of military operations itself. Vladivostok, which until 1882 
17 I. F. Babkov, Vospominaniia 0 moei sluzhbe v zapadnoi Sibiri 1859-1875g. Razgranichenie s zapadnym 
Kitaem 1869g. (St.Petersburg: Tipografiia V.F.Kirshbauma, d M-va Finansov, na Dvorts. Ploshch. 1912) 
pp,.485-517. 
Bilof, 'The Imperial Russian General Staff and China in the Far East 1880-1888. A Study of the 
Operations of the General Staff ' p.ix and Gen. Sht Podpolkovnik Ragoza Krat/di ocherk zaniatiia 
Amurskogo kraia i razvitiia boevykh , si/' priamurskogo voennogo okruga (Khabarovsk: Tipografiia Shtaba 
Priamurskogo Voennogo Okruga 1891) pp. 130-3 1. 
19 Gen. Sht. Podpolkovnik Ragoza, Kratkii ocherk zaniatiia Amurskogo kraia i razvitiia boevykh' sil' 
priamurskogo voennogo okruga pp.141-42 and John J. Stephan. The Russian Far East pp.55-6. 
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comprised no more than an earthen field battery system, saw the setting up of new coastal batteries and an 
inland field fortification system during the Anglo-Russian war scare of 1885, and work was begun on a 
road network both to these fortifications and in the Ussuri krai generally. However these defences 
continued to be recognized as severely deficient as late as 1895. The comparison in terms of the time, 
money and labour expended upon fortification of the Far East compared with the crucial strategic triangle 
in European Russia of the Warsaw, Novogeorgievsk and Zerghze forts, covering the railway network of the 
forward European theatre, was stark?1 
The cause of dispute with China, aside from the large annexations made by Murav' ev and Ignat' ev 
('unequal treaties' which continue to aggravate Sino-Russian relations even today), rested with Kaufman's 
annexation of the Hi Valley in northeastern Turkestan in 1871. Although officially a response to the 
treatment meted out a Russian emissary by the Taranchi Sultan Adil-Ogly, this was clearly a move to 
implicitly threaten the autonomous state in neighbouring Kashgaria set up by Yakub Bek in the period 
1866-1877, a Bukharan adventurer who had already faced the Russians at Tashkent It created the 
'Kul'dzha Question' that continued to sporadically disturb the Asjatic Department for many years. 
Unlike the majority of the Chinese Empire, the population of north western Sinkiang (as it was 
called after 1884-the Chinese 'New Kingdom') were predominantly Muslim, with all the potential 
problems of coreligious fraternity with Central Asian Muslims that condition implied. Russian concerns 
were heightened in the 1860s when the Dungan uprising led to the Chinese losing control of Chinese 
Turkestan and created the prospect of an independent Muslim state bordering the Russian domain in 
Turkestan. Russia viewed Yakub Bek, who had moved in and gradually become the dominant figure in this 
province in the wake of the Muslim uprising against the Chinese, with particular suspicion as a potential 
alternative centre of power and pawn of Britain. 22 
In 1875 rumours reached State Councilor Vainberg of a potential alliance between the Emir of 
Bukhara and Yakub Bek, thereby threatening earlier hopes that a weak Muslim buffer state to the east 
20 Hauner, What is Asia to Us? p.82. 
21 (Sekretno) Obzor deiatel'nosti Voennogo Ministerstva v Tsarstvovanie Imperatora Aleksandra III 1881-
1894 (St.Petersburg: Gosudarstvennaia Tipografiia 1903) pp.183-89. On the European fortifications, see 
also: O.Y. Saksonov, 'Zarozhdenie i razvitie otechestvennoi voennoi strategii' in: V. A Zolotarev (ed.), 
Istoriia voennoi strategii Rossii (Moscow: Kuchkovo Pole Poligrafresursy 2(00) p.96. 
22 On Kaufman's changing assessments of the situation in Kashgaria, see: S. Rostovskii, 'Tsarskaia Rossiia 
i Sin'-Tszian v XIX-XXvekakh' 1M3 (55, 1936) pp.34-5. 
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would act as a counteIbalance to Russia's restless protectorates in Central Asia. Captain A N. Kmopatkin, 
a young officer on Kaufman's staff at the time, was dispatched in 1876 to gain all the political and military 
intelligence he could whilst delimiting the Fergana-Kashgar border. Kuropatkin's work supplemented that 
of three earlier Russian missions, those of Captain Reintal (1870,1875) and General Staff officer and 
official emissary Baron A V. Kaul'bars (1872).23 These missions in tum supplemented earlier work by 
both the Kazakh explorer Captain Chokan Valikhanov, who had recommended Kashgaria's annexation as a 
protectorate, and by Poltoratskii and Veniukov.24 Kuropatkin's journey involved a trip of 2,000 miles 
through Kashgaria, mapping the country and making observations of its geography, industry, ethnic 
balance and military forces. The party was even accompanied by a naturalist, A I. ViI'kins (1845-1892), to 
make scientific observations. For this work, Kuropatkin was awarded the Imperial Geographical Society's 
small gold medal. The Kashgarian army was of interest since it was on the receiving end of a number of 
European annaments as a consequence of Anglo-Russian rivalry to gain influence in the region, and 
consequently presented a good example of an Asiatic army in a period of transition Yakub Bek's army 
bore an integrated character that was both unique and characteristic of the region, a traditional crossroads of 
invading armies and clashing cultural influences. Within it coexisted the traditional structure of a Muslim 
army alongside elements of Chinese military organization and Turkish and European military technique. In 
equipment it bore Bukharan and Afghan arms, Chinese pikes and toifury and, latterly, European percussion 
arms and artillery.25 The troops disposed of by Yakub Bek failed to impress Kuropatkin however- most 
were still armed with crude, semi-rifled muzzle-loading muskets and discipline was weak, with the army 
only able to manoeuvre in square. The field artillery consisted of one battery of muzzle-loaders and one of 
3-pound breech-loading Indian mountain guns, but the breech mechanisms on five of the latter were broken 
at the time of Kuropatkin's visit. Kuropatkin's account of the parades he witnessed, with cavalrymen 
23 For a brief survey of Anglo-Russian diplomatic rivalry in this region see: Louis E. Frechtling, 'Anglo-
Russian Rivalry in Eastern Turkestan, 1863-1881' JRCAS26 (3,1939) pp.471-89. A study unseen by the 
present author of events in Kashgaria is the thesis of Ho-dong Kim, 'The Muslim Rebellion and the 
Kashgar Emirate in Chinese Central Asia, 1864-1877' Ph. D. diss., Harvard University 1986. In this 
connection, see also: Paul Henze, 'The great pme in Kashgaria: British and Russian missions to Yakub 
Bey' CAS 8 (2,1989) pp.61-95 and Kemal H. Karpat, 'Yakub Bey's relations with the Ottoman sultans: a 
reinterpretation' CMRSXXXlI (1,1991) pp.17-32. 
24 On Valikhanov, see: Kermit E. McKenzie, 'Chokan Valikhanov: Kazakh Princeling and Scholar.' CAS 8 
(3,1989) pp.I-30 
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falling off their horses and the flintlock-armed infantrymen scattering powder across the parade ground as 
they fired blindly by volley, suggested a low level of general discipline. Local fortifications also presented 
no significant obstacles, being thinly walled, many of them overlooked by higher points, lacking glacis and 
possessing only rudimentary artillery. 26 Kuropatkin' s review served to correct earlier Russian impressions 
that, as a consequence of new armaments and a degree of European-style training. Yakub Bek's army 
would present a more formidable force than those encountered in either Khiva or Bukhara. In 1876 the 
Russian authorities in Turkestan learnt via Staff Captain Pevtsov, then accompanying a trade convoy in 
Mongolia and Dzhungaria, of the advance of a Chinese army some 42, 000 strong. divided into three corps, 
towards Dzbungaria on a mission to re-conquer China's western provinces.27 By 1877 Yakub Bek was 
dead, possibly by his own hand, Sinkiang had been reconquered by the Chinese army, and the Russian and 
Chinese empires were once more face-to-face in Central Asia The question of the Russians then returning 
the Ili district to China, a province officially annexed on China's behalf, thereafter became a source of 
diplomatic conflict between the two states. 28 
Kuropatkin, as head of the Asiatic Department of the General Staff in 1878, recommended that the 
Chinese pay ten million pounds in gold as compensation for the Russian occupation of Ili, with the money 
being put towards construction of the Siberian railroad that was already under discussion at this time.29 
Following an initial diplomatic parlay relations grew tense however, and war seemed imminent, the 
Russians fortifying the Barokhorinski ridge. It was this state of affairs that caused Przheval 'skii to draw up 
the bare outline of a war plan for operations against China, a plan to receive many supplements in 
following years?O This officer's qualifications for such a role were considerable. In his lifetime Major-
General N. M. Przheval'skii (1839-1888) gained fame across the length and breadth of the Russian Empire 
25 M. K. Baskhanov, 'Vostochnyi Turkestan: Zagadki Voennoi Istorii' in: Problemy Voennoi Istorii 
Narodov Vostoka (Biulletin ' Kommissii po voennoi istorii narodov vostoka) Vypusk I (Moscow: 
Izdatel'stvo "NAUKA" Glavnaia Redaktsiia Vostochnoi Literatury 1988) p.38. 
26 A. N. Kuropatkin & WalterE. Gowan (trans.) Kashgaria [Eastern or Chinese TurkistanJ Historical and 
Geographical Sketch of the Country; its military strength, industries and trade. (Calcutta: Thacker, Spink 
& Co. 1882) pp.202-240. 
27 V. S. Kadnikov, 'Iz istorii kul'dzhinskogovoprosa' IVCXXIV (1911) p.898. 
28 The two best existing studies of this diplomatic crisis are Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, The Iii Crisis. A Study of 
Sino-Russian Diplomacy 1871-1881 (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1965) and, more recently, and based on new 
archival research: A. D. Voskressenskii, Diplomaticheskaia istoriia russko-kitaiskogo Sankt-
Peterburgskogo dogovora 1881 goda (Moscow: Pamiatniki istoricheskoi mysli 1995). 
29 Kuropatkin, The Russian Army and the Japanese War pp.92-3 
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by his series of four daring expeditions undertaken through Mongolia and Inner Asia between 1870 and 
1885, fulfilling tasks that were at once related both to the development of geographic knowledge and to 
military intelligence.31 The last chapter of his final book contained a series of considerations on war with 
China that were based on his own earlier reports to the Russian General Staff and in particular on his input 
at an 1886 conference assessing the security of Russia's Far Eastern frontiers. 
A tactical offensive movement often characterized Russian war plans on the Asiatic frontiers, even 
where the overall strategic plan was defensive. This was due not only to the contemporary cult for 
offensive action common to European armies as a whole, but also from the specific experience of the 
Asiatic corps of the psychological power of even small active expeditionary columns. There was much fear 
too, of the effects on 'Asiatic' popular opinion were the Russian army seen as purely reactive, not 
aggressive. There was also the tactical reason that troops on the ground were in practice often too few in 
number to assume an effective active defence- Kuropatkin claimed that Kaufman chose the offensive 
against Bukhara in 1868 for this very reason.32 It is understandable then, that although Russia strategically 
was only concerned at the time with the defensive goal of retaining the IIi Yalley in the event of war with 
China in 1880, the 'IIi Battle Plan' drawn up by the staff of the Turkestan military district opted for the 
offensive in that: 
generally, in all Asiatic wars the best method of operations against the 
enemy consists in hurrying him into an encounter and in defeating him 
before [he enters] into our boundaries, because the approach of an enemy 
towards our territory can have a bad influence on the minds of the 
indigenous population.33 
The plan, which would have been discharged by one of Kaufman's most trusted subordinates, General G. 
A Kolpakovskii34, in the event of a diplomatic break, envisaged a main attack out of the Kul'dzha region 
30 For Przheval'skii's first war plan against China, see '0 vozmozhnoi voine s Kitaem' SGTSMA 1(1883), 
rP·293-306. 
On Przheval'skii as a popular phenomenon, see: Daniel Brower, 'Imperial Russia and its Orient: The 
Renown of Nikolai Przhevalsky' RR S3 (3,1994) pp.367-381 
32 Kuropatkin, Zadachi .. Tom.II p.101 
33 'The IIi Battle Plan' SGTSMA XXVIII,pp.304.306, quoted in Bilor, 'The Imperial Russian General Staff 
and China in the Far East' p.182 
34 Kolpakovskii, Gerasim Alekseevich (1819-18%) Organizer of the Semirech' e Cossack forces. Military 
service began at 16, at 21 participated in action in the Caucasus, going on the serve in Moldavia, Hungary 
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through the Talkin and Achal gorges down onto the old Chinese Imperial road to Dzhin-ho and Shikho. A 
subsidiary group was to be concentrated in the Fergana ob/ast' for operations against Kashgaria itself 
consisting of 16 companies, 11 sotnias, 22 guns, 8 rocket-carriages and 4 mortars?5 This force 
concentration, which British observers considered rather inadequate to take on the troops of the talented 
Chinese general Tso Tsung-t'ang (1812-85), was to have its overall effect bolstered by the actions of the 
Russian Far Eastern fleet and by a partisan detachment of the West Siberian military district.36 This latter 
group, composed of 12 Cossack sotnias, 4 guns, and 8 rocket batteries, was to march from Zaisanskii post 
southwards into the Chinese rear, wreaking havoc amongst their supply and transport columns. Snow on 
the mountain passes meant that the timing of the offensive was crucial, with May the optimum month-
earlier, and the Semirech'e forces could not cross the passes, leaving the Chinese to tackle the Siberian 
troops in their rear unmolested. Any later and Chinese forces falling back from the advance in the west 
would envelop and destroy these same Siberian troops. In the event the war plans came to nothing. Russia 
was overstretched by her Ba1kan commitment and the Chinese army was something of an unknown 
quantity to the Russians at the time- a situation that staff studies in the next ten years did much to correct. 
The greater bulk of the Russian forces in Turkestan in 1878-9 were concenttated not on the eastern border 
with China, but on the border of Afghanistan, ready to pose a political threat to British rule in India. 
Despite later claims by one prominent Tsarist historian that the Russian troop concenttation that did occur 
served to bring the Chinese to their senses, 37 the overall outcome of the IIi Crisis was something of a 
diplomatic reverse for Russia and a vivid demonstration of just how unprepared this frontier was for 
warfare against a major opponent38 What information the Russian General Staff did possess in the period 
1880-81 inspired caution rather than boundless optimism, despite Przheval' skii 's personal contempt for the 
military capability of the Chinese. On the ground, Governor-General Kaufman fnmkly confessed his own 
ignorance regarding the capabilities of the Chinese army, complaining that what information he did receive 
from so-called experts was contradictory, and pointing to supply difficulties and the need to significantly 
and Central Asia. A frequent substitute for Kaufman in times of illness, Governor-General of the Steppe 
following the administrative reorganization of Turkestan after 1882. ' .. a typical representative of the 
Turkestan forces, having spent all his life in steppe expeditions. ' Logofet, 'Zavoevanie Srednei Azii' p.l08 
35 Bilof, 'The Imperial Russian General Staff and China in the Far East.', p.183 
36 Hsu, The Iii Crisis p.l00 and Terent'ev, Istoriia Zavoevaniia Srednei Azii Tom III p.256. 
37 Lt.-Gen. M A Terent'ev, /storiia Zavoevaniia Srednei Azii Tom III pp.258-9. 
38 See for example Miliutin's assessment: Zaionchkovskii (ed.), Dnevnik D.A. Miliutina T.m pp.239-240. 
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disperse his own detachments in conducting a campaign against the Chinese. 39 On the 20th October 1880 
meanwhile L. N. Sobolev, Kuropatkin's successor as head of the Asiatic Department of the General Staff, 
wrote a report on military considerations in the event of war with China that incorporated a short review of 
the wars of the British and French with the Chinese in 1857-60. This report dwelt gloomily on the 
difficulties presented the Russians by such an operation. It estimated that the conquest of Western China 
would take two years, years in which Russian Turkestan, still only recently conquered, would be left in a 
dangerously undermanned state. Maintaining a fresh division in Turlrestan for two years to cover all 
eventualities would add 6,000,000 roubles to an already expensive campaign plan, with no guarantee 
meanwhile that the occupation of Western China would compel the Peking government to sue for peace. 
This latter goal would only be achieved by a direct naval operation against Peking itself, an operation that, 
when the British and French employed it against a Chinese anny still completely unmodemized, had even 
then required 20,000 troops and a large fleet of over 300 ships. A Russian operation of such a type would 
involve drawing troops away from the European theatre and an expense of 30,000,000 or perhaps even 
300,000,000 roubles. Given these considerations, Sobolev wrote that for Russia in its present condition war 
with China presented a 'calamitous' prospect and advised that 'all possible measures' should be pursued in 
order to 'with honour' avoid such a confiict.4O 
Though the IIi Crisis was settled diplomatically, staff officers based in the region or travelling 
through it regularly, like Przheval'skii, continued to advise on war plans. The main area of debate in this 
early period centred on whether to attack the Chinese heartland through Mongolia or Manchuria. 
Przheval'skii soon became a stern advocate of the Mongolian option, pointing out that possession of Urga 
would carry both strategic and moral significance, the town being considered by Mongolian Buddhists the 
second most holy city after Lhasa itself.41 The Manchurian theatre of operations gained precedence over 
time however in Russian strategic thought due to evidence of its richer resource base.42 The extent to which 
39 Kadnikov, 'Iz istorii kul'dzhinskogo voprosa' p.903. 
40 RGVIA F.846 Op.2 0.21 dl.I-44. 
41 Przheval'skii, 'Ovozmozhnoi voine s Kitaem' SGTSMA 1(1883) pp.301-5, and supplement, pp.317-21. 
42 Bitof, 'The Imperial Russian General Staff and China in the Far East. ' pp.98-147, 165-8. The main area 
of dispute lay as to which theatre presented the best environmental conditions for a Russian advance; 
Manchuria was well provisioned but conditions could be severe, with flooding, marshes, and plagues of 
horse flies. In addition too great an advance from this base would expose a weak supply line between the 
Ussuri oblast' and European Russia, and Russian columns could fall victim to partisan attacks. The 
Mongolians by contrast were seen as being friendly to the Russians. Mongolia offered the shortest direct 
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Russia took steps to correct its previous ignorance of China evoked the rather paranoid respect of one 
prominent Russophobe at the tum of the century: 
From 1881 till 1895, Russia devoted her utmost energies to the gaining 
[of] infonnation respecting China. Surveying parties were despatched in 
all directions. Scientific observers, always protected by Cossack escorts, 
were despatched to various parts of the empire, until her geographers 
knew more of the physical features of China. and her military surveyors 
more of her strategic possibilities, than the Chinese themselves. In these 
respects Russia has beaten the record Her knowledge of China is more 
complete and more reliable than that possessed by any other country ... 43 
This expansion of effort by the Russian General Staff had both a public and a private face in that 
nearly all the officers involved were also members of the Russian Imperial Geographical Society. Russian 
science was blessed at this time by an outstanding trinity of military vostokovedy, all of whom were to 
varying degrees disciples ofPrzheval'skii. The names ofM. V. Pevtsov (1843-1902), V. I. Roborovskii 
(1856-19lO) and P. K. Kozlov (1863-1935) would come to be indelibly linked, like Przheval'skii, with a 
golden age of Russian scientific and ethnographic exploration in Inner Asia 44 All made their reports both 
in public session to the Geographical Society and in private to the Russian General Staff, with Pevtsov for 
example also being appointed on the lOth March 1887 as a desk-head in the Asiatic Department of the 
General Staff.45 During this period military officers also frequently accompanied what were ostensibly 
route to Peking but scarcity of resources, most particularly water, would require Russian troops to move in 
split detachments, and deep gorges and walled towns further along the route could slow columns already 
severely taxed by a long desert march. The Soviets were forced to consider many of the same type of 
problems when planning their offensive against the Japanese in 1945. They opted for a combined assault 
through both Mongolia and Manchuria, using Mongolian cavalry in a special horse-mechanized group to 
pass through the Gobi Desert: Alvin D. Coox, Nomonhan. Japan Against Russia, 1939. (California: 
Stanford Press 1990) pp.l033-74 and LTC David Glantz, August Storm: Soviet Tactical and Operational 
Combat in Manchuria, 1945 (Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas: Leavenworth Papers NO.8 1985) 
43 A Krausse, Russia in Asia. A Record and a Study. (London: Curzon Press 1900) p.180. 
44 For standard biographies on these figures, mostly hagiograpbic but often incorporating their original 
reports, see for example: T. N. Ovcbinnikova, P. K. Kozlov-Iss1edovatel' Tsentral'noi Azii (Moscow: 
Izdatel'stvo "NAUKA" 1964), P. K.. Kozlov, Russkii Puteshestvennik v Tsentral'noi Ani. Izbrannye trudy k 
stoletiiu so dnia rozhdeniia (1863-1963) (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Akademii Nauk SSSR 1963), S. A 
Ogurtsov, Mikhail Vasil'evich Pevtsov. Geograf-puteshestvennik (Omsk: Omskoe Knizhnoe izdatel'stvo 
1960). 
45 G. M. Iskhakov, Etnograficheskoe izuchenie uigurov vostochnogo Turkestana russkimi 
puteshestvennikami vtoroi po/ovinyXIXveka (Alma-Ata: Izdate1'stvo "NAUKA" 1975) p.97. 
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civilian expeditions, whilst the Russian academic community through the IRoo also volunteered its aid 
The Russian geographer and ethnographer G. N. Potanin (1835-1920), whose name was destined to be 
preserved for posterity by a glacier in the remote Altai mountains, conducted many trips in the Far East in 
this period, encompassing northern China, eastern Tibet, central Mongolia (1884-86, 1892-93) and 
Manchuria (1899). These journeys furnished much infonnation that was also of interest to the Russian War 
Ministry. During his first expedition in south-east Asia in 1877-78 meanwhile, Potanin had also been 
accompanied by Staff-Captain P. A Rafailov of the Topographical Corps, who composed a map on a one 
inch-to-fifty-verst scale of north-western Mongolia as a result of the expedition. 
This increased emphasis on the Far East by the General Staff's Asiatic Department was further 
reflected in the Kotsebu Commission of 1881 's considerations on the reorganization of the central organs 
of the War Ministry. The Commission proposed a much greater focus on intelligence gathering in the Far 
East for the Asiatic Department than that originally outlined in the statute of 1867. Financial considerations 
in the wake of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 meant that the Kotsebu Commission's proposals were 
not realized however, and the Commission's recommendations, which would have led to the creation ofa 
truly independent intelligence arm within the General Staff, were set aside until the issue was again raised 
in 1903.46 In 1886 the General Staff's Asiatic Department was finally expanded in view ofits rapidly 
increasing responsibilities, but this marked a change in budget and an increase in personnel rather than a 
fundamental reorientation. 
China continued to be considered a dangerous force on the grounds of the sheer quantity of its 
population. The colonization programme begun in northern Manchuria was considered particularly 
threatening, there being thirty times more Chinese colonists there than there were Russians in the 
neighbouring Amur and Primor' e oblosts in 1882-90.47 Writing an advisory note to the Main Staff in this 
period, Asiatic expert L. N. Sobolev opined that along the whole Asiatic border, only China 'under certain 
political conditions, independently and directly, could threaten our interests and position in Asia ,48 
46 I. S. Makarov, 'Formirovanie tsentral'nykh organov upravleniia voennoi razvedkoi rossiiskoi imperii 
(posledniaia tret' XIX-nachalo XXv.) in: Ross;ia v mirovom politicheskom protsesse. Materialy vtoroi 
mezhdunarodnoi nauchno-teoreticheskoi konferentsii (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Rossiiskogo universiteta 
druzhby narodov 1997) p.58. 
47 Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy 1881-1904. p.22. 
48 L. N. Sobolev, 'Oborona russko-kitaiskoi granitsy' quoted in Bilof, 'The Imperial Russian General Staff 
and China in the Far East' p.149 
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According to calculations by officers of the Amur district, it would take eighteen months for Russian troops 
in route march to reach the Primor'e oblast; calculations like these lay behind the laying of the Trans-
Siberian railway in 1891-1904, the purpose of which was largely strategiC.49 From the second half of the 
1880s onwards Russia's Minister of Communications, K. N. Pos'et, until then almost a lone advocate for 
the building of a Trans - Siberian line, gained a powerful governmental ally in the person of War Minister 
P. S. Vannovskii, himself influenced by the concerns expressed by his Far Eastern Governor-Generals. The 
task of geographically delimiting the best route for such a line, much of it across great tracts of Asia largely 
unstudied and unmapped in the modem sense, was assigned to the Corps of Military Topographers, the 
only government department with the expertise to take on such a role. 50 Between 1896 and 1903 officers of 
the Russian Topographical Corps in Manchuria fixed over 200 astronomic and geodesic points, helping 
produce a new map of Asiatic Russia on a scale of 100 versts to an inch, a new map of the southern border 
strip of Asiatic Russia, a map of the Far East (10 versts to the inch) and a map of the Liaotung peninsula. In 
1900 however, in a move later destined to have painful political and military repercussions, a proposal by 
the head of the Priamur district's topographical section, Colonel M. P. Polianovskii, to conduct an 
extensive topographical survey of northern Manchuria, was rejected by the Russian Main Staff on financial 
grounds, the project requiring 115 men and an expenditure of 600,000 roubles. 51 
Unlike many 'Asiatics', the Chinese army itself, in either attack or defence, could not be too easily 
dismissed. Hesitant modernization and a complicated organizational structure made the Chinese army 
difficult to assess. 52 The army at this time consisted of three types of troops- local militia, the Chinese army 
(the so-called 'Green Standard' forces), and the 'Eight-Banner' troops, the latter of which had brought the 
49 Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy pp.24-6, 39-40. On the Trans - Siberian railroad see also: 
Marks, Road to Power, D. Geyer, Russian Imperialism. The Interaction o/Domestic and Foreign Policy, 
1860-1914 (Leamington Sp!.: Berg Publishers Ltd 1987) and Theodore H. Von Laue, Sergei Witte and the 
Industrialization o/Russia (NY & London: Columbia University Press 1973) Geyer argues for the 
predominance of commercial over strategic considerations in Vitte's railway project; his assessment has not 
met general consent amongst historians however. 
50 V. V. Gushkov & A A Sharavin, Na karte Genera/'nogo Shtaba-Man 'chzhuriia. (Moscow: Institut 
politicheskogo i voennogo analiza 2000) pp.235-243. Towards the end of this period there was compiled a 
literary memorial to this expansion of effort by the military topographical department. See: M. N. Levitskii 
(ed.), V trushchobakh Man 'chzhurii i nashikh vostochnykh okrain. ' Sbornik ocherkov, raskazov i 
vospominanii Voennykh Topogra/ov. (Odessa: Tipo-litografiia Shtaba Okruga 1910). 
51 Gushkov & Sharavin, Na karte Genera/'nogo Shtaba-Man 'chzhuriia. pp.325-326. 
52 For a brief survey of this important period of Chinese military history, the reader is advised to consult the 
work of David B. Ralston: Importing the European Army. The Introduction 0/ European Military 
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Manchu dynasty to power in the seventeenth century and consequently occupied a hereditary, privileged 
position within the Chinese state. The majority of the Eight-Banner troops were deployed in Manchuria, the 
ruling dynasty's heartland, and formed the most technologically backward section of the Chinese army, 
being armed with arrows, spears, swords, and worthless matchlock muskets. Their reform would not be 
significantly noticeable until after 1905, when a new wave of military reforms was instituted in ChinaS3 
Within the militia and the so-called 'Green Standard' forces however the story was rather different. During 
the course of the Taiping Rebellion (1850-64), the militias of Tseng Kuo-fan, Li Hung~hang and Tso 
Tsung-t'ang had proven the only effective forces in combating the Taiping troops. The effectiveness of 
these militias was in large part based both upon their own organization and discipline, including a ban on 
opium smoking, and upon the use to a limited degree of Western technology. These militia armies 
remained standing forces, though in reduced numbers, after the rebellion, and their leaders important 
proponents of military modernization in China. The infantry of Li Hung~hang' s army when he was 
governor of Chihli, for example, came in the main to be armed with the Mauser 71 rifle, a weapon that 
would become amongst the most common of modem arms in Chinese service in subsequent years. Their 
artillery comprised Krupp guns of German make, and German instructors trained the troops in Prussian 
drill. After 1885, on the suggestion of General Gordon of Khartoum fame, two military academies were set 
up, whilst a handful of Chinese officers began to be sent abroad to study. The reorganization of sections of 
the Green Standard troops into so-called 'Disciplined Forces' also represented an attempt to transfer the 
virtues of the Taiping-era militia forces to the larger Chinese army. Modernization remained painfully slow 
however, the Japanese General Staff estimating in 1895 that only three-fifths of the Chinese troops 
mobilized against them had some type of firearm, many carrying only a pike, spear or sword S4 
Complicating the question of assessment further was the fact that until the start of the twentieth century, 
military reform was uneven, dependent on the whim (and level of corruption) of local governor-generals. 
Initially the balance of modem arms in China lay in Russia's favour, China having devoted most attention 
to its coastal defences following the repeated trauma of foreign intervention from that direction in the 
Techniques and Institutions into the Extra-European World. 1600-1914 (Chicago & London: The 
University of Chicago Press 1990) pp.l07-41. 
53 'Reorganizatsii vos'mi-znamennykh' voisk' (Pa-Tsi)' SGTSMA LXXXV (1912) pp.89-152. 
110 
earlier part of the century. 55 One Russian military traveller in the first half of the 1880s noted that the 
degree of advanced military technology in China appeared to vary depending on the distance from the 
northern frontier. In Urga matchlock muskets were still to be found, in Kalgan percussion arms were stored 
in the arsenal and in Peking and the southern ports the Chinese forces bore breech-loading Sniders.56 
Assessment of China and the Chinese army in Russian eyes was of course the direct responsibility 
of the Russian military agent in China, an innovation in Sino-Russian relations that had been introduced 
during the height of the IIi Crisis in 1879-1880. On the Sth March 1880 the military commander of the East 
Siberian military district reported to the Main Staff that the Chinese counted on having 10,000 armed 
troops in Manchuria in the event of an outbreak of hostilities. It was resolved in the light of this and other 
reports to dispatch two officers of the General Staff to China via Europe to judge the extent of the Chinese 
military build-up from a review of the arms orders received in European capitals and observation of 
Chinese forces at first-hand. 57 The Main Staff proceeded to launch an intelligence operation that remains 
impressive today by its scale, range, and depth of coordination. The two officers selected for the principal 
task were General Staff Lt. Colonel Shneur and Staff Captain (soon Lt. Colonel) Bodisko. These two 
officers were to make a grand tour of Europe, gathering information on Chinese arms orders, Shneur being 
assigned the southern half of Europe and Bodisko the north. Meeting up in Britain, they were then to go to 
America, to investigate the possibility of supplying the Primor' e military district by sea from that country 
(an obvious stopgap solution to the supply problem given the non-existence at the time of the Trans-
Siberian railway). Their final destination would be China itself. The two officers were to be assisted by 
agents of the Russian Foreign Ministry throughout, the Foreign Ministry promising the Military-Scientific 
Committee the aid of its consulates in London, Rome, Berlin, Vienna, the Hague, Brussels, Tokyo, Paris, 
Washington and Peking. 58 These plans underwent some slight alteration at the outset, Bodisko being sent 
directly on to America and then to China 'where the most rapid presence of our officer was recognized ... as 
54 Ralph L. Powell, The Rise ofChine~ Military Power 1895-1912 (NY. & London: KennikatPress 1955) 
pp.1945. V. Nedzvetskii, 'Voennyia Reformyv Kitai' Inostrannoe Voennoe Obozrenie. VS 12 (1S86) 
W'.191-20S. 
See for example: 'Svedeniia 0 peremenakh v vooruzhenykb sit Kitai za IS82-1883g. (Iz Jahresberichte 
uber die Veranderungen und Forschritte im Militarwesen, Lobell 1883)' SGTSMA XII (1884) pp.286-89. 
On the Chinese strategic dilemma in this period see: Paine, Imperial Rivals pp.51-3. 
56 'Zapiska 0 Kitae Praporoshchika 2 Vostochnogo Sibirskogo Strelkovogo bataliona Shulyngina' 
SGTSMA VII (1884) p.122. 
57 RGVIAF.447, Op.l, 0.11. dl.2-7ob. 
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an urgent necessity' and Shneur being left to work in Europe alone. 59 The consequence of these actions was 
the receipt of a constant stream of detailed reports to the Military-Scientific Committee (and passed on 
from there to the Asiatic Department of the General Staft) throughout the latter half of 1880 on the state of 
Chinese military modernization On the 28th July/9th August for instance, the military agent in Berlin 
reported the purchase of 6, 000 Snider carbines, 4, ()()() Vittena rifles, 3, ()()() Peabody-Martinis, 2, 000 old 
Remington rifles, and the order of around 15, 000 Mausers, all destined for China. These orders, with the 
exception of the Mausers, produced through the Dreyse factory, were made with Hamburg firms who 
operated without any degree of quality control, and the arms were old, cheap, and in a bad state of repair. 60 
The consul in Antwerp on the 19th September meanwhile reported the timetables of all vessels sailing from 
Antwerp to China with their accompanying loads of arms and military materials, and the General-Consulate 
in San Francisco on the 8th120th October gave a detailed breakdown of all ships sailing to China between 
January and September of that year with a precise enumeration of all the boxes of rifles and ammunition 
that they bore.61 Based on his review of arms orders in Europe, Shneur estimated that in the spring of 1881 
China would dispose of in the region of 260, 260 rifles of modern make, the majority of them (94, 500) 
Mausers, alongside modem artillery and torpedoes.62 He also dismissed the possibility of supplying the 
Primor' e district by engaging in contracts with American shipping firms, the terms of trade he was offered 
by American merchants being nearly twice as unfavourable as those he received in Europe.63 
Once he reached China Shneur met up with Bodisko and awaited new instructions, the ill Crisis 
having passed its most critical stage. Shneur was eventually instructed to return to Russia via India, 
investigating en route the impression made by Russia's latest successes in Central Asia upon the Indian 
population, whilst Bodisko stayed on as the official military agent in China. 64 He had been active there 
whilst Shneur travelled through Europe, one of his first reports, passed on to the chief of staff of the 
Turkestan military district on the 26th May 1881, being concerned with the number, type and disposition of 
58 Ibid,dl.20-200b. 
59 RGVIA F.401, Op.4, 0.56. dl.l. 
60 RGVIA F.846 Op.l D.55.dl.2-3. 
61 Ibid,dl.38-4lob, 57-5700. 
62 RGVIA F.40I, Op.4, D.56. dl.2. 
63 Ibid,dl.3. 
64 The section of Shneur's trip relating to hisjourney through India can be found printed in: Shastitko (ed.), 
Russko-Indiislde Otnosheniia v XIXv. pp. 251-55. 
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heavy artillery pieces in Western China.65 Short periods of service and excessively large spheres of 
responsibility meant that neither Bodisko nor his successor, Shneur, proved fully effective as military 
agents in China however, Shneur for example being tasked during his tenn of office (in addition to his 
primary responsibility) with providing data on both Korea and Japan 66 Only the arrival ofO. V. Putiata in 
1886 for a relatively long period of service served to put the role of military agent in China on a 
satisfactory basis. Putiata himself was destined to spend most of his career engaged in the study of Asiatic 
states, having come up through the ranks from the Turkestan military district and served as assistant head 
of the General Staff's Asiatic Department immediately before his appointment to China. After his service 
in China he would continue to be attached as a desk-head to the Asiatic Department of the General Staff, 
being appointed military adviser to the Korean government in 18% before eventually becoming head of the 
Asiatic Department in 1898 - 1902. This career path made his views on the Far East in general far more 
influential over the long term than those of his predecessors. 
Putiata's reports to the General Staff after 1886 kept it updated on the latest developments in 
Chinese military organization and secured his place as the Russian staff's leading expert on the history and 
military potential of that country, despite the fact he himself did not speak Chinese. His standing was not 
unchallenged by the academic community however, particularly when Putiata ventured publicly outside 
study of the purely military sphere. His 1895 book on the history, religion, economy, culture and armed 
forces of China came in for a blistering critique from the leading Russian vostokoved of the day, Dmitri 
Pozdneev, who attacked nearly every aspect of the work, from its faulty transliteration system to its 
presentation of Chinese Buddhism. Pozdneev attributed these errors chiefly to the sheer scope of the 
programme Putiata set himself, a task he was 'completely unable to fulfill.' Nonetheless Pozdneev did not 
criticize Putiata's analysis of Chinese army, recognizing that in this area Putiata was a weU-qualified 
judge.67 The chief characteristics of Putiata's reports to the General Staff, meanwhile, were his steady focus 
on the efforts at reform and military reinforcement undertaken by the Chinese in Manchuria and a 
consequent stress upon this area as the most crucial section of the long Russo-Chinese frontier. 
65 RGVIA F.13% Op.2 0.127. dl.4-5ob. 
66 RGVIAF.447Op.l 0.11. dl.128-129, 161-164. 
67 O. Pozdneev, Kriticheska;a zametka 0 kn;ge polkovnik D. V. Putiata 'Kita;' (StPetersburg: Tipografiia 
V. S.Valasheva i Ko. 1895) pp.9-20. 
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In 1885 the Chinese formed in the three provinces of Manchuria troops of what Putiata termed 
'auxiliary contingents', that is to say combined arms detachments (infantry, cavalry, artillery) in the main 
towns of each province. These formations were significantly better armed, trained, and led than standard 
Chinese troops, the infantry bearing Mausers, the cavalry Winchester carbines and the artillery Krupp field 
gunS.68 Observing the manoeuvres of the Mukden detachment of these forces in 1888, Putiata opined that 
under the leadership of knowledgeable officers and with improved training these forces could soon master 
European tacticS.69 In addition the Chinese undertook for the first time attempts to create a modem 
fortification system in Manchuria, three forts being constructed at Ekho (north of Ninguta), San-hsing and 
Khun-ch 'un, and attention being paid to the improvement of communication routes in this area. The 
disposition of these forts was designed to cover China from the side of the Russian South Ussuri krai. Of 
this group of fortifications only those at Khun-ch 'un resembled anything more than earthen fortified camps 
however. Even the Khun-ch'un forts, consisting of oval earthen walls with rondels mounting 15cm. Krupp 
cannon, (see overleaf) shared the faults of their brethren elsewhere in being poorly constructed and 
dominated by neighbouring heights. Putiata reported that the Krupp guns, recently installed, were already 
rusted beyond use by neglect and that their gun carriages were stored, disassembled, in great disorder.70 
The local brigades at Khun-ch'un were relatively well-armed and disciplined, the troops bearing 
Winchester, Remington and Hotchkiss rifles, and a special officer being appointed to oversee cleaning and 
maintenance of the arms. Faulty mainsprings in the majority of these repeating weapons made firing 
68 Gen. Sht. Polkovnik Putiata, 'Kitai: Geograficheskie ocherk. Naselenie. Gosudarstvennyi budzhet v 
vneshnaia torgovlia. Vooruzhennyia sily. Russko-Kitaiskaia granitsa.' SGTSMA LIX (1895) p.261.On 
Chinese attempts to reform the Banner forces, see also: Robert H. G. Lee, The Manchurian Frontier in 
Ch 'ing History (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press 1970) pp.123-5. 
69 Gen. Sht. Polkovnik Putiata, 'Otchet 0 poezdke po Man' chzhurii cherez Inkou, Mukden, Girin, Da1in, 
Ashlkho, Paiensu, San' -Sin', Ningutu, Khunchun' vo Vladivostok' 1888g.' SGTSMA XXXVIII (1889) 
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practice extremely inaccurate however. 71 Nonetheless Putiata felt that the measures China had taken 'must 
arouse suspicion regarding the true intentions of the Chinese in the Manchurian region.,72 
A review of the whole length of the Russo-Chinese frontier in a topographical re~lI'd led Putiata to 
emphasize the dominating strategic importance of Manchuria. With the exception of the border region in 
the IIi district, he felt China could not be seriously threatened in the west, although local unrest would 
probably require a Russian occupation along the lines of 1871 in the event of renewed hostilities of any 
kind In regard to Mongolia, he utilized personal study of Russian steppe operations in Turkestan, the 
campaigns of Chinghiz Khan, and the Chinese invasion of Mongolia in 1696 to argue that Mongolia 
presented an obstacle to military movement from either side. In Turkestan, steppe wells could not support 
the provision of over 270-300 men in 24 hours; wells in Mongolia must be expected to reproduce this 
performance. At the same time each column could not be expected to advance at more than 30 versts a day, 
a standard set by the cavalry raids of Chinghiz Khan. The Chinese operations of 1696 meanwhile best 
illustrated the difficulties that would be presented to movement in that country by a large, modern army. On 
that occasion a sizable Chinese force had covered 2/3 of the distance from Peking to the Russian border in 
72 days, including 26 days of rest, and had repeatedly almost been overwhelmed by both the natural 
elements and local resistance. Such figures supported Putiata' s contention that forces of the requisite size 
for serious military operations (circa 100,000 men) could not traverse the area between eastern Mongolia 
and the Russian border in less than 104 days or, in other words, three-and-a-half months.?3 These 
conditions in Mongolia and Sinkiang, and Chinese military reinforcement in the Manchurian theatre, 
rendered inescapable in his view, 'the overwhelming importance, in a military regard, of the extreme 
eastern section of the Russo-Chinese frontier. ,74 Chinese defeat in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, 
Putiata admitted, demonstrated the bankruptcy of many of the military measures the Chinese had 
71 Gen.Sht Polkovnik Putiata, 'Vooruzhennyia sily Kitaia i printsipy voennogo islrusstva v tolkovanii 
drevnikh kitaiskikh polkovodtsev. Beregovaia oborona Kantona 1886 goda. Zametki 0 porte Artur. 
Svedeniia 0 Kitaiskikh voiskakh v Khunchune 1888.' SGTSMA XXXIX (1889) pp.171-172. 
72 Putiata, 'Kitai: Geograficheskie ocherk. Naselenie. Gosudarstvennyi budzhet v vneshnaia torgovlia. 
Vooruzhennyia sily. Russko-Kitaiskaia granitsa.' p.263. 
73 Ibid, pp.237-251. 
74 Ibid, p.265 
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undertaken in Manchuria, but 'it does not exclude the reality of their former intentions', implying that 
Russia must maintain a policy of strict vigilance in this area. 75 
Through the study and reports of the Russian military agent on the ground therefore, amongst 
other factors, Manchuria came to dominate the strategic thought of the Russian General Staff in regard to 
China. However the outbreak of the Boxer Rebellion in 1900 and the corresponding question of organizing 
a Russian expeditionary force to Peking still came as a surprise to some elements within the General Staff. 
As General Rediger, the future War Minister, at this time serving in the War Ministry Chancellory, 
recalled: 
Nobody in St.Petersburg thought seriously about war in the Far East; war 
with China appeared simply inconceivable since, ever since the time of 
Przheval'skii, we had maintained the conviction that one battalion could 
go through the whole of China. Therefore mobilization was prepmxl 
only as a precaution, in the assumption that this work, properly 
speaking, was pointless; the very quality of the Siberian forces was 
seen as doubtful, since the Siberians from time immemorial had not 
participated in any military actions.76 
Rediger's comments must be treated with caution. As he himself admitted, he spent the great 
majority of his service in a section of the General Staff that played no part in war-planning or strategic 
mobilization-therefore his knowledge of the 'strategic mindset' of the General Staff was almost inevitably 
bound to be quite limited. 77 That not all within the Russian General Staff necessarily shared this attitude 
regarding China, or Przheval' skii 's personal contempt for the Chinese army, is evident in the already-noted 
moves towards strategic reinforcement taken in the Far East and the concerns exp:essed by officers like L. 
N. Sobolev. Nonetheless, Rediger's comments probably do reflect a collective disparaging attitude that 
existed in the General Staff as a whole towards the potential threat of China before 1900.78 
75 Ibid., p.265. 
76 Rediger, Istoriia Moei Zhizni. Vospominamia Voennogo Ministra T.l p.316. 
77 Ibid, p.357. 
78 On Russian attitudes to the Boxer Rebellion, see: David Scbimmelpenninck Van DerOye, 'Russia's 
ambivalent response to the Boxers.' CMR 41 (1, 2(00) pp.57-78 and Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern 
Policy 1881-1904 pp.l24-44. 
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The question of a potential invasion of Western China as a secondary theatre of military 
operations continued to fascinate the Russian General Staff meanwhile, the IIi and Kashgaria districts being 
subjected to further surveys by officers of the Turkestan military district in 1899-1900. One side-affect of 
the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 was a dramatic weakening of Chinese forces in her western borderlands, 
one third of China's best troops in the region being despatched back to the capital to meet that crisis. These 
forces had still not returned in 1900 when news of a possible imminent break with one or more of the 
Western great powers reached Ururnchi from Peking by telegraph. A side-affect of this chain of events was 
the increased difficulty the local Chinese authorities faced in dealing with even minor uprisings such as that 
of the Dungans in 1899, that rebellion having compelled them to hastily form a local militia To add to 
these difficulties, an anti-Ch'ing secret society was uncovered in the military forces disposed of in 
Sinkiang, leading to the removal and arrest of the heads of two locallianza detachments. In Kashgar the 
Chinese authorities attempted to respond to the worsening security scenario by the conduct of military drill 
and training exercises, the issue of 1, 300 Mauser magazine rifles and the expulsion of around 2, 000 of the 
most destitute and politically unreliable elements from the town into villages in the surrounding 
countryside. In July anti-Russian demonstrations by Chinese-Manchu settlers in the Kul'dzha region posed 
such a threat to the Russian consulate and merchant community there that Russian troops in neighbouring 
Turkestan began to mobilize and concentrate on the Semirech'e border, a move sufficient to provoke the 
Chinese to take rapid measures to calm the situation. Russian military analysis was carried out against the 
backdrop of this period of renewed unrest and administrative instability.79 Appointed to assess Kashgaria in 
1899 was LtColonel Lavr Kornilov, later to serve as military agent in China before rising to national 
prominence in the revolutionary events of 1917. Although Komilov estimated there were now enough 
breech-loading rifles in the region for the Chinese on the outbreak of war to be entirely armed with 
Mausers, he still considered the defensive capacity of the country to be very low.so General Staff Lt.-
Colonel Fedorov of the Turkestan military district simultaneously studied the Ili region in both a military, 
geographic and ethnographic regard, his review emphasizing in its conclusions the advantages to be gained 
79 'Kratkii Ocherk. sovremennago polozheniia v zapadnom' Kitae (Kashprii i Chzhungarii) k 20 Dekabria 
1900' Dobavlenie k sbornik materialov po Azii No. 7 (1902) p.54-59. 
80 Podpolkovnik Kornilov, Kashgariia iii vostochnyi Turkestan '. Opyt voenno-statisticheskago opisaniia 
(Tashkent: Tipografiia Shtaba Turkestanskago Voennago Okruga 1903) p.382. 
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from again occupying the region in the near future. The Russian General Staff rejected the idea of re-
annexing the IIi district however as a goal hardly imminently attainable given the existence of tasks of a 
much more immediately urgent and pressing chamcter.81 The General Staff concluded generally that 
Chinese difficulties in Sinkiang, outside of mistakes made in Chinese administrative policy, were 
symptomatic of a more general Islamic militancy also experienced by the Russians in the 1898 Andizhan 
uprising in Central Asia. In particular, the presence in Kashgaria of suspected Turkish or Afghan political 
agents was taken as indicative of ' ... the presence of certain secret and still elusive links gradually arising 
amongst followers of the Sunni branch of Islam, not only in various countries but also across various parts 
ofthe globe. ,82 
Assessment of China's western provinces in the light of the new wave of military reforms 
instituted in the country was also of course the task of Baron C. G.E. Mannerheim, the future president of 
Finland, during his famous trip through the country in 1906-08.83 Mannerheim found the new wave of 
reforms only beginning to touch the Chinese troops in the western provinces. In particular he, like many 
observers, felt that the Chinese army's greatest continuing weakness was the lack of a fully trained and 
professional officer corps. The Chinese performed their new drill manuals, which consisted in the main of 
high-speed formation marching, dazzlingly well, but demonstrated no knowledge of extended order or 
tactical use of ground Annament, which Kornilov noted in Kash~ in 1899 to vary between muzzle-
loaders, Winchesters, and Mauser 71-84 rifles, amongst others, remained cripplingly diverse at the time of 
Mannerheim's visit, complicating tremendously the question of supply. In addition the railway network 
spreading in the Chinese central provinces in this period had yet to reach these outer borderlands. 
Reflecting the consensus within the Russian General Staff of the time, Mannerheim fett that Manchuria 
would be the main theatre of war in any future conflict. Nonetheless, considering all the logistical and 
81 GSh Podpolkovnik Fedorov 'Kratkii voenno-statisticheskii obzor' Iliiskago kraia' Dobavlenie k sbornik 
materialov po Azii No.7 (1902) pp.I60-1 and 'Kratkii Ocherk sovremennago polozheniia v zapadnom' 
Kitae (Kashgarii i Chzhungarii) k 20 Dekabria 1900' p.74. 
82 'Kratkii Ocherk sovremennago polozheniia v zaJBdnom' Kitae (Kashs;uii i Chzhuns;uii) k 20 Dekabria 
1900' p.77. 
83 Polkovnik Baron Mannergeim, 'Predvaritel'nyi otchet 0 poedzke, predpriniatoi po Vysochaishemu 
poveleniu cherez Kitaiskii Turkestan i severnyia provintsii Kitaia v gorod Pekin', v 1906-7, i 8 gg. ' 
SGTSMA LXXXI (1909). For a study of the scientific results of this expedition, including Mannerheim's 
collection of 1370 photographs, see: P. Koskikallio & A. Lehmuskallio (eds.), C. G. Mannerheim in 
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119 
technical failings outlined above, he urged the staff to take advantage of China's weaknesses in Sinkiang to 
annex the western provinces as a political trophy at peace negotiations in any future war. Essential to 
success above all was the seizure of the central military depot at Urumchi. Kashgaria to the south could by 
contmst be practically ignored, since the scattered Chinese garrison forces there would be pinned down in 
monitoring the local Muslim population. A cavalry detachment with horse artillery and machine guns, 
debouching from the Tekcs and Yulduz valleys, and seizing the towns ofKarashar, Khami and Barkul, 
would put the camel route from Gul-Khua-Chen to Guchen in Russian hands, effectively cutting off the 
western provinces from China as a whole. Mannerheim a~in identified May to September as the optimum 
period for such an attack over the mountain crossings. Any further advance from the west beyond the 
operation outlined above, Mannerheim saw as attended by ever-increasing difficulties due to stretches of 
desert, dense woods and mountainous districts, not to mention the number of forces needed to secure an 
ever-extending communication line. A direct advance towards the capital from Manchuria could moreover 
achieve similar fmal results quicker and easier. Much less exertion would be needed, on the other hand, 
according to Mannerheim, to arm and train some of the dissatisfied local elements in Gansu province-
primarily the Dungans. The Japanese, he noted, would not be squeamish about using such means, any more 
than the French in Jndo-China.84 
A similar interest in the loyalties of the local populations in the Chinese western provinces was 
part of the motivation behind the trip of R A Syrtlanov in the year following Manncrheim's expedition. 
Ravil' Shakh-Aidarovieh Syrtlanov was the senior adjutant on the staff of the Turkestan military district at 
this time, and was therefore charged with intclligcncc-collcction in neighbouring countriCS.85 Officially 
undertaken as a supplement to the work of the recently deceased B. V. Dolbezhev, an outstanding student 
of the Eastern Faculty of St. Petersburg university and an expert on the Mongolian language, Syrtlanov' s 
1909 study considered the loyalties of two prominent tribal border groupings, the Mongols and the 
Kirghiz.86 
84 Mannergeim, 'Predvaritel'nyi otchet 0 poedzke, predpriniatoi po Vysochaishemu poveleniu cherez 
Kitaiskii Turkestan i severnyia p'OVintsii Kitaia v gorod Pekin', v 1906-7,i 8 gg.' pp.118-135. 
85 Alekseev, Voennaia Razvedka Rossii (Kniga 2.) p.502. 
86 R. A Syrtlanov, 'Materialy po Zapadnomy Kitaiu, sobrannye R. A Syrtlanovym' vo vremia ego 
poedzdki iz Urumchi na Altai v 1909 godu.' SGTSMA LXXXVI (1913) pp.53-113. 
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A crucial role in these later intelligence expeditions was also of course the monitoring of Japanese 
penetration into China. One cannot analyze the Russian staff's assessment of China after 1904 without 
taking into account the impact and consequences of the Russo-Japanese War, a war which had caught 
Russia's intelligence community apparently crucially under-prepared . 
... 
Underestimation of Japan was to prove one of the most significant intelligence failures of the 
Geneml Staff, with costly military and political consequences. However, as the cause and course of the war 
is tmditionally blamed on the influence of a court clique-that group led by Bezobrazov- the culpability of 
the military has mrely been independently examined. 87 It is therefore perhaps worthwhile to review how 
this intelligence failure came about, particularly as this underestimation is traditionally attributed purely to 
mcism on the Russians' part. The overall failure of Russian intelligence towards Japan is the more striking 
since war with Japan by 1904-1905 was far from unexpected. It is true that initially the Japanese armed 
forces had not been regarded as a significant threat Until 1875 in fact, as George Lensen has shown, 
harmony and warmth chamcterized Russo-Japanese relations.88 Typical were the lectures of Veniukov to 
the Staff Academy in 1871 which, whilst they noted the pace of Japanese military modernization since 
1868, went on to consider the threat other countries posed to Japan rather than any threat Japan might pose 
them.89 In part also the Russian General Staff, in common with many other European powers before 1894, 
simply considered China a more significant regional power. Thus a special edition of the Geneml Staff's 
Sbornik. .. po Azii from the early 1880s on the armed forces of China and Japan devoted 169 pages to the 
former and only 16 pages to the Iatter.90 However, Japan was kept under close observation following the 
Triple Intervention of 1895, and a special committee of the Naval MinistIy in that year actually noted that 
Japan's accelerated shipbuilding progmmme, designed to outpace the completion of the Tmns-Siberian 
87 For a concise summary of the competing Russian state concerns in the Far East in this period, see: 
McDonald, United Government and Foreign Policy in Russia, 1900-1914 pp. 9-75. 
88 G. Lensen, The Russian Push Toward Japan: Russo.Japanese Relations. 1697-1875 (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press 1959) pp.447-471. 
89 M. I. Veniukov, '0 sovremennom sostoianii voennykh' sil' i sredstv' Iaponii i Kitaia po dannym' 1869-
1870 godov.' VS 8 (1871) pp.239-243. Veniukov concluded that only Britain. as a major naval power in the 
region, could threaten Japan. 
90 David H. Scbimmelpenninck Van Der Oye, 'Russian Military Intelligence on the Manchurian Front, 
1904-05' Intelligence and National Security XI (1, 1996) p.2S. 
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railroad, made conflict in the period 1903-1906 a real possibility.91 The Triple Intervention itself involved a 
significant degree of strategic work on the part of the Asiatic Department of the Russian General Staff, 
Russia being the power able to most directly threaten the Japanese forces deployed in Manchuria. Thus 
1895-96 saw the first development of a strategic warplan for conflict with Japan, the mobilization to a 
wartime footing of the Priamur military district, the despatch of reinforcements from European Russia, and 
the upgrading of Vladivostok from a grade three to a grade two military fortification In the wake of 
demobilization following the end of the immediate war scare it was resolved to increase the military forces 
pennanently stationed in all of the Siberian military districts.92 General Staff Lt. -Colonel Strel 'bitskii 
conducted a reconnaissance of the route between Hailar and Tsitsikar in late 1894, a route which, although 
the probable operationallioe of the Trans-Baikal and West Siberian military forces in the event of 
hostilities, the Asiatic Department noted had until then been completely unstudied. CaJUin Manakin 
meanwhile, a future head of the Asiatic Department, conducted a reconnaissance between Mergen and the 
Russian border town of Blagoveshchensk two years later. At the same time the reports of Colonel K. I. 
Vogak, the Russian military agent in the Far East during the immediate prelude and course of the Sino-
Japanese conflict, conveyed almost with awe the level of efficiency and training visible within the Japanese 
armed forces. Noting that during the course of one attack on a Chinese redoubt a Japanese brigade caught 
in a crossfire continued on to its allotted position despite losses in the leading companies of 100010 of its 
officers and 75% of its lower ranks, Vogak concluded that this army now easily compared with that of any 
European force and undoubtedly formed the strongest military body in the Far East. Its sole remaining 
weakness lay in the capabilities of its higher commanders, former samurai not fully trained in modem 
military thought, and this defect would be eradicated over time by the natural processes of retirement and 
the promotion of younger officers. 93 
Colonel Putiata meanwhile, by now serving as a desk-head with the Asiatic Department of the 
General Staff, took the opportunity of the clear turning-point of 1895 to write a detailed report on proposed 
policies to secure Russia's future position in the Far East. As the base of this programme he took it as 
axiomatic that: 
91 Alekseev, Voennaia Razvedka Rossi; (Kniga 1.) pp. n-78. 
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the probable consequence of the presently proceeding events will 
be a still greater development of the armed forces in the neighbouring 
with us Asiatic states. 94 
China, he noted, had spent the last thirty years buying new arms, hiring European military instructors, 
building new fortresses and constructing arsenals. This policy however, due to the arbitrariness of its 
execution in the provinces, had failed to create either a modem army or a real fleet, and China had 'been in 
need of a lesson to convince it of its mistakes.' Consequently, he continued: 
If China is now conscious that it lies upon it to fundamentally 
alter its military system ... then through its material means it 
will become a more threatening neighbour than it was up until 
the present time. 
Japan meanwhile had, he believed, been left unsatisfied by its war with China, a war in which there was no 
military glory, and ' .. .it is natural to expect that later on there will arise the need [for it] to find new laurels 
in a war with a more suitable opponent, in another nearby theatre of military action, such as is presented by 
our Pacific coast. ,95 
In consequence Putiata urged a whole series of measures to improve Russia's position in the Far 
East, including encouraging the activities of missionaries, increasing the number of posts occupied by 
Russians in the Chinese customs service, and creating separate military agents for China and Japan. This 
latter suggestion was carried out the following year, when Colonel Vogak, military agent for China and 
Japan since 1893, became responsible for military intelligence in China alone and Colonel N. I. Ianzhul 
was appointed the first independent military agent in Japan. Putiata appears to have underestimated the 
difficulties of intelligence collection in Japan however, writing that since Japan had a well-developed 
communication system and an open press, intelligence collection there could be assigned to one man 
'without special harm to the affair.' Intelligence collection in China he saw as altogether more difficult due 
to poor communications, traditional Chinese secretiveness, and the extreme poverty of published 
information, and for this country he argued that having military agents in place in at least three distinct 
93 Russko-Iaponskaia Voina 1904-1905gg. Rabota Voenno-Istoricheskii Kommissii po opisaniiu Russko-
Iaponskoi Voiny T.I pp.423-6. 
94 RGVIA F.447 Op.l 0.69 dl.ll. 
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regions would be a necessity in the near future.96 At the same time as Putiata wrote his report. General 
Obruchev expressed his own views as a traditionalist 'Westerner' on the implications of the Sino-Japanese 
War. Acknowledging the strategic advantage that could be gained in the annexation to Russia of northern 
Manchuria, thereby shortening the land frontier from 3, 185 to around I, 400-1, 600 versts, Obruchev 
deprecated achieving this goal through conflict, particularly with Japan. Russia had sufficient enemies in 
Europe and Central Asia, he wrote, without creating a new foe in an opponent with a 40-million strong 
population, a powerful fleet, and a well organized army. By implication therefore, Russia's strategic 
priorities should remain concentrated upon the security of the Western frontier. However, although his 
estimation of the difficulties that would be presented in fighting a war with Japan proved prescient, 
Obruchev's remarks also displayed a distinct lack of understanding regarding what the local Chinese or 
Japanese response would be to even such 'peaceful' annexations as he proposed. This indicated a certain 
degree of ignorance in regard to the true diplomatic situation in the Far East.97 Obruchev's proposals for a 
Russo-Japanese rapprochement were rejected and Russian foreign policy in 1895 followed the line of 
intervention advocated by Finance Minister Sergei Vitte and supported by War Minister Vannovskii.98 
Despite Obruchev's personal orientation, a growing sense of the Japanese menace in this area 
came to impinge in almost every regard upon the strategic issue with China. Russia's military agents in 
China, more effective in intelligence terms than their counterpu1S in Japan, reported after 1898 a 
continuous stream of Sino-Japanese military exchanges as Japan sought to become the sole foreign mentor 
of Chinese military reform. This process, interrupted by the Boxer Rebellion, continued and even increased 
after that event, Japanese arms proving cheaper than their European competitors. Most troubling to the 
Russian General Staffwere Colonel Vogak's reports that, despite Chinese official denials, Japanese 
military instructors and spies were now also operating in the northern regions of China, Russia's traditional 
sphere of influence. 99 The Russian navy's strategic 'game' of 1903 was specifica1lybased on the possibility 
of a war between Russia and Japan, and even included, in an eerie premonition, the premise of conflict 
95 Ibid.dl.11. 
96 Ibid. dl.13-13ob. This change regarding the number of military agents in China was shortly to be carried 
out, again indicating Putiata's level of influence in such matters. 
97 Ibid. dl.4ob-8. Paine, Imperial Rivals p.183. 
98 Peter S. H. Tang, Russian and Soviet Policy in Manchuria and Outer Mongolia. 1911-1931 (Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press 1959) p.41. 
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erupting without an official declaration of war. Nonetheless, reorganizations in the intelligence service, 
disagreements over proposed war plans, and deficiencies in the very process of intelligence gathering itself 
served to hinder the Russian Staff on the eve of war with Japan A reorganization of the General Staff in 
1903, as previously noted, assigned intelligence collection in foreign countries to the VIIth Section of the 
Second Quartermaster Directorate, leaving the Asiatic Department with jurisdiction over the purely Russian 
territories (the Caucasus, Central Asia, Siberia). In addition, in 1903 Bezobrazov persuaded the Tsar to 
form a special Viceroyship of the Far East under Admiral Alekseev. The Viceroy's special conference 
(soveshchanie) then took charge of Russian military preparations in the Far East, reducing War Minister 
Kuropatkin and the Russian Main Staff to an advisory capacity. In particular, this meant that the reports of 
Russian military agents in the Far East were now sent directly to the Viceroy. This divided authority was to 
continue to have a deleterious effect during much of the course of the subsequent conflict. 
The Russian military agent in Tokyo from 1903 onwards, Colonel V. K. Samoilov, after an 
uncertain start, actually provided sound, accurate reports on the Japanese military buildup, largely through 
collaborating with other foreign intelligence agents in that country. This cooperation continued during the 
course of the war itself, one of the most able agents of the Tsarist intelligence service being the French 
journalist Bale, an individual fluent in Japanese. In the naval sphere the Russian naval agent in the Far East 
since 1900, Lieutenant A I. Rusin, likewise held the military capacity of the Japanese battlefleet in a far 
higher regard than many of his contemporaries. One of the few to assess Japanese intentions correctly, 
Rusin's reports served at least to convince Admiral Alekseev, the new Viceroy in the Far East, of the 
inevitability of war with JapanlOO For the Russian army however, Samoilov marked a late breakthrough in 
intelligence about Japan, the General Staff having been persistently dissatisfied by the quantity and quality 
of information provided by his immediate predecessor G. M. Vannovskii, a relation of the former War 
Minister, who served as military agent in Tokyo between 1898 and 1902.101 Vannovskii's own immediate 
predecessor, lanzhul, attributed much of this comparative failure by Russia's military agents in Japan to the 
99 E. V. Dobychina, 'Razvedka Rossii 0 Iaponskom voennom vliianii v Kitae na rubezhe XIX-XX vekov.' 
VI 10 (1999) 1'1'.127-31. 
100 Rosen, Forty Years of Diplomacy V.l, 1'1'.212-13 and Gushkov & Sharavin, Na karte General 'nogo 
Shtaba-Man 'chzhuriia p.S7. 
101 E. M Primakov (ed.), Ocherki istorii Rossiskoi vneshnei razvedka (Tom.l) (Moscow: 
"Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia" 1996) 1'1'. 192-3.Vannovskii arrived in 1898 to take on the post 
tempomrily, becoming permanent military agent there in 1900. 
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lack of reliable interpreters. Russian military agents were not trained in Japanese, and local interpreters 
were unreliable, compelling the military agent either to dispatch indiscriminately any secret documents that 
fell into his hands on the long journey to St. Petersburg to be translated, or to abstain from attempting to 
gather such documents altogether. 
Perhaps even more serious however in terms of the formation of Russia's strategic view of Japan 
between 1895 and 1904 was the marlced change in Vannovskii's own views toward the Japanese army 
compared with those of his predecessors. Vogak's successor to the post in 1896, Colonel Ianzhul, whilst 
somewhat critical of the Japanese army's high command. cavalry and artillery, nevertheless still felt that in 
training, equipment and mobility this army could compare favourably with that of any European power. 
One of Vannovskii' s first reports however, written whilst he was still in St Petersburg, marked a dramatic 
turnaround from these previous assessments. This report claimed that it would be decades, perhaps 
centuries, before the Japanese army acquired the moral foundation to compete on an equal footing 
militarily with 'even the weakest' of the European powers. Apparently unconscious of the parallel that 
could be made with Russia, he noted that the army would only reach even this low stage if the Japanese 
nation as a whole were able to endure 'the internal disorder that proceeds from too rapid an influx of ideas 
foreign to its historical and cultural existence. ' This report met high level approval, War Minister 
Kuropatkin noting with satisfaction in the mazgin: 
I read this. The enthusiasm of our former military agents towards the 
Japanese army is ended. This view is sober. I 02 
Vannovskii's views towards the Japanese army grew if anything even more critical as he ~ 
greater opportunities to observe it in action. His assessment of the 190 1 military manoeuvres in Japan, 
taken together with data on the performance of the Japanese in China in 1900, concluded by remarking that 
the infantry were poorly trained tactically and physically weak, the artillery poorly commanded and almost 
immobile, and the cavalry ineffective in every regard Against such an army, he wrote, a strong cavalry 
detachment provisioned with artillery and acting in a partisan-style action could operate with certainty of a 
decisive success. These views were corroborated and further elaborated in the highly critical comments of 
102 Russko-Iaponskaia Voina 1904-1905gg. Rabola Voenno-Istoriches/di Kommissii po opisaniiu Russko-
Iaponskoi VOinyT.l pp.430-l. 
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the Chief of Staff of the 1st East Siberian corps, Major-General Ivanov, another spectator at the 190 I 
Japanese manoeuvres. Less critical was Captain Gorskii of the 10th East Siberian rifle regiment, also 
present, who observed that European observers at these manoeuvres divided generally into two groups-
those who were highly critical, and those more cautious in their assessments. To the latter group 
appertained the German contingent; they admired in particular the level of discipline the Japanese 
displayed. The General Staff in St Petersburg treated the varied assessments it received with caution. 
Major-General Zhilinskii, head of the Quartermaster-General section of the Main Staff, noting that Ivanov 
exhibited a clear prejudice against the Japanese army, was of the view that: 
There is no doubt that the Japanese army in every regard is still very far 
from perfection and can in no way compare with the main European 
armies and in particular with our own. Nonetheless it would appear ... 
desirnble to be more impartial, without any bias in evaluating the military 
capability and training of our probable opponent. 1 03 
Over the course of the next few years however, Vannovskii as military agent continued to stress 
what he saw as weaknesses in the Japanese army and state, including mutinies in the fleet, widespread 
corruption, and the demise of a whole battalion of Japanese infantry from cold and starvation whilst on 
manoeuvres abroad in January 1902. This latter event, Vannovskii was convinced, demonstrated the 
incapability as yet of the Japanese army to mount a winter campaign in regions of north-east Asia where 
that season was climactically much more severe than in northern Japan. In terms of shaping strntegic 
perspectives on Japan therefore, the period Vannovskii spent in office as military agent in Tokyo marked a 
critical, and in retrospect deeply harmful interlude between the respect in which that army was held by 
Vogak and Ianzhul and the urgent, last-minute warnings of Samoilov. Probably the most famous 
consequence of these shortcomings of Russian military intelligence on the ground was the erroneous pre-
war Russian estimates of the size of the Japanese army. These estimates set the size of that force at some 
200, 000 men when its real strength closer appoximated 600, 000 under arms.104 The situation was further 
complicated by the views of the War Minister himself, AN. Kuropatkin famously visiting the Far East on 
103 Ibid, p.441. 
104 Menning, Bayonets before Bullets p.I54, Van Der Oye, 'Russian Military Intelligence on the 
Manchurian Front, 1904-05' p.26. 
the very eve of war in 1903.\05 The Far East as a whole was not high on the agenda of Kuropatkin's 
strategic priorities at this time; as he confided to Vogak during his visit to Japan: 
Russia and the Imperial throne is threatened from the West, and not from 
the East ... Wi.Ihelm and all of Germany is glad at each DeW expenditure of 
Russia in the Far East for, weakening ourselves in the west, we also gradually 
lose the right of Russia to a voice in European affairs, befitting Russia as a 
great European, and not an Asiatic, power.l06 
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Kuropatkin returned to report that Russia could rest secure in the safety of the Priamur district and Port 
Arthur, and of the 130 million roubles allotted the War MinistIy in 1904-09 for fortifying the Far Eastern 
border, only 9 million was released for improvements in Nikolaevsk, Port Arthur, Vladivostok and Pos'et. 
Kuropatkin also took the opportunity of his visit to the Far East to form and deliver his own verdict on the 
Japanese army. Amongst the factors Kuropatkin felt contributed to the inability of this army to participate 
in modem war was the absence amongst their officers and soldiers of any religious feeling-'without 
religion, without faith in providence, an individual might bear the casualties and losses of the heavy test of 
war, but the mass will not.' Such an evaluation only served to underline Kuropatkin's basic scholastic 
ignorance regarding Japan however, since the Japanese state religion-Shinto Buddhism- was in fact an 
intrinsic ideological element behind Japanese militarism right up until 1945.107 
Even improved efficiency at the lower-intelligence gathering levels was not sufficient therefore to 
shift the accretions of arrogance and lethargy that had gathered at the very highest levels of the Russian 
government, not least with the Tsar himself, who personally and most famously regarded the Japanese as 
no more than trained monkeys. The Geneml Staff itself on the eve of war prepared a report to the Tsar 
based on the collected information of their agents in Japan, China and Korea, setting out in fine detail the 
accelerated pace of Japan's training and mobilization over 1903. Despite the submission of this report to 
the Tsar approximately a month before war began, no complimentary intensified preparations took place on 
the Russian side. Literally a day before the outbreak of hostilities. on the 26th January/8th February 1904, 
105 The flawed assumptions made by Kuropatkin on this trip later formed one of the major charges of blame 
levelled by Finance Minister Vitte over the mishandling and outcome of the Russo-Japanese War in the 
messy post-war period of mutual recriminations within Tsarist governmental circles. 
106 Gushkov & Sharavin, Na karte Genera/'nogo Shtaba-Man 'chzhuriia. p.5S. 
107 Ib·d 60-1 I ,pp. . 
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there crossed Kuropatkin' s desk in St.Petersburg for his signature a report that accurately outlined Japanese 
strategic intentions almost exactly as they were subsequently played out in the war itself. It predicted the 
campaign beginning by an attack on the Russian fleet to gain command of the sea, an invasion of southern 
Manchuria, and the cutting-ofI and rapid siege of Port Arthur. Kuropatkin signed the document but noted 
that it remained a series of educated suppositions, not backed by covertly-obtained documentary evidence. 
Thus, even this did not inspire the Russian General Staff to order the majority of its forces in the Far East 
into a state of war readiness, nor to set about more general mobilization measures. IOR Grulev, a General 
Staff officer who participated in many scientific expeditions in the Far East in this period, helping select the 
site for the Russian town ofKharbin in 1895, later complained in his memoirs that officers who had visited 
Japan and strove to warn of the Japanese military build-up, like Sarnoilov and Agapeev, were reprimanded 
for 'timidity before the enemy.' Grulev himself suffered similar reprimands from his superiors on the eve 
of war for attempting to give, as he saw it, a more realistic picture of Japan's military strength.l09 
An overall survey therefore suggests that, despite the chaos caused by last minute reorganizations 
of administrative structure and previous weaknesses, the relevant sections of the Russian General Staff 
itself were, on the very eve of war, actually providing detailed and accurate information. However, the 
placing of more active and effective military agents in both Japan and Korea on the eve of war was no 
substitute for the absence of a broad, weU-organized agent network in these countries. Moreover, the 
Russian intelligence system then broke down mpidly upon the actual onset of hostilities in the theatre of 
war itself, emphasizing the fragility of what had been created. Intelligence reports initially only reached the 
army staff through the staff of the Far Eastern Viceroy. The secret agents deployed by the intelligence chief 
of the Manchurian army staff to Japan and Korea had to dispatch their reports by a roundabout route 
through Europe. The officer assigned organization of the Manchurian army's long-range intelligence, 
Major-Genem1 V. A Kosagovskii, had such fractious relations with the Quarterrnaster-General, Major-
General V. I. Kharkevich, that he later confided to his diary that by the end he felt like strangling the latter. 
As a result of these and other factors, delay, administrative discord, general disotpnization, and an overall 
lOS Alekseev, Voennaia Razvedka Rossi; (Kniga l.) pp.I64-5. 
109 M. Grulev', Zap;ski generala-evreia (Paris: no.pub. 1930) pp.205-206, 233. 
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failure at the tactical level characterized Russian military intelligence throughout the war. 110 Battlefield 
defeats exacerbated these difficulties. After the battle of Mukden, during the Russian retreat, the Japanese 
captured Russian field staff documents that compromised several agents of Russian intelligence working in 
Japan and Korea. In addition, after that battle, the recruitment of Chinese agents by the Russian field 
intelligence sections, always difficult and unsatisfactory before, became practically impossible, not least 
due to the severe punishments the Japanese always inflicted on any Chinese caught in the act of espionage. 
The Russian army's gradual retreat into northern Manchuria also placed it in the difficult position of falling 
back into territory for which it lacked adequate maps, largely as a consequence of the official rejection that 
had met Colonel Polianovskii' s proposal in 1900. In the immediate pre-war period the smallest scale maps 
suitable for tactical actions covered the Liaotung peninsula and part of southern Manchuria This was a 
situation the War Ministry considered perfectly appropriate given that their 1903 war plan envisaged 
playing for time whilst concentIating forces along the southern end of the Chinese Eastern Railroad before 
moving to a counter-attack and, ultimately, invading Japan itself. No fall back to positions further north had 
been envisaged. In the meantime, money allotted for increasing the number of maps and distributing 
topographical materials to the troops had only been assigned three months before the very outbreak of 
hostilities. The dispatch of maps to the troops was frequently dilatory, whilst materials already at the 
disposal of the General Staff were underdeveloped and often published too late to be useful. In 1903 the 
head of the Corps of Military Topographers, Lt-General N. D. Artamonov, generalizing from his own and 
other topographers experiences in the Russo-Turkish war twenty-five years earlier, had recommended the 
creation of a full topographical section to accompany the field staff of the active army. On the outbreak of 
hostilities Kuropatkin had ignored such advice, relying instead only a ludicrously inadequate number of 
topographers attached to his own army staff and those of each individual corps. I I I As a consequence the 
despatch of trained staff officers who could have fulfilled more vital tasks on the military front into the 
countryside instead, to draw up maps of the surrounding area, formed a recurring theme in many officers' 
postwar memoirs, fostering the later myth that the Russian War Ministry had entirely neglected to study the 
110 I.V. Derevianko, 'Russkaia razvedka i kontrrazvedka v voine 1904-1905gg' in: Tainy Russko-Iaponskoi 
Voiny (Moscow: Izdatel'skaia gruppa "Progress": "Progress-Akademiia" 1993) pp.143-157. 
III Gushkov & Sharavin, Na kiJrte General 'nogo Shtaba-Man 'chzhuriia pp.87, 341-5, 368-9. 
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Far Eastern theatre of military operations in the pre-war period I 12 In actual fact of course, as should be 
already evident from the foregoing, the General Staff's greatest problem was the rational organization and 
effective utilization of materials and infonnation that were already in principle at its disposal. Perhaps most 
devastating and unexpected of all however was the effectiveness of Japan's own intelligence service, which 
spread its net to Europe, funding the leaders of the Polish, Finnish and Russian revolutionary movements. 
The Japanese devoted no less than 1 million yen (35 million of today 's dollars) to this cause. I 13 At the 
general level, the Japanese outspent the Russians in the area of intelligence acquisition. Before the war, the 
Russian Main Staff assigned 56, 000 roubles annually to intelligence work, to be distributed amongst 
district staffs, each district receiving between 4-12, 000 roubles. The only exception to this financial pattern 
was, as we shall see in the next section, the Caucasus. The Japanese, by contrast, on the run-up to war, 
devoted (in Russian terms) around 12 million roubles gold to the cause of intelligence.114 As a result the 
superiority of the Japanese intelligence service throughout the conflict contributed significantly to Japan's 
final victory. Thereafter, in logical consequence, the improvement of its intelligence-gathering capabilities 
in Asia became one of the major tasks facing the Russian General Staff in its post-war reforms. 
Nowhere was the psychological impact of the Russo-Japanese War more evident subsequently 
than in the writings of Kuropatkin, the former Russian commander-in-chief in that war. In the massive 
strategic review undertaken on his taking up the post of War Minister in 1898, Kuropatkin had originally 
adjudged Russia's frontiers for the twentieth century to be generally satisfactory. In this he had for example 
rejected the opinions of other Russian Asiatic experts, L. N. Sobolev amongst them, that the Hindu Kush 
would form a more natural border than the Amu-Darya to Central Asia. I IS His general model for potential 
future conflict followed that of his former chief, N. N. Obruchev, envisaging defensive wars in the West 
112 On these 'blanks on the map' in wartime, see for example: Polovtsoff, (Polovtsov] Glory and Downfall. 
Reminiscences of a RUSsian General StafJOjJicer pp.66-7. 
113 For details on this operation, see: D. B. Pavlov & S. A Petrov, 'Iaponskie den'gi i russkaia revolutsiia' 
in: Tainy Russko-Iaponskoi Voiny pp.7-69 and Motojiro Akashi, Rakka ryusui. Colonel Akashi 's Report on 
His Secret Cooporation with the Russian Revolutionary Parties during the RuSSlhlapanese War. Selected 
chapters translated by lnaba Chiharu and edited by Olavi K.Falt and Antti Kujala (Helsinki: SHS 1988) 
On Russian counter-measures, particu1arly code-breaking, see: Inaba Chiharu, 'Franco-Russian Intelligence 
Collaboration against Japan during the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-05' JSEES 19 (1998) pp.I-23. 
1141. V. Derevianko, 'Russkaia agentumaia l3ZVedka v 1902-1905gg' VlZh 5 (1989) p.76. 
115 A. N. Kuropatkin, The Russian Army and the Japanese WarA>.64-5. However, Kuropatkin's account of 
his generally pacific attitude towards Russia's Asiatic borders is flatly contradicted by the deeply biased 
memoirs of Count Vitte, who claimed not without foundation that at the time of the Boxer Rebellion 
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and Far East whilst retaining a limited offensive capacity in Central Asia 116 Such a viewpoint led him to 
support the Foreign Minister, M. N. Murav'ev, in a policy of passivity rather than of territorial 
aggrandizement at the turn of the century when the possibility was raised of taking advantage of Britain's 
entanglement in the Boer War. I 17 By 1910 however Kuropatkin had come to foresee a century in which the 
subjugated Asiatic races would rise up against their European masters. A review of the European 
experience in other parts of Asia and Africa- the Anglo-Boer war, the triumph of the Abyssinians over the 
Jtalians- convinced Kuropatlcin that Asiatics would increasingly challenge their masters, using the 'armed 
fruits' of European culture against them, in the coming century. I 18 This would assume particular 
importance since in the twentieth century the value of Asiatic markets would increase-external trade from 
China alone in the past fIfty years had risen more than ten times, to say nothing of the consumer power of 
the Chinese population.119 As a result of what Kuropatkin saw as the growing threat of costly Asiatic 
insurrection, the Central Asian situation had already grown more complicated: 
Now, instead of the fIve or six battalions with which we conquered the 
country, we have two whole anny corps in Turkestan.120 
The danger of such insurrection meant that the Turkestan forces should pursue their traditional strategic 
policy-
the best means of action will be, as in the past, an attack against 
those preparing to invade, in order to smash them before they enter 
our territory.121 
Kuropatkin had used his influence during his tenn as War Minister to push forward strategic 
improvements in Russia's Asiatic military districts, such as construction of the Orenburg to Tashkent rail 
line, a link he saw as a strategic necessity. These facts indicate a desire on Kuropatldn's part even before 
the Japanese debacle to more seriously consider Russia's Asiatic frontiers, an area in which this former 
Kuropatkin wanted to seize Manchuria and create 'a second Bukhara.' Clubb, China and Russia. The 
"Great Game" pp.125-8. 
116 Van Dyke, Russian Imperial Military Doctrine and Education. 1832-1914 p.ll7. 
117 A. Popov & M. Pokrovskii, (eds.) 'Tsarskaia diplomatiia 0 zadachakh Rossii na Vostok v 1900g.' KA 5 
(18,1926)pp.4-25. 
118 Kuropatkin, Zadachi.. Tom. III p.253 
119 Ibid, p.253 
120 Kuropatkin, The Russian Army and the Japanese War p.87 
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head of the General Staff's Asiatic Department had never lost interest even whilst serving under the 
European-orientated Obruchev. Indeed, Obruchev's most recent biographer has written that: 
For Obruchev, Turkestan and China did not signify anything, and 
for people like Kuropatldn-everything.122 
Indeed, in the eyes of some officers, Kuropatlcin's greatest weakness was that he never ceased to be a 
'Turkestanets' in terms of both clan allegiance and, in their view, mental development 123 It was perhaps for 
these underlying psychological reasons (sensing how others perceived him) that in the run-up to the Russo-
Japanese War Kuropatkin had in effect acted as a 'Westerner', arguing that the Eastern frontier was a 
distinct second priority compared to the menace of Germany. 
Kuropatkin by 1910 however foresaw a new century in which European world hegemony would 
be increasingly challenged- he predicted for instance that Japan and America would between themselves 
divide up the Pacific, closing out Europe from the enormous commercial market on both shores. 124 A 
particularly large threat in this regard was what Kuropatkin defined as the 'yellow peril', a fear greatly 
inspired of course by the Russo-Japanese War, and which had not played so great a role in the thinking 
behind his original review of 1898-1900.125 China and Japan, Kuropatldn now warned, could each field 
armies of several millions, with the Chinese army now going through a period of considerable military 
reform via Gennan instructors~ Chinese children practised European military evolutions on the streets and 
the motto 'China for the Chinese' was on everybody's lips.126 In this oncoming conflict the role of the 
Muslim in his eyes was ambiguous (zagadochno)~ were the 'yellow races' to win the first battles he might 
well side with them. resulting in two enemies to every one European. 127 To meet this threat in the coming 
century, Kuropatkin in 1910 was urging the creation of a European union, enabling Russia to redirect 
forces from its western frontiers. A particular pet project was unification of English and Russian railway 
lines in Central Asia, an issue that dated back in Russian thought to the 1870s. By 1910 however, this 
122 Airapetov, Zabytaia kar 'era "Russkogo Mol 'tke" p.270. 
123 VanDyke, Russian Imperial Military Doctrine and Education, 1832-1914 p.137 
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125 For this turnaround in the thought of Kuropatkin and others, from 'Westerners' to 'Easterners', see 
Fuller, Strategy and Power p.424. The reader will note however in the foregoing some ambiguity expressed 
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would be 'a union of two peoples of the white race against the encroaching danger from the oncoming 
awakening of the yellow races. ,128 
In the area Kuropatkin had studied as a young officer, Kashgaria, he reckoned only the local 
Dungans might now provide assistance to Russia in the event of a conflict, the other local races in the 
contested border area- Kirghiz, Taranchi (Uigurs), and Kashgartsy- having effectively been subordinated 
by the Chinese. He particularly feared the political influence of Chinese-Kirghiz on Russia's own Kicghiz 
in the event of an invasion through the Dzhungarian Gate. 129 Kuropatkin felt that to meet this threat Russia 
had to revitalize and utilize its own immense natural and spiritual resources; a policy best summed up by 
the motto Kuropatkin proposed for the twentieth century, which headed all three volumes of his main 
literary work of the period: 'Russia for the Russians' (Rossiia dlia russkikh).I30 The estimates of the famous 
scientist Mendeleev on Russian population growth in the twentieth century gave Kuropatkin some hope 
that Russia could eventually secure its Far Eastern possessions through colonization. 131 In the meantime 
however, not sharing Przheval' skii's high estimate of the Mongol character, he recommended in 1913 a 
realignment of the Russo-Chinese border to recreate a barren strip of influence between the two empires on 
the 'natural' border of the Gobi Desert.132 
This emphasis in Kuropatkin's writing after 1905 on the new threat from the East was to a certain 
extent reflected in the more general military literature of the day. 133 The Voennyi Sborn; k for 1911 
contained 8 articles on the armed forces of China and Japan, not counting traveller'S accounts and 
reminiscences. To take a representative cross-section from the period before the Russo-Japanese War in the 
same category, the Voennyi Sbornikfor 1902, 1897, and 1891 had no such articles, and the samejoumal for 
1886 just one. 
Kuropatkin's reconsidel3tion of the 'Kuld'zha Question' in the first decades of the twentieth 
century also reflected contempomry military developments, most particularly renewed Sino-Russian 
128 Kuropatkin, Zadachi .. Tom.II p.147 
129 Kuropatkin, Russko-Kitaiskii Vopros'p.l72. 
130 The phrase was taken from Alexander 1lI. 
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tension over Chinese attempts to re-negotiate the StPetersburg agreement of 1881.134 In 1911 during 
'manoeuvres' Russian troops again crossed into Sinkiang and in 1912 again moved into the Kuld'zha area, 
though the Foreign Minister overruled proposals to reoccupy the whole Hi District. Military planning for 
full-scale operations in Western China was marred by disagreements between GUGSh and the Omsk and 
Turkestan district staffs, but amongst the most ardent advocates of a forward movement at this time was the 
Turkestan Governor-General Samsonov. Samsonov warned that while Hi remained in the hands of the 
Chinese, they possessed an 'open door' for action against the Russian town ofVernyi. A Russian 
occupation of the district on the other hand would be an advance to a 'natural frontier line' and would push 
the Chinese concentration area back on Urumchi, from where Chinese forces would have to operate across 
a broad strip of desert. 135 Thus, just a few years before the outbreak of the First World War, the strategic 
debates first raised during the 'IIi Crisis' some decades earlier were suddenly reignited. 
Another direct outcome of the Russo-Japanese War, meanwhile, was a renewed interest by the 
General Staff in Mongolia, culminating in Olter Mongolia becoming a Russian protectorate in 1911-12.136 
In the aftermath of the battle of Mukden, rumours had reached the Russians of a Japanese turning 
movement through Mongolia allegedly involving 20, 000 men with artillery. The Russian staff then 
discovered that it lacked the topographical and statistical data necessary to judge whether such a flanking 
movement was possible, or even likely. This in itself was an indirect comment on the level of organization 
of the Russian field staff in that war, since Staff officers like Pevtsov, Przheval' skii and others had reported 
extensively on Mongolia in the past Consequently a series of expeditions were despatched in 1905 
throughout the country led by Staff-Captain Guberskii, Staff-Captain Rossov, and the commercial agent of 
the Manchurian army, Mr. Gromov. These expeditions reported that there were no Japanese forces in the 
country other than a group of Japanese officers allegedly directing a band of hunhoses. They also made 
reports on various routes, concluding that Mongolia was too barren for the movement of so large a 
134 See: E. A Belov, 'Russko-Kitaiskii spor v 1911-1912 gg. po voprosu peresmotra Peterburgskogo 
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detachment as had been reported, and established diplomatic relations with Mongolian tribal leaders. 137 
These trips and one by Life-Guard Hussar Lieutenant Kushelev in 1911 laid the strategic groundwork for 
the later Mongolian-Russian rapprochement. 138 Kushelev's work in particular was later openly printed and 
circulated, ensuring it a wider readership than that traditionally associated with the General Staff's 
Sbornik..po AZii .139 One significant aspect of these officers' later activities was the manner in which they 
're-envisaged' Mongolia in geographical tenns in order to make political engagement in this country seem 
a pressing necessity. This was a familiar pattern, repeating in reverse the manner in which the Amur had 
earlier been 'envisaged' by Russian governmental personnel in the first half of the century. That river had 
at first been seen as a 'Russian Mississipi' and was then later downgraded as geographical reality 
intervened upon illusion. Clearly if the Russian General Staff were now interested in Mongolia, it could not 
be perceived as the strategic wasteland pictured earlier by Putiata. Kushelev did most amongst militaIy 
officers in altering the popular perception of Mongolia, writing that Mongolia had been considered a buffer 
state in view of its large expanses of 'shifting sands, wild mountains, [being] deprived of irrigation, 
communication routes and means of subsistence ... and being generally completely unsuitable for settlement 
by a cultured [ ... ] population, and equally not fit as a theatre of military action .. ' This perception, Kushelev 
attempted to persuade his military and governmental readers, had now been proven wrong-'for the past few 
years there has been emerging completely different information' The Chinese were advancing in a 'great 
wave' to colonize the country, revealing the whole territory of Mongolia to be not unfertile but, 'on the 
contrary [agriculturally] rich', facilitating the approach of a 'yellow peril' towards the Russian border.l40 
Furthermore the whole country was naturally passable for the movement of large bodies of troops, 
particularly cavalry and mechanized transport. This was particularly important in view of the strategic 
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consideration pointed out by both Kushelev and (separately) by General Staff Colonel V. F. Novitskii in a 
survey of Eastern Mongolia conducted in 1906- namely, that with the loss of a Russian presence in 
southern Manchuria, the shortest possible route from the Russian border to Peking now ran through 
Mongolia.141 In response to all these considerations, Kushelev urged a forward movement in Mongolia and 
the Hi district by Russia. This scheme included the construction of a strategic railroad linking Trans-Baikal 
to Kiakhta, Urga, and eventually Kalgan, together with exploitation of the cotton market in lli in order 'to 
be saved from the cotton yoke of America', and making use of the 'indisputably rich' mineral reserves in 
the mountains ofthe area-'everywhere there are signs of gold. ,142 Kushelev's own fantasies aside, Russian 
actions in general were also guided by an awareness of Japanese competition in the same region Mongol 
petitioners for Russian aid explicitly threatened to turn to the Japanese for arms in the event of a Russian 
refusal. In early 1907 the Russian government learnt via their leading sinologist, Dmitri Pozdneev, of the 
formation in Tokyo of a new society seeking to increase the influence of Japanese Buddhism amongst the 
Mongol Lamaist branch of that faith. Russian intelligence feared the spread of the new 'Pan-Asian' 
propaganda in the region, permeating Mongolia and percolating through the border to influence Russia's 
own Buriat subjects in the Trans-Baikal region Such fears were fortified by military intelligence reports in 
the immediate aftennath of the Russo-Japanese War of Japanese agents in Outer Mongolia who were 
particularly intensive in studying routes leading to Trans-Baikal.143 By 1913, in response to such pressures, 
the Russians had trained a Mongolian Brigade equipped with rifles and machine guns and commanded by a 
Russian officer appointed by the War Ministry. In a pact with Russia, China recognized the 'autonomy' of 
Outer Mongolia shortly thereafter. 
The Russo-Japanese War instituted a series of strategic reforms within the Russian state that also 
generally came to reflect Kuropatkin's publicly expressed fears and a policy of strategic retrenchment in 
the East. One consequence of the war, a result of a desire to improve intelligence operations in future, was 
the creation of permanent intelligence staffs within the local military districts in 1906. In 1908 and 1910, 
for the more successful coordination of central and local intelligence orpns, conferences were held 
141 V. F. Novitskii, 'Voenno-geograticheskii OOzor' raiona Vostochnoi Mongolii, obsledovannogo v 1906g. 
ekspeditsiei Gen. Sht Polk. V. F. Novitskogo' SGTSMA LXXXII (1909) p.l04. 
142 Kushelev, 'Otchet 0 poezdke s voenno-nauchnoiu tsel'iu v Mongoliiu' pp.299-300. 
143 S. S. Grigortsevich, Dal'nevostochnaia politika imperialisticheskikh derzhav v 1906-1917gg. (Tomsk: 
Izdatel'stvo Tomskogo universiteta 1965) pp.392-4. 
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bringing together the senior adjutants of the intelligence organs of the military districts. The 1908 
conference, held in Kiev, involved the intelligence staffs of those districts whose concerns encompassed the 
Western frontier, whilst the 1910 conference brought together those staffs directly concerned with 
intelligence operations in the East Heading this latter conference was General Staff Colonel Oskar 
Karlovich Enkel', head of the 5th (Far Eastern) operational desk of the 3td Quartermaster-General section 
(Asiatic fronts) of GUGSh, the organization which sent him to the Far East at the start of 1910. Enkel' 
returned with a bulky report regarding the intelligence operations of the military district staffs, military 
agents and secret agents in the region, with accompanying recommendations for future improvements.l44 
That same year the Governor-General of the Priamur military district, Unterberger, was granted expanded 
legal powers in the field of counter-espionage.145 
A further result of the Russo-Japanese War was increased expenditure upon intelligence 
operations by the General Staff generally. In 1906-1909 the General Staff received annually for 'secret' 
(intelligence) expenditures 344, 140 roubles, compared to the pre-war figure of 56,920 roubles. In 1909 a 
State Duma-voted supplement increased this expenditure to around half a million roubles, and in 1910 the 
War Ministry managed to obtain a further increase again that brought the figure on intelligence expenditure 
to 1,947, 850 roubles. A final financial boost in 1914 to the western military districts in particular meant 
that state expenditure on military intelligence between the start of the centuIy and the First World War rose 
by 2000%. Most striking across the whole period however was the manner in which these increased sums 
continued until 1914 to be inadequate.l46 The Far East did benefit however from application of these 
increased sums, to the extent of there being some divergence from Russia's traditional strategic interests. 
As late as 1913, out of the total intelligence budget, 311, 600 roubles were devoted to intelligence 
operations in the East, compared to 203, 600 roubles in the West.147 
A 1909 report by GUGSh highlighted the need to direct all efforts towards raising the ·till now 
very scanty' level of knowledge regarding Japan as a potential opponent and about the Far Eastern theatre 
of war generally. The main means towards fulfilling these goals the Russian General Staff saw as the 
144 Shelukhin, 'Razvedyvatel 'nye organy v strukture vysshego voennogo upravleniia rossiiskoi imperii 
nachala XXveka (1906-1914 gg.)' p.19; Alekseev, Voennaia RazvedkaRossii (Knip 2.) p.I40. 
145 Harrison, Peace or War East of Baikal? 1'1'.242-3. 
146 Shelukhln, 'Razvedyvatel 'nye organy v strukture vysshego voennogo upravleniia rossiiskoi imperii 
nachala XXveka (1906-1914 gg.)' pp.24-25~ Sergeev & Ulunian, Ne podlezhil' oglasheniiu pp.27-28. 
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creation of an efficient agent network, the most notable oversight in Russian pre-war military policy in the 
region. The Russian military agent in Tokyo, Colonel Samoilov, on returning to his post in 1906, reported 
almost immediately that intelligence collection directly under the eyes of the Japanese authorities remained 
as difficult as ever, and for this reason he advocated in 1908 the establishment of a bureau outside the 
country for directing intelligence. At the end of 1909 the Main Directorate of the General Staff concurred 
with this suggestion, and in 1911 laid upon the shoulders of the assistant military agent in Shanghai, Ll-
Colonel Nikolaev, the task of organizing an agent network- No. 31- which conducted intelligence in Japan. 
This network remained in existence at considerable expense (35, 000 roubles annually) until 1914, when 
the General Staff finally transferred the greater burden of its intelligence-pthering activities to the 
European frontier. I 48 
The General Staff undertook on an equally ambitious scale the prepuation of material on the 
potential future theatre of military operations. Up until this time the largest single source of information on 
the Far East in Russian was the two volume work on Manchuria of the distinguished Russian sinologist 
Dmitri Pozdneev (Putiata's sharp critic). This major work was prepared in the 1890s on the explicit 
instructions and with the backing of the Finance Minister, Sergei Vitte. At that time the Russian War 
Ministry lacked any statistical compilation on the region that was remotely comparable in scale. I 49 This 
enterprise demonstrated explicitly both the predominant influence in that period of the Finance Ministry in 
the Far East, and also the wiliness of Vitte in poaching experts to serve his own cause. In the same period. 
Vitte had also lured away from the Asiatic Department of the Foreign Ministry to serve under his own wing 
as an agent of the Russo-Chinese bank the Russian diplomat D. D. Pokotilov. The Foreign Ministry's loss 
was Vitte's gain, as Kalmykov, a diplomat serving in the department in that period. cbaracterized Pokotilov 
and P. M Lessar as the only two officials of the MID's Asiatic Department 'who knew and understood the 
East. ,150 The immediate prelude to the Russo-Japanese War had JDaIked the passing of the Vitte period of 
patronage in Far Eastern affairs however, and in its aftermath the need for the Russian General Staff to 
have its own independent body of knowledge and statistical data on the region became obvious. An attempt 
147 Alekseev, Voennaia RazvedkaRossii (Knip 2.) p.41. 
148 Ibid .• pp.l09-27. 
149 D. Pozdneev (ed.), Opisanie Man 'chzhurii (s leartoi) sostavleno v kantseliarii ministra finansov T.1-2 
(St.Petersburg: Tipografiia Iu.N.Erlikh 1897). On this habit ofVitte's for the institutional poaching of 
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to answer this need was thereafter expressed in the production of nine very large volumes of statistics 
entitled simply 'The Far East', and produced through the Main Directorate of the General Staff in 1911. 151 
The Russo-Japanese war had inflicted enormous materia1losses in terms of transports, guns and 
other equipment upon the Russian anny, losses disproportionate to the actual number of troops engaged. 
Internal insurrection had further undermined the morale oftheanny. Consequently only in 1910 did the 
Russian General Staff again feel capable of formulating a complete war plan and mobilization schedule 
based upon planned and existing technical capacity. I 52 This plan was the first in Russian imperial history 
that developed full mobilization schedules for combat on the entire Ewasian continent, again reflecting the 
General Staff's new sense of vulnembility in Asia The 1910 war plan developed mobilization schedules 
that in various scenarios envisioned the dispatch of significant forces from European Russia to the Asiatic 
frontier. It made provision for war against China, Japan, China and Japan in alliance, war in the Caucasus, 
and war in Turkestan, whilst at the same time continuing to provision for the traditional European threat. I 53 
This schedule marlced a complete break from the General Staff's war plans of the past, where the European 
theatre (Poland) had traditionally been subject to the most detailed mobilization planning and the Asiatic 
theatres, if considered at all, were allotted only contingency schedules using purely local forces. 
Accustomed to analyze threats by the study of facts rather than diplomatic promises, the Russian military 
were generally unplacated by the assurances of their diplomatic counterparts that the 1907 Anglo-Russian 
Convention and later agreements with Japan had effectively neutralized the threat from that direction. More 
pertinent from their perspective was the prospect that in any future conflict in the Far East the Japanese 
would deploy an anny 1.5 times bigger than that encountered in the conflict of 1904-05 (475 as opposed to 
300 battalions), with those forces rearmed, re-equipped, and well-trained.lS4 In addition the course of 
military modernization in China had now also to be considered. The survey conducted by the Main 
Directorate of the General Staff in 1909 of the Chinese armed forces noted the rematkable advances in 
modernization made there over the preceding five years, already visible from the Chinese manoeuvres of 
1905 and 1906. New European-style formations had been adopted and moves towards a standardization of 
150 Kalmykow [Kalmykov), Memoirs of a Russian Diplomat p.25. 
151 Dal'nii Vostok Glavnoe Upravlenie General'nogo Shtaba (9 vols.) (St.Petersburg: A.Benke 1911) 
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arms taken in the form of the 1888 model Mauser infantry rifle and Japanese and German field guns of 
75mm calibre. This study concluded that' ... this army in and of itself cannot [any longer] be ignored and 
the more SO in joint action with the army of another strong power. ,155 Russian war planning in 1910 would 
make abundantly clear whom the General Staff saw as most likely to comprise this other 'strong power. ' 
The effective destruction of the Russian Far Eastern fleet during the war of 1904~5 meanwhile 
made the building-up of Russian land forces in the Far East, to the point where they could independently 
conduct a prolonged defensive struggle, a strategic priority. A forward movement might best achieve 
security in this new situation, and late in 1910 War Minister Sukhomlinov recommended to the Council of 
Ministers the annexation of northern Manchuria to Russia 'on strategic grounds. ,156 At the same time, 
Russian diplomatic circles for their part increasingly toyed with the prospect of a complete physical 
division of Manchuria between Russia and Japan, as had been provisionally arranged in a secret clause of 
the Russo-Japanese convention of 1907. A special session of the Council of Ministers on 19th 
November/2nd December 1910 under the chairmanship of P.AStolypin reviewed the whole Manchurian 
issue. Examining what was regarded as a hostile policy by China in the area of Manchuria under Russian 
intluence- mistreatment of Russian subjects, increased Chinese colonization, and the sudden appearance of 
Chinese vessels on the Amur-the conference concluded that with Japanese aid the 'Manchurian question' 
should be resolved by annexation Thus the higher leadership of the Tsarist state in 1910 accepted in 
principle the decision to annex northern Manchuria to Russia, thereby 'straightening' the line of the Sino-
Russian frontier. Differences between the War and Foreign Ministries over Tsarist policy in the Far East 
therefore were more over means rather than ends; in agenda both departments were now essentially 
pursuing a 'forward policy'. Acting Foreign Minister A A Neratov objected to War Minister 
Sukhomlinov's proposal to increase the number of Russian forces guarding the Chinese Eastern Railway on 
the grounds that the preliminary diplomatic groundwork had yet to be laid by his department, i.e. 
consultation with the Japanese.IS7 At the November 1910 conference the Foreign Ministry had settled 
154 N. Romanovskii, 'Iaponskaia Armiia v 1911godu.' VS 5 (1911) p.l0S. 
155 Vooruzhennyia Sily Kitaia (po dannym k 1 Ianvariia 1909 godo) Izdanie Glavnogo Upravleniia 
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however upon the need to take a 'finner tone' with China in future, and permitted the consideration, in case 
of need, of an actual military attack on China.1S8 Diplomatic attempts by the Russian Foreign Ministry to 
reach an agreement with the Japmese on the division of Manchuria over the following years were hindered 
of course largely by the unwillingness of either side to be the actual initiator in this process. 
The possibility of redistributing Russia's reserves from their traditional concentration points- the 
Vil'na, Warsaw and Kiev military districts- to a more central area. the Vol~ region, had first been raised 
by the Chief of the General Staff, General Pa1itsyn, in 1907.159 In a 1908 report Palitsyn and Major-General 
M. V. Alekseev, in addition to noting the traditional threats of Gennany and Austro-Hungary, noted darldy 
the emergence in the Far East of 'young, warlike, energetic powers. thirsting ... for [future] conquests. ' The 
only resolution to this dilemma as they saw it was that, in future, Russia should prepare for a war on two 
fronts. 16O Palitsyn' s own perspective on sttategic threats to Russia during his tenn of office as both Chief of 
Staff and head of GUGSh was unconventional, at least when compared to the decades-old focus on Poland 
first instituted under Obruchev. In a note to Stolypin from 1908 expressing concern over the security of St. 
Petersburg given the changing balance of power amongst the Scandinavian states, Palitsyn also added that 
although the threat to Russia's Pacific coast presented a less immediate danger to Russia's national 
interests, additional fortification to Vladivostok should now take priority over fortification in the Western 
European theatre.161 As early as September 1905 Palitsyn had presented a project to the Tsar in the 
presence of War Minister Rediger that sought to take measures in the event of a renewed outbreak of 
hostilities with Japan. This project foresaw the creation of two armies, one in Trans-Baikal and one in the 
Priamur military district. both to be tmnsported by railroad to Kharbin from where they would engage the 
Japanese in Manchuria Rediger objected to the proposal on the grounds that it would strip the Priamur 
region of its defences, where the ~son ofBlagoveshchensk in particular anchored the Russian centre. 
The plan was approved. but Rediger used his financial powers as War Minister to hinder the fulfillment of 
its implications, in particular the transformation of Kharbin from a civilian town into an enonnous military 
arsenal.162 Nonetheless fears regarding the Far East remained. Palitsyn continued to pursue his Far Eastern 
158 Rostovskii, 'Tsarskaia Rossiia i Sin'-Tszian v XIX-XX vekakh' 1M3 (55, 1936) p.47. 
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war plan until his fall from power in 1908, and War Minister Sukhomlinov produced a report in 1909 that 
differed in only minor details from Palitsyn' s and Alekseev' s 1908 analysis. In a report delivered to the 
Council of Ministers in April of that year, Sukhomlinov outlined to the assembled members the militaIy 
might of Japan and declared that it would be impossible in future to concentrate the whole strength of 
Russia's military forces on the western frontiers. 163 In the meantime, Sukhomlinov's own visit to the Far 
East persuaded him of the need to upgrade Vladivostok from a grade two to a grade one military 
fortification, a reform that the Tsar himself fully approved of. 
These concerns were reflected even more strongly in the work of military commanders and 
statisticians on the spot. Amongst the most distinguished Russian militaIy students of the Far East was V. 
K. Arsen'ev (1872-1930), a man whose career, like that of Kozlov, was destined to span both theTsarist 
and Soviet epochs. l64 Inspired by a love of nature and exploration in his youth by reading the works of 
Przheval'skii and Pevtsov, and as a young soldier by access to the Sbornik .. po Ani, Arsen' ev bad achieved 
his life's ambition in 1897 when he was transferred to the 8th East Siberian line battalion From this posting 
he had almost immediately embarked on a series of increasingly large scientific expeditions into the dense 
forests and taiga of the Russian Far East, invariably accompanied after 1902 by his faithful native guide, 
Dersu Uzala. His reports on the archaeological remains of local tribal cultures soon attracted the interest of 
the local Priamur section of the IRoo, several members of which were General Staff officers, and this 
organization funded his main expeditions in the period from 190 1 to 1911. These expeditions provided the 
material for his comprehensive militaIy-statistical study of the Ussuri /erai, published in 1912 by the 
Priamur militaIy district staff. Covering the geology, fauna, climate, lines of communication, economy, 
local population and the degree of Russian colonization in the /erai, this study was specifically orientated 
around illustrating the dominant characteristics of the district and how they would atIect any fighting in the 
event ofa Japanese invasion. l65 Arsen'ev's study survives as solid evidence of the seriousness with which 
just such a prospect was regarded by the Tsarist Staff's military-scientific ann in the aftermath of the 1904-
05 conflict, particularly in the Far East. 
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In December 1906 Arsen'ev's foremost sponsor, the Governor-General of the Priamur military 
district, P. F. Unterberger, wrote to the Council of Ministers urging the military reinforcement of the Far 
East alongside increased civilian settlement.l66 Earlier that same year, the newly-created State Defence 
Council had ordered the construction of bases in the Ussuri, Trans-Baikal and Siberian military districts to 
maintain troops concentrated there, and instructed the Chief of the General Staff to look into improving 
communication routes in the region, including the creation of an Amur flotilla and the building of an Amur 
railway. The construction of the latter soon became of overriding concern, since without it, a future 
Japanese attack could easily seize the Chinese Eastern Railroad and cut off Vladivostok and Khabarovsk 
from Russia as a whole, paving the way for a policy of conquest and annexation. War Minister Rediger 
supported Governor-General Unterberger on the need to construct the Amur railroad, writing to Stolypin 
that to delay construction by even one year would be highly dangerous and that delay from financial 
considerations could result in the loss of the whole Primor' e krai .167 Stolypin went on to explicitly use the 
'yellow peril' analogy to push through the necessary monetary grant for the construction of the Amur 
railway in the State Duma.168 Strategic concern for Russia's position in the Far East would lead to the 
building of this railway through some of the most difficult terrain in the world, the work finally being 
completed in 1916 at a total cost to the state of some 400 million roubles. Military considerations 
dominated the construction, the line being built ten to eighty miles from the borderline, a distance 
considered sufficient to protect the track from enemy interdiction whilst retaining a reasonably short 
deployment time for troops transported along this route. In pursuing this policy the option of utilizing a 
railroad deployed further northward in order to facilitate the civilian colonization of the krai was 
deliberately rejected.169 Moreover, in direct conuast to the policy pursued earlier with regard to the Chinese 
Eastern Railway, and in a move reflecting the mood of the times, the 'yellow races' were specifically 
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excluded from participating as cheap labour in the construction of the Amur line, Russian workers being 
imported instead at considerable expense. 170 
The 1910 strategic war planning meanwhile reflected the importance of defending the existing 
Chinese Eastern Railway, with a special district being set up in the Kazan okrug to reinforce the Central 
Asian and Siberian fronts and allocated by War Minister Sukhomlinov 320 battalions, most transferred 
from the Western frontier. Eight corps and three rifle brigades were set aside in the borders of European 
Russia and the North Caucasus as a general reserve in the event of fighting breaking out independently on 
the Asiatic fronts.171 The most famous consequence of this strategic realignment of reserves was the 
dismemberment of Russia's traditional fortress system in the West. Forts like lvangorod which bad 
screened Russian Poland for decades were now abandoned, only Novogeorgievsk being left intact, to hold 
out 'to the last cartridge and rusk' against an invader. As a consequence of the destruction of the old 
fortification line and the incompleteness of the new one, Russia would go to war in the west in 1914 with 
no fully organized defensive system. l72 The after effects of this redeployment and the strategic uncertainty 
it created regarding the true value of Russia's western fortifications was to be most painfu11y felt during the 
Great Retreat of 1915. 
In May 1910 Sukhomlinov wrote to the commanders of the Priamur, Omsk and Irkutsk military 
districts ordering them to present their considerations on the latest mobilization schedule for war in the Far 
East, informing them that 'we need now to consider China [with Japan] ... which in recent years bas 
significantly improved its military forces. ,173 This mobilization schedule foresaw the creation of three 
significant armies to fight a Japanese opponent or a Sino-Japanese military alliance. The so-called lit 
Trans-Baikal army, formed from the forces of the Irkutsk military district, was to advance into Manchuria 
to cover the Chinese Eastern railway, deploying between Kharbin and Tsitsikar. The 2nd and 3rd Trans-
Baikal armies were to be commanded by the heads of the Moscow and Kazan military districts 
170 On these laws, and the political mood of the period in general, see: Lewis H. Siegelbaum, 'Another 
'Yellow Peril': Chinese Migrants in the Russian Far East and the Russian Reaction before 1917.' MAS 12 
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respectively. As these districts also had a role to play in the event of war breaking out on the western 
frontier, the 1910 mobilization schedule therefore required those district commanders to be ready to deploy 
either east or west. The 2nd Tmns-Baikal army from Kazan was to be fonned of the XVIth, yIh, VIlth and 
VIllth army corps, Siberian cavalry regiments and the Irkutsk cavalry division, plus automobile, aeroplane 
and auxiliary sections, in all 152 battalions, 76 squadrons, 5% guns, 26 engineer companies and an 
engineer park. This force was to begin movement to the Far East at the end of the second month of 
mobilization174 The 3M Trans-Baikal army was to comprise the XIUth army corps, mM Caucasus army 
corps, the XXIth and J"t army corps, the Ural Cossack division, automobile and auxiliary elements- in all 
136 battalions, 68 squadrons, 540 guns, 29 engineer companies and one engineer park. This was to begin 
movement to the Far East at the end of the fIfth month of mobilization.17S This planning schedule, and the 
role allotted in it to the ~ corps, would appear to fully continn the claim of the late Russian military 
historian, A A Kersnovskii, that Sukhomlinov's creation in Kazan of two new corps-the XVIth and 
XXIyth - was designed not to put Russian army organization on a territorial basis (an explanation which he 
contemptuously commented only laymen believed) but to have a reserve ready in the event of an outbreak 
of war with Turkey or Japan.176 Defence of the Chinese Eastern Railway, meanwhile, also hinged upon the 
construction of new fortifications there. On the basis of reports from General Evert, commander of the 
Irkutsk military district, the Russian War Minister resolved in 1913 that a new round of fortification along 
this line was a necessity. Following an initial scheme to set up a series of tempOrary defences, a programme 
to construct permanent fortifications at a projected cost to the state of 1, 200,000 roubles was soon 
adopted. This sum did not include the cost of guns, machine-guns and searchlights. Informed by the 
Assistant War Minister of 'the extIaordinary significance of the Chinese Eastern railway as a strategic line', 
the Council of Ministers after some deliberation in 1913-14 approved the carrying out of this work. 177 
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Such Russian measures at military reinforcement as did occur in the Far East in the meantime 
served as grist to the mill for the more militant circles in the Japanese government, leading to a worsening 
of relations on the immediate eve of war in 1914. There was published in Japan a series of articles and 
books across 1913-14 speculating on the imminence of the next Russo-Japanese War, a war which Baron 
Motono, the Japanese consul to St.Petersburg, informed Russia's military attache Samoilov in Tokyo 
would be fought by the Japanese 'to the last drop of blood. ,178 
Although some of the thinking behind this strategic retrenchment and redeployment came to be 
rejected by the General Staff after 1912, there was insufficient time to prevent its actual practical effects- a 
slowdown in concentration times in the West- from being felt in 1914.119 Moreover, at least one prominent 
official within the Russian bureaucracy was still arguing the implications of 1910 on the very eve of the 
First World War. The famous Durnovo Memorandum of February 1914 argued for an alliance with 
Germany rather than England on the basis that a European war would be disastrous for Russia. This 
argument was specifically predicated upon the thesis that Russia's most natural strategic objectives were 
the Pamirs, Persia, Kuld 'zha, Kashgarla, and Mongolia- areas where international friction was created by 
England, not Germany. 180 
4.2 The Caucasus. 
The other area most immediately and directly threatened on the Asiatic frontier, and therefore of 
direct relevance to the Asiatic Department of the General Staff and the war planning of this period, was the 
Caucasus and the Russian-Turkish border. Of Russia's six wars in the nineteenth century, five were fought 
over issues stemming from Ba1lcan politics, each war seeing activity on the Russo-Turkish border.181 In 
contrast to China, Russia had direct experience of fighting Turkey in this theatre stretching back into the 
eighteenth century, and the geography of the immediate border region had become well known since the 
consolidation of the Transcaucasus in 1828. War planning in this area was directly affected by the actual 
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course of military events in this period as well, the retention of Kars, Ardahan and Batum following the war 
of 1877-78 forming an important counterbalance to the Turkish border base at Erzerum. Within the later 
period the most obvious overall change in the local balance of power lay in the inability of Persia to any 
longer present a military threat to Russia. A study conducted by staff officers of the Caucasus military 
district in 1889 stated at the outset that a conflict with Persia in future was only foreseeable were Persia 
drawn into an international alliance against Russia by the 'money, glorious promises, and threats' of other 
hostile powers. This study then concluded that even in that event the sudden appearance of a Russian 
detachment at Tabriz, just beyond the line of the Russo-Persian border, would serve to drive Persia out of 
the war. The forces involved on the Russian side for such an operation would be minimal-six to eight 
infantry battalions and a brigade of cavalry-sufficient to deliver the strategic equivalent of a bloody nose.182 
An intelligence trip by officers of the Caucasus military district conducted in the Russo-Persian border 
region ten years later reported that the local Persian forces devoted more time to attempting to avert 
imminent starvation than to military drill and training. For their often antiquated and defective rifles the 
individual Persian footsoldiers were issued just five cartridges for self -defence and received no instruction 
in firing, whilst being simultaneously financially cheated by the officers who were allocated the funds for 
feeding and maintaining them. Morale and espirit d 'ecorps were therefore non~xistent 183 Such 
considerations, alongside the fact that Russia increasingly held political influence in the Persian captal 
through the institution of the Persian Cossack Brigade after 1879, meant that Turkey and internal 
insurrection formed the main remaining threats to Russian power in the Transcaucasus. 
That foreign opponents might try to incite internal revolt in the Caucasus to coincide with external 
difficulties was not mere speculation, but something the Russian Staff bad acute experience of both from 
the exploits of the British adventurer David Urquhart in the late 18305 and more directly from Turkish 
181 The literature on the Eastern Question is voluminous. As a general point of reference, I have utilized: M. 
S. Anderson, The Eastern Question 1774-1923 (London: Macmillan 1966). 
182 L. K. Artamonov, Persiia, leak nash protivnik v zakavkaz 'i. Soobshcheniia, proiznesennyia v sobranii 
ojitserov General 'nogo Shtaba Kavkazskogo voennogo okruga (Tiflis: Pechatano po pikazaniiu Ego 
Siatel'stva Komanduiushchogo voiskami Kavkazskogo voennogo okruga 1889) pp.l, 192. 
183 Sht. Kapitan Aver'ianov, & Polkovnik Ia F. Shkinskii, Otchet 0 poezdke po severnomuAderbeidzhanu 
Polkovnika Shldnskogo i KapitanaAve,'ianova v kontse 1899 goda (fiflis: Tipografiia Shtaba 
Kavkazskogo voennogo okruga 1900) pp.78-81. 
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policy in 1877_78.184 The extremely broken nature of the mountain country, with a population still largely 
tribal. dictated that large armies were restricted to certain lines of approach, whilst the open sea coast left 
open the possibility of a desant or combined-arms operation by either side. These were all conditions quite 
different, as Zaionchkovskii noted. from those likely to be encountered in the European theatre.18S The 
nationalities problem in the area. with the corresponding difficulties of carrying out warfare with a 
significant 'political element', in turn demanded officers acquainted with local customs and beliefs. 186 In 
contrast to the other theatres under its consideration. the Asiatic Department could count on a considerable 
degree of support from the War Ministry as a whole in re~ to safeguarding the Caucasus since, as we 
saw at the start of this chapter, Obruchev considered the Bosphorus to be one of Russia's vital strategic 
interests. In later years the Bosphorus became for Obruchev, in Vitte's phrase, his 'idee fixe.' Faced 
towards the end of his career with a young emperor fascinated by Far Eastern affairs, Obruchev merely 
tailored his arguments to present seizure of the Bosphorus as the natural solution to all of Russia's security 
problems, including the Far East.187 This consensus within the Russian General Staff that in any future 
conflict, in one way or another, Turkey would prove to be one of the most likely major opponents was 
reflected in the expenditure for intelligence gathering allotted the Caucasus military district throughout this 
period. In stark contrast to its less fortunate frontier counterparts elsewhere, and as a consequence of the 
Tsar's personal resolution in 1895, the Caucasus district staff until 1905 were annually assigned 56,890 
roubles for intelligence acquisition in Asiatic Turkey-more than all the other district staffs put together.l88 
During the bout of increased intelligence expenditure that followed the Russo-Japanese War the Caucasus 
retained this relatively privileged position in annual expenditures, the district staff being allotted in January 
184 In 1877-78 the Turks had undertaken an amphibious operation, seeking to land 2-3,000 Circassians and 
Abkhazes with 30,000 rifles to arm the local population and create an uprising. Tiflis was hindered from 
immediately dispatching reserves to meet the threat by fear of a rising in Chechnia and Dagestan. a fear 
justified in Chechnia by the actions of one Haji Ali Bey in declaring himself Imam. Henze, 'Fire and 
Sword.' p.35 and N.V. Skritskii, 'Naprasno gortsy zhdali Turok' VlZh 4 (1995) pp.46-51. For a review of 
Western diplomacy during the period of the earlier Caucasus War see: Polkovnik V.V. Popov, 'Voiny na 
Kavkaze i zapadnoevropeiskie 'tsivilizatory" VlZh 4 (1997) pp.60-70 and G.H. Bo1sover, 'David Urquhart 
and the Eastern Question. 1833-37' JMH 8 (1936) pp.444-467. 
18S Zaionchkovskii, Podgotov/(Q .. p.27. 
186 'Sostav naseleniia v Armenii i v Zakavkaz'e, vrazhdebnyi gospodstvuiushcbim natsional'nom, mog 
vnesti v voennye operatsii v bol'shoi doze politicheskii element. Kharacter vsego teatra ... daval 
vozmozhnost' razvit' v bol'shikh razmerakh maluiu voinu.' Ibid., p.28. 
187 Airapetov, Zabytaia /car 'era "Russkogo Mol'tke" pp.274-5. 
188 Derevianko, 'Russkaia agenturnaia razvedka v 1902-1905880' P. 76; Alekseev, Voennaia Razvedka 
Rossii (Kniga l.) p.14S 
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1914 the sum of 65,000 roubles for intelligence collection-still more than any of the other individual 
military districts, even those on the western border, for that year. 189 
The special position given the Caucasus was evident from the very beginning of the post-reform 
period in the 1860s. The Caucasus was the one major military district outside the European theatre to be 
closely examined in the great strategic review of 1873. The Grand Duke Mikhail Nikolaevich then 
predicted that the local population would rebel on the outbreak of war and recommended a strategic 
offensive to offset this- again reflecting the general approach of Staff officers that only an offensive 
strategy was appropriate in Asiatic theatres. The lines of attack selected in 1873 were directed at Kars, 
EIZerum and the Saganulskii pass- points that would dominate both planning and action in 1877-78 and for 
many years afterward In the Caucasus the traditional moral arguments for an offensive were reinforced by 
the great difficulty of carrying out a defensive on the ground itself- the wide mountain ranges, however 
inaccessible, demanded large and widely scattered bodies of men to be defended adequately. The strategic 
planning for the conflict of 1877-78 in both Europe and Asia was the work of the ubiquitous Obruchev. As 
both the planning and course of this war has received close analysis in the recent Russian and English-
language historiography however, the details will not be related at great length here, particularly as the 
overwhelming emphasis of much of this planning lay on the Balkan theatre. l90 
Changes in Balkan politics following the war of 1877-78 increasingly denied Russia the 
opportunity of an attack against Turkey through the European theatre, and staff planning correspondingly 
switched to investigating the possibility of a naval desant on the Bosphorus.191 The Turks had fortified this 
approach to Constantinople in the period 1765-1795 with the assistance of French engineers, and these 
fortifications had been periodically updated ever since. Plans in this direction were worked out throughout 
the reign of Alexander III, but the concept did predate his reign, Obruchev having made a personal 
reconnaissance of potential landing sites in 1873 or 1874.10 the early 1870s Mikhail Veniukov, having 
increasingly fractious relations both with the head of the Geographical Society and with his direct superior 
189 Alekseev, Voennaia Razvedka Rossii (Kni~ 2) p.51!' 
190 Undoubtedly the most detailed recent work on war planning for the conflict of 1877-78 is that of David 
Rich, The Tsar's Colonels pp.115-148. 
191 Obruchev was scathingly critical in the aforementioned memorandum of 1885 of what he saw as the 
petty rivalries and ingratitude of the Balkan states; a primary reason, as he saw it, to launch a naval rather 
than a land-borne assault in future: Zolotarev, Voennaia Bezopasnost' Otechestva (lstoriko-pravovoe 
issledovanie) pp.260-2. 
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at the Asiatic Department of the General Staff, A P. Protsenko, and increasingly disillusioned by the 
General Staff in general, asked for a two month leave to visit Karlsbad and Turkey. Part of the inspiration 
for the trip came from rumours circling in the General Staff at the time that war with Turkey was imminent. 
Lt.-Colonel Bobrikov, the member of the Military-Scientific Committee directly concerned with the study 
of Turkey, declared that the Serbs would probably initiate this conflict and that Russia would then send a 
40,OOO-strong corps through Austria to fight the Turks. Veniukov harboured the personal belief that the 
greatest damage could be inflicted on Turkey by a blow through the Asiatic rather than the European 
theatre, but felt he lacked the first-hand knowledge to convincingly substantiate his views before his 
colleagues. Unexpectedly given a 2, 700 rouble monetary grant for his leave, Veniukov made a circular trip 
across the length of the Ottoman Empire, beginning from Vienna and ending in the Russian Caucasus, 
making notes on the country's geographic, ethnographic and economic characteristics as he went. 192 One 
major consequence of this trip was a specific plan of the Bosphorus contributed to the Voennyi Sbornik in 
1874.193 Veniukov considered the Bosphorus fortifications outdated, floating gun batteries being able to 
achieve the same goal, but admitted their utility in giving the Turkish fleet freedom of action. Like 
subsequent observers however, he noted these fortifications' vulnerability to being turned from the rear by 
landward-based forces and their often-restricted field of fire due to embrasured gun positions. 
In 1882 Alexander ill resolved to revitalize the Black Sea fleet, changing the local balance of 
power and giving Russian war planning in this area serious intent.l94 In December of that same year in 
connection with the English occupation of Egypt the Russian consul in Constantinople, A I. Nelidov, wrote 
Alexander the first of a series of famous notes recommending Russia occupy the Bosphorus Straits. The 
Paris peace agreement of 1856 neutralizing the Black Sea bad hindered Russian naval construction in the 
region for decades meanwhile, leaving Russia without a serious ocean-going fleet during the Russo-Turkish 
War of 1877-78. In a desperate bid to secure the Caucasus and Crimean coasts the Naval Ministry in 1871-
76 had commissioned the construction of two monstrous floating gun platforms, the 'Popovki' (so-called 
after the initiator of their construction, Admiral A A Popov) whose design originated in a Glasgow 
192 Veniukov, Iz Vospominaniia. T.2 pp.189-203. 
193 M. Veniukov, 's dorogi po Turtsii (iz pisem puteshestvennika)(s kartoiu Bosfora) VS 8 (1874) pp.365-
93. 
194 W. E. D. Allen & P. Muratoff, Caucasian Battlefields. A History o/the Wars on the Turco-Caucasian 
Border 1828-1921 (USA: Cambridge University PresslThe Battery Press 1953/1999) p.225 
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shipyard With poor manoeuvrability as a result of their circular design, the Popovki were built at 
considerable expense to the state and soon proved almost criminally, comically useless. Able only to fire in 
I 
volleys, since a single shot could send them into an uncontrolled turning circle, full-scale charges for their 
shells were forbidden since practice-firing with such rounds had already resulted in damage to the plating 
of their hulls and upper SUperstruCture.195 
Russian coastal defence in the Black Sea in the 1870s: The 'Pooovki'. Source: A B. Shirokorad 
Russko-Turetskie voiny 1676-1918gg. p.S1S. 
195 A B. Shirokorad, Russko-Turetsliie voiny J676-J9J8gg. (MoscowlMinsk: "Kharvest-Act" 2000) 
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Naval design after 1882 in the wake of deneutralization of the Black Sea banished the memory of 
such horrors and produced unique designs specifically created for offensive action in the Bosphorus Straits. 
Between 1883 and 1893 four mighty vessels, three with names evoking past Russian victories over the 
Turks-the ' Catherine II'. 'Chesma' and 'Sinop '-were commissioned and brought into service, each bearing 
six powerful 305mm cannon positioned in three mountings, two at the front and one at the rear. Deploying 
therefore four rather than the more normal two forward-firing main guns, these vessels were battering rams 
of the artillery age, designed not to conduct the broadsides normally associated with open-sea naval combat 
but to blast their way through the narrow gates of the Turkish Straits and to obliterate any fleet contesting 
their passage. 196 
On the offensive in the Black Sea, 1880s. The gun layout of the Sinop'. Source: A. B Shrro1Coraa 
Russko-Turetskie voiny 1676-1918gg. p.588. 
In connection with developing war plans for the Bosphorus, a special commission was set up in 
the Odessa military district in 1885 to study the problem, and it was with the goal of gathering more 
information on potential landing sites and coastal defences that A. N. Kuropatkin was dispatched in 1886 
undercover on a secret intelligence mission, coordinated with the Russian military agent in Constantinople, 
Major-General Filippov.197 Kuropatkin felt that the Turkish coastal defences presented no particular 
difficulties at that time; the main batteries on both banks could be knocked out by naval gunfire and the 
coast itself, whilst wild and presenting significant logistical difficulties offered opportunities [or creating 
successive defensive positions to the Russian landing forces. That same year, undoubtedly as a result of his 
joint work with Kuropatkin, Filippov presented a strategic overview of the Bosphorus coast that practically 
p~. 512-14. 
1 Ibid ,p.588. 
197 A. N. Kuropatkin, 'Razvedyvatel'naia missiia v Turtsiu ' VIZh 4 (1995) pp.68-77. 
153 
laid out in black-and-white how a Russian desant could be undertaken in this theatre. l98 The planning for 
such a desant at the time was unusual, since it amounted in effect to a seize-and-hold operation. By gaining 
the heights of the mountain-chain of the Istrandzh-dag above the Turkish capital, the main watershed of the 
region, and by fortifying selected plateaus, the Russians hoped to seize Constantinople's water supply and 
place the town effectively in a state of siege. The contemporary problems of how to conduct a combined-
arms offensive would therefore be almost entirely avoided, since almost as soon as they disembarked the 
Russians would be constructing a commanding entrenched position. Filippov considered the Turkish forces 
to be in a worse condition for combat in 1886 than they had been in 1877-78, with the regular anny 
(Nizam) no longer meeting in their training camps and the Twkish reserve being practically untrained. The 
Russians by contrast, in his view, presently possessed significant technical advantages in the form of the 
latest naval mines, electric searchlights, telephones and telegraphic equipment Therefore any Russian 
expeditionary corps should be provided with these means in abundance, in particular to assure 
communication and mutual support between the forces landed on both banks of the Straits. Naval mines 
would hinder either Turkish or foreign naval intervention whilst searchlights would halt any Turkish 
attempts at nighttime counterattacks, thereby facilitating the success of a potential strategic coup de 
main. 199 
Kuropatkin returned to Sevastopol in April-May 1886 where the Tsar was reviewing the latest 
Russian fortifications and oversaw the first Russian experiments with underwater craft. These vessels were 
small and apparently submerged and surfaced with some difficulty. Kuropatkin later speculated that what 
the Tsar saw convinced him of Russia's poor preparedness for carrying out desant operations on the 
Bosphorus.2°O Training for such an operation reached its height in the late 1880s however, in 1885, 1891 
and 1893 practice desanty were conducted around Odessa, in 1886 in the southwest Crimea, in 1887 and 
1892 around Sevastopol, in 1893 around Ochakov and in 1890 around Sudak. These operations typically 
198 Major-Gen. Filippov, Strategicheskoe opisanie Bosfora (St.Petersburg: Voennaia Tipografiia v zdanii 
Glavnogo Shtaba 1886). For a history of the meaning of desant operations in Russian military thought, 
including the actual naval desant operations carried out across the Black Sea in 1916, which owed at least 
something to these pre-war military preparations, see: Peter Vigor 'The 'Forward Reach' of the Soviet 
Armed Forces: Seaborne and Airborne Landings' in Erickson & Feuchtwanger (eds.), Soviet Military 
Power and Performance pp.183-212. 
199 Filippov, Strategicheskoe opisanie 8osfora p.8S. 
200 Kuropat:kin. 'Razvedyvatel'naia missiia v Turtsiu', pp.76-77. 
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involved the disembarkation of 3-4.5 battalions of infantIy, 0.5-1 squadron of cavalry, and 4-8 guns.201 In 
connection with these plans there was created in Odessa in 1886 a top-secret 'special supply' of heavy 
artillery pieces (6 and 12-inch guns) for transport and emplacement on both banks of the Bosphorus where 
they were intended to consolidate Russian gains. Numbering 78 guns in 1894, this stockpile were 
supplemented over the following years by the addition of twenty-four Maxim machine guns, fifty 6-inch 
guns of various descriptions and ten 57mm Nordenfe1dt guns, with the whole being serviced by a special 
reserve of 7000 troops. From the mid-1890s onwards this 'special supply' bepn to carry in addition a new 
series of 9-inch light mortars. Easily transpOrtable, the limited range of only 3km on these mortars made 
them unsuitable for conventional operations but perfect for the narrow Straits, where from coastal positions 
their l40kg vertical-trajectory shells would easily penetrate the decks of the latest warships in any 
incoming British fleet From 1895 it was decided in addition not to store this special artillery reserve any 
longer in coastal warehouses, but to have it based on the transport ships ready for immediate movement. 202 
Although Turkey devoted most of her resources in this period to the fortification of the 
Dardanelles, chastened by the British fleet's bombardment of Alexandria in 1882, awareness of Russian 
intentions led to naval mines being deployed in the Bosphorus after 1895. Russian planning in this direction 
probably came nearest to fulfillment in 1896-7~ on that occasion commanders were actually assigned to 
conduct such an enterprise and plans worked out for a deception operation to cover Russian movements. 
The fleet commander had at his disposal the Catherine II, Sinop and Chesma along with an array of 
minelayers and torpedo boats. Armenian massacres in the Turkish capital provided the incentive for foreign 
intervention and Nelidov, still the Russian consul in Constantinople at the time, travelled to StPetersburg 
in November 1896 to press the case for a desant. In this Nelidov was also taking advantage of the sudden 
and recent death of Prince Lobanov-Rostovsky, which had created a temporary power-vacuum in the 
leadership of the Russian Foreign Ministry.203 A desant on the Bosphorus was averted however when the 
Main Staff calculated that it lacked the naval assets to transport more than 20,000 men in a two-week 
period. These numbers were judged insufficient to achieve the fait accompli demanded by the tense 
201 Airapetov, Zabytaia kar'era "Russkogo Mol'tke" p.2S3. 
202 Shirokorad, Russko-Turetskie voiny 1676-1918gg. p.591 andK. F. Sbatsillo, Ot Portsmutskogo mira k 
~rvOi mirovoi voiny. Generaly i polttka. (Moscow: Rosspen 2(00) p.S9. 
V. Khvostov, 'Problemy zakhvata Bosfora v 9O-kh godakh XIXveka' 1M 10 (1930) pp.110-11. 
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international environment of the time.204 Perhaps even more persuasive however was the distinct coolness 
shown towards such an enterprise by Russia's major ally of the period, France. Not being officially 
informed, the French nevertheless heard rumours of Nelidov' s project. The French at the time managed 
60% of the Ottoman Empire's state debt and had large investments in Turkish railroads and industry; 
correspondingly, they had little interest in seeing the Ottoman Empire divided and dismantled as Nelidov's 
scheme implied. Their expressed resistance as much as technical considerations led to Nelidov's project 
being discreetly shelved, to the disappointment of Obruchev and War Minister Vannovskii but much to the 
relief of Count Vitte. 
An inquiry by the Foreign Minister on the occasion of the Boer War in 1900 revealed conflicting 
strategic intentions regarding Russia's proper missions along the southern frontier. Whilst Navy Minister 
Tyrtov remained unenthusiastic about the prospect of seizing the Bosphorus, preferring to see Russia's 
naval position consolidated in the Far East, War Minister Kuropatkin, undoubtedly reflecting the influence 
of his former mentor, Obruchev, saw seizure of the Bosphorus as the most important task facing Russia in 
the twentieth century.20S Despite Admiral Tyrtov's reservations, by the turn of the century war plans on the 
Bosphorus had assumed significant dimensions. In 1903 it was considered that on the ninth day after 
mobilization (M+9) Russia could have concentrated in its Black Sea ports the designated ground forces-
four and a half infantry and one and a quarter cavalIy divisions. By the eleventh day (M+ 11) these troops 
could begin disembarking in the Bosphorus, and 170,000 men might be gathered in the Bosphorus by day 
nineteen (M+19). Turkey by contrast would be in a position to dispatch no more than 215,000 men by the 
sixteenth day (M+ 16) to meet the threat, 60 per cent of them redif;o" with insignificant trained cadres. The 
main problem lay not in the military planning, but in the intervention of the other great powers again seen 
as inevitable at some point after war was declared. 207 
The course and immediate aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 inaugumted a period 
of flux and change in the planning for a Bosphorus desant. The immediate effect of the conflict with Japan 
was to almost completely destroy Russia's war-fighting capability in the Black Sea, since the 'special 
204 Fuller, Strategy and Power pp.367-72. 
205 Popov & Pokrovskii (eds.), 'Tsarskaia diplomatiia 0 zadachakh Rossii na Vostok v 1900g.' KA 5 
(18,1926) pp.18-22 
206 The Turkish first-line reserve forces, as opposed to the regular peacetime army (Nizam) which had 
replaced the janissaries after 1828. 
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supply' in Odessa was stripped back to help equip Russian forces fighting in the Far East. It was with this 
in mind that War Minister Rediger at the end of 1907 recommended to the State Defence Council the 
dissolution of the Odessa naval battalion- with the loss of so many other resources, this was effectively a 
force now devoid of a strategic role.208 The Tsar rejected this suggestion however, whilst the concept of an 
operation on the Bosphorus continued to have its defenders, most notably in Chief of the General Staff 
Palitsyn and Foreign Minister Izvol'skii. Izvol'skii in particular gave a new impetus to thinking behind this 
direction given his own apparent delusion that the recent Anglo-Russian agreement ensured that for the first 
time for several generations the British would not contest a Russian intervention in the Straits. The whole 
of the Foreign Ministry in the meantime shared the premonition that 'the sick man of Europe' (Turkey) was 
now about to succumb to his long-term 'illness'. The Russian Foreign Minister's personal interest in Near 
Eastern affairs would of course ultimately culminate, ironically, not in the fall of the Ottoman Empire but 
in the destruction of his own career. Palitsyn's interest meanwhile stemmed from concern over recent 
Turko-Persian border clashes, and at the start of 1908 he urged military preparations in readiness for an 
open break with Turkey. Rediger, never one ofPalitsyn's defenders, later opined in his memoirs that the 
Chief of Staff dreamed of deliberately inciting a war between Russia and Turkey.209 Whilst most of 
Palitsyn's focus centred on reinforcing the Caucasus military district, these plans did incorporate an aspect 
encompassing a Bosphorus expedition, since Palitsyn felt it would be useless for Russia to acquire more 
territory in Asia Minor. For him, only possession of the Bosphorus presented an object of vital strategic 
interest. Nonetheless Palitsyn also confessed to his French counterparts around this time that he saw a 
Bosphorus expedition as a rather 'chimerical' project, for all the staff planning involved, a response which 
perhaps reveals some underlying confusion or internal doubts in his own thinking. 210 
Under these influences strategic planning for the Black Sea revived, but with new variations on the 
old theme. In particular the Chief of the General Staff instructed the Third Over-Quartermaster Section 
(Asiatic Fronts) to prepare plans for possible desanty on the coast of Asia Minor. Schemes for such an 
operation, with one corps being landed between Trebizond and the line Sivas-Samsun to assist the main 
efforts of the Caucasus Army, were accordingly presented in October 1908. Such a plan possessed the 
207 Zaionchkovskii, Podgotovka ... pp.48-9. 
208 Shatsillo, Ot Portsmutskago mira k pervoi mirovoi voiny. Generaly i poJitka. pp.61-2. 
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merit not only of potentially gaining operational surprise, but also of relieving the severe mobilization 
pressure that would be exerted on the Transcaucasus milway. A conference was also held on the same 
theme under Major-General Skerskii, now head of GUGSh's Third Over-Quartennaster Section, but before 
that an assistant desk-head at the Asiatic Department of the General Staff (1896-1900). This conference 
considered the whole desant issue afresh and revealed divergent views between the anny and naval General 
Staffs. Whilst the navy saw its main role as the blocking of the Straits, the army sought the seizure of 
Constantinople, a desant on Trebizond, and foresaw a possible fleet action with the Tmkish or even 
Austrian navies-tasks for which the navy complained it was completely unprepared and lacked the 
resources.211 A series of conferences held in 1911 helped iron out these disagreements to a pessimistic 
conclusion-that an assault on the Bosphorus was at present impossible and a series of desanty on the Black 
Sea coast at best doubtful. In accordance with these conclusions Sukhomlinov obtained Nicholas II's 
approval to the final dispersion of the 'special supply' in Odessa. Nonetheless successive Near Eastern 
crises meant that the Bosphorus question continued to be revived until the outbreak of the First World War, 
but with little in practical technical terms being done to reverse the decay that had eaten into these 
preparations after 1904-05. A practice mobilization by the new head of the Odessa militaly district in 1911 
revealed drastic shortcomings that highlighted the continued gap between the General Staff's paper 
planning and reality. Of the forces mobilized, the first-line troops lacked 40% of their machine-gun 
complement, 15% of their cartridges and had no high-explosive shells whatsoever for their light artillery 
pieces. Second-line troops lacked their machine-guns and small arms ammunition altogether. The district 
commander grimly concluded that the VII1h army of which these units in theory formed the main part in 
practice did not exist-a damning indictment that the Tsar underlined eight times in the subsequent report.212 
A renewed inquiry by the Foreign Minister in 1912 meanwhile, inspired by the contemporary Turkish-
Italian conflict, revealed it would take two weeks to transfer two corps from the Odessa militaIy district to 
Constantinople- a time period still too slow to be considered a surprise attack. 213 At the same time, the 
report of the Russian military agent in Constantinople, Colonel Khol'msen, sounded the most pessimistic 
210 Luntinen, French Information on the Russian War Plans 188~1914. p.1l6. 
211 Shatsillo, Ot Portsmutslwgo mira k pervoi mirovoi voiny. Generaly i politka pp.62-4. 
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note yet about a proposed desant operation on the Bosphorus succeeding. A strengthened Turkish fleet 
meant that Turkey would soon be able to contest Russian supremacy on the Black Sea, whilst Turkey's 
modernized mil network meant that Russian landing forces, even if successful on the first day, would soon 
face an overwhelming superiority in enemy numbers. Examining the landing sites on the European and 
Asiatic shores proposed by his predecessors, and by Filippov in particular, Khol'rnsen concluded that any 
attempt to seize these sites now under present conditions was simply untenable. The tmditionallogistical 
difficulties aside- including steep, rocky, wooded ground that would involve manhandling the artillery into 
position- military technology in geneml had changed. The improved mnge and accuracy of artillery meant 
that the Turks could now not only enfilade but strike into the very rear of the proposed landing positions, 
creating the potential for a military disaster.214 The extremely able Russian naval agent in Constantinople 
in this period, Captain AN. Shcheglov (1875-1953), shared this pessimism on the potential for a 
successful desant operation.215 These views on the ground were reinforced by those of War Minister 
Sukhomlinov, who as an observer had been unimpressed by the Black Sea war game of 1903, and who sent 
his representative to talk down Russian diplomatists' enthusiasm for seizing the Bosphorus when the issue 
was again mised at the start of 1914.216 At a conference in February 1914 the Quartermaster-General of the 
Geneml Staff, Danilov, deprecated action against the Turkish Straits as a strategic distraction from war in 
the West against Germany and Austro-Hungary. That same year Admiral A 1 Rusin, the former naval 
agent to Japan and now head of the Naval General Staff, opined to his superior that Russia would not be 
ready for war in the Black Sea until after 1917.217 These considerations rendered stillborn plans evolved the 
previous year by the chief operations officer of the Black Sea fleet, Captain Ivan Kononov. Kononov's 
plans if accepted would have resulted in effect in a full-scale revival of technical preparations for a 
Bosphorus desant. Alongside a risky transfer of two warships from the Baltic to the Black Sea fleet, 
Kononov proposed the creation of a specially trained 'Landing Corps' equipped with light artillery, and the 
use of armoured floating gun platforms to suppress Turkish coastal defences. His scheme gained some 
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support in both naval and diplomatic circles but was sidelined by the February conference in 1914. 
Shcheglov himself was appalled by Kononov's ideas, and in their later years ofpost-war exile abroad, 
debate between the two over the scheme's relative merits raged in the pages of the Russian emigre press. 218 
Thus, on the eve of the First World War, the Tsarist state, after thirty years intelligence work on the 
problem, became much more cautious about seizing the Bosphorus, paving the way for the disastrous 
Allied attempt to seize the initiative and resolve the same type of problem at the Dardanelles . 
• 
As changing evaluations of the possibility of a naval desant demonstrate, assessment of the threat 
of Turkey could often only be evaluated by the actions of agents of the Russian General Staff on the 
ground Of particular importance of course was the condition of the Turkish army and the degree of 
political infiltration Turkey achieved in the Caucasus in peacetime given opportunities like the regular hail 
of Muslim pilgrims to Mecca and other holy sites. The Caucasus was the largest source of Muslim 
pilgrimage within the Russian Empire in this period In tandem with dramatic change in the Turldsh state 
itself throughout this period, which appeared to make Turlrey itself more militarily effective, fear of Islamic 
political movements, in particular Pan-Islamic threats, became of increasing concern to the Russian General 
Staff. The position Russia inherited in the North Caucasus after 1859 was in many ways unique, since 
Shamil had created the primitive outlines of an entire state system- the Imamate- to pursue his decades-long 
struggle against the Russians. This essentially theocratic system had its own bureaucratic hierarchy, 
taxation system, and local government organization and, of course, disposed of trained military forces. 219 It 
was this system the Russians had had to dismantle, adopt, and build upon in setting up their own 
administration after 1859, whilst being continually conscious of the contested legitimacy of the Russian 
model offered by local memory of Shamil's long reign. In principle the Russian state in the aftermath of the 
mass migrations of the early 1860s pursued the same policy in the Caucasus as it did in Centtal Asia and 
elsewhere in the latter nineteenth century, namely, attempting to create a social sphere of 'imperial 
citizenship'. For the mountaineers, this involved a special form of military-political rule (voenno-narodnoe 
upravlenie)~ for the Transcaucasus, the establishment of Russian-appointed local institutions, such as 
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separate Sunni and Shi'i religious boards in 1872. In practice, in parallel with this programme, the Russian 
General Staff was compelled to maintain a position of perpetual, expensive orientalist vigilance over the 
Sufi Islamic sects of the North Caucasus, which were officially banned.. From the very start of the 
nineteenth century, the North Caucasus had been distinguished by the fact that the great burden of Russia's 
ethnographic and statistical material on the om had been achieved almost wholly through the military arm 
to the near-exclusion of the civilian. a consequence of the almost continuous warfare occurring in the 
region.220 In the aftermath of Shamil's surrender and the settlement of 1864 this situation was moderated 
but not dramatically altered. Indeed, one of the most distinguished scholars on the local Caucasus dialects, 
Baron Petr Karlovich Uslar (1816-1875) began his career as a General Staffofficer, being entrusted by the 
High Command of the Caucasus Army in 1858 to write a history of the region from the time of Alexander 
of Macedon. With the coming of peace Uslar continued his scientific activities in the region till his death, 
becOming involved both with creating alphabets and primers on the local languages and with promoting 
programmes of secular education. These schemes proposed to draw the mountaineers away from traditional 
forms of religious scholastic education in the Arabic language to secular education, first in their own native 
dialects and ultimately in Russian. 'Literacy in ones' [own) 1anguage'-Uslar proclaimed-' is the first step to 
enlightenment. ,221 
Schemes like U star's fell to the consideration of the new structures of military administration 
created by Bariatinskii in the Caucasus, all of which corresponded regularly with the Asiatic Department of 
the General Staff. The main burden of this task locally fell upon the special Caucasus Mountaineer 
Administration (Kavkazskoe gorskoe uprav/enie). Bariatinskii's successor after 1863 as Viceroy in the 
Caucasus was the mediocre Grand Duke Mikhail Nikolaevich, but the latter was able to rely to a 
considerable extent upon talented subordinates, including Lt.-General D. S. Starosel'skii (1832-1884). In 
1864 Starosel' skii, also a member of the Caucasus branch of the Imperial Geographical Society, was 
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appointed head of the Mountaineer Administration. He thereafter spearheaded efforts at building up the 
Caucasus district staff's knowledge of local institutions and customs, and to this end, amongst other 
endeavours, he commissioned the short-lived journal 'A Collection a/Information about the Caucasus 
Mountaineers' (Sbornik svedenii 0 kavkazskikh gortsakh). Amongst the largest tasks facing the officers of 
the Mountaineer Administration, one that they carried out in painstaking detail, was the recording and 
categorization of the mountaineer's system of adat laws, the customs by which they were to be ruled. In 
performing this ritual the General Staff corps involved functioned in effect as social anthropologists, setting 
down a system of laws for which by and large no written record had existed up until then. 
One of the most significant legacies of Shamil's rule meanwhile was the continuing employment 
by the Russians of his naibs (subordinate commanders) within the ftamework of the Mountaineer 
Administration. To begin with the Tsarist administration took what might be termed a libeml approach to 
the employment of these local administrators. Instructions from both the Tsar and Viceroy decreed that 
local mountaineers were to be preferred to the appointment of Russian officers or representatives of the 
Cossack forces to such posts, whilst the number of naibs employed should be maintained or even increased, 
but never allowed to drop from their pre-conquest level. Changing administrative policies under Alexander 
III which sought to bring local institutions into line with geneml Russian law, combined with disillusion 
following the revolt of 1877-78 (in which many naibs assisted the mountaineer rebels) led to a change in 
governmental attitudes however. The number of naibs was reduced and the recruitment of 'natives' for 
such posts discouraged, until finally in 1899 the existence of such an institution was abolished altogether, 
replaced by a Russian-style equivalent 222 Alexander lll's reign was also marked by the abolition in 1882 of 
two institutions which had traditionally symbolized the Caucasus's specialized administrative status, 
namely the local Viceroyship and the Caucasus Committee, the latter of which since its aeation in 1839 
had formed part of the State Council. The geneml effect of these changing policies across this period 
however was actually a sharpening of local tensions, precipitating the re-appointment of a Viceroy to the 
Caucasus, Vorontsov-Dashkov, on the 26th February 1905. Whatever the other merits of the Mountaineer 
Administration meanwhile, it did little towards pacifying the traditionally warlike North Caucasus 
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mountaineers. Between 1859 and 1811 there were 18 different revolts in Dagestan alone. One of the largest 
of those risings, that in Unkratil' in 1811, ended with the arrest of around 1,500 people who were sent to 
Temir-Khan-Shura for re-Iocation to Russia.223 The revolt of 1811 presented a particular crisis to the 
security arms of the Russian state, since the punitive re-Iocation of approximately 5,000 mostly Dagestani 
mountaineers to Saratov province in the Russian interior created particular logistic and administrative 
difficulties. Re-located mountaineers refused to take up fanning or to utilize their state-sponsored and 
erected mosques, nor did they adopt the normal administrative practices employed in villages in central 
Russia. Evidence of such ingrained stubbornness and a corresponding and aJarming rise in the (essentially 
self-inflicted) death-rate from illness and starvation forced the Russian state to admit defeat; in 1883 what 
was left of this exiled mountaineer community was permitted to return to Dagestan. 224 
It was against this institutional and ideological background that the Tsarist military attempted to 
monitor the security of the Caucasus and its neighbouring regions. On the orders of the Asiatic Department 
in 1884, the staff of the Caucasus military district prepared a report on the annual pilgrimages made by the 
natives of the Caucasus, detailing their numbers, ethnic makeup and the routes used, whilst suggesting 
ways individuals might be used as intelligence agents.225 Security concerns in this direction increased with 
the development of Pan-Islamic trends in Tmkey and military and political changes in Asia Minor. From 
the mid 1880s onwaIds the Russian Main Staff received regular reports both from its agent in 
Constantinople and officers of the Caucasus district staff on proposed and actual military reforms in the 
Ottoman Empire's Asiatic border districts. Such considerations included, for example, the installation of 
Krupp artillery pieces on raised rotary platforms at Trebizond, projects for new railway lines in Anatolia, 
and a new round of fortification to strengthen &Lerum. 226 In 1898 Staff-Captain Davletshin, a future head 
of the Asiatic Department, accompanied the annual hajj of Muslim pilgrims to Mecca, reporting on the 
geographical division of the Hejaz, the number and makeup of the Turkish forces disposed there, and the 
ethnic composition of and point of origin of Russian pilgrims. Davletshin was particularly concerned to 
discover whether the hajj had any political significance in terms of unifying Muslims of various 
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nationalities, but reported that no such merger was observable, and that on the hajj 'even our Kirghiz and 
Tatars do not want to know one another. ,227 The General Staff remained unplacated regarding the potential 
political dangers from this direction however and at the turn of the century the Caucasus military district 
staffbegan a robust campaign to gain more military agents in the sensitive Transcaucasus border region In 
particular in October 1903 the Caucasus staff petitioned for the appointment of military vice consuls in 
Bitlis and Diarbekir alongside a military agent in Mosul to cover the Turkish VI corps in Mesopotamia. 
The latter was a region that, with the building of the Baghdad railway, appeared set to gain increased 
stIategic significance.228 In support of their demand for permanent military agents in these regions in place 
of temporarily commandeered officers, the district staff submitted in 1904 the report of Staff-Captain 
Shelkovnikov, recently returned from an intelligence-gathering operation in Mesopotamia. Shelkovnikov 
pointed out that the standard cover given on such operations- that of being attached to various Russian 
archaeological or geographical societies- was rapidly wearing thin in this particular region During 
Shelkovnikov's own trip, only the fact that he had himself graduated from the archaeological institute in 
St.Petersburg and therefore had some knowledge of Babylonian-Assyrian cultures prevented him from 
being exposed when in the presence of 'real' German and American archaeologists near Baghdad. 
Shelkovnikov was therefore an ardent advocate for new methods of providing cover. if the setting up of 
permanent military agents in the region were financially impossible, then officers on temporary 
komandirovkas should be given the more believable cover of being temporarily-attached bureaucrats to 
local consulates of the Russian MID.229 The result of all these suggestions however was only the 
development of a bitter paper war between the War Ministry and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The MID 
objected strongly to the possibility of replacing diplomatic consuls by military men As Lamsdorf rather 
primly responded in March 1904: 
it is essential that our consular institutions, even if allowing into their 
composition military secretaries, are CONSULATES and not merely 
military intelligence networks. This holds true in particular regarding the 
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towns of Tabriz, Erzerum, Bitlis and Baiazet; the political significance 
of the last three is rising as they now appear in recent years as centres of 
the developing Annenian movement. 230 
The Foreign Minister gave rather grudging consent meanwhile to the principle of providing diplomatic 
cover for officers on komandirovka in the area, but insisted his Ministry be appraised of every detail of the 
proposed missions, down to their period abroad and the very subject of their investigation. This 
bureaucratic war of words burst into life again following the Russo-Japanese War, in large part as a 
consequence of the War Ministry gaining in 1907 the right to have its personnel serve in an expanded series 
of consular posts in the Near and Middle East. The performance of military personnel in these positions led 
to urgent petitions from the Foreign Ministry to have these posts returned to its jurisdiction. In 1908 for 
example, the MID consul in Damascus used the occasion of Shelkonikov's departure from the post of vice-
consul in Hami to deliver a stinging and detailed diatribe against the practice of using military men in such 
posts.231 The presence of such officers, meanwhile, allowed the Russian General Staff to investigate 
strategic horizons previously closed to them. The Russian General Staff had learnt of Arab uprisings in the 
Ottoman Empire from their agents in Constantinople during the period 1901-06, and in 1906 GUGSh asked 
Shelkovnikov to assess the possibility of creating a Bedouin uprising in the event of a Russian war with 
Turkey. Shelkovnikov reported that unfortunately the Bedouin had no mental conception of Russia, their 
political outlook being restricted to Britain and France and their attitude to a conflict between Russia and 
Turkey being one of indifference. Given their numbers and the quantity of arms amongst them, the Arabs 
could nevertheless prove useful allies, but the main question in that event would be one of money- an 
assessment with which the British officers T. E. Lawrence and General Allenby some years Jater would 
undoubtedly have concurred 232 
Intelligence operations continued to be further circumscribed by financial restrictions, as may be 
seen from the following examples. Undoubtedly one of the Russian General Staff's leading military experts 
on contemporary political conditions in the Transcaucasus border region was Lt.-General P. I. Aver'ianov 
(1867-1929). A secretary at the strategic listening post of the Russian consulate in Erzerum from 1901 to 
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1905, Aver'ianov would go on during the First World War to become Chief of the General Staffin 1916. 
Under the Kerenskii government in 1917 he would occupy simultaneously the posts of Commissar in 
Turkish Armenia, Head of Supply for the Caucasus front and commander-in~hief of the Caucasus military 
district The collapse of the Caucasus front that same year saw him leave Georgia to follow the path taken 
by many emigres- journeying from the Crimea to Constantinople and thereafter to Yugoslavia, exiled from 
Russia for the remaining years of his life.233 Therefore the great majority of his active service career was 
spent directly or indirectly on affairs related to the Caucasus. At the turn of the century, whilst still a Staff 
Captain, Aver'ianov had been charged by the Chief of Staff of the Caucasus military district, Major-
General N. N. Beliavskii, with drawing up a military-historical portrait of Russian relations with the Kurds 
during her wars with Turlrey and Persia for the past hundred years. 234 This work, incorporating in its 
appendixes a wealth of documents drawn from the Caucasus district staff's own archives, concluded that 
the political significance of the Kurds in the border zones in a potential future conflict situation was set to 
increase. From the beginning of the 18905 the Ottoman government had introduced into Eastern Anatolia a 
new military organization, the Hamidi, units of Kurdish irregular cavalIy initially utilized to help suRJfess 
the local Armenian movement. The Hamidi militias were also intended to perform an intelligence and 
scouting function as units attached to the regular Ottoman army in the event of full-scale conflict on the 
border. Within a very short space of time however the Hamidi came to be viewed with considerable 
suspicion by their Ottoman masters, and it was here that Aver'ianov saw an opportunity for Russian 
political influence in the region. In 1908, by now serving in GUGSh as a full Colonel of the General Staff, 
Aver'ianov returned in one of his reports to the possibility of drawing the Kurdish population onto the 
Russian side in the event of a future war.23S The Hamidi were badly paid and poorly maintained; a well-
salaried Kurdish militia serving on Russian territory could therefore be counted upon to have a significant 
influence on their Ottoman counterparts across the border. Aver'ianov's report met with initial approval 
and a scheme was developed for the formation of a Kurdish militia within the Russian border in peacetime 
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suitable for future expansion in wartime. The Caucasus military district staff drew up a list of families, the 
heads of whom it would be essential to draw into the service; branches of these Kurdish families already 
served administratively on both sides of the Russian-Ottoman frontier. It was proposed to form two 
Kurdish sotnias attached to the Caucasus Cossack Divisions and a Kurdish mounted platoon attached to the 
Viceroy's convoy. However at the beginning of May the War Minister abruptly brought an end to the 
discussion over the development of these formations in peacetime, citing their expense. 236 
In 1908 the staff of the Caucasus military district also responded to a request of the Main 
Directorate of the General Staff to present a pIan on the organization of intelligence in Turkey in wartime. 
Here again the district staff were relying on Aver'ianov's expertise, utilizing a pIan he had first drawn up in 
1903. This scheme hinged on being able to despatch into Asiatic Turkey officers trained in the relevant 
languages and able to pass for Turks or Tatars. It demanded an expansion of the presently existing 
peacetime intelligence organization in Asiatic Turkey, requiring in addition to current annual expenditures 
an annual boost of 18,400 roubles and a one-off supplement of 20,000 roubles. Even then positive results 
were not expected to be forthcoming until two or three years had elapsed. 237 Financial constraints again 
made these plans unrealistic. Even in the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War and the increased 
intelligence expenditures it brought about, as we have seen, the Caucasus military district benefited only 
marginally, retaining but not substantially improving its already privileged position in this regard. Not even 
a modified scheme by the Chief of the General Staff, Palitsyn, involving the despatch of just 2-4 officers 
into Asiatic Turkey at an expense of 12,000 roubles annually was fulfilled. 238 
The aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War was seen however as presenting a renewed danger to the 
Caucasus theatre in the eyes of the newly arrived Viceroy, Vorontsov-Dashkov. Following his arrival on 
the scene and actions in dealing with the internal revolutionary insurrections of 1905, Vorontsov-Dashkov 
presented a nightmare picture to the Tsar of a district he claimed to be even more poorly prepared for war 
than the Far East had been. He identified shortages in the supply, communications and medical systems and 
urged a more rapid rearmament of the artillery, particularly the mountain guns. Even the fortresses, he 
claimed, could not perform their allotted role due to shortages in men and equipment, and only a 
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reinforcement of troops from the Russian interior would avert disaster at the outset of a war he now feared 
was imminent.239 A further element in Vorontsov-Dashkov's reports were calls for a greater level of 
autonomy to be granted the work of local administration in the Caucasus; a full return in effect to the old 
Viceregal system. Such a system would help meet, he felt, both the rising social and political tension in the 
Transcaucasus so recently experienced in the local ' Armenian-Tatar war' and the perceived failings of the 
Mountaineer Administration in the North Caucasus. The latter system, he wrote in a brochure in 1907, by 
placing the bureaucratic reins of government in the hands of military officers and by allowing the local 
peoples to regulate themselves by their traditional ada! laws, now answered 'neither the general tasks of the 
state, nor the needs of the population. ,240 Vorontsov-Dashkov's critique of the Mountaineer Administration 
mirrored growing criticism in the contemporary press, although on slightly different grounds. One 
correspondent in particular attributed continued unrest in the North Caucasus to the poor quality of 
administrative personnel, corruption, and lack of faith by the locals in the court system, which was itself 
hampered by a lack of reliable interpreters. The result, he wrote, was ever-growing levels of crime and 
repeated skirmishes between the army and local populace that threatened at times to break out into full-
scale partisan warfare.241 In promoting greater decentralization Vorontsov-Dashkov also attemped to 
manipulate of course his special relationship with Nicholas II. In 1908 War Minister Rediger reprimanded 
the Count for conducting Caucasus affairs through a private correspondence with the Tsar, reminding him 
that: 
in matters of military administration the Caucasus is in no way 
distinct from other military distrlcts ... To allow another order of things 
would signify allowing the violation of the army's unity.242 
Nonetheless the present situation was widely seen as unsatisfactory and change was on the wind. In April 
1908 Stolypin confided to assistant War Minister Polivanov that in the event of Vorontsov-Dashkov 
leaving his post, administrative reform might be undertaken to divide the Caucasus into two new and 
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distinct sections, north and south.243 Just as in neighbouring Turkestan however, major administrative 
reform was destined to be delayed until the outbreak of war in 1914 rendered all further thinking in this 
direction irrelevant. 
In the meantime, whilst there was undoubtedly an element of exaggeration in the Viceroy's reports 
to advance his own cause, particularly as regards the Turks' supposed crushing superiority, the military 
agent at Constantinople reported to the General Staff that the Turks were definitely manoeuvering for a 
superior strategic position in the Transcaucasus. In particular, they were seeking to eliminate the possibility 
of a Russian advance on Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf in the event of a war. The 1908 report of 
General M. V. Alekseev of the General Staff, soon to be Chief of Staff (and, effectively, commander-in-
chief) of the wartime Russian army, and heavily involved at this time in calls for a scheme of national 
defence, confirms an escalating fear towards Turkey in General Staff thinking after 1905.244 Alekseev 
warned that Turkish army reform (changing to a three-year rotation system) and German plans for a Berlin 
to Baghdad railway made the position in the Caucasus no less threatening than in Europe. In response he 
urged creating a broader railway network, with a line through the main Caucasus range connecting Tiflis 
with the Russian interior, a line from BoIZhum to Kars, and a further line in the Tiflis-Kars-Erevan area for 
forward concentration of forces and lateral communication on the Caucasus front. 245 He also recommended 
strengthening Kars, a strategic fortification the General Staff recognized to be quite outdated by the tum of 
the century, by building strong points on its approaches. In the event only Alekseev's railway 
recommendations were to be in any way fulfilled by the outbreak of war, the Russian rail net in the 
Caucasus undergoing considerable improvement in 1912 whilst Kars remained neglected, continuing to 
lack both mortars and heavy ordnance. 
The need for a new strategic railroad in the Caucasus had long been recognized. At the time of the 
Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 a railroad had only existed between Tiflis and Poti, and only in the years 
following that war had a line been constructed linking the railhead at Tiflis with European Russia through 
Elizavetpol, Baku, Petrovsk and Vladikavkaz. This line was extremely circuitous however-eight times 
longer than a direct line between Vladikavkaz and Tiflis- and the need for a new railroad across the main 
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Caucasus range had been acknowledged in a special session of the Council of Ministers in 1894.246 In a 
report to Stolypin in November 1910 War Minister Sukhomlinov urged redoubled efforts in this direction, 
pointing to Turkish efforts to improve their own road and rail communications. Also significant was the 
fact that Ottoman Empire was able to concentrate forces on the Transcaucasus border several times 
exceeding the number of forces that could be maintained in the Caucasus military district in peacetime. 
This made maintaining Russian superiority in the speed of initial mobilization and a secure deployment of 
troops from European Russia a strategic priority. In addition to a line crossing the main Caucasus range 
Sukhomlinov therefore reiterated calls for additional lines along the Kars-Borzhum and Kars-Sarykamysh 
axes of advance. 
In the meantime, Colonel Khol'msen in Constantinople presented regular reports to the General 
Staff stressing the importance the Turkish government, in the aftermath of the Young Turks' consolidation 
of power in 1909, were now putting on intelligence activities in the Caucasus. The Turkish War Minister's 
correspondence with the Grand VIZier, to which Khol'msen had access. showed that the War Ministry had 
approached the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to transfer several consular posts to military officers, these 
posts being on the Black Sea coast and in Kars. Khol'msen also noted that Turkestan and the Caucasus 
were now being 'inundated' with Pan-Islamic printed material. In addition the Turks had organized their 
own counter-espionage service in Constantinople, forcing Khol'msen himself to operate with greater 
caution. The military agent urged the Russians to organize a counter-espionage service on Turkish territory 
in response, a task he proposed be laid upon the civilian political police (the Okhrana) rather than on the 
already overworked consular service.241 Traditional service rivalries between the MVD and the War 
Ministry prevented such proposals being clearly implemented however, whilst Khol 'msen 's own reading of 
events was challenged by the official Russian ambassador in Constantinople, and former political agent to 
Bukhara, N. V.Charykov. Whilst Khol'msen interpreted Turkish military reform as directed against Russia, 
Charykov interpreted these reforms as being directed against Greece and Bulgaria.248 Only in the autumn of 
1911 meanwhile did the War Ministry satisfy its domestic needs by establishing independent counter-
245Zaionchkovskii, Podgotovka.. pp. 78-80. 
246 RGVIA F.2000 Op.l d3871 dl.8 
241 V. M. Gilensen, '''Osinye Gnezda" pod konsul'skoi kryshei' VIZh 5 (1997) pp.53-54. 
248 Fuller, 'The Russian Empire' in May, (ed.) Knowing One's Enemies. p.123. See also Charykov's 
memoirs: N.V. Tcharykow (Charykov), Glimpses of High Politics pp.273-9. 
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intelligence sections in the Petersburg, Vil'na, Warsaw, Kiev, Odessa, and Caucasus, Omsk, Irkutsk, 
Priamur and Turkestan military districts.249 
In 1910 meanwhile, in accordance with its new mobilization schedule, the General Staffworked 
out four war plan variants for possible combat on the Turkish-Trnnscaucasian border. The first foresaw a 
war with Turkey alone, the second a war with Turkey as a member of a hostile coalition, the third a war 
which Turkey did not enter till some point after other powers had already begun hostilities (as actually 
occurred in 1914). The fourth variant covered, which obviously carried no direct combat implications for 
the Caucasus, foresaw Turkey maintaining its neutrality in a general conflict. The worst variant was 
correctly seen to be the third one, a war in which the Caucasus forces would be hard pressed to meet both 
internal and external threats having already dispatched half their strength to the European front. 
In both the first two variants Russian forces were initially to pursue offensive action, the main 
striking force being concentrated on the crucial Kars-Erzerum axis whilst a large force of cavalry was to 
gather in the Erevan sector on the Russian left for flanking and security duties. The cavalry and other troops 
were to debouch onto the Bayazet and Alashker plains and cut off Enerum from Turkish forces marching 
up from the south. Subsequently they were to dispatch a strong detachment to the Alla-Dag and Sharian-
Dag ranges to raise the local population against the Turks and carry out other important intelligence tasks. 
In the first variant the Caucasus forces could look to a reinforcement from European Russia of four corps, 
facilitating a general advance into Anatolia, the main operational base of the Turkish army. In the second 
these reinforcements would not be forthcoming, and the possibility of a change from an initial offensive to 
a defensive was taken into account, the Caucasus forces being instructed to secure defensive positions 
appropriate to small forces. 
As the war actually developed along the third variant in 1914, most of these plans were at first 
thrown into disarray by the Turkish offensive, and the only reserve upon which the Caucasus corps could 
draw was the 2nd Turkestan corps. Comparing the planning for the European and Caucasian fronts however, 
Zaionchkovskii commented favourably on the clear operational goals the Caucasus corps had been set, 
which he compared in glowing terms to the very general and almost aimless disposition given the European 
249 Gilensen, "'Osinye Gnezda" pod konsul' skoi kryshei' pp.53-S4. On the travails of organizing a counter-
intelligence service, see also: Shelukhin, 'Razvedyvatel'nye organy v strukture vysshego voennogo 
upravleniia rossiiskoi imperii nachala XX veka (1906-1914 gg.)' pp. 21-23. 
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forces by the staff planning of 1910. Possibly he also saw in the Caucasus anny, where operational clarity 
made a virtue of small numbers in a complicated political situation, a model for the early Soviet anny. His 
final comment was particularly revealing on the European! Asiatic division in strategic planning: 
The Caucasus and European theatres present a case, not only in regard 
to preparatory work but also in the character of conducting war when it 
occurred., where it is almost as if there were two different armies and two 
different general staffS.250 
4.3 Afghanistan and the British Fear. 
Probably the theatre dealt with by the Asiatic Department of the General Staff that drew the 
greatest attention and coverage in the West was that of India and Afghanistan. It was fear of a Russian 
invasion of India that dominated most Western analysis of Russian campaigns and war-planning in Asia, 
and that sent the journalist Charles Marvin to specifically question the head of the Asiatic Department of 
the General Staff, L. N. Sobolev, over Russian intentions in 1882. Following the initial investigations of 
Bariatinskii's staff, which amounted to little more than strategic speculations, Russian war planning for the 
Indian and Afghan theatres became much more detailed following the conquest of Central Asia itself as a 
consequence of the natural increase in geographical knowledge. This had particular relevance in the sphere 
of river borne transport, which had played a prominent place in Russian thinking towards Central Asia 
since the time of Peter the Great Many Russian strategic thinkers up until the conquest of Central Asia had 
theorized as to the use that could be made of the Amu and Syr-Darya rivers with their accompanying inland 
seas, the Caspian and Aral, as communication routes for consolidation and further expansion. The strategic 
plans of Khrulev in 1863 for instance had been tied up with his own plans for a commercial venture, 
envisaging a river and rail network based around a commercial colony in Balkhan bay on the eastern bank 
of the Caspian. This route he prophesied would overtake in speed of delivery contemporary commerce 
routes across the Suez isthmus or round the Cape of Good Hope, underlining how many Russian thinkers 
continued to tie together military strategy and commercial exploitation. However, with the conquest of 
Central Asia the limitations of riverine transport, and the consequent need for railways, became fully 
apparent, thanks in large part to the statistical-geographical work carried out by one of Governor-General 
250 Zaionchkovskii, Podgotovka .. p.338. 
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Kaufman's most efficient servitors, and a future head of the General Staff's Asiatic Department, Colonel L. 
F. Kostenko.251 The Amu-Dcuya is prone to unexpected and dramatic shifts of course due to moving 
sandbanks and erosion whilst the Syr Dcuya is not navigable due to braiding of its channels and shallow 
waters in its lower reaches. In addition sections of both rivers freeze in winter and dry out in the summer. 
Attempts to use these rivers as strategic lines of communication were to prove as doomed as earlier 
attempts in the 18S0s to create a substantial Aral Sea fleet, which similarly foundered on local 
environmental conditions.252 General Kaufman emerged a finn advocate from the very beginning for the 
importance of railway construction in Central Asia, pointing out that it had taken the War Ministry ten 
months in 1868 to reinforce Central Asia to meet the Muslim revolt there.253 The strong case he built up 
may have rested partly on his own natural inclinations, being an engineer by original training, and partly 
from contemporary conceptions that technological penetration would lead to the more rapid 'civilization' of 
unstable borderlands. Bariatinskii had been a supporter of railway penetration in the Caucasus for the same 
reason, and Finance Minister Sergei Vitte, nephew of the famous Caucasus general R A Fadeev, later 
came to apply some of the same thinking to Siberia Russian thinking on this issue also fitted into the 
general European intellectual current of the time. Kaufman supported railway construction both from the 
point of view of security and from its commercial advantages, but never lived to see the full network he 
advocated built. Before 1880 Russia did not have a single railway line in Asia in contrast to the IS,OOOkm 
of track in British India, a situation gradually corrected by construction of the Trans-Caspian line in 1880-
1888.254 The Grand Duke Nikolai Konstantinovich (18S0-1918), a graduate of the General Staff Academy, 
conducted three expeditions in the period 1877-79 to determine the optimum route for a Central Asian 
railway, but not till 1905 was his recommendation of a line via Orenburg to Tashkent constructed. The 
251 Kostenko produced two major works on Central Asia; his earlier Sredniaia Aziia i vodvorenie v nei 
Russkoi grazhdanstvennosti (StPetersburg: Tipografiia v. Bezobrazova i komp., 1871) examined the value 
of Central Asia as a market for Russian goods and remained hopeful about the possibilities of the Central 
Asian rivers, whilst noting their difficulties. His more comprehensive three-volume Turkestanskii krai. 
Opyt voenno-statisticheskago obozreniia of 1880, performed as closely as possible to the outlines of the 
Military-Scientific Committee of the General Staff (Tom I, p.ii), remains the key text to communication 
routes in Turkestan in the period. The whole of the second volume was dedicated to this topic, and stresses 
overland routes. 
252 Crean, 'The Governor-GeneralshipofTurkestanunderK. P. von Kaufmann, 1867-1887.' pp.2S-6; 
Marvin, The Russian Advance Toward India p.29S. 
253 Shastitko (ed.), Russko-Indiiskie Otnosheniia v XlXv pp.I60-l. 
254 Hauner, What isAsia to Us? p.99. 
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ultimate goal of railway development in Asia. the linkage of the Central Asian and Trans-Siberian lines, 
although proposed in the Tsarist period, had to wait till Soviet times for its full accomplishment. 
The conquest of Central Asia also had the natural consequence of bringing Russia into more direct 
diplomatic contact with Afghanistan and India. These contacts soon emphasized to the Russian General 
Staff the cultural and political fluidity of the area they had come to inherit. As early as 1867, Lt.-Colonel 
AbramOy55 at lany Kurgan near Samarkand encountered an envoy from the ruler of Indor in India. This 
man, after an arduous and eventful two-year trip, bore with him offers of support from that ruler in the 
event of a Russian invasion of India. The Russians did not take this declaration, written rather dramatically 
in invisible ink, very seriously since it lacked specifics and appeared to be based mainly on rumours 
circulating in India about Russian conquests. Nevertheless, although the military governor of Turkestan 
refused to open diplomatic relations, the event was noted at the time for its political interest. 256 The activity 
of adventurers like Ramchandr Baladzhi and Iskander-Khan also had the effect of somewhat increasing 
Russian knowledge of the area. Such contacts were particularly important given the exceptional 
constriction the General Staff suffered throughout the period on this frontier, that of not having a militaIy 
agent in the neighbouring state available to provide on-the-spot information. 
The presence of Afghan refugees in Central Asia was a commonplace by the time of Russia's 
arrival in the area, many Afghans fleeing the civil strife that had swallowed their own country in 1863-68. 
A great number of these refugees joined the armies of the Central Asian rulers, and Afghan mercenaries 
fought alongside the Emir of Bukhara's subjects during the Russian siege of Tashkent in 1865.257 Iskander-
Khan, grandson ofDost Mohammed and nephew of SOO Ali Khan, both Amirs of Afghanistan in their 
time, had fled to Bukhara and then Turkestan after 1866. In 1868 the Afghan emigre fighting detachment 
he led joined forces with the Russians, and Iskander-Khan himself enlisted in the Russian service, being 
made a Lt.-Colonel. Taught the Russian language in Tashkent by M. A Terent'ev, it was not long before, 
in response to his own petition, the young Afghan sardar departed for St.Petersburg to receive a proper 
255 Lt.-General Aleksandr Konstantinovich Abramov, (1836-86) Participant in conquest of Central Asia, 
from 1868 head of the Zeravshan okrug and from 18n head of Fergana oblast'. Member of the IRoo and, 
as an amateur vostokoved, indirect discoverer of the valuable Koran Osman. This was later returned to 
Central Asia by the early Soviet government as a propaganda gesture. 
256 Shastitko (ed.), Russko-Indiiskie Otnosheniia v XIXv pp.139-41. 
257 Iu. V. Gankovskii (ed.), Rossiia i A!ganistan (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "NAUKA" Glavnaia Redaktsiia 
Vostochnoi Literatury 1989) 1'1'.70-1. 
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military education. Requests by Governor-General Kaufman to the Amir Shir Ali to allow this young 
Mghan to return to his homeland were met by a cool diplomatic silence. The Amir had good cause to be 
suspicious of a potential rival to the throne who now possessed the benefits of a Russian military education. 
Dissatisfied with what he saw as the Tsarist government's passivity, Iskander-Khan tendered his 
resignation in 1871 despite the protests of both Kaufman and War Minister Miliutin, and sought 
employment in Britain. There he was to be equally disappointed in attem}XS to gain support for his personal 
cause, and after travelling to Twkey during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, he settled in Persia 
Another Mghan who found refuge in Russian Turkestan in this period, one destined for a much 
more prestigious fate, was of course the future Amir 'Abd al-Rahman. Interviewed in 1870 by L. N. 
Sobolev, Rahman related details both on the route of his flight from Mghanistan and on the armed forces of 
Bukhara and Mghanistan (repaying in the process the distinct coldness shown towards him by the Emir of 
Bukhara). Rahman estimated the size of the Mghan army at that time at around 40,000 men and informed 
the Russians of English encouragement to Mghan expansionism in the contested border area between the 
Bukharan and Mghan realms.258 
Ramchandr Baladzhi, meanwhile, was a European-educated Indian who claimed to be a nephew of 
the famous Indian Mutiny rebel Nana Sahib and who spent the latter half of his own life trying to gain 
support to liberate his homeland. Arriving in St.Petersburg from Europe in 1878, Baladzhi soon made a 
useful series of political and social contacts, and at the special petition of the leading vostokoved V. V. 
Grigor'ev he accompanied the Grand Duke Nikolai Konstantinovich on his third research trip through 
Central Asia in 1879. The Grand Duke enthusiastically thanked Grigor'ev for proposing Baladzhi as a 
travelling companion, emphasizing his value in reconnaissance of routes for the war against the English in 
India that was 'inevitable. ,259 The Indian was reca11edfrom the Grand Duke's party however due to 
suspicions in higher quarters about his character and his 'bad influence' on the Grand Duke.260 On his 
return, L.N. Sobolev, head of the Asiatic Department, questioned the Indian, who reported that a Sikh envoy 
258 RGVIAF.400 Op.l 0.4795 dl.I-6. 
259 Shastitko (ed.), Russko-Indiiskie Otnosheniia v XIXv. p.2l0. On Ramchandr Baladzhi, see also: M I. 
Salonikes, 'lndiiskii patriot v Rossii' VI 9 (1999) pp.143-149. 
260 In later years the Grand Duke Nikolai Konstantinovich became the black sheep of the Romanov family, 
continually involved in scandals and afflicted by what most contemporaries interpreted as mental illness. 
As a result Central Asia became his place of permanent exile from the royal court, and there he rapidly 
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he claimed to have met whilst in Central Asia, one Charen-Singh, promised the support of around 300,000 
armed men if Russia invaded India. 
Baladzhi provided the General Staff with much general information, some of it useful and some of 
it of negligible value, the latter based on misconstrued notions of the kin-relationships of the Indian 
princely states. He was considered useful enough to be granted the sum of 400 roubles to help him out of 
his immediate financial difficulties, and efforts were made to recruit him to the Asiatic Department of the 
Russian General Staff. He was to be placed at the disposal of General Skobelev for relations with the 
Turkmen and Islamder-Khan, the latter then residing in Persia Unhappy at the lack of positive 
commitments from his interviews with Russian War and Foreign Ministry officials however, Baladzhi left 
for Persia There he aided for a while in Japanese-Persian diplomatic negotiations, writing later from 
Baghdad to inform his StPetersburg mentors that he would render them no further aid In September 1880 
Sobolev reported such difficulties with the Indian as an agent that the decision was ultimately taken to 
discontinue his subsidy and sever all communication with him. 261 A last ill-fated attempt by Baladzhi to 
gain credit with the Russian authorities by participating in General Skobelev's expedition against the 
Turkmen ended catastrophically. Skobelev regarded the Indian as a potential English spy and confined him 
to work in the Russian transport column. Disillusioned by both his own treatment and by the brutality of the 
Russian military campaign, Baladzhi attempted to leave for Herat but was arrested by the Russians and 
sent, first to Baku and then on to Moscow, the decision ultimately being taken to expel him, penniless, from 
the country. Contact was subsequently entirely discontinued. 262 
Sikh offers of support came again first-hand in 1879 meanwhile from Baba Ram Singh, the head 
of the Sikh Namdkhari sect in India then in exile in Rangoon, this time predicated upon the prophecy of a 
local guru that English rule in the Punjab would only last 34 years. The Russians were promised the support 
of 315,000 Sikhs should they invade. The envoy, a certain Cham Singh, was questioned by Lt. -Colonel 
Korolk'ov of the General Staff serving in Zeravshan okrug. but returned to his home in October 1878 
became a minor local celebrity of some infamy to all those who visited or worked in the krai. See for 
example: Grulev', Zapiski general-evreia pp.218-219, and Sukhomlinov, Vospominaniia pp.248-249. 
261 Shastitko (ed), Russko-Indiiskie OtnosheniiavXL¥vpp.216-17. 
262 M. I. Saionikes, 'lndiiskii patriot v Rossii' pp.147-8. 
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without" contact being renewed. 263 War planning was aided and affected by all these developments, the 
Russians carrying out their first exercise in serious war planning for the Central Asian theatre during the 
diplomatic crisis of 1878. 
Action in Central Asia in the event of a break with England during the Balkan crisis was the 
subject of a special meeting of the Tsar, War Minister and the Asiatic Governor-Generals, amongst others, 
on the 8th April 1878. Here various suggestions were considered. Baron Tornau, a member of the State 
Council, recommended the acquisition of Persian Astrabad (pre5ent~y Gorgan] in return for territory 
Persia would acquire by Russia's deal with Turkey at San Stefano. Such a deal, and the consequent gaining 
of Persia as a diplomatic ally, was decisively rejected by the head of the Foreign Ministry's Asiatic 
Department, N. K. Giers, who pointed out that England was in a position to strike immediate and direct 
blows at Persia in the event of such an alliance. In Giers' view, Persia could prove substantially more 
useful to the Russian cause as an officially neutral state.264 Governor-General fon Kaufman, meanwhile, 
saw a demonstration in Central Asia as the best means to affect Britain politically in India. For this he 
recommended the dispatch of two (in practice, later three) columns, one through Bukhara to around the 
town of Shirabad and the second, composed of forces of the Caucasus military district, towards Merv. The 
Orenburg Governor-General, Kryzhanovskii, was extremely pessimistic about such a demonstration 
achieving anything significant; only an invasion force of around 150,000 men advancing toward Herat 
would influence British policy in his view. Given the poverty of communications and the immense fiscal 
and military resources such a plan would require, this scheme must have appeared clearly impracticable at 
the time. Kryzhanovskii was suggesting by proxy in fact that Russia lay in no position to offer any 
immediate threat to England in the East. Kryzhanovskii's opposition to Kaufman's proposals may in pu1 
have been influenced by professional jealousy, Kryzhanovskii having originally coveted Kaufman's role as 
263 Shastitko (ed.), Russko-Inc/iiskie Otnosheniia v XIXv, pp.243-44. It is unclear from the sources whether 
this Cham-Singh was the same 'Charen-Singh' Baladzhi claims to have met, but the laws of probability 
make this highly likely. 
264 Giers probably had in mind the Anglo-Persian war of 1856-57, which had been directly motivated by 
earlier British fears of Russian manipllation of Persian policy. N. K. Giers has been credited in the past 
with helping to 'tame' the Asiatic Department of the Foreign Ministry; in 1875-1882 he was joint head of 
both the Chancellory and the Asiatic section. See: Robert M Slusser 'The Role of the Foreign Ministry' in 
Ivo J. Lederer (ed.) Russian Foreign Policy. Essays in Historical Perspective (New Haven and London: 
Yale University Press 1962) pp.204-5. For a balanced view of Giers' influence, see also: Ritchie 'The 
Asiatic Department during the reign of Alexander 11' p.342 and Koot 'The Asiatic Department of the 
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governor-general in Turkestan. The council resolved to cany out a demonstration along the lines suggested 
by fon Kaufman, although it rejected Kaufman's request for an increase in the pennanent forces stationed 
in Turkestan on the grounds of expense. The Caucasus and Turkestan columns were to coordinate with one 
another by flying column or other means if possible and an ambassador was to be dispatched to the Amir of 
Afghanistan to assure him this movement implied no hostile intent towards him. This latter consideration 
resulted in the Stoletov Mission to Kabul, probably the most famous outcome of this session, and the root 
cause of the subsequent Anglo-Afghan war.265 General Stoletov himself was selected as an officer well 
acquainted with the customs and habits of the East. knowing the Persian language and having founded the 
town of Krasnovodsk on the eastern bank of the Caspian in 1869. 
During this period, unsurprisingly, the General Staff intensified its military-statistical work by 
covert missions in the Afghan and Persian theatres and studies of communication routes, seeking to bolster 
the unreliable knowledge provided by adventurers like Iskander-Khan and Baladzhi. This effort 
foreshadowed similar developments in British India, the British rapidly increasing their intelligence activity 
in the aftermath of the Second Afghan War with the creation of the Intelligence Department 266 Both the 
Russians and the British sought, in particular, to expand their network of agents in the sensitive border 
regions, the British for instance by establishing a permanent consul at Mashad in 1885 obtaining an agent 
network, the so-called 'c' and 'D' agencies, that had native emissaries in Russian Samarkand and 
Sarrakhs.267 On the Russian side, Colonel Matveev of the General Staff conducted an extensive 
reconnaissance through the Bukbaran and Afghan realms in 1877, concluding that the Kabul plain would 
be the site of any future large-scale Anglo-Russian conflict. This mission made use of the warmer 
diplomatic relations existing at that point between Shir Ali's government and the Russian Tsar, a window 
of opportunity that would not pertain in future. Matveev was tasked to investigate not only the shortest 
possible route between Russian Turkestan and the Indian border, but also to pursue a range of political and 
scientific questions. These included assessing the mood of the local tribal populations towards Russia 
Russian Foreign Ministry and the Foundation of Policy toward the Non-Western World, 1881-
1895. 'pp.331-333. 
265 Shastitko (ed.), Russlw-Indiiskie Otnosheniia v XIXv. pp.205-8. Miliutin notes this meeting in his diary 
but says little about it: Zaionchkovskii (ed.), Dnevnik D.A.Miliutina Tom III w.45-6. 
266 On British activities see L.P. Morris, 'British Secret Service Activity in Khorassan, 1887-1908' and P. 
Morris, 'Intelligence and its Interp"etation: Mesopotamia 1914-1916' in C. Andrew & J. Noakes, (eds.) 
Intelligence and International Relations 1900-1945 (Exeter: University of Exeter 1987) pp.n-IOl. 
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alongside determining the heights of the local mountain ranges and the positioning of key geographical 
points in what was still at this time a very understudied region. For this reason a civilian astronomer, 
Shvartz, who at that time was filling the post of director at Tashkent observatory, accompanied the 
mission. 268 However the onset of winter and the opening of Anglo-Mghan hostilities, as Matveev himself 
admitted, left these tasks only half-completed. Investigating the existing pack-roads in northern 
Mghanistan and eastern Bukhara, Matveev gave an assessment of which routes would be most suitable for 
the movement of artillery and military transport. As the best route (from Hissar to Balkh) passed through a 
near-waterless desert, Matveev supplemented this study with reports on the shortest routes to nearby water 
resources such as the Amu-Darya. He noted the suspicion with which his party were regarded by their 
Mghan escorts, many of whom suspected the Russians of being covert propagandists for the rival to the 
Mghan throne, 'Abel al-Rahman, who was then of course still living in Russian-held Samarkand The 
Mghan anny itself Matveev felt to be fairly well equipped and disciplined, particularly in comparison to its 
Bukharan counterpart, where troops often paraded with muskets lacking locks or even trigger mechanisms. 
Mghan regular troops by contrast bore smooth-bore percussion anns of British make and drill was carried 
out according to British manuals, the instructions being translated into Mghan or Persian. In a passage that 
might have been expected to dissuade the Soviet invaders of 1979 had they read it, Matveev noted the 
Mghans' natural warlike spirit and that 'despite their lack of moral training, the Mghan forces possess a 
good military spirit and are always ready to meet an enemy no matter from what side he comes from. ,269 
Areas like Kafiristan south of the Hindu Kush had also, he noted, conspicously foiled the efforts of 
conquerors throughout history, from Alexander of Macedon to Tamerlane to Nadir Shah. The tribal 
populations of these areas could deploy significant numbers of irregular warriors- the area of settlement 
around the left bank of the river Swat alone allegedly disposing of around 30,000 riflemen. Such figures, 
Matveev noted, 'even if exaggaared; testify ... to- the significant, although scattered, military forces of 
Mghanistan. 0270 Matveev condudedhis study with a stIategic review of possible theatres of Anglo-Russian 
conflict in the region. This pointed out that the Turkestan forces acting on their own could only undertake 
267 Morris, 'British Secret Service Activity in Khorassan' pp.663-66S. 
268 Polkovnik Matveev, 'Poezdka general'nogo shtaba polkovnika Matveeva po Bukharskim' i Avganskim' 
vladeniiam' v fevrale 1877g.' SGfSMA V (1883) pp.I-2. 
269 Ibid. p.43. 
270 Ibid.pp.44-S0. 
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action of a limited and purely demonstrative character, with their very furthest reach a possible advance 
through mountainous Badakhshan across the Baraghil pass and down to the headwaters of the river Indus. 
Such considerations undoubtedly influenced General Kaufman's very conservative proposals in April the 
following year and contrast dramatically with English fears in the same period that the Russians intended a 
full-scale invasion of India. 
Herat itself was also the subject of a visit by Colonel Grodekov, a talented linguist and 
ethnographer, in 1878, under very different political circumstances and with a very different outlook from 
Matveev's mission. In Grodekov's own words, this mission was undertaken when Kaufman had already 
gathered the Turkestan forces on the Bukharan border, ready 'to move south to the borders of Afghanistan 
and further if circumstances demanded it. ,271 Grodekov was amongst the first to advocate the division of 
Afghanistan, with the special region of Afghan Turkestan being turned into a Russian protectorate. He 
pointed out that the second largest khanate in the region, that of Maimana, had only been subjugated by the 
Afghan central government under Shir Ali three years previously. The local Uzbek population in northern 
Afghanistan suffered the oppression of high taxes with no access to arms or positions of authority, and 
during his own trip in the region Grodekov witnessed Afghan soldiers filling their leisure time by beating 
Uzbeks with whips in the streets. As a consequence, according to Grodekov's account, the whole of the 
local Uzbek population anxiously awaited a Russian advance southward, having heard tales of the fairness 
and justice of Russian rule from Central Asian Muslims on pilgrimage every April to Ali's tomb in Mazar-
i_Sharif.272 The Afghan anny itself Grodekov felt to be composed of good-quality material, but the infantry 
in puticular was, he argued, actually hampered by their drill-manuals based on English models, which 
Grodekov regarded as ill-suited to the Afghan character. British influence in equipment and training 
extended as far as belt-buckles and other fittings bought in India and consequently bearing such 
incongruous mottoes as' lit Regiment BengalLigbt Cavalry' and 'God Save the Queen'.273 Grodekov's 
survey included a review of routes to Herat and advocated the use of special transport carts to move 
artillery in the region. Such carts had first been utilized by the Russians in the Fergana valley in 1877, 
serving as an indication of the Russian army's growing expertise in steppe and mountain warfare. He also 
271 Polkovnik Grodekov, 'Poezdka Gen.-Sht. Polkovnika Grodekova iz Samarkanda cherez Gerat' v' 
Afganistan' (v 1878 godu).' SGTSMA V (1883) p.58. 
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noted that several local nationalities, such as the Hazzaris and Jamshanids, would probably aid a Russian 
advance on Herat. The Hazzaris had already, uninvited, assisted the Russians in their local campaigns 
against the Tekke Twkmen. 274 
At the same time, during the height of the Second Afghan War, Governor-General fon Kaufman 
elected to despatch to Bukhara a man 'well acquainted with native languages and customs', Captain G. A 
Arendarenko, for the gaining of political intelligence regarding Bukhara and northern Afghanistan. 275 
Arendarenko, later the primary candidate for the role of political agent in BukhaIa in 1886 (a post 
ultimately taken up by N. V. Charykov of the Foreign Ministry), was a man fully experienced in local 
administration in Turkestan. His journal reports were read by Kaufman and members of the Turkestan 
administration and passed on to the War Ministry and the MID, and formed a vital source of intelligence at 
this time on the CentIal Asian border region of the Russian Empire. 
The ultimate result of Russian military preparations and intelligence probes across the Turkestan 
border in 1877-78 was in the end however to emphasize to the Russians how much knowledge they still 
lacked on the region It led in addition to calls to hasten the absorption of the Turkmen lands into the 
Russian Empire in order to gain a secure transport corridor. In particular, in 1879, Colonel Petrusevich, 
recently returned from Khorassan and drawing up a military-statistical portrait of that region for subsequent 
boundary negotiations, lamented the low genera1level of Russian knowledge regarding the East. Russian 
efforts in his view came off particularly badly in comparison with those of her 'natural enemy in the East', 
England Despite the great distance of North Persia from Peshawur, for example, British travellers like 
Butler and Baker had provided the Anglo-Indian authorities with extensive data on that region Russia by 
contrast was in the main compelled to continue to employ data first gathered by the Khanykov expedition 
twenty years before. He therefore argued that Russia urgently needed to become acquainted both with the 
tribes and territory between Hera!, Kabul and the Indian border, whilst also maintaining a net of military 
agents in Persia (where up until now she had deployed only diplomatic representatives) alongside a military 
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agent in Mgbanistan. 276 Four years after his 1878 study meanwhile, Grodekov wrote a supplementary note, 
reviewing routes running between Russia's now newly-founded Trans-Caspian province and Herat. This 
review began by admitting that when Kaufman had gathered his columns on the border in 1878, the 
Russian high command knew nothing of the country through which they may have had to plSs, nor of the 
nationalities they would meet there.277 As a result of subsequent events, Grodekov felt that the experience 
of 1878 had demonstrated the fact that 'the heroic period of Turkestan ... is now ended.' Hopes to use the 
Turkestan theatre as a base from which to menace India had foundered upon the lack of geographical exits 
the region provi~ consequently the onus for providing this advantage now fell upon the Trans-Caspian 
region. Grodekov's critique reflected a new swing in Russian strategic policy in the region as greater and 
greater attention was now devoted to penetrating Mghanistan from the west, i.e. from the new railheads 
available in the Trans-Caspian province. In this same period the Russian General Staff worked up its most 
detailed warplan yet for the Central Asian theatre. In a war with England alone, the premise of this plan 
began, 'in view of our comparatively weak fleet in the Baltic, White Sea and Eastern Ocean, we must go on 
the offensive in Central Asia ,278 This plan foresaw three distinct stages to such an operation- the 
occupation of Mghan Turkestan and Herat, the occupation of part or all of Mghanistan with a 
concentration of forces on the Indian border, and an invasion of India Despite this ambitious outline the 
detailed development and working-up of such a scheme then extended only as far as its initial stage, i.e. the 
occupation of Herat and northern Mgbanistan. Moreover the warplan admitted that given 'the very modest 
and fragmentary information' available regarding the political mood in Mghanistan and India, the frequent 
declarations of support received from the local populations by the Russians in the past had to be treated 
with the greatest caution: 
We can only count on this, that hatred towards us is less strong than 
hatred towards the English and that we, even unloved, are respected.. 279 
This plan hinged upon the creation of two operational groups, one on the Amu-Darya and the other, and 
main striking force, in Trans-Caspia. This latter grouping. initially comprising 12.5 battalions, 24 guns and 
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18 sotnias, was to receive reinforcements from European Russia and move on Herat. The war-plan 
contained appendices regarding maintaining the health of troops in desert conditions, taking into account in 
passing British experience in both Africa and Egypt. In addition to this was attached a detailed scheme for 
the siege of Herat itself using the incremental approach of parallel trenches dug by engineer forces over 
successive nights in cooperation with heavy artillery fire, with accompanying diagrams of that city's 
medieval walls and gates.280 
In its general pursuit of knowledge on the region in this period meanwhile the General Staff did 
not neglect to also use academic instruments. Professor Ivan Pavlovich Minaev (1840-1890), a senior 
lecturer in Sanskrit literature at St. Petersburg university, carried out three research trips to India in the 
period 1874-1886. As one of Russia's leading Indologists, Minaev was deeply involved in helping resolve 
Russian Asiatic policy throughout this period, studying contemporary events alongside the ancient history 
of his area of expertise. Recent archival evidence has demonstrated however that this undertaking also 
included previously unsuspected links with the Russian War Ministry. After his trip to India in 1880 
Minaev met repeatedly with both L. N. Sobolev of the General Staff's Asiatic Department and with Chief 
of the General StaffN. N. Obruchev, whilst Governor-General Kaufman had already consulted him about 
the Indian Namdkhari sect in connection with the Cham Singh mission of 1878.281 General Kaufman 
attempted to get one of the topographers on his military staff to accompany Minaev on his first trip to make 
surveys around Peshawar, the major town beyond the Khyber Pass. The Military-Scientific Committee of 
the Main Staff, meanwhile, communicated to Minaev questions on a series of points it would be militarily 
valuable to learn more answers to. These included the attitude of the Sikh states, in view of the envoys 
recently received in Turkestan and information gained by General Stoletov in Kabul, the situation in the 
north~ (Burma and Assam), and the stance of India's other native rulers, in particular the sovereigns of 
Gwailor and InOOr. Although Minaev provided the staff with little information of long-term value, he did 
provide insights into some of the difficulties facing English rule in India, including the unwillingness of 
Indian troops to fight in Europe, and the complaints and unrest caused by the tax burden and the unpopular 
Afghan war. Minaev was himself under observation by the British authorities during the duration of his 
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second stay, and he urged on Obruchev the need to fonn a large network of 'unofficial' (i.e. secret) agents 
to obtain information in future.282 On his third trip in 1885-86, Minaev was accompanied by Captain A 
Timler of the Russian army, of whom he formed a low general opinion, the most common expression used 
with regard to this officer in Minaev's diary being durak (fool). Timler himself observed the manoeuvres 
then being conducted in the Anglo-Indian army, and reported on the same, writing articles later published 
in the Voenny; Sbornik.283 Minaev himself was a pessimist on the chances of any Russian expedition to 
India succeeding, and to his diary confided his horror that in conversation with staff officers like Obruchev 
such a prospect was raised even theoretically. The main goal set Minaev during his trips to India was not 
the gathering of strategic information but the evaluation of the Indian nationalist movement and any aid it 
might render the Russians in the event of Russian pressure in this direction. Unimpressed by the Anglicized 
leaders of the newly-fonned Indian National Congress however, Minaev recommended that the Russians 
count on nothing from the Indian intelligentsia?84 
Undoubtedly the most aggressive Russian strategist with regard to a possible invasion of India in 
this period was L. N. Sobolev (1844-1913). He was the aforementioned head of the General Stairs Asiatic 
Department at the time of Charles Marvin's visit and a full member of the Imperial Geographical Society, 
having already received the coveted gold medal for his statistical work in the Zeravshan okrug. Sobolev 
had a reputation as Russia's most experienced man on Anglo-Afghan affairs, writing a long commentary on 
the course of events as they occurred during the Second Afghan War in the pages of the Russkii Invalid. 
This work was later reflected in a book, entitled' A Page from the History of the Eastern Question: the 
Anglo-Afghan feud. ,285 In an addendum to the work he listed various plans for Russian invasions of India, 
including those of Napoleon and Paull, and gave a brief historical account of all past invasions of that 
country from Kira and the Mongols to Nadir Shah. This obsession of Sobolev's with previous invasions of 
India probably reached its zenith in 1886-1888, years which saw the publication in the Voennyi Sbornik of 
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a fifteen-part series by him on the past conquerors of India.286 During his time in Central Asia before 
joining the General Staff, Sobolev had also of course become acquainted whilst in Samarkand with 'Abd 
al-Rahman, the man who would later replace Shit Ali as Amir of Afghanistan. His views on the topic were 
shaped therefore both by intense study of the contemporary situation and of its historical aspect; as he told 
Charles Marvin on his visit to the War Ministry: 
if Nadir Shah could march from Askabad [sic] to Bokhara [sic] on the 
one side, and to Meshed, Herat, and Candahar [sic] on the other, we could 
do the same?87 
These views Sobolev expounded more fully both in his book on the Anglo-Afghan war and in a 
pamphlet at the turn of the century entitled 'Would a Russian expedition to India be possible?,288 In this 
latter publication Sobolev continued to espouse the conviction that, based on historical experience, such an 
expedition was possible-though not necessarily desirable. Perhaps unsurprisingly given that he also briefly 
served as minister-president for the Russian-backed Bulgarian government, Sobolev set settlement of the 
Black: Sea line of influence as the key to Anglo-Russian harmony in the rest of Asia- 'the weaker ... English 
rule in India. .. the more compliant they will be in Europe. ,289 
Marvin encountered profound disagreement with Sobolev's plans amongst some of his most 
prominent contemporaries however. Grodekov, who as we have seen personally visited Herat in 1878, and 
who later became a Governor-General in both Central Asia and the Far East, in particular questioned 
Sobolev's true grasp of local conditions: 
Soboleff [sic] bas never served in any campaign in Central Asia. He 
does not know what warfare in Central Asia is. He lived for a time at 
English authorities alongside newspaper reports and descriptions of the key actions- Maiwand and the 
Kabul to Kandahar march. 
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Samarcand, [sic] but Samarcand is a town, and a journey thither alone 
in a carriage is very different from a march with an army on foot. He 
regards the subject more from a civilian than a military point of view. 
[At Geok Tepe]..we killed 20,000 camels during that campaign, in which 
only 5,000 troops were engaged. We should need a good 300,000 men to 
invade India, and where could we obtain the transport and supplies for 
such a number? Rest assured that a Russian invasion of India is an 
impossibility. 290 
If the question of a full invasion of India was a source of contention within Russian staff circles 
however, the other factor in the Centtal Asian equation, namely the need to have knowledge of northern 
Afghanistan in order to facilitate (in the event of a diplomatic break) an invasion of that sector of the 
country, remained an accepted strategic constant It was the northern Afghan theatre that the General Staff 
saw as the main intended target, following traditional principles of always conducting an offensive in Asia 
rather than awaiting attack, in the event of any future clash between either Afghanistan and Russia or an 
Afghan-British coalition and Russia. This was spelt out in staff writings on the subject as late as 1903, the 
strategic plans on that occasion envisaging four-fifths of a proposed assault force moving from Merv on 
Herat whilst the remaining troops in two groups moved to encircle Mazar_i_Sharif.291 Later diplomatic 
considerations only served to intensify the General Staff's need to acquire knowledge regarding the region. 
The Franco-Russian agreement of 1900-01 provided that in the event of Britain fighting France alone, 
Russia would undertake to concentrate 300-350,000 troops on her Afghan border to menace the British 
position in India. In the event of Britain attacking Russia, France was to reciprocate by entering the English 
Channel and threatening a naval desant on the British coast of 100-150,000 men. 292 In JDClice of course 
either operation would have been attended by considerable difficulty. The concentration of these 300,000 
men on the Afghan border, which Grodekov in 1882, as we have seen, regarded as impossible given the 
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limitations of animal transport, appeared more feasible in this later period given the slow egress of railways 
across Central Asia. Nonetheless in its private considerations the Russian General Staff remained 
considerably more conservative over the number of troops it could realistically concentrate and deploy in 
this region than they were in mutual security pacts with their French counterparts. Moreover the Russian 
General Staff's own knowledge of northern Afghanistan had only began to acquire satisfactory dimensions 
during the course of the Anglo-Russian war scare of 1885. 
In 1885 the military commander in Twkestan, Governor-General Rozenbakh, had successfully 
petitioned in March for a 10,000 rouble monetary grant for conducting intelligence operations in the border 
regions, with a further grant of 5,000 roubles being assigned in December that same year.293 Amongst the 
results of these awards was the despatch of an intelligence agent from Tashkent into Afghan Turkestan in 
March. This agent commented upon the difficulties presented by work in 'Abd al-Rahman's security state; 
in all the major towns he found himself detained and questioned on arrival. He reported the population of 
Mazar-i-Sharif, who were in the main Afghan, 'Uzbek and Tadjik, to be anti-Russian. In the event of a 
Russian invasion there would be a national uprising and all would fight. The Afghans themselves however 
were not loved in many areas, in part due to the large tax burden imposed on this region, in part from their 
habits and the ctifficulty of communication, particularly -between Afghans and Turkmen This 
correspondent reckoned there to be 8, 500 infantry, 3, 800 cavalry, 2 heavy and 26 light guns in the whole 
Of northern Alghanistan at that time.294 The collecte(1 data gained by the Turkestan military district in this 
period was amalgamated into a massive military..:statistical portrait of the region by Staff-Captain Trusov of 
the Turirestan military district. This study covered everything from a general geographical review to studies 
of the agricultural productivity, mineral wealth, administration, taxation system and tribal composition of 
northern Afghanistan. As an individual work it probably represented the Tsarist General Staff's greatest 
and most comprehensive intelligence achievement on the region and was to remain unmatched in scale 
thereafter.295 In the aftermath of this tense period of relations, the financial resources allocated for studying 
northern Afghanistan were reduced, whilst' Abd al-Rahman's ever-tightening security state made the 
gaining of such data increasingly complex. Such information as was obtained was therefore often limited to 
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geographical descriptions or brief outlines of local political events. In 1893 for example the Russian 
Political Agency in Bukhara felt compelled to apologize to the Turkestan Chancellory for the low quantity 
and quality of data it had managed to collect on the region, blaming 
the very difficult and unsuitable circumstances attending its acquisition, 
since the vigilant patrols of Afghan border guards ... deprived us of the 
chance to despatch intelligence agents well-acquainted with local 
conditions ... and thus we had to be satisfied as far as possible with the 
interrogation of caravans and individuals arriving from Kabul and Char-
vi/ayet.296 
The porous nature of the Russo-Afghan border and the potential threatfrom Afghanistan were 
also of concern to the Asiatic Department of the Russian General Staff. The Amir 'Abd al-Rahman saw in 
the Afghan regular anny a major bulwark for his state policies as a whole, and his reign witnessed several 
innovations in Afghan military organization. These included the acquisition of heavy artillery and mountain 
guns and the creation of supply bases at important strategic points around the country alongside an anny 
transport park In addition to this, and in opposition to the council of his own advisors, the Amir in 1895 
introduced a more regulated recruitment system to facilitate the creation of a larger standing anny with a 
trained reserve.297 Islam meanwhile formed one of the central ideological bastions that the Amir utilized to 
support his state policies, and to this end during his reign he also directed the composition of two religious 
books, with a large publication run. advocating the importance of jihad (holy war) apinst the infidel. Staff 
Captain Lavr Komilov during one of his intelligence missions in the northern Afghan regions in the late 
1890s obtained a copy of one of these tracts for the Turkestan military district staff, a translation being 
made under the direction of famed local academic N. P. Ostroumov and passed on to the Russian War 
Ministry.298 Such phenomena only served to fan the Russian General Staff's fears that the Amir in a Russo-
Afghan conflict would seek to raise Russia's own Central Asian Muslim population against them. On the 
Russian side of the border meanwhile, the Amu-Darya and Transcaspian frontier guards late on into the 
period deployed barely one man per kilometre of border, with intervals of 90 versts between frontier posts 
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along one recorded section In 1900 O. V. Putiata, by then the head of the General Staffs Asiatic 
Department, calculated that, under existing conditions, military mobilization in Turkestan would be 
prolonged and inadequate. Forces north of the Amu-Darya would mobilize in 48 days and the forces 
disposed in Semirech'e would take even 10nger-82 days. Moreover, taking into account that one-third of the 
forces disposed of in Turkestan would have to remain behind to secure railheads and internal security, the 
Turkestan military district could only dispose of 40,000 men and 100 gwtS on the field of battle against a 
potential opponent. Putiata saw these figures as clearly insufficient given the threat of a 'warlike 
Afghanistan' and the 'fanatical Muslim population' of the Twkestan military district.299 For this reason, 
taking advantage of a sympathetic War Minister, border garrisons such as Kusbk were built up and fortified 
at the turn of the century. Alongside this, measures were taken to increase the carrying capacity of the 
Trans-Caspian railroad, enabling the more I3pid deployment of the 2m Caucasus Army Corps to the Afghan 
border in case of need, and steps were taken to introduce the system of divisional organization to the 
Turkestan brigades. Whilst the cavalry were to be somewhat reduced, the Turkestan district was 
henceforward to deploy 70,000 as opposed to 50, 000 infantry and 184 as opposed to 114 artillery 
pieces.300 Fears about the porousness of this border were not misplace¢ within the early Soviet period an 
almost identical initial correlation of border troops to frontier allowed roving bands of basmachi to opel3te 
between Af~stan and Central Asia with relative impunity. 301 
The immediate security of the border region with Afghan Turkestan was also the sphere that 
exercised the Asiatic Department of the General Staff greatest politically, the most important event 
following the disappointments experienced with Iskander-Khan and 'Abd al-Rahman in the 1870s being the 
revolt of Ishaq Khan in 1888. This revolt was again intimately connected to the ethnic makeup of Afghan 
Turkestan itself, the Hazzaris and Jamsbanids alongside CentmI Asian Uzbek. Tadjik and Turkrnen 
elements forming 'the Achilles heel of Afghan despotism'. Accordingly such elements could potentially 
advance the Russian cause in the event of an invasion. Envoys from these tribal elements had met up with 
Prince Dondukov-Korsakov during the visit of the latter to Merv in 1885, although the Russians ignored 
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their declarations of devotion on that occasion. Later attempts in the early 1890s by these tribes to find 
safety on Russian territory from the persecution of 'Alxl al-Ralunan met refusal from the Russian 
authorities, anxious to maintain as good relations as possible with 'the Iron Amir,.302 However, 
undoubtedly the most important event in relation to these tribal groupings' attraction toward Russia was the 
revolt of Ishaq Khan in 1888. Traditional Soviet studies of this event have emphasized the Tsarist 
government's unwillingness to become in the least way involved with this rebellion.303 However, this has 
always left open the question, as one more recent study has pointed out, of why Ishaq Khan's envoy, 
Ahmed Khan. remained in Russian Turkestan for over three months, and what role Russian envoys did play 
in the revolt. 304 The picture that emerges from the archival evidence is of a division within Tsarist policy-
making bodies on the issue, with Foreign Ministry 'doves' very much attem~ to rein in the more 
hawkish War Ministry. 
On the 31 st July 1888 a new envoy from Ishaq Khan arrived in Russian Turkestan requesting aid 
for the sardar's revolt against 'Abd ai-Rahman in the form of rifles, ammunition and, if possible, Russian 
forces. The policy debate this then provoked in Russian governmental circles highlighted internal divisions 
from the very first. On the 12th August Major-General Kostenko, head of the General Staff's Asiatic 
Department, declared himself in favour of supporting Ishaq Khan's cause by covertly supplying him with 
arms whilst publicly maintaining Russia's recently-concluded diplomatic agreement with England 
Kostenko noted that: 
Such a form of action is practiced in Europe quite frequently, and in 
Asia is applied nearly always. [ ... ] If Ishak [sic] Khan is triumphant 
he will place relations regarding us in the same state as that in which 
now exists the Bukharan and Khivan khans. And this will be quite natwa1, 
since through both geographical, ethnographic and historical conditions 
Char-vi/ayet comprises one whole with the territory of the Bukharan 
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and Khivan khans. 305 
Such a course of action was finnly supported by the Genernl Staff's reigning Anglo-Afghan expert, L. N. 
Sobolev, who in a report five days earlier had advocated the despatch of both arms and Muslim officers to 
aid Ishaq Khan. Northern Afghanistan, he pointed out, was populated primarily by Uzbeks and Tadjiks, 
'who were and always will be enemies of the Afghans. ,306 However, both the Russian political agent in 
Bukhara, N. V. Charykov, and his superior at the MID, Foreign Minister N. K. Giers, were opponents from 
the very first to the idea of supporting this local uprising. On the th August the War Minister, P. S. 
Vannovskii, wrote to the Tsar that he had been advised by persons 'serving in Asia' that to react 
'indifferently' to Ishaq Khan's rebellion could seriously damage Russian prestige in Asia, and he therefore 
officially proposed supplying the sardar with rifles and ammunition. Alexander III rejected the War 
Minister's suggestion however, declaring Ishaq Khan's revolt a 'domestic affair' in which Russian 
intervention was unnecessary. 307 The desires of the War Ministry were further frustrated at a special 
conference held on the I th August, a session at which the War Minister, Foreign Minister, the head of the 
MID's Asiatic Department and the head of the General Staff's Asiatic Department, Kostenko, were all 
present. At this session a serious blow was struck the War Ministry's cause by the attitude of I. A 
Zinov' ev, head of the Asiatic Department of the MID, who deprecated giving assistance to Ishaq Khan, a 
character 'about whom we have only very insufficient information.,308 This statement appears to contrast 
sharply with views that Zinov'ev had been expressing only a few days earlier. When one also takes into 
account the fact that Zinov' ev traditionally allied with the military over their policies in Centrnl Asia, one 
may hypothesize that he had been pressurized by his superior, Giers, into presenting a united MID front 
against the War Ministry's plans.309 Despite the protests of Vannovskii and Kostenko that the secret 
despatch of arms to Ishaq Khan would carry no risk of longer-term strategic complications, the resolution 
of the conference settled upon merely reinforcing the border garrison of Kerki. This setback to the Genernl 
Staff's desires in the region effectively ended their window of opportunity; on the 14th Se}tember Ishaq 
Khan's forces were routed by those of 'Abd-al Rahman. and the defeated Afghan sardar fled northwards 
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across the border. He was destined to spend the remaining years of his life in exile in Russian Turkestan on 
a comfortable pension provided by the Russian War Ministry. Repercussions from this affair were long-
lasting. The Asiatic Department of the General Staff kept a special copy of the minutes from the August 
conference in a part of its own files reserved for matters of special instructional importance and value, thus 
commemorating this bureaucratic defeat in the department's institutional memory. That resentment 
regarding this may have been long-running was reflected by the fact that War Minister Kuropatkin in his 
strategic review of 1900 felt compelled to outline specific arguments against the annexation of northern 
Afghanistan. Kuropatkin's arguments were a near-explicit riposte to those raised by Kostenko and Sobolev 
over a decade earlier. In particular, Kuropatkin wrote: 
in moving our frontier up to the edge of the Hindu Kush, we should 
be forced to take over tribes of Afghan descent, and yet at the same 
time exclude some non-Afghan races kindred to those we had already 
taken over. Where the inhabitants of the valleys are peasants, Uzbegs 
[sic], and Tajiks, they would probably submit to us without opposition, but 
the hillmen, even those of non-Afghan descent, would fight fiercely for 
their liberty. Even after conquering them, we, like the British in India 
today, would have no peace. [ ... ] Finally, it must be remembered that 
the people of Afghan Turkestan and Herat, who now look on us as their 
liberators from Afghan oppression, might, when taken over, change their 
feeling toward us. The consequence would be that, instead of keeping 
neighbours well disposed towards us, and ready to assist us when called 
upon, we should be acquiring fresh responsibilities in the shape of 
discontented subjects, who would require military garrisons for their 
contro1.310 
The resolution upon a policy of non-intervention in northern Afghanistan decided upon in 1888 
and underlined by Kuropatkin's analysis twelve years later marlced the last time an extension of Russian 
309 On Zinov'ev's traditional pro-military outlook, see: Koot, 'The Asiatic Department of the Russian 
Foreign Ministry and the Foundation of Policy toward the non-Western World, 1881-98' pp. 335-6. 
310 Kuropatkin, The Russian Army and the Japanese War Volume 1 pp.64-5. 
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political and military influence in Central Asia southward to the line of the Hindu Kush was seriously 
posited. Just as in the other theatres under its direct consideration however, the Asiatic Department by the 
turn of the century was also becoming increasingly concerned over the internal stability of its Central 
Asian possessions. 
Perhaps the most prominent governor-general in Central Asia following Kaufman's death in 1882 
was Sergei Mikhailovich Dukhovskoi. A staff graduate of 1862 and a Caucasus veteran, Dukhovskoi 
served as governor general of the Amur Province before taking up his post in Turkestan in 1898 in the 
wake of the Andizhan uprising. Like Kaufman, Kostenko and so many others therefore, he had spent most 
of his service in one way or another upon the Asiatic frontiers. Yet in the aftermath of the Andizhan revolt 
he, as Kuropatkin later would, lost faith in the stability of the rationalist project proposed by General 
Kaufman in Central Asia. Like other Tsarist administrators before him, he viewed Islam in Central Asia 
from the perspective of his Caucasus experience; consequently he saw Sufi Islamic sects as the greatest 
threat to Russian colonial rule. To further ignore Islam, trusting in its natural decay was, he wrote, 
impossible; sterner measures were required. 311 
Undoubtedly the most ambitious scheme in regard to the declared need for increased monitoring 
of the population of Turkestan, however, was the proposal of Governor-General Mishchenko. On the 14th 
of March 1909, this Turkestan Governor-General presented a detailed, top secret report to the War 
Minister, which included a review of relations between the natives and the Russian governing 
administration in Turkestan over the preceding forty years.3\2 This review focused specifically on the 
sporadic and failed attempts of previous Govemor-Genera1s- Kaufinan, Cherniaev, Dukhovskoi- to create 
language schools and the accompanying cadres of officials closely acquainted with the languages and 
customs of the natives of Turkestan. The basis for Mishchenko's own proposals were founded in the work 
of one of his most recent predecessors, Lt.-General Subbotich, who in 1906 had set up a special 
commission to study in depth the need for officials to be acquainted with local languages in the region. The 
work of the commission had led to a lively exchange of opinions in the Turkestan press, including the 
locally printed Turkestansldi Vedomosti, and members of the academic Orientalist community had been 
311 S. M. Dukhovskii, 'Vsepoddanneishii doklad Turkestanskogo general-gubernatora General ot infanterii 
Dukhovskogo: Islam v Turkestane' (Tashkent: no pub. 1899). 
312 RGVIA F.400 Op.l D.3772 dl.l-13. 
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drawn into the debate. The most interesting articles were subsequently gathered by the administration of the 
krai and published in collected form as a booklet.313 The language schools that had been opened by 
Subbotich had to be closed following his departure however, and the proposals by both himself and his 
successor, Grodekov, to make knowledge of the local languages a compulsory facet of service in the 
Turkestan administration encountered resistance from the War Ministry. However, the 'awakening' of the 
Muslim East begun by the Russo-Japanese War made the need for such schools now, in Mishchenko's 
eyes, a pressing necessity. As evidence of the political developments he spoke of: including the penetration 
of Pan-Islamic or Pan-Turanian ideas into Turkestan, he enclosed with his report an intercepted letter from 
a member of the Young Turk: Foreign Ministry to a native of the Fergana oblas! '. As a result of what he 
described as these 'new influences, new currents in the local Muslim world', Mishchenko formed his own 
special commission of representatives of the Turkestan administration to develop the appropriate 
corresponding political measures. All the members of this commission agreed upon the need to organize a 
wide and systematic intelligence network amongst the local Muslim population, periodically drawing up 
reports on the position and mood of contemporary Islam. Observation would be carried out in the large 
towns and settlements, 'the centres of the economic and spiritual interests of the Muslim population. ' To 
coordinate this gathered intelligence it was proposed to hold periodic conferences of the main personnel 
involved- chiefs of district staffs, diplomatic bureaucrats and heads of Okhrana sections, under the 
chairmanship of the TUIkestan Governor-General's aide. As a natural accompaniment to this prognmune it 
was proposed to institute courses ofvostokovedenie and language studies to raise the knowledge of 
members of the local uezd administrations, along the lines of the project developed in 1906.314 The total 
number of agents hypothesized in the detailed plan that accompanied Mishchenko's report was 18, spread 
out across the Turkestan military district, their wages calculated at 50 roubles a month, in all 1080 roubles a 
year. Since the head of the local Okhrana section was already oveIburdened and would lack both the 
language skills and orientalist training necessary to process the reports of these native agents, it was 
proposed to set up a new post of assistant to the Okhrana section to handle this task. This was foreseen as a 
313 Sbomik materialov po voprosu ob izuchenii tuzemnykh iazykov sluzhavshchimi po voenno-narodnomu 
ueravleniiu Turkestanskogo Kraia (Tashkent: Tipografiia Shtaba Turkestanskogo Voennogo Okruga 19(6) 
3 4 RGVIA F.400 Op.1 D.3772 dl.5ob-7ob. 
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job for a man well acquainted with the Turkic and Persian dialects, on a sa1ary of 'not less' than 2000 
roubles a year.315 
Mishchenko's proposals filtered into a general governmental review of the whole of the Turkestan 
administration being conducted at this time, his entire report being passed along on the 7th April 1909 to 
Senator K K Palen, the individual charged with reviewing the local administration in Turkestan and 
drawing up reform prOposalS.316 Ironically, one of the products of Palen's own investigations was to be the 
retirement of Mishchenko himself, outraged over the departure of individuals close to him who had become 
tainted by the scandal of administrative corruption that the Palen commission exposed in Turkestan. In 
August of that same year Samsonov, Mishchenko's successor as Governor-General, wrote to War Minister 
Sukhomlinov pointing to reports from his secret emissary in the Emirate of Bukhara on the penetration of 
revolutionary propaganda into the madrasas of the area, and asking that Mishcheko's programme of 
political surveillance be rapidly implemented. 317 The following year however the Asiatic Section of the 
Main Staff informed the Turkestan administration that Mishchenko' s proposals would now be considered 
and conclusions implemented only as part of the whole Palen commission review. In practice, although this 
was unforeseeable at the time, this meant that no new measures were undertaken before the First World 
War intervened. 318 In 1909 Samsonov on his own initiative proposed to re-invigorate the all-round 
scientific study of Turkestan, an ambition expressed during the following year in a series of circulars and 
printed programmes. This initiative planned the organized study of Turkestan in a statistical, ethnographic 
and anthropological regard, with the study of local languages and religion being assigned to the field of 
anthropology. These ambitions got no further than a series of conferences and projects however, with very 
little concrete being achieved. In 1913 one Russian writer gloomily concluded that after nearly half a 
century of Russian rule in the region, 'the internal life of the native Muslim population and every aspect of 
their spiritual lives, flowing from centuries of Islam, still remains till the present moment very little known 
byUS.'319 
315 Ibid, dl.21-22. 
316 Ibid, dl.34. 
317 Ibid,dl.44ob-590b. 
318 Ibid,dl.67-6700. 
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The aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War also produced several outbursts about the dangerously 
poor quality of intelligence collection along the Central Asian border, just as it did in other Asiatic districts. 
In the years immediately preceding that war, the interest of the Russian General Staff in regard to India had 
received fresh impetus due to thc English alliance with Japan and thc final resolution of the question of 
establishing a Russian consulate in India. In 1895 Obruchev had informed the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
that: 
in view of the growing might of Japan and the absence in India of Russian 
representatives, it is proposed to despatch there from time to time young 
officers, giving them prolonged leave for this purpose with retention of all the 
privileges of active service. ?20 
The majority of officers who performed this work in the course of the following ten years were, naturally 
enough, men attached to the Turkestan military district. An interesting sidelight on the strategic mindset 
behind these missions is given by the memoirs of General Grulev, a Russian staff officer serving in the 
Tashkent military district in this period. Already a source of suspicion for some in the Russian army at the 
time through his Jewish background, Grulev made himself even less popular through his insistence that any 
thought of Russia presenting a threat to India was simply nonsensical. Grulcv presented these views at a 
strategic conference in the l890s and was even thanked by Colonel Iudenich, the future Chief of Staff of 
the Caucasus military district, then serving in Turkestan, for his frankness. Grulev nonetheless felt that one 
result of his forthrightness was his being overlooked a few years later when the question came up of 
dispatching officers to India, his place being taken instead by a 'notorious drunkard, who squandered his 
fare even before he left Tashkent. ,321 Grulev was clearly felt to be insufficiently hawkish to perform the 
strategic missions laid upon this band of officers, and he later opined that only military failure in the Far 
East 'sobered up' the General Staff regarding what could be realistically accomplished in Asia as a whole. 
The question of establishing a Russian consulate in India, meanwhile, dated back as far as 1875, 
when this proposal was first raised in exchange for a British consulate at Tiflis. The issue made no progress 
over the course of the next twenty years, till in 1898 repeated Russian diplomatic pressure on London 
320 A Popov, 'AngliiskaiaPolitika v Indii i Russko-Indiiskie otnosheniia v 1897-1905gg.' Kit XIX (1926) 
E.59. 
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finally secured a breakthrough when the British government gave its agreement in principle to the 
establishment of such a consulate at Bombay. Attempts by the British government to secure additional 
advantages on its side in the form of additional consulates in Irkutsk and Samarkand delayed matters 
further however. Only in 1899 did the Russians receive a note giving formal agreement to the establishment 
of their consulate in Bombay, and only in 1905 did the British concede the granting of the title 'General' to 
this institution 322 No Russian military agent was appointed however, and close British surveillance of the 
consulate's members inevitably meant that they were still able to do very little in the form of real 
intelligence work. The Foreign Ministry issued the first Russian consul in Bombay, V. O. Klemm, highly 
detailed secret instructions. These highlighted the importance of gaining information of a military 
charncter, including the number of forces disposed of in India, the defensive means of the country, and the 
positions of railroads and fortresses. In this the ministry was guided by a series of instructions prepared by 
War Minister Kuropatkin on the responsibilities of a secret military agent in India In November 1901 
however Klemm reported almost insuperable difficulties in recruiting agents and gaining accurate 
intelligence; servants watched and reported on the movements of every member of the consulate and the 
consular mail regularly bore the marks of baving been tampered with before arrival. As a result Klemm bad 
come to the conclusion that only indirect routes of gaining political and military intelligence through third 
parties stood any chance of success. Meanwhile even Klemm's attempts to move freely around the country 
in response to the changing seasons raised British suspicions and increased diplomatic tensions.323 The 
situation for visiting Russian officers was no easier. Lt-Colonel Lavr Kornilov visited India in 1904. His 
name being already known to the English authorities from his travels in Khorassan and Kashgar, Kornilov 
suffered the misfortune of being identified almost immediately on the steamer out from Egypt by a party of 
British officers and was thereafter unable to travel incognito. Although treated with outward hospitality by 
the military authorities upon arrival in India, Kornilov was closely watched by the civilian police and 
suffered the indignity of having his suitcases robbed of photographs and notebooks during his stay in 
Peshawer, an act almost undoubtedly conducted by agents of Anglo-Indian intelligence. 324 
322 Ibid. pp.58-9. 
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This continued frustration in the gaining of accurate intelligence in the region was reflected in the 
renewed bout of introspection over intelligence matters that occurred in Russian military circles during and 
after the Russo-Japanese War. In 1905 in one polemical work, Staff-Captain P. A Rittikh emphasized the 
new importance given to intelligence by the Russian General Staff by particular reference to Afghanistan: 
The main principle of the military preparity of a state is its knowledge 
of neighbouring states. In this regard in Turkestan we turn out to be, as 
in Manchuria, completely bankrupt, since we do not know Afghanistan 
and India and we do not want to know them. 325 
Rittikh urged several reforms, including the creation of more schools on eastern languages for Russian 
officers and the greater use of 'the native element' in intelligence work. For the language schools he 
recommended the model he had seen used by the British in India, namely voluntary schools in which 
officers nonetheless received a monetary supplement for attendance. To highlight the value to be given by 
native agents, he pointed out the great service recently rendered the Russian Geographical Society by 
Tsybikov, a trained Buriat Mongol, who had recently returned from a trip to Lhasa in Tibet with more 
information than had been gained by Nikolai Przheval'skii in his whole lifetime. Tsybikov's abilities were 
so great that he subsequently went on to become a lecturer at the Eastern Institute in Vladivostok. 326 
Undoubtedly the individual most qualified to be critical however was Rittikh's close friend, who 
helped him write his work and to whom Rittikh's own book was dedicated, Captain A E. Snesarev. A 
dazzling combination of military theorist, linguist. statistician, mathematician, geographer, philosopher and 
orientalist, Snesarev saw the ultimate resolution to tension in Central Asian politics as social revolution in 
India itself. One of the select group of Russian Staff officers who actually visited India from the l890s 
onwards under ObIUchev's programme, Snesarev's massive two-volume study of the Indian north-west 
frontier established him as the leading Russian military Indologist of his or perhaps any generation.327 In 
one of his most famous books from 1906, Snesarev laid bare in almost Marxist terms what he saw as the 
325 P. A Rittikh, Avganskii Vopros' p.82.(Empbasis in the original) 
326 As interest in his field of study bas grown recently, Tsybikov's collected works have been reprinted: 
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social and economic corruption of the British regime in India. based on observations made during his own 
visit there. Believing in the imminence of revolt in this country, he urged: 
. .it is impossible to look upon [India] as a theatre of secondary 
significance- it must have the same right to our attention [now] as have, 
for example, our western theatres.328 
After a long apprenticeship serving in the Turkestan military district, working in particular in the 
Pamirs mountain detachment, Snesarev had an opportunity to make his views more widely felt when he 
joined the Main Staff and GUGShin 1905-1910. His work in this regard was inaugurated in August 1905 
in a devastating critique delivered to the General Staff on the level of Russian intelligence operations 
regarding Afghanistan up until this period. In his view, despite the fact that Russia had held its present 
frontiers in Central Asia for over 20 years, and in some areas for over 40, 'our information about 
neighbouring countries and especially about Afghanistan is weak in the extreme. ,329 The majority of 
information at the Staff's disposal was often unreliable or simply antiquated-amongst sources of practical 
military information there existed little to supplement the studies of Grodekov and Matveev, conducted 
almost thirty years before. Not only was there a lack of raw data to formulate campaign plans for that 
country, there was no data to draw up even general sketches and dispositions. As a consequence 'all our 
plans and intentions as soon as they cross the state frontier are suspended in the air and scarcely sound. ,330 
Snesarev ascribed this weakness to both general and particular causes and drew up a programme of 
proposed measures to correct this system. Amongst the general causes he highlighted a traditional Russian 
disregard of the importance of accurate military intelligence, the consequences of which were now being 
painfully felt to 'a fatal degree in the present [Russo-Japanese] war.' The consequence of this was a lack of 
system in the organization of intelligence and this was then expressed in the particular factors of disarray 
in the intelligence system of the Turkestan military district. This assertion was then backed by use of 
devastating examples of neglect that Snesarev had observed during his own period of service there. 
328 A E. Snesarev. Indiia Iwk glavny; jakJor v sredne-aziatslwm vopros'. (StPetersburg: Tipografiia A S. 
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To take just one example, one of the heads of the Pamirs mountain detachment had for a whole 
year confined his reports to the movement of two Afghan horsemen along the Piandzhu river and to an 
outbreak of epileptic sickness. Moreover there was no allocation of areas of study to the heads of district 
detachments, resulting in wasteful administrative overlap. Snesarev pointed out to his superiors that 
intelligence collection in Asia was quantitatively different from intelligence gathering in Europe-that in the 
absence of printed statistical material and even astronomically determined points, in Asia it was necessary 
'to study everything and to study broadly.' The programme of change he advocated included making the 
military agent in London a General Staff officer acquainted with Central Asia; establishing a programme of 
intelligence training and a stricter allocation of intelligence tasks in Turlrestan; and having a network of 
trained and experienced agents living permanently in the population centres of neighbouring states. 331 
Both political and financial circumstances conspired over the course of the following years to 
leave Snesarev's programme largely unrealized, although some change was effected in regards to the post 
of military agent in London. In September 1905, just a month after Snesarev's report, Palitsyn wrote to 
Major-General K. I. Vogak, the military agent in London, reprimanding him for concentrating primarily on 
political events in the British capital to the detriment of military intelligence. Palitsyn reminded Vogak that 
the primary task of the military agent in London was to assess the military capability of Britain at home and 
in its colonies. 'particularly in the presently-important Central Asian theatre. ,332 In October 1910 War 
Minister Sukhomlinov successfully petitioned that the Russian military agent in London, by then Lt -
General N. S. Ermolov, be permitted to visit India the fonowing year for the gathering of information on 
the state of the country and the condition of the Anglo - Indian army. The open nature of this Uip meant 
that the British authorities in India were able to dictate Ermolov's movements and meetings, but he was 
nonetheless able to gain much valuable information, and copies of his report were passed on to the Tsar, the 
Foreign Ministry, the Turkestan military district, the Russian consulate in Calcutta, and the Intendance and 
Engineer Directorates.333 In 1909 meanwhile the staff of the TUIkestan military district had come to the 
conclusion that the carrying out of deep intelligence in Mghanistan could only be conducted by individuals 
possessing an excellent knowledge of the native languages and customs and themselves able to pass for 
331 Ibid., dl.104ob-1070b. 
332 Sergeev & Ulunian, Ne podlezhit' oglasheniiu p.57. 
201 
natives. Such an assessment ruled out the use of Russian officers. Officers of the 'native type' were most 
suitable and to this end there was selected a Tatar officer, Lieutenant Chanyshev of the 1st Turkestan rifle 
regiment Chanyshev was to be despatched under the cover of being a pilgrim to Mecca for a four-month 
reconnaissance, at a cost to the state of 2, 500-3, 000 roubles. In this role Chanyshev went on to visit both 
Turkey and Afghanistan in 1910, providing valuable information on the town of Maimana in northern 
Afghanistan in puticular. He noted that the modernized Afghan army still lagged far behind European 
standards, but that in the event of an invasion the Afghans would destroy all wells in an invaders' path, 
attack his rear, engage in night attacks, and generally 'trouble him all the time. ' The expense of 
Chanyshev's mission however, and the difficulty of finding officers for such enterpises in future meant 
that this highly productive exercise appears never to have been repeated by the Turkestan military district 
before the outbreak of war in 1914.334 In the meantime, the setting up of an effective agent net in northern 
Afghanistan to provide continuous strategic intelligence was destined to remain as elusive a goal as ever. 
Continued concern regarding the internal situation both in Turkestan and on the Russo-Afghan 
border, meanwhile, prompted further efforts to increase the efficiency of the forces disposed of in the 
Turkestan military district that continued right up to the eve of the First World War. Here again the Russo-
Japanese war acted as the incentive in this area, the Anglo-Japanese alliance creating, as Obruchev had 
foreseen, a unified security threat to Russia's land frontiers east of the Caspian. Heightened Anglo-Afghan 
tensions coincided with the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war and led to the Amir of Afghanistan taking 
measures to increase the size and military capacity of his forces. It was initially unclear to Russian 
intelligence against whom these measures were immediately directed, whilst it was also simultaneously 
evident that the English strove in every way to aid their Japanese ally by applying pressure on Russian 
Centtal Asia. Amongst British demands to the Afghan Amir was are-positioning of the Durand line (the 
territorial border between India and Afghanistan) and the deployment of Anglo - Indian forces to northern 
Afghanistan, around Balkh and Mazar-i -Sharif. As one direct consequence, Russia's Turkestan battalions 
remained locked in Central Asia, unable to be re - deployed to the Far East. The Asiatic Department of the 
333 M. T. Kozhekina, "'Dlia Anglii .. nesomnenno vygodnee ... imet' sosedom velikuiu derzhavnuiu Rossiiu" 
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General Staff suspected the Anglo-Indian army of intending to penetrate Tibet and Western China, 
suspicions apparently confinned by Youngbusband's occupation of Lhasa, the Tibetan capital, on the 4th 
August 1904.335 In response to heightened tensions in the region the Turkestan forces during the course of 
the war with Japan were boosted by the addition of artillery elements despatched from Moscow and by the 
employment of troops due for demobilization whose discharge was delayed. 336 In June 1905 the Russian 
Foreign Ministry insisted on the need to increase the size of Russian forces in Central Asia in order to have 
there 'an army completely organized in a military regard.. [ready to] rebuff the English. ,337 On the 18th July 
1905 the Chief of the General Staff, General Palitsyn. presented a project to the State Defence Council to 
reinforce the military forces in Turkestan in readiness for a rapid strike on Herat. Part of the incentive for 
the plan undoubtedly came from a certain Colonel Polivanov, who hadjust returned from India and bore 
witness to the reformation of the Anglo-Indian army being conducted there under Kitchener.338 Rediger, the 
newly-appointed War Minister, disapproved of the plan. feeling that it would merely alert the English to 
reinforce Herat. and that money would be better spent creating new forces in Turkestan on a peacetime 
footing, ready armed and equipped for the exigencies of mountain warfare. Rediger was overruled in the 
Council. but used his financial powers as War Minister to delay the fulfillment of Palitsyn's project.339 The 
question of improving the forces in Turkestan in a technical regard continued to occupy the General Staff 
however. In 1909 the head of the Turkestan military district informed War Minister Sukhomlinov that. on 
the basis of a war game run the previous winter by Mishchenko, the railroad forces should be retained in 
Turkestan in order secure a reasonable deployment time in the event of an advance on Herat 340 In August 
1910 in response to injunctions from the Main Directorate of the General Staff on increasing the military 
capability of the Turkestan army, plans were outlined for building a railroad to Termez and unifying the 
Tashkent line through Vemyi and Semipalatinsk with the Trans - Siberian line. Amongst the technical 
335 The history of Anglo-Russian intrigues over Tibet has recently produced an extensive number of new 
works, the revelations of which can obviously not all be detailed here. Strong representative examples of 
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recommendations was the distribution to the forces in the district of light automobile companies, dirigibles 
and fixed balloons in order to maintain communications and conduct reconnaissance along the strategic 
Kabul-Kandahar line of advance.341 Amongst the other options and requirements under discussion was the 
need for bridging material at Termez in order to be able to rapidly span and cross the Amu-Darya into 
Mghanistan in the event of mobilization. To meet this need there was raised the possibility of gaining this 
bridging material from the old Novogeorgievsk fort in the Warsaw military district, where it was laid aside 
for spanning the Danube. Thus this appears to form another striking example of a case where defences in 
the West were being stripped back, at least in part, with a view to reinforcing Russia's southern and eastern 
borders. Another recommendation that was actually followed through in 1913 was the reallocation of 
artillery resources in the district. Light field guns were reduced from 104 tubes to 72, whilst mountain guns 
were increased from 24 to 72 pieces and six new mortar batteries were added. The latter were regarded as 
particularly important assets since, in the event of a march into Afghanistan. the Turkestan army would 
encounter clay fortifications, a~ which the direct fire of field guns was proven to be highly 
ineffective. 342 One witness to these increasing efforts at professionalization within the Turkestan forces was 
the future Chief of the Soviet General staff, Boris Shaposhnikov. On his departure from his first military 
home, the 1 It Turkestan rifle battalion, for the Nikolaevskaia Staff Academy in 1907, Shaposbnikov had 
been only the third officer in the whole history of his unit since its formation in 1867 to apply for this 
distinction-the first having been Kuropatkin in 1871. The unit he left held staff officers in low esteem and 
did little in the way of effective peacetime military training beyond diligent rifle practice and long and 
rapid route marches-'a tradition of the Turlrestan rifle units.' Yet on his return in 1910 Shaposhnikov noted 
an entirely different military atmosphere on this southern section of Russia's Asiatic frontier. The 'old 
Turkestan atmosphere' in the life of the regiment had vanished, and there was now nothing to distinguish it 
from an ordinary infantry unit. whilst the new Governor-General, Samsonov, was conducting war game 
manoueuvres between Russian and 'Afghan' forces with a view to practical training for war.343 These 
trends were reflected in a summary by a Russian officer writing in 1913, reviewing three-and-a-half 
centuries of Russian expansion across the steppe. Examining the condition of Turlrestan's neighbours, he 
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outlined a picture where 'normal' relations were still far from being obtained; Kashgaria remained 
distuIbed, England remained a 'sabre-mttling rival' in India despite the alliance against Germany and, most 
of all, Afghanistan remained a 'nest of various harmful for us and alarmist movements' - a centre of Muslim 
fanaticism, and more recently 'a shelter for German military instructors from the Turkish army, dreaming 
of turning Afghanistan into a new Japan for us [Russia] with lightning - fast military progress .. ' All these 
trends had compelled the transformation of Russian Turkestan into a 'first - class' military front, and the 
army there had been reformed in line with the general changes brought through in the wake of the Russo-
Japanese War.344 Until the very eve of the First World War therefore the Russian forces in Turkestan, as 
elsewhere in Asia, continued to be maintained and even improved in both quantity, quality and efficiency 
in response to a stmtegic situation that was perceived in the eyes of many in the General Staff to be 
increasingly dangerous. 
344 A. D. Shemanskii, 'Zavoevanie Srednei Alii' in: istoriia Russkoi arm;i ; flota vol. 12 (Moscow: 
Tipografiia Russkogo Tovarishchestvo "Obozrenie" 1913) pp.193-5. 
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mE LAST DAYS OF mE ASIATIC DEPARTMENT. 
It is a common mistake in going to war to begin 
at the wrong end, to act first and to wait for 
disaster to discuss the matter. 
Thucydides, The History of the Peloponnesian War, Book 1, 
Section 78, p.52.1 
5.1 LANGUAGE TRAINING AND THE IMPERIAL CRISIS. 1910-1914 
By the end of the Tsarist period, the study of the East by the Russian military had passed through a 
distinctive period of evolution, in which Tsarist officers and administrators strove to categorize and 
scientifically encompass an area stretching from the Black Sea to the Pacific. In strategic tenns this period 
embraced a natural overarching strategic trend, from the initial military and political expansion of Russia in 
Asia, to consolidation and reinforcement, to increasing worries over the defence of these attained goals by 
the eve of the First World War. Across this period, in regard to what one may term the development of 
Russian military vostokovedenie, it is probably easiest to see the evolution of this bl31lch of Russian 
military art in three distinct generational stages, each stage being characterized by the contribution of 
certain outstanding individuals. 
In the first half of the nineteenth century, under the sponsorship of Nicholas I, the Russian 
military, and its General Staff structure in particular, began to come to tenns with the difficult task of 
conquering and administering the Caucasus and assessing Russia's expanding sphere of influence in the 
Near East and Central Asia. This period was marked by the creation of essential institutional structures 
such as the Asiatic Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Corps of Military Topographers, 
and also by the contribution of outstanding individuals such as 1. F. Blaramberg, D. A Miliutin, N. N. 
Murav'ev-Karskii and A!. Maksheev. The contributions of these men, in particular the formation in the 
1840s by D. A Miliutin of the discipline of 'military statistics' alongside the lectures at the Niko1aevskaia 
General Staff Academy by A 1. Maksheev on steppe warfare in the 186Os, were to have a great influence 
1 Michael I. Handel,Masters of War. Classical Strategic Thought (London: Frank Cass 2001) p.77. 
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on subsequent generations of Russian military explorers and geographers in Asia. Of this generation. the 
one individual wielding the single greatest long-term influence was undoubtedly D. A. Miliutin himself, 
through his membership of the Imperial Geographical Society, his service as Chief of Staff in the Caucasus, 
and his later contribution as War Minister during the period of major Russian expansion in Central Asia. 
Given this background, it is entirely understandable that, upon his retirement as War Minister, Miliutin was 
at one point briefly considered for the role of Viceroy of the Caucasus. 
In the aftennath of the Crimean War of 1853-56, Russian military vostokovedenie entered its 
second and most active stage, with dramatic physical expansion in Central Asia and the Far East being 
accompanied and facilitated by the creation for the first time of a centralized military institutional structure 
for these areas, the Asiatic Department of the General Staff. This department was charged with the defence, 
administration and strategic coordination of Russia's Asiatic military districts. Its specialized status was 
reflected in the fact that the heads of this department after 1886 had to be men having had direct military 
experience of service in one of the Asiatic military districts.2 Following service in this post it also became 
customary for former heads of the Asiatic Department to serve as Governor-Generals in one of these 
districts, further prolonging the influence of these men in this sphere. Thus Protsenko on his first retirement 
from the post in 1878 governed in both the Semipalatinsk and Turgai obJas/s, and upon leaving the Asiatic 
Department in 1887 G. 1. Ivanin became military governor in Semirech'e. For his own part, D. V. Putiata 
after leaving the department in 1902 became military governor of the Amur ob/ast and Ataman of the Amur 
Cossack forces. In terms of specialized personnel in the field, this period was maIked by a dazzling array of 
talent, particularly in Central Asia-the names ofN. M. Przheval'skii, P. K. Kozlov and M. V. Pevtsov being 
linked not merely with the military but with scientific achievements of the highest calibre. This period was 
also marked by repeated attempts to form a sufficient number of language schools producing linguistically 
trained officers to serve in the Asiatic military districts, through institutions such as the Academic 
Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Tashkent officers' school. 
By the turn of the century the extent to which the military bad become an accepted facet of the 
Russian scientific enterprise in the study of the East was reflected by the presence of military men on the 
governing boards and membership lists of the most prominent Orientalist otpnizations of the day. Both 
2 RGVIA F.400 {)p.l, D.I060 dl.55-60. 
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Chief of the General StaffF. F. Palitsyn and War Minister AN. Kuropatkin were members of the Society 
for Vostokovedenie (from 1910 the 'Imperial' Society for Vostokovedenie- Imperatorskoe Obshchestvo 
Vostokovedeniia), created on private initiative but with the sURX>rt of Minister of Finance S. Iu. Vitte in 
1900. The goals of this society were 'to spread amongst eastern peoples an exact and correct knowledge of 
Russia, and also to acquaint Russian society with the material needs and spiritual life of the East. ,3 The 
chairman of the scientific section of the society was Professor A M. Pozdneev, director of the Eastern 
Institute in Vladivostok, and amongst the society's most active members was A E. Snesarev. The emphasis 
of the society lay in the practical study of the East with a view to facilitating Imperial Russia's military-
political missions in that sphere of the world In 1911 for example the Interior Ministry organized courses 
of Islamic study through the society, the goal being to produce personnel capable of serving in a 
bureaucratic regard amongst the Empire's Muslim population. 
Another society raised at the time and notable for its emphasis on the 'practical' study of the East 
was the Russian Committee for Studying Central and Eastern Asia, created in connection with International 
Congresses of Orientalists held in Rome (1899) and Hamburg (1902). In 1903 the Head of the Asiatic 
Department of the General Staff, F. V. Vasil 'ev, was appointed by Kuropatldn the War Ministry's 
representative to this body, again reflecting the extent of the War Ministry's involvement in this sphere by 
the tum of the century. 4 
One final indication of the closeness of the military's involvement with the scientific community 
by the tum of the century was the degree to which events and activities in one field could carry professional 
consequences in the other. MI. Veniukov, the Russian officer most famous for his explorations of the Far 
East, served in the Asiatic Department of the General Staff in the early 1870s. There his work consisted of 
developing strategic and statistical portraits of Khorassan, Mghan Turkestan, and India and delivering 
articles on recent events in Asia to the official War Ministry journal, the Russkii Invalid. However he 
suffered strained relations with his direct superior, A P. Protsenko, who, according to Veniukov, feared 
that the latter would replace him as head of the department or even worse become a governor-general in 
one of the Asiatic military districts before Protsenko did As a result his chief began a whispering campaign 
3 Dantsig, Blizhnii Vostok v Russkom nauke i literature pp.280-81. 
4 RGVIA F.400 Op.l 0.3030 dUO and Skachkov, Ocherki istorii russkogo kitaevedeniia pp.273-78. 
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against Veniukov, alleging amongst other things that he worked for the Cherniaev newspaper Russkii Mir, a 
paper that took a strong anti-Miliutin line. However, Veniukov did not see this rivalry as the crucial factor 
that effectively destroyed his career and that would lead to his departure for Paris in 1877 to become a 
writer for the emigre press. The key turning point in Veniukov's account was the hostility he encountered 
in the society of which he was also contemporaneously a member, that is to say the Russian Imperial 
Geographical Society. According to Veniukov, during his period as secretary of that society, a dispute with 
leading figures in that group, including Semenov Tian-Shanskii, led to the creation of a fatal degree of ill-
will against him. As a consequence the Chief of the Main Staff, General Obruchev, informed Veniukov that 
his 'behaviour' in the Geographical Society had had a very unfavourable effect on his future fate, i.e. his 
future opportunities of military promotion. In short, links between the General Staff and the scientific 
community were so close by the second half of the nineteenth century that disagreements in one sphere 
could affect the other, and actually have a detrimental effect upon one's whole career.5 
The strain of administering this vast territory in this second period took its toll on the personnel 
of the General Staff's Asiatic Department more generally however. Writing in 1895, the head of the 
department, A P. Protsenko, noted that recent political complications-the Pamirs question and, in 
particular, Sino-Japanese relations- had increased the workload of the department, and petitioned for an 
increase in personnel. Correspondence on purely military matters, he noted, comprised barely half the total 
correspondence running through the department, compared to extensive communication on political, 
financial and legal matters relating to local administration in the military districts. As a consequence the 
personnel of the Asiatic Department of that time- one desk head and two assistants- had laid upon each of 
them an extremely heavy and diverse workload, frequently requiring the men to work late into the evening 
and during their hOlidays.6 On one staff officer alone, Protsenko recorded, there had recently been laid 
responsibility for all the correspondence regarding the Turkestan and Omsk military districts, all 
extraordinary correspondence of a political and financial character related to the Afghan and Chinese 
frontiers. and all correspondence regarding imperial relations with the kb:mates of Khiva and Bukhara. On 
5 Veniukov,Iz Vospominaniia T.2 pp.187-88. In overall terms, a similar interconnectedness, both structuml 
and ideological, was viSIble in many Western societies engaged in imperialism in the period, although often 
conditioned by particular events in each country. See for example: O. V. McKay, 'Colonialistn in the 
French Geographical Movement, 1871-1881.' Geographical Review 33 (1943) pp.214-232. 
6RGVIAF.400Op.l 0.1831 dl.6~. 
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another unnamed officer there was laid all correspondence related to the Priamur and Irkutsk military 
districts, military reinforcement of the Far East, and also all correspondence on the administration of forces 
of the Trans-Caspian military district, including that district's relations to Persia On this latter luckless 
individual there had also been laid, through force of necessity, correspondence regarding the administration 
of the Kars and Dagestan military districts and the mountaineer population of the North Caucasus- another 
distinct and entirely discrete set of political and administrative responsibilities. Taking into account the 
calculation that the physical volume of correspondence passing through the Asiatic Department of the 
General StafIin 1886 (when it was last reformed) amounted to 2240 pages, and in 1895 to 4097, and it is 
easy to see why Protsenko felt his men were becoming overburdened. 7 
It was this sense of imperial overstretch which was to become the dominant concern during the 
final period ofTsarist military involvement in Asia between 1895 and 1917, and which was to be the 
predominant theme and topic of criticism of the third genemtion of military vostokovedy. Perhaps the most 
vocal member of this latter group would be A E. Snesarev. This imperial crisis was to continue till the 
downfall of the Tsarist empire, its implications being taken up, confronted and transformed by its Soviet 
successor. 
The most obvious open expression of this phenomenon, particularly in the aftermath of the Russo-
Japanese War, was the debate conducted both in public and private on the language tmining of Russian 
soldiers and other officials serving in Asiatic countries. A prominent voice in this debate was that of the 
young orientalist V. V. Bartol' d, who in 1905 began to deliver for the first time a series of lectures in a 
groundbreaking area of historiographical research, 'The History of Asian studies in Europe and Russia' 
(Istoriia izucheniia Vostoka v Evrope i Rossii). These lectures amounted to a scathing criticism of the level 
of Russian understanding and knowledge of the East, and although the role of the Tsarist military was not 
particularly highlighted, it also included specific criticisms of their role and aptitude in this area. Amongst 
the criticisms Bartol' d levelled both here and elsewhere was the accusation that only a handful of officers 
in Tsarist Central Asia were acquainted with the local languages and that the War Ministry was dilatory in 
the publication of educational material on eastern countries. Enthusiasm for studying the krai in a scientific 
regan! had not outlasted the initial period of military expansion there, and 'scientific tasks set nearly half a 
7 Ibid. dl.6-7. 
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century ago remain until now unfulfilled. ,8 Of Russian vostokovedenie in general Bartol' d famously 
concluded that Russian science had preferred to utilize foreign (European) texts rather than the rich 
resources directly at its disposal both within the Empire and along its borders. This charge was a 
particularly sensitive one to make of course. The whole course of the development of eastern studies in 
Russia, both military and civilian, had been marked since the late 1840s by a passionate drive to make this 
a 'Russian' science and banish the ghosts of the German and French scholastic influences that served as 
midwives at its birth. As early as 1838, driven by a desire to establish Russia's uniqueness and cultural 
distinctiveness (samobytnost ,), the leading Russian orientalist V. V. Grigor' ev had written that: 
The best means to counteract the influence of the west is to rely on the study 
of the east. 9 
This process involved both great verbal rhetoric on the part of many of Russia's orientalists and the actual 
physical removal of reminders of this inheritance, such as the purge of Germanically-named scholars from 
the governing board of the Imperial Geographical Society in the 1850s. These men had come to be 
regarded by Semenov Tian-Shanskii, amongst others, as a 'collection of German teachers, who kept the 
Society in its outgrown, and in spirit foreign, swaddling clothes.' 10 BartoI'd was now in 1905 saying in 
effect that Russia had scorned its unique cultural inheritance and missed the opportunity that gave to 
surpass others in the field of oriental studies-Russia had once again proven itself 'backward' in comparison 
to, or at least no better than, Europe. In this field, as in so many others, Russian ideologues had sought a 
means to surpass the West. Bartol'd's criticism was now implying that they had failed, and that the Russian 
army, as part of this system, shared in that failure. 
In the Soviet period Bartol' d was to posthumously become the 'grand old man' of Russian Central 
Asian studies and this 1905 lecture series the touchstone of both Russian and Western assessments of the 
development of Russian vostokovedenie. 11 In the process however Bartol'd's arguments perhaps inevitably 
became a matter of faith and comparatively few set this lecture series within the context of its time. Yet in 
8 V.V. BartoI'd, Sochineniia IX (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "NAUKA" Glavnaia Redaktsiia Vostochnoi 
literatury 1977) p.525. 
9 Knight, 'Grigor'ev in Orenburg. 1851-1862: Russian Orientalism in the Service of Empire?' p.80. 
10 Bassin, Imperial Visionspp.95-6. 
\1 To the extent that Bartol'd's work formed the essential point ofreference even for those who disagreed 
with aspects of his argument See for example: V. A. Romodin, 'Iz istorii izucheniia afgantsev i 
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many ways Bartol'd's diatribe was a classic product ofa fierce debate occurring within Russian military 
and academic circles at the time in the wake of the Russo-Japanese War. Moreover, BartoI'd was scarcely 
an impartial, Olympian academic observer in this debate. As a member of both the Imperial Society of 
Vostokovedenie and the Russian Committee for Studying Central and Eastern Asia he had had opportunity 
to become acquainted at first hand with the representatives of the military, foreign-policy and financial 
institutions of the Russian state engaged in study of the East His editorship of the first society's journal, 
The World of Islam (Mir Islama), ended in a feud with the head of the Russian Interior Ministry over the 
high scholastic tone he gave that publication, and his removal from that post, to be replaced by D. M. 
Pozdneev. Pozdneev, a former head of the Eastern Institute in Vladivostok, rapidly moved the subject 
matter of the journal from academic research to practical, political goals, with the publication of articles on 
matters that were at the time of most direct concern to the Russian War, Foreign and Finance Ministries. 
Pan-Islam, Pan-Turkism and the scholastic training of young Muslims in the Russian Empire thereafter 
dominated the journal's plges.12 Bartol'd's lecture series therefore probably reflected in part the bitterness 
of an earnest, highly gifted young man towards the Russian governmental establishment. More than this 
however, his comments reflected a general sense of malaise and unease at the time amongst the Russian 
intellectual establishment, shocked into retrospective analysis by the implct of military defeat in the East. 
Criticisms similar to Bartol'd's flourished in the contemporary press and. in one prominent instance, 
provoked the irritated response of the Asiatic Department of the General Staff itself. 
Fairly representative in this regard was an article in The Herald of Asia (Vestnik Azii), the journal 
of the Society of Russian Orientalists based in Kharbin and dating from June 1910.\3 Taking as its starting 
point the need to have large numbers of Chinese and Japanese interpreters which had been highlighted by 
the Russo-Japanese War, and also the contemporaneous debate being conducted in the Turkestanskii 
Vedomosti on language training, this article went on to propose a wide ranging programme of reforms. 
These included the setting up of compulsory programmes of language training for all Russian officials 
Afganistana v Rossii' in: Ocherki po istorii Russkogo Vostokovedeniia (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Akademii 
Nauk SSSR 1953) pp.148-184 
12 Dantsig, Blizhnii Vostok v Russkom nauke i literature pp.282-3. For an insight into some of the tensions 
behind this feud, see: Robert Geraci <Russian Orientalism at an Impasse: Tsarist Education Policy and the 
1910 Conference on Islam' in: Brower & Lazzzerini (eds.), Russia's Orient pp.138-61. 
\3 B.G. <K voprosu 0 rasprostranenii v Rossii znaniia vostochnykh iazykov' VA 5 (1910) pp.138-41. 
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serving in the Asiatic military districts, and for those serving in border districts, a compulsory requirement 
to know the language of the neighbouring state. In addition the author saw a need to require a basic 
knowledge of Muslim and customary law; and for those persons working in eastern states, knowledge of 
the history, geography, and the military and political order of the state they served in. Workers in this field 
should be given one year to become acquainted with their area of service and a second year to brush up 
both their grasp of the literary and local languages; the minimum knowledge required being an ability to 
check translations. Testing commissions should be set up to regulate both entrants into the Russian service 
in these areas and the line of promotion. Only such measures, in the author's opinion, would effectively 
diffuse a knowledge of eastern languages amongst Russia's administrative personnel. I4 
The debate on language tIaining raged at somewhere near its fiercest, as has already been implied, 
in the Turkestan military district, in part as a natural consequence of efforts sponsored by the local 
administration itself to investigate the issue. A particular source of acrimony here was the work of one 
Colonel Iagello, head of the Tashkent officers' school and author of a Persian-Arabie-Russian dictionary. 
In the course of a general debate over the quality of language courses run through the Tashkent school, 
lageno's own qualifications and expertise came under increasing attack, both in the pages of the locally-
printed Turkestanskii Vedomosti and in the wider military and civilian press.IS It was the input of an 
orientalist to the Novoe Vremia (The New Times) in December 1910 that finally provoked the wrathful 
response of the Asiatic Department of the General Staff however. In a piece apocalyptically entitled 'Do we 
know the East?' the anonymous author launched a scathing attack on the level oflageno's scholarship. 
Quoting the opinion of Fozi-Khuri, a student of the Lazarevskii Institute, that anyone wishing to learn 
Persian through lageno' s dictionary would only be wasting their time, the author went on to cite the 
opinion ofF. E. Korsh, a teacher at the aforementioned institute, that the dictionary in inexperienced hands 
could prove 'positively harmful' in its influence. In conclusion the author wondered whether it would not 
be better for the War Ministry to lean on the expertise of the Russian academic community rather than 
funding such efforts as lageno's dictionary, which had become the object of such criticism.16 This article 
14 Ibid, A>.140-41. 
15 Ryzhenkov, 'Rol' v~~ogo vedomstva Rossii v razvitii otechestvennogo vostokovedeniia v XIX-
nachaleXXvv.' A>.17~~1. ' 
16 'A.-.' 'Znaem li~. Vostok?' NV 12485 (1910) pp.2-3. 
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evoked a detailed response by an unnamed worker within the General Staff's Asiatic Department. In 
January 1911 this individual launched an impassioned defence of lagello's work, bringing to the cause of 
the defence two very large volumes recently published in London on the organization of oriental studies in 
England 17 Given that the London commission was highly complimentary on the level of oriental studies 
within the Russian army, the author asked, how could one explain the discrepancy between this opinion 
held abroad and that held at home by the Russian academic community? The author concluded, 
unsurprisingly, that the latter were holding unrealistically high expectations and charged the anonymous 
author of the article in the Novoe Vremia (whom the writer suspected to be 'a person well known to us', 
namely Professor AKhashchab, lecturer in Arabic at StPetersburg university) to be more exact in sourcing 
the criticisms he so freely quoted Impartial observation would, over time, this officer was convinced, lead 
to a more moderate opinion on Colonel lagello and his dictionary than that currently being expressed in the 
Russian preSS.18 
These debates in the press of course both fed and fueled a debate occurring in the General Staff 
itself over the system of training for officers in eastern languages in the wake of the Russo-Japanese war. 
On 2th October 1907 GUGSh initiated a commission to investigate the setting up of a new programme of 
language training in this field After a year, in November 1908, the membership of the commission was 
widened and A Z. Myshlaevskii, the Chief of the General Staff, appointed its chairman. The commission's 
membership comprised some of the General Staff's most distinguished personnel in the field of Asiatic 
affairs. These included A E. Snesarev, S .V.Tseil', (head of the Asiatic Department at the time), and 
Colonel A G. Tumanskii, graduate of the Eastern languages school of the MID and author of a major 
scholarly work on Islamic Baha'i sects in Central Asia. A significant part of the commission's work was to 
review the manner in which eastern languages were studied in other armies- A E. Snesarev using his 
expertise on India for example to p-esent a report on language studies amongst officers of the Anglo-Indian 
army .19 UllSUI'p'isingly the rep-esentatives of the military districts presented different preferred schemes for 
the future training of officers in eastern languages. The Priamur military district proposed a system of a 
two-year komandirovka of the relevant officers abroad, preceded by a brief six-month course at a special 
17 RGV1AF.400Op.1 D.5011 dl.I-2 
18 Ibid, dl.3-6. 
19 RGVIA F.400 Op.1 D.3723 dl.7-9, 93-97ob. 
213 
preparatory school in the military district itself. The Caucasus military district staff, daunted by the expense 
and risk of despatching officers abroad, sought almost the direct opposite- a two-year training course with 
the local staff followed by the ~g of experience in dialects by trips within the bounds of the military 
district. The Turkestan district staff opted for a midway line, with a two-year course of theoretical training 
in winter being complemented by summer komandirovkas of the relevant officers to regions both in-district 
and abroad for four months each year.2O In the event it was the J7OPOSals of the Priamur military district 
that gained approval. It was furthermore agreed that the setting up of language schools in the local military 
districts should be accompanied by the closing down of the language courses for officers run through the 
Eastern Institute and the MID which had until now proven so unsatisfactory.21 The linguistic training 
schools thereafter set up in the Priamur, Turkestan and Caucasus military districts were to take in students 
on the basis of exams in Russian. the French or English languages, geography, the modem history of the 
relevant Asiatic states, and topography. Emphasis was placed, at the end of completing their training 
abroad, on officers' ability to translate from books and papers on primarily military themes.22 Tiflis and 
Tashkent were to enroll five officers annually and Vladivostok twelve, reflecting the General Staff's 
strategic priorities at this time on the Asiatic frontier. Officer graduates would gain the rank of interpreter 
with the right to increased pay conditional upon serving in the eastern military districts. Finally the whole 
programme, developed by the commission over the course of 1910 and introduced by statute on 211t July 
1911, was to come under review again after two years in order to judge what progress had been made on 
the basis of the experience of the 'first wave' of graduates. Accordingly, in 1913, the Asiatic military 
districts began to report back on what effect this new system of training had bad 
Feedback from the military districts in 1913 about the new courses, which, after a relatively short 
period of theoretical training involved such a long period of essentially independent practical study abroad, 
was generally highly positive, but carried an undercurrent of recognition that still more needed to be done. 
The Chief of Staff of the Priamur military district noted a need to expand the qualifications for entry to the 
district language schools, in order to ensure that matriculating students had a full grasp of the geogmphy 
2° Ibid,dl.8Oob-810b. 
21 Polozhenie ob izuchenii ofitserami vostochnykh iazykov s prilozheniem rukovodiashchikh ukazanii i 
~Jo~amm (StPetersburg: Izdan. V. Berezovskii 1912) pp.3-4. 
IbId, pp.14, 24-5. 
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and history of neighbouring Asiatic states. He also advocated increasing the period of officers' 
komandirovka abroad from two to three years to help perfect their ability to read handwritten documents, a 
notable shortcoming in the present batch of graduates.23 The need to introduce the teaching of Chinese into 
the school of the Tashkent military district, with the corresponding establishment of a fixed teaching post in 
this discipline at that district school was also highlighted. The Main Staff acknowledged these reservations, 
being advised by experts that the reading and writing of the Chinese and Japanese languages presented 
special difficulties compared to Near Eastern dialects. In November 1913 it was also agreed to set about the 
'second part' of the task facing the Russian General Staff in this sphere, namely the need to produce not 
just competent linguists (which could be broadly satisfied by the 1911 statute) but to have at the Staff's 
disposal 'Officer-Vostochniks' - men acquainted not just with the languages, but with the history, 
geography, religion, and political position of Asiatic states, upon whom could be laid 'more difficult tasks 
according to their specialties. ' For this, three alternatives of further training for the best graduates of the 
present system were proposed. The most outstanding officer-translators should either undergo 
supplementary courses through the Eastern Institute and the Academic Department of the MID, or be 
enrolled in the Eastern Practical Academy in St.Petersburg. or be sent abroad for a further two years. The 
head of the Asiatic Department at the time, S. V. Tseil', asked on 12th November 1913 for a new 
conference to be held to discuss this issue.24 The replacement of Tseil' by Manakin as head of the Asiatic 
Department of the General Staff in December 1913 delayed the formation of this commission, and in June 
1914 GUGSh raised objections to some of the proposed changes to the existing s1atUte presented by the 
Asiatic Department, worried that some of their implications would attract adverse attention from the State 
Duma. Finally of course, the outbreak of the First World War permanently suspended any further 
discussion of the question. 25 With the declaration of mobilization in Russia the foreign komandirovka of 
officers from the district schools was ended, the schools themselves were closed down, and officers were 
recalled to their respective units.26 Thus in language training, as in so much else, the General Staff found its 
23 RGVIA F.400 Op.1 0.4273 dl.I-Iob, 120. 
24Ibid. dl.8-9. 
25 Ibid, dl.26, 154-155. 
26 RGVIA F.400 Op.l 0.4006 "a", dl.1l9. 
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attempts to be militarily better prepared for managing its geostrategic position on the Eurasian continent 
cruelly interrupted by its oldest nightmare, the eruption of hostilities on the western frontier. 
The question of language training for officers in the Asiatic military districts raised its head once 
more during the actual course of the war itself, but a~ outside events- revolution and civil war-were 
destined to interrupt any proposed resolution. On the 14th July 1917 the Chief of Staff of the Siberian 
military district received a telegram from OGENKV AR (the Quartermaster-General Section of GUGSh 
responsible for intelligence and counter-intelligence operations) proposing to expand and reorganize 
intelligence operations in the Far East and requesting local input in this process. The aim was to create a 
better agent network in the region 'in the event of complications in the East' The Russian military position 
in the Far East in general had notably weakened during the course of the war itself as a consequence of the 
despatch of all railways guards on the Chinese Eastern Railway to the German front in 1915, their 
replacements being youths and elderly reservists armed with outdated equipment 27 In addition Russo-
Japanese diplomatic relations had notably deteriorated from their prewar position The Omsk head of staff 
responded positively the next day, pointing to the rising level of Chinese emigration to the district-' ... before 
the war it was difficult to find one or two Chinese in the town of Omsk and now they appear in the town 
and surrounding area in their thousands' -as one factor in making the re-organization of the local counter-
intelligence arm a pressing necessity.28 This officer concluded that: 
The contemporary political situation and all the developments and complications 
of life both in our East and the neighbouring Chinese and Japanese realms 
urgently demands the existence of officer-vostochniks attached to the staffs of 
the Asiatic military districts, including Omsk. 29 
Given political developments in the region over the course of the following twenty-five years, this plea 
would prove prescient. In August 1917 OGENKV AR announced the organization of a special conference 
to develop and work out a plan for organizing military intelligence in the region Intelligence 
representatives from the staffs of the Far Eastern military districts were duly invited to attend the 
conference in Petrograd that September. At this conference the representatives of the Priamur military 
27 Quested, 'Matey' Imperialists? The Tsarist Russians in Manchuria 1895-1917 p.249. 
28 RGVIA F.1450 Op.1 D.2 dl.139, 142-3. 
29 Ibid., dl.l43 
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district presented a proposed statute for 'officer-vostochniks' worked out by the district staff. This statute 
envisaged the opening of a special military section in the Eastern Institute in Vladivostok, where officers 
would enroll to undergo courses on the military geography, history and military organization of countries in 
the Far East. A five-year course was envisaged, with four years to be spent in the Institute and the fifth on a 
foreign komandirovka to a country of special study for perfection in its language. In the opinion of the 
district staff, such a programme would correct the shortcomings that had been observed in the pre-war 
training programmes and would provide the men, in the now familiar cry, regarded as essential in 
intelligence work; men 'versatile in understanding the whole structure of life of the enemy, his language, 
customs, and so on' This was particularly important in the Far East, where 'the future for us, after the end 
of the war, is pregnant with events, and these far from good for us (da/eko ne v nashu po/'zu]. ,30 The 
subliminal aim of this programme was also, of course, to reforge the special relationship that had always 
existed between the Russian military in the Far East and the Eastern Institute in Vladivostok, a link that had 
been sharply broken by the language training statute of 1910-11. As the most organized presentation, the 
Priamur staff's proposal met general approval, aside from the inevitable disputes amongst the district staffs 
as to who should be the greatest beneficiaries of this new array of talent graduating from Vladivostok. 31 
Revolution prevented the General Staff from implementing its plans however, and it was left to the Tsarist 
government's Soviet successor to create tIaining programmes and dispositions appropriate to the newly 
emerging situation in the Far East. 
The pre-war debates on eastern language programmes, meanwhile, formed practically the last 
major administrative responsibility of the Asiatic Department of the General Staff. Increasingly shorn of 
strategic responsibility following the reorganization of the central military administration in 1903 and the 
creation of GUGSh in 1905, the Asiatic Department spent its last remaining years overseeing the 
development of language programmes and the day-t<Hlay administration of the Asiatic military districts, 
including most importantly the proposed overhaul of the military administmtion in Russian Turkestan. 
Symbolic of this change was the alteration in wording of the department's responsibilities in 1906 from 
dealing simply and broadly with 'military-political questions' to 'political questions having links with 
30 Ibid, dl.I72. 
31 Ibid. dl.179 
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administrative affairs and military<ivil administration. 032 Such an order of things took some time to settle-
in December 1906 Palitsyn complained that political information regarding Persia and India was still being 
routinely sent to the Asiatic Department of the Main Staff, for whom it could now have only 'theoretical 
interest', rather than to the new formation of GUGSh.33 Once settled however, this trend was not reversed. 
At the start of 1914 the head of the Asiatic Department, M. M Manakin, made one last, doomed 
plea for his de}mt:ment to be expanded. Pointing to the enormous bureaucratic burden created by reviewing 
the legislative proposals for a new administration in Turkestan, Manakin claimed that only by chance was 
the Asiatic Department able to handle this task-i.e. only the fact that it presently had on its establishment 
exceptionally long-serving, experienced personnel enabled it to tackle the issues the new legislative 
proposals raised. That this happy situation arose by accident pointed to the need to expand the number of 
personnel permanently serving on the department Manakin asked for two assistant desk-heads and an 
assistant secretary to be added to the existing establishment of one head of department, three desk-heads, 
one assistant desk-head and one secretary.34 This would ease the burden of work on the department, which 
presently involved, amongst other things, the head of the department in 1913 having had to participate in no 
less than 20 governmental commissions and committees on Asiatic affairs.35 A special deloproizvodstvo 
should be set up in the Asiatic Depu1ment purely for tackling the issue of the new Turkestan statute and a 
commission set up to oversee the implementation of the project. On the 19th June 1914 however Manakin 
was informed that it had been decided to set aside his proposal 'until such a time when the [military] 
establishment generally will be reviewed.,36 As a result here too the plans of the General Staff's Asiatic 
personnel were never to reach full fruition, interrupted by the outbreak of war in 1914. 
Over the course of the subsequent World War the establishment of the Asiatic Department of the 
General Staff itself withered on the vine as a natural consequence of the concentration of all material and 
human resources upon the western frontier. By 1915 four men had already left the department, leavingjust 
two men to handle the administration and forcing the temporary head of the department at that time, 
32 RGVIA F.400 Op.l 0.3811 dl.30b-4. 
33 RGVIA F.2000 Op.l 0.969 dl.187-187ob. 
34 RGVIA F.400 Op.l 0.4343 dl.2-7. 
3S Ibid, dl.8-9. 
36 Ibid., dl.l4. 
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Davletshin, to petition the War Ministry for replacements. one of whom came from the Foreign Ministry. 37 
Question maIks over the future existence of the department itself also served to heighten the difficulties the 
department experienced in wartime in maintaining sufficient personnel on its establishment. In 1917 the 
staff of the Caucasus military district offered the Asiatic Department the services of a certain Colonel 
Smimov, one of its personnel, as a desk-head with the department. Smimov possessed excellent 
qualifications for the role, having served in peacetime as a tutor to the young Shah of Persia and during the 
course of the war itself having conducted political work amongst the Kurdish population as well as service 
in the intelligence and counter-intelligence section of the Caucasus army. Davletshin, by now full head of 
department, was forced to turn down the offer of his services however, 'in view of the proposed-in-the-
near-future abolition of this section [i.e. the Asiatic Department] and the transfer of its affairs to the Interior 
Ministry. ,38 In 1918 the last head of the Asiatic Dqmtment of the Russian General Staff, Colonel Abdul 
Aziz Abdulich Davletshin, watched over the winding down of the department and the retiral of its 
personnel for family or medical reasons. The last communication passing through the department from the 
Narkom on military affairs dated from 28th September 1918.39 
5.2 CONCLUSION. THE MYOPIC GUARD: THE RUSSIAN GENERAL STAFF AND THE 
'KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY'. 
The period from 1906 to 1917 marked in many ways the culmination of the strategic and doctrinal 
debates created by the expansion of the Russian Empire's Asiatic frontiers in the nineteenth century, and 
this was reflected in the role and position of the Asiatic Department of the General Staff. In the course of 
this expansion the Russian Empire continued to differ markedly from other imperial powers in two obvious 
regards. Firstly, in that, with the exception of Sakhalin Island, this empire was geographically contiguous 
with the core area~ and secondly, in that the Russian administration never possessed a 'Colonial Office' in 
the manner of other European empires for administering their' Asiatic' territories.4O Instead it had by the 
end of its existence developed distinct subsections within its main ministries for the administration of these 
frontiers, in the form of the Asiatic Departments of the General Staff and Foreign Ministry. The integrated 
nature of these departments within their larger bureaucratic units made the conciliation of agreed strategic 
37 RGVIA F.400 Op.1 0.4347 dl.49. 
38 Ibid .• dl.84-87. 
39 Ibid. dl.l90. 
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missions a continual headache and placed Russia in a unique sttategic position by 1914. Natural conflicts 
of interest were liable to be aggravated and further complicated by the patrimonial nature of Russian 
government, in which each ministry competed for the attention of the Tsar. Towards the end of the 
nineteenth century, for example, there is good reason to argue that Tsarist foreign policy in the Far East 
was more the product of internecine conflict between the War, Foreign and Finance ministries than 
anything else. In this period calls grew in the Russian press for the creation of a ministry tasked with 
overseeing and ordering the economic and social life of the Russian border districts, but these calls were 
destined to be unfulfilled. One prominent consequence of this situation was, as one commentator noted, 
that an extremely heavy administtative burden fell upon the Asiatic Department of the Foreign Ministry, 
imposing a wide range of tasks for which 'the competence of this department is not always sufficient. ,41 
Much the same criticism could be (and was) made of the Asiatic Department of the Russian General Staff. 
At the same time these 'Asiatic Departments', at least on the surface, performed a panoptic 
surveillance function akin to that attributed by Foucalt to the modem state in general (the so-called 
'panoptic guard' of Jeremy Bentham's ideal prison, itself in part inspired by Bentham's own tour of the 
Russia of Nicholas I) and by Edward Said to western orientalist societies in particular.42 Here at least the 
Russian General Staffs preoccupation with the gathering and assimilation of statistical information seems 
superficially to conform to the modem vision of the performance of Western European governments in 
geneml in regard to their colonial theatres: 
colonialism was itself a cultural project of control. Colonial knowledge both 
enabled conquest and was produced by it; in certain important ways, knowledge 
was what colonialism was all about.43 
This was certainly the view at the time of some Tsarist administrators, who viewed their empire in 
specifically comparative terms alongside the policies and methods pursued by other imperial systems. On 
departing for Siberia in 1819 Speranskii had gone armed with the wisdom imparted by Dominique de 
40 Crean, 'The Governor-Generalship of Turkestan under K.P. von Kaufman, 1867-1882' pp.4-S. 
41 K. A . Skal 'kovskii, Sovremennaia Rossii. Ocherki nashei gosudarstvennoi i obshchestvennoi zhizni T.l 
(S1. Petersburg: Tipografiia AS. Suvorina 1890) pp.127-29. 
42 Michel Foucault, DiScipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York: Random House 1977) 
If·19S-228. 
Nicholas B. Dirks, 'Foreword' in Bernard S. Cohn, Colonialism and Its Forms of Knowledge. The British 
in India (NJ: Princeton University Press 1996) p.ix. 
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Pradt's treatise Des colonies. This advised the would-be colonial legislator to create laws appropriate to the 
spiritual and intellectual needs of the subject peoples. As a clear example of the dangers inherent in 
ignoring this Enlightenment principle, de Pradt pointed to the disaster of Spanish colonial policy in the 
Americas.44 Parallels were even more tempting of course for those who actually travelled abroad. On his 
visit to North Africa, made with specifically comparative intent, the future head of the Russian General 
Staff's Asiatic Department, L. F. Kostenko, noted with surprise that the French government 'reiterates 
those mistakes practiced by us in the last and at the start of the present century' - namely the bolstering of 
Islam by the sponsoring of mosques and other religious institutions. This was all the more surprising since 
'the French clergy is famous from time immemorial by their missionary zeal.' Russian policy he felt to be 
clearly superior by its evolution to its present policy of 'indifference' (ravnodushiia i indejerentizma) 
regarding Islam. 45 
Some contemporaries saw the Asiatic Department of the General Staff within this general pan-
European imperial framework, as a panoptic instrument of enlightened control and governance. Visiting the 
department in 1882, the journalist Charles Marvin was unimpressed by the 'rabbit-warren' of rooms in the 
upper storeys of the War Ministry, the 'bare, cheerless walls' and the 'ordinary-looking' room that was L. 
N. Sobolev's office, but concluded however that: 
the world is governed by men, not by habitations. England, in all 
likelihood, would gladly part with the grand and imposing public office in 
Downing Street, if she could get in return a powerful and consistent 
foreign policy [sic], such as is pursued by the political officials in one 
shabby wing of the General Staff office at St Petersburg, and supported by 
the military officials in the other.46 
This myth of the omnipotence of the imperial department head, suspended above a hidden web of 
knowledge more relevant than material institutions, rather like the millionaire financier of Joseph Conrad's 
44 Yuri Slezkine, Arctic Mi"ors p.82, M Raeff, Michael Sperans!di: Statesman ofImperiaJ Russia, 1772-
1839 pp.217-22. 
45 L. F. Kostenko, Puteshestvie v Severnuiu Afriku (StPetersburg: Tipografiia i khromolitografiia A 
Transhchelia, 1876) pp.127-8. The Russian Ministry of Education adopted an equally comparative 
approach when formulating education policy for the Empire's Muslims; see Dowler, Classroom and 
Empire. The Politics of Schooling Russia's Eastern Nationalities pp.68-84. 
46 Marvin, The Russian Advance Toward India p.76 
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Nostromo- 'cobwebbed aloft by the radiation of telegraph wires' -was just that, a myth.47 The reality 
reflected all the frictions and local misunderstandings one would expect from the administration of an 
enormous land frontier. One individual particularly disenchanted with the directions given from the centre 
in this period was the Chief of StafIfor Western Siberia, General!. F. Babkov. Babkov's case is 
particularly poignant and instructive since he began his career as an element of centralist control, one of a 
generation of academy-trained officers who took up field commands in regions where in the past the 
presence of staff officers was not traditional. As a representative of the StPetersburg centre, Babkov' s 
early career was blighted by fractious relations with local military officialdom. Yet long service on the 
frontier soon converted Babkov to the efficacy of regionalist solutions. In his memoirs, looking back over 
his lengthy career, he blamed the complexities of Sino-Russian relations in the 1870s upon the fact that: 
we had at that time an excessively centralized [authority], as in S1. 
Petersburg was concentrated even the smallest springs of the state 
mechanism. Plans were not developed in places where they would 
be put into action, but in St.Petersburg chancellories and special 
commissions. 48 
In this unmistakable attack upon his superiors at the Asiatic DeparUnent of the Genernl Staft: Babkov 
quoted in his support the view of Prince Dondukov-Korsakov, governor-general of the Caucasus. The 
govemor-genernl expressed the opinion that the history of the war against Shamil proved that when local 
affairs were left in the hands of local men, matters prospered, whilst directives and the intervention of 
representatives from the centre invariably led to disaster. The lessons for Babkov was clear- that given 'the 
rapidly changing events of a political character' characteristic of Asiatic states, a devolution of political and 
administrative responsibilities was a necessity. 
Such tensions expressed by those involved in the very heart of the machine serve to indicate that 
the Asiatic Department of the General Staff was very far from the smoothly functioning and omnipotent 
state mechanism seen by outsiders like Charles Marvin. By the end of the period under study, calls were 
growing. as we have seen, for the abolition of the Asiatic Department altogether. One prominent voice in 
47 Joseph Conrad, Nostromo (Kent: Wordsworth Editions Ltd. 1996) p.63. 
48 Babkov, Vospominaniia 0 moei sluzhbe v zapadnoi Sibiri 1859-1875g. Razgranichenie s zapadnym 
Kitaem 1869g. p.533. 
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these debates was that ofVasilii Fedorovich Novitskii (1869-1929).49 A graduate of the Staff Academy 
(class of 1892-5), Novitskii's military service led him to become acquainted at first hand with practically 
all of Russia's Asiatic concerns. Fulfilling part of his early service as commander of a Turkestan rifle 
battalion, and commandeered for eight months study to British India in 1898, Novitskii went on to serve as 
a staff officer to a West Siberian Cossack brigade. With this unit he participated in the 1900 intervention in 
China before, after a short term in the Main Staff: joining the 2nd Manchurian Army in the Russo-Japanese 
War of 1904-05. Post-war service then saw him conduct military-scientific expeditions in both Mongolia 
and Manchuria, whilst his pre-war journeys in the Bukharan and Pamir mountain regions facilitated his 
1910 study of the Afghan theatre of military operations.50 Yet as a veteran of the Russo-Japanese War and a 
prominent contributor to the military press of the day, Novitskii was not merely a typical product of 
Russia's Asiatic military districts, but also part of a new generation of 'Young Turks' who advocated 
dramatic military and economic reform in the years leading up to the First World War. Like so many others 
in this category, he would later join the Soviet side in the Russian Civil War and go on to serve in the Red 
Army Staff Academy of the 1920s. He likewise shared with many others of his generation an imJBtience 
regarding the many ancillary functions that had been laid upon the Russian War Ministry as a consequence 
of the Miliutin reforms of the 1860s, and these views he expressed in a prominent work of 1909 advocating 
fundamental reform in the War Ministry. Supporting the return of GUGSh to the War Ministry, Novitskii 
advocated the removal of all those administrative accessories that detracted from the General Staff's ability 
to plan for war itself These included the Cossack administration, which was largely involved in land and 
economic questions, the Military-Medical Institute, with a view to transferring its functions to a civilian 
institution where they belonged, and the Topographical Department. With regard to the latter, Novitskii 
wanted the Topographical division removed from the War Ministry's remit as its work was of empire-wide, 
rather than purely military, relevance. Undoubtedly one of his most dramatic proposals however was the 
removal of Central Asia from being the responsibility of the General Staff's Asiatic Section, since he felt 
49 On Novitskii, I have utilized: L. Leonidov, 'Vasilii Fedorovich Novitskii (K lOO-letiiu so dnia 
rozbdeniia) VIZh 3 (1969) pp.77-85 and A G. Kavtaradze, 'Krupnyi voennyi istorik V. F. Novitskii' in V. 
L. Mal'kov (ed.), Pervaia mirovaia voina. PrologXXveka (Moscow: Izdate1'stvo "NAUKA" 1998) 
~.635-43 
Polkovnik (GS) V. F. Novitskii, Voenno-Geograficheski; OcherkAfganskoe Teatra voennykh deisMi s 
podrobnym , obzorom ' operatsionnykh' pute;, vedushchikh 'cherez Afganistan ' (St Petersburg: Voennaia 
Tipografiia (v zdanii Glavnogo Shtaba) 1910) 
223 
that the head and bureaucrats of that section were insufficiently qualified to handle the complex legal, 
financial and economic questions involved in governing that region.51 Since this area formed the last major 
area of responsibility for the General Staff's Asiatic Section, Novitskii' s proposals in practice implied the 
abolition of that department. His views suggest in general that for many younger officers engaged on the 
Asiatic frontier, the very existence of that department after 1905 was simply no longer seen as relevant or 
meaningful. Moreover, such views during this later period enjoyed a degree of high-level support. As early 
as 1906 War Minister Rediger declared to the Council of Ministers the desirability of turning Turkestan 
over to a civilian administration, a declaration that encouraged the appointment of the Palen commission 
two years later. To his uncomprehending governor-general in Turlcestan, Mishchenko, Rediger explained 
that he knew nothing of the administration of Turkestan, and was consequently forced to conduct matters 
according to the prompting of Colonel Tseil', head of the General Staff's Asiatic Section In what may be 
read either as a self -deprecating comment or as a veiled criticism of Tseil', Rediger explained that he 
therefore wanted to end this 'abnormal' situation and to 'put the matter into competent hands. ,52 The Palen 
report itself favoured a greater measure of civil (as opposed to military) administration in Turkestan, but as 
we have seen from the foregoing chapter, nothing was done in practice before the outbreak of war in 1914. 
Governor-General Samsonov himself favoured a greater devolution of power, with more responsibility 
given to the local commander, thus mirroring calls heard from the Viceroy of the Caucasus, Vorontsov-
Dashkov, in the same period. However, at an inter-departmental conference on the subject in 1911 under 
the chainnanship of State Inspector P. A Kharitov, it was resolved to reject Samsonov's pleas to expand 
his powers on the grounds that this would lead to the separation of the region from the rest of the Empire.53 
Dilemmas of regionalization versus centralization would remain unresolved therefore before the outbreak 
of war in 1914. 
Across the great majority of this period, several factors had hindered the Russian General Staff 
from obtaining a full and correct pmoptic knowledge of its Asiatic frontiers and their immediate 
neighbouring states. Amongst these factors, undoubtedly the two greatest were financial and organizational. 
51 Kavtaradze, 'Krupnyi voennyi istorik V. F. Novitskii' pp.637-8. 
52 Rediger, /storiia Moei Zhizni. Vospominaniia Voennogo Ministra T.2 pp.218-19. 
53 V. V. Korneev, 'Upravlenie Turkestanskim kraem: real'nost' i "pravovye mechtaniia" (60-e gody XIXv.-
fevral' 1917 goda)' VI 2 (2001) p.67. 
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During the period of office of War Minister Vannovskii (1881-1897) the Russian armed forces budget was 
cut to a barely sustainable minimum, the effects of which were felt at every level of military infrastructure. 
With large expenditures reserved for the complex process of complete re-armament, such as those linked 
with the introduction of the Mosin-Nagant magazine rifle in the 1890s, the drive for savings at every level 
was reflected and typified in the position of the regimental artel'. The artel', a form of soldiers workshop, 
took responsibility for putting together and maintaining uniforms in the Russian army, the War Ministry 
finding it cheaper to issue raw materials rather than complete tailored uniforms to the forces under its 
command As a result many soldiers marched to war against Japan in 1904 in ill-fitting boots and with 
inadequate greatcoats. The considerable expense attendant on Russia in staying in the late nineteenth-
century European arms race meanwhile formed at least one of the reasons for Nicholas II calling for the 
Hague Peace Conference of 1899. The astringency attending such efforts at military economy undoubtedly 
carried over some side-benefits as well, in terms of developing a certain sense of economy, a hatred of 
waste, and in cultivating the reputation for robustness and durability associated both with Russian 
weaponry and the Russian soldier in general. Russian officers took pride in the fact that their troops 
remained in vigorous and robust health despite a basic and monotonous diet of tea, bread, biscuits and 
cabbage soup. Indeed, it was believed such a regime increased their men's stamina and hardiness for the 
harsh test of war. The performance of Russian soldiers throughout history demonstrated that such beliefs 
were not entirely unfounded. Nonetheless in other areas this drive for economy undoubtedly carried dire 
consequences. Nowhere was this more evident than in the field of military intelligence, always a poor 
candidate for state investment given the inability to deliver an immediate, visible and reliable return. In the 
second half of the nineteenth century the expanding nature of the modem battlefield placed a premium on 
the ability to generate real-time and accurate strategic and operational intelligence, both in peace and in 
time of war. Yet the Russian military budget made no allowance for such factors, and only in the aftermath 
of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 did the inadequacy of allotting a mere 56, 920 roubles annually to 
the cause of intelligence across the Russian Empire become evident to the War Ministry. Such practical 
drawbacks contrasted dramatically with the often highly developed intellectual dialogue within the General 
Staff itself, illustrating a classic military dilemma between theory and performance. The scientific 
structures and methods of analysis inculcated into General Staff thinking by men like Miliutin and 
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Maksheev had become undermined by the parsimony of a military administration which could not even 
afford to give its men properly-fitting boots. 
The second factor obstructing the most effective use of even these limited resources was 
organizational. Unlike the Military-Scientific Committee, with its clear linear responsibility for managing 
the correspondence of Russia's military agents abroad, the role of the Asiatic Department of the General 
Staff in intelligence ~thering was never clearly defined or demarcated. By statute it had if anything a dual 
function, given that its responsibilities involved the monitoring of events in regions bordering Russia's 
Asiatic frontier alongs; de the internal administration of Russia's Asiatic military districts. In practice, as 
might have been expected, attention to intelligence concerns was often sacrificed on the altar of daily 
military administration, with A P. Protsenko noting in 1895, as we have seen, that over half the 
correspondence of his department did not relate to military matters at all. These twin factors of tight 
financial restraints alongside a less than coherent organizational system meant that despite the p-esence of 
talented and often outstanding individuals working on its Asiatic frontiers, military scholars like 
Pnbeval'skii and Kozlov, the Russian General Staff was not able to deal with its numerous responsibilities 
across the southern frontier in what would nowadays be termed a 'joined-up' fashion. Russia went to war 
with Japan in 1904 anned with inadequate maps, with a poor cultural knowledge of its opponent, and with 
a critical lack of reliable inteIpreters, and all this despite numerous military-scientific expeditions in the 
region in the past, military agents in the relevant countries, and a military presence in the Far East dating 
back several decades. A significant and understudied aspect of Russia's post-war military reforms was 
therefore aimed at directing a more organized, better funded, and single-minded gaze at Russia's Asiatic 
responsibilities. The reduction of the Asiatic Department's responsibilities after 1903 reflected not any 
diminished importance being assigned to the administration of these frontiers but rather the increasing 
military commitments these districts demanded. Such commitments could only be handled by a large 
central military administration containing several desks for both the collection and processing of military 
intelligence, a need that the or~ization known under the acronym of GUGSh largely provided after 1905. 
The reunification of GUGSh with the Main Staff in 1909 ended significant areas of administrative overlap 
between the two or~njntions and created a central administration capable of planning for the next major 
conflict in both a doctrinal and technical regard. It was these developments that simultaneously undermined 
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the relevance, in the eyes of many younger officers like Novitskii, of retaining the old Asiatic Section at all. 
Nonetheless even here the former contradictions were far from completely eradicated, since the Asiatic 
Section, as we have seen, retained responsibility for organizing the training of officers in eastern languages, 
training that obviously qualified them to perform an intelligence role in the East alongside everyday 
administrative duties. Right up until the end of its existence meanwhile the Asiatie Section continued to be 
headed by men-Manakin, Davletshin- who had risen to prominence in their early careers as intelligence-
gathering agents both within and beyond Russia's Asiatic frontiers. 
In some ways of course this 'knowledge panic' that afflicted the Russian General Staff in the 
wake of its defeat in the Far East- expressed in its concern over lack of cadres, native intermediaries, basic 
statistical data and translators- was far from exceptional. Indeed, ironically, it was again typical of and 
paralleled the other imperial, knowledge-based eolonial systems of its day.54 What was striking however 
was the scale and urgency of the concern in the Russian case given again the indivisibility of its European 
and Asiatic strategic concerns; strategic balance and accurate information for Russia were peculiarly vital. 
In the wake of the Russo-Japanese War the Russian military and the state in general was left with 
a whole raft of organizational and administrative reforms regarding Turkestan, the Caucasus, and the Far 
East, few of which had time to fully evolve before the outbreak of a new and wider war. Whether the 
Russian state could have properly developed its administrative and strategic policies in Asia had war not 
interrupted in 1914 therefore remains one of the most intriguing 'what if' questions ofmoclern history . 
• 
Changing institutions aside, the organized study of the East by the Russian General Staff left long 
legacies in other areas as well. In particular, the Russian General Staff did on occasion apply the tool of 
military statistics to practical policy goals in some of the panoptic forms envisaged by Foucault and Said-as 
Peter Holquist has recently argued: 
Military statistics was an applied science in the most direct sense of the 
term. To a significant degree what was known by the Imperial government 
about its subjects, i.e. their numbers, where they lived, and even their health, 
54 For a useful survey of the same phenomenon in the British case. see: C. A Bayly. 'Knowing the 
Country: Empire and Information in India.' MAS 27 (1, 1993) pp.3-43. 
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it learned from military statistics. 55 
The creation of psychogenetic group identifications fostered by military statistics undoubtedly 
paved the way for the sometimes extremely brutal manner in dealing with ethnic groups that the Tsarist 
Government pursued in both the Transcaucasus and Central Asia in 1914-17. During the course of its 
dealing with the Central Asian rebellion of 1916 for example, the Turkestan administration under 
Kuropatkin targeted an entire ethnic group, the Kirghiz, and exiled many of them en masse across the 
border to China. This group had been singled out as early as 1910 by General Staff Captain Fedorov of the 
Turkestan military district as a politically unreliable element given their retention of a strong (and hence 
culturally impenetrable) internal clan structure. Fedorov had advocated increased Russian colonization as a 
means to balance the native element and assure security in the sensitive Semirech' e border region with 
China.56 Kuropatkin in 1916 therefore was in many ways only acting out political strategies for which the 
intellectual groundwork. had already been plved in the plSt by generations of Russian staff officers 
conducting military-scientific expeditions to analyze the ethnographic and political balance of Russia's 
Asiatic borderlands. Nor was the Tsarist government alone in this trend towards scientifically-justified 
'population policy', the German government pursuing policies in Eastern Europe in the same period that 
may have been inculcated and fostered by earlier German administrative practice in Africa. 51 In the 
immediate pre-war period of course, the British administration in India, by their extensive support for the 
Amir 'Abd ai-Rahman in defence of their so-called 'scientific' frontier in Afghanistan, also backed a policy 
that amounted in effeet to organized genocide against the nationalities of northern Afghanistan. 
It is furthermore undeniably true that in the development and deployment of knowledge-based 
systems of control and administration, the Russian War Ministry in the Tsarist period played an 
55 Piter Kholkvist (Peter Holquist), 'Total'naia mobilizatsiia i politika naseleniia: Rossiiskaia katastrofa 
(1914-1921) v Evropeiskom kontekste' in: Z. Galili (ed.), Rossiia i Pervaia Mirovaia Voina (Materialy 
mezhdunarodnogo nauchnogo kollokviuma) (StPetersburg: Izdatel'stvo "Dmitri Bulanin" 1999) pp.8S-6. 
56 GeD. Sht. Polkovnik D. Fedorov, Voenno-statisticheskoe opisanie Turkestanskago voennago okruga. 
Chzhungarsko-Semirechens!di prigranichnyi raion • (Tashkent: Tipografiia Shtaba Tutkestanskago 
Voennago Okruga 1910) p.99. 
51 Piter Kholkvist (Peter Holquist), 'Total'naia mobilizatsiia i politika naseleniia: Rossiiskaia katastrofa 
(1914-1921) v Evropeiskom kontekste' pp.90-l. On the development of the 'gardening state' as an aspect 
of modernity, and with this same emphasis of the implet of the colonial experience on European practice, 
see also: Amir Weiner, Making Sense o/War. The Second World War and the Fate o/the Bolshevik 
Revolution (Princeton & Oxford: Princeton University Press 2(01) pp.21-39. Weiner points out that the 
foreign SS troops used to clear the Warsaw Ghetto in 1943 were referred to as 'Askaris', the Swahili term 
for the African troops of Germany's colonies. 
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exceptionally significant role. Within Tsarist Russia generally, science rapidly became an institutionalized 
occupation, a state of affairs that the Soviet Union would inherit. The emphasis upon knowledge for 
military needs was reflected in the development, before World War L of a map of the Asiatic border zone 
on thirty-two shects (scalc 1 inch: 40 verst) and a military road map of Asiatic Russia (1 inch: 50 vcrst). 
Civilian-sponsored geographical programmes by contrast, such as the cadastral survey begun in 1765, took 
a significantly longer period to carry out with, in the case of the cadastral project, the task uncompleted till 
1915.58 The importance the Russian military attached to rendering Asia knowable was further reflected by 
thc distribution of topographical officcrs within the Asiatie border ZODCS. In 1866, following the prcccdcnt 
set by the establishment of an independent topographical section for the Caucasus Corps in 1854, 
D.AMiliutin directed that four of the new military districts-Orenburg, Western and Eastern Siberia, and 
Turkestan- be allotted topographical sections of 20-40 men each as opposed to the 2-4 topographers 
attached to the military district staffs elsewhere. 59 Nonetheless practical problems remain with applying the 
post-modem 'orientalist' model to the Tsarist bureaucracy and strategic thinking as a whole. As we have 
already seen, the Tsarist government's capacity to eonvert knowledge into power was severely restricted by 
both economic and practical restrictions, ie. by the sheer burden of the cataloguing and monitoring of 
archival knowledge. The fundamental inescapable fact of the unwieldy nature and inefficiency of the 
central bureaucratic institutions, so familiar a theme to students of Russian Imperial history, held as true 
here as it did elsewhere. It should be noted however that this represented a rather different problem than 
that posited by Edward Said for European orientalisrn as a whole. In Said's view orientalisrn was in effect a 
'rcprcscntation' of the 'true' Orient that was inextricably bound up within the parameters of an avaricious 
European colonialism. According to this theory, all forms of orientalisrn, whatever their claims, were 
directed only at continually re-evoking and re-empbasizing 'the ehasm between intelligent, logical and 
mentally disciplined Europeans and 'Orientals,' whose minds are so disorganized that they cannot even 
walk on a paved road. ,60 European orientalists were incapable of perceiving or representing the 'true' 
patterns of cultural development in the East because they were imperialists enraptured by this diehotomy 
58 L. S. Berg, Ocherk istorii russkoi geograficheskoe nauki (vplot do 1923 gada) (Leningrad.: lzdatel'stvo 
Akademii Nauk SSSR 1929) p.29, and Marina ToJmacheva, 'The early Russian exploration and mapping of 
the Chinese Frontier' CMR 4111 (2000) pp.55-56. 
59 Glushkov & Sharavin, Na /carte Genera/'nago Shtaba-Man 'chzhuriia p.349. 
60 Edward Said, Orienta/ism Western Conceptions a/the Orient (London: Penguin Books 197811995) p.38. 
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and because, at a deeper level, in Said's view, all forms of representation are inevitably bound to be forms 
of misrepresentation Within the framework of Russian military vostokovedenie this claim begins to look 
rather peculiar. Although inevitably bound by professional requirements to study the past to a certain 
degree, military vostokoveds were primarily concerned with the contemporary situation in Asiatic states. 
Had they begun with the cultural precept that the nature of the Orient was unchanging and backward, this 
region by definition could never have been perceived as forming any type of security threat. In reality, by 
contrast, it was the military's perception of the very real cultural and technological changes occurring in 
Asia that led them. in the Russian case, to devote increasing amounts of attention to the region. This would 
suggest that Said's thesis of an instinctively racialist and bUnkered orientalism, to the extent that it is 
compatible with reality at all, remains entirely inapplicable to the forms of analysis deployed by the 
Russian military with regard to the East It was the very conciousness of the fact that the East was 
changing, and awareness of the poverty of its instruments to monitor this development, which caused 
increasing levels of concern in the Tsarist military's policy-forming departments. If military analysts were 
often inclined to associate these technological changes with aggressive intentions in formulae that carried 
racist overtones (the so-called 'yellow peril' threat of the 1905-1910 period), then this was probably no 
more than a by-product of the Hegelian and atavistic world-view which dominated all strategic thought at 
the time and which applied as much in Europe as in Asia 
Throughout all this later period meanwhile the increased strategic significance assigned to the 
Asiatic frontiers is the most striking (and most overlooked) factor of Tsarist military policy in the 
immediate prewar period Whilst Tsarist generals were understandably anxious in their postwar memoirs to 
assert that Russian prewar military policy remained firmly fixed on the menace of Germany, the actual 
technical and strategic changes of the 1905-1914 period-the running down offortifications in the West 
alongside the construction of new fortifications and major rail links in both the Caucasus, Turkestan and the 
Far East-presented a rather different picture. In the immediate aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War, 
Palitsyn and the State Defence Council drew up a series of measures and plans for the reinforcement of 
both Central Asia and the Russian Far East. War Minister Rediger opposed these measmes and used his 
financial powers to delay their implementation, but his successor, Sukhomlinov, proved more disposed 
towards such a re-orientation of resources. The cost and effort involved in these changing dispositions was 
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neither cheap nor undertaken lightly. State finances in this later period came under the scrutiny of the State 
Duma as well as the Tsar and were truly 'political' questions in the modem sense of the term. 61 The 
ultimate cost of the Amur Railroad alone-400 million roubles- came at a time when the annual expenditure 
of thc Russian state budget amounted to less than three billion roublcs.62 Such rcdispositions can only have 
been l.mdertaken therefore because a majority within the Tsarist governmental system, including its military 
wing, saw them as highly necessary. In short, on the eve of the First World War itself the Russian Empire 
felt increasingly threatened along its Asiatic frontier in both a strategic, political and economic regard In 
the words of one scholar who has studied this phenomenon from an economic pcrspcctive, this undoubtedly 
'contributed to the atmosphere of general crisis for the [T]sarist regime in July 1914. ,63 It did not, to say the 
least, facilitate the formulation of a unified strategic response. In the words of another economic historian: 
In practice, this meant a desperate attempt to maintain adequate troops in 
readiness for an offensive against both Germany and Austro-Hungary, without 
ignoring the defence of Russia's borders in the Far East and in Central Asia As 
if this was not enough, the Tsar insisted that Russia be provided with a fleet 
that had an offensive as well as defensive capability.64 
Tsarist Russia's Asiatic concerns were also played out at a wider level of policy debate after 1905 
on the whole future of Russian strategy across Eurasia, a debate that exposed fundamentally opposing 
views and beliefs. Proponents of the political alliance with Japan sought thereby to gain a free hand for 
Russia in the Balkans and Near East. Those who believed in the inevitability of a new war with Japan by 
contrast argued for an alliance with America and a settlement of affairs with Germany and Austro-
Hungary, leaving the strategic 'rear' of Europe secure in order to prepare for renewed conflict in the Far 
East. 65 These debates played themselves out within the academic and orientalist societies of the day of 
which so many military and diplomatic personnel were by now members. At a sitting of the Society for 
Vostokovedenie in May 1910 the retired General K. I. Druzhinin presented a paper arguing for 'transferring 
61 For a shon summary of the powers of the Duma in this later period, see: Lieven, Russia and the Origins 
tithe First World War pp.50-4. 
Marks, 'The Burden of the Far East: the Amur Railroad Question in Russia, 1906-1916.' p.1S. 
63 Derek W. Spring, 'Russian Imperialism in Asia in 1914' CMRS:XX (1979) p.305 
64 P. Gatrell, Government, industry and rearmament in Russia, 1900-1914. The last argumentoftsarism. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1994) p.320. 
231 
the centre of gravity of state defence' to the Trans-Baikal region. 1bis was to involve building up the 
railway net there, setting up field fortifications and concentrating troops. These preparations were to be 
complemented by the formation of a diplomatic anti-Japanese alliance with America and, potentially, 
England Such measures, he suggested, would help prepare for a sharp preemptive strike a~ both Japan 
and China in the very near future. 1bis paper drew support from prominent members of the society, 
including Colonel A. E. Sncsarcv and thc Sinologist Dmitri Pozdnccv. Such supporters of a rc-oricntation 
of strategic resources on Asia were therefore by proxy 'Germanophile', a charge levelled ag;linst Snesarev 
in 1907 when it was suspected that the newspaper he ran, running critical pieces on the recent agreement 
with Japan, had German financial backing.66 Druzhinin's 1910 presentation was however criticized and 
voted down by the majority of the Society, including former Chief of the General StaffPalitsyn, who 
despite his own anti-Japanese inclinations (he was an opponent of the 1907 Anglo-Russian and associated 
Russo-Japanese conventions) found such a plan too radical and in his view too unrealistic for even his own 
tastes.67 Probably the greatest opponents of any redisposition of strategic resources however (and even of 
such changes as did occur) were individuals within the Russian Foreign Ministry, and in particular Foreign 
Minister Izvol'skii. In a confidential letter to a colleague in 1906, Izvol'skii lamented that the Russian 
General Staff, in his view: 
have learnt nothing and forgotten nothing; they talk of Seistan, the 
Pcrsian Gulf, thc Indian Ocean &c. cxactly as thc talk used to be 
before the Japanese war, of Manchuria. Korea. and the Pacific 0cean.68 
Debate on these issues both in private and in the press led to Izvol'skii's successor, Sazonov, making the 
famous statement to the State Duma in 1912 that: 
one must not forget ... that Russia is a European power, that the state 
was formed not on the banks of the Black Irtych but on the banks of the 
Dnieper and of the river Moskva.69 
65 I.V. Bestuzhev, Bor'ba v Rossii po voprosam vneshnei politiki 1906-1910 (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo 
Akademii Nauk SSSR 1961) p.366. 
66 Polivanov, Iz dnevnikov i vospominanii po dolzhnosti voennogo ministra; ego pomoshchika, 1907-1916g 
r,.88. 
7 Bestuzhev, Bor'ba v Rossii po voprosam vneshnei politiki 1906-1910 pp.37S-6. 
68 B. H. Sumner, Tsardom and Imperia/ism in the Far EastandMiddle East, 1880-1914 (USA: Archon 
Books 1968) pp.37-38; Bestuzhev, Bor'bav Rossii po voprosam vneshnei politiki 1906-19JOpp.136-7. 
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The growing importance attached to the Asiatic frontier by the Russian military in this later period 
was shaped by factors that were as much psychological as physical. The southern frontier by the end of the 
Tsarist period was seen implicitly in the eyes of many Tsarist officers as part of a long single 'causal 
chain', in which evcnts in onc theatre would carry inevitable political repercussions elsewhere along the 
line. During his term in office as Governor-General in Turkestan in the 1890s, General Dukhovskoi for 
example had speculated over possible explosive links between the rising tide of Pan-Islamic propaganda 
and recent political events in China. Dukhovskoi felt in general that Europeans must expect in the coming 
century the declaration of a universal Muslim gazavat, (holy war,jihad), an event in which Russia, by the 
nature of its geographical position, would be at the epicentre. In particular however, he warned that in the 
event of even minor military reverses in a potential Sino-Russian conflict, Muslims could be inspired by the 
Chinese example to pursue a policy of revanchism.7o Even the slightest military setback might therefore 
spark political instability right along the frontier line. In this regard Russian military expansion actually 
reinforced the intrinsic unity of Inner Eurasia discussed at the very start of this work. The railway and the 
telegraph-ironically the very tools of modem imperial expansion-replaced the horseman and the caravan 
and surpassed them to such an extent that political repercussions at one end of the region such as the Russo-
Japanese War could now be felt at the other in a matter of weeks rather than years. The political causative 
chain felt in this region in the past, in for example the movement of the Huns westward as a result of 
political developments in north-west China, would now express itself a~ in the modem period in months 
rather than centuries.71 The southern frontier towards the end of this period was correspondingly under 
political pressure from both ends of the line- from political developments in Turkey after 1909 and from the 
evidence of Japanese and Chinese modernization after 1904-05. Central Asia formed the natural crux, the 
region where the crosshairs of these two influences, as it were, met, and where the third and unique 
69 Lieven, Empire. The Russian Empire and its Rivals p.222. 
70 RGVIA F.400 Op.l D.4984 dl.5-7ob. 
71 A similar Russian view of the southern frontier as a region posing significant overlapping political and 
military dangers, specifically through the cuhurally introverted nature of Islam, can be found even in recent 
analyses. See for example: Victor Spolnikov, 'Impact of Afghanistan's War on the Former Soviet 
Republics of Central Asia' in H. Malik (ed.), Central Asia. Its Strategic Importance and Future Prospects 
pp.95-116. A former Major-General of the Soviet KGB, Spolnikov is now a scholar of the Russian Institute 
of Oriental Studies in Moscow. Consequently his 8pp'eCiation is based on access to past studies made by 
the KGB on the failure of party structures in Soviet Central Asia to replace the pre-existing Islamic order. 
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problem of Anglo-Russian tension over Mghanistan creating a complicating factor that correspondingly 
came under increasing pressure for political resolution. 
Whilst they did not necessarily conform to the patterns of Said's 'Orientalism' meanwhile, the 
forms and methods of thought developed by the Tsarist military and academic community outlived the 
Tsarist regime itself and went on to have a significant impact upon early Soviet modes of government. On 
the one hand this was simply a matter of a chronological continuity of personnel- of individuals who had 
begun their careers under the Tsars going on to spend their last years serving under Stalin. On the other 
hand this continuity was also in some regard scientific and ideological. For many, assuming they survived 
both war and revolution, 1917 marked less of a change or turning-point in the nature of their careers or 
even their thinking than it may outwardly appear. In the immediate course and aftermath of the Civil War, 
Russia's new rulers found themselves in a terrifying state of strategic and scientific ignorance. In 1919 one 
official of the Commissariat of Nationalities noted to his superiors that the only things known about the 
natives of the Trans-Baikal region, the Buriat and Enisei Tunguz, was that they were Mongols, Lamaists 
(they were in fact neither) and that they were 'quite wild, and that is about it. ,72 As late as 1926 delegates at 
a session of the Central Executive Committee warned that 'it would be difficult to maintain power' in the 
non-Russian provinces if local administrators did not learn more about their charges.73 The only immediate 
solution to these enormous tasks facing the Soviet government, in every field, was the employment of 
Tsarist-era bureaucratic, academie, and administrative personnel. In the Far East. the Eastern Institute in 
Vladivostok continued to train translators in its 'practical programme' for the pursuance of the Soviet 
regimc's political goals in China. The eminent Tsarist sinologist Dmitri Pozdnccv helped set up language 
programmes in the Red Army, a contribution that did not spare the octogenarian from summary state 
execution in 1937 on the charge of being a Japanese spy.74 The le~ of the practical courses developed in 
the Russian Far East since 1899 was destined to have a deep and long-lasting impact on the evolution and 
course of Soviet Sinology. 
In the field of exploration, both P. K. Kozlov and V. K. Arsen'ev would continue their scientifie 
researches into the Soviet epoch, although the latter had a particularly uneasy relationship with the ruling 
72 Slezkine, Arctic Mi"ors p.139. 
73 Francine Hirsch, 'The Soviet Union as a Work-in-Progress: Ethnographers and the Category Nationality 
in the 1926, 1937, and 1939 Censuses.' SR S6 (2, 1997) p.2S2. 
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regime. Narrowly dissuaded in the 1920s from dedicating one of his works to his former patron and mentor, 
the exiled Unterberger, in all likelihood only his sudden death in 1930 spared Arsen' ev from the later 
purges. His wife was less fortunate. Kozlov meanwhile dedicated his last active explorations to the study of 
the field first opened up by his patron and mentor, Przhcval' skii, with expeditions in Mongolia and a 
further unsuccessful attempt to penetrate Tibet. 
At a wider level, the committees formed by the Tsarist government in wartime for assessing the 
internal structure of the Tsarist Empire went on to become the most direct outward expressions of scientific 
continuity into the Soviet regime. The collection of scientists, ethnographers and statisticians assembled 
under the Committee for the Studying of Natural Industrial Resources formed in 1915 (KEPS for short) and 
the Commission for the Study of the Tribal Population of Russia and the Borderlands (or, confusingly, 
KIPS, formed in February 1917) would both go on to serve the Soviet government For both committees 
their primary task. would remain the problem of the gathering and assimilation of knowledge and its 
practical application. The papers delivered. by A E. Snesarev at these gatherings in the immediate postwar 
years reflected a continued dissatisfaction with the level of knowledge available to the central government 
(the 'knowledge crisis') that Snesarev had already identified and expressed under the Tsars. 
At the first all-Russia conference of scientific societies for the study of local areas in December 
1921, Snesarev pointed out that data regarding even the most basic facts about Asiatic states, such as 
climate, population density and social movement, all too often remained conjectural or non-cxistcnt.75 He 
further lamented that the careers of the great Asiatic commanders, such as Timur and Chinghiz Khan (men 
whosc achievements in his own view surpassed those of Frederick the Great, Turamc. Gustavus Adolphus 
and Eugene of Savoy) were still ignored or, worse, slandered and misunderstood by the arrogance of 
European science and historiography. He assured his listeners however that: 
In the matter of scorn or arrogance towards Asiaties we [Russians] are 
much less culpable than Europe.76 
The position of Russia geographically would make her play a large role in the resolution of all 
Asiatic political questions generally, whilst the special position of the Russian Far East as a buffer in the 
74 Wolff, To the Harbin Station p.175 and John J. Stephan, The Russian Far East pp.222-223. 
75 A E. Snesarev, 'Russkii vostok kak zadacha kraevednogo izucheniia' VO 3 (1993) p.98. 
76 Ibid, pp.l01-2. 
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emerging struggle between Europe and the 'yellow peril' demanded particular attention. These were 
themes and issues that had already evolved latently in the Tsarist period; Snesarev was but one lightning 
rod of such concerns to the new Soviet order. Andrei Evgen' evich had joined the Red Army in 1918 and 
becamc hcad of thc General Staff Academy in 1919-21 before retiring and becoming rector and professor at 
the Institute of Oriental Studies from 1921 to 1930. 
Delivering a series of lectures at the Staff Academy on the discipline of 'Military Geography' (a 
direct outgrowth of Miliutin's old course on 'Military Statistics'), Snesarev supplemented his lecture series 
with a military-statistical portrait of the onc country hc had fclt in thc Tsarist period to be most 
understudied, namely Afghanistan.77 This study warned that the invasion of Afghanistan would present a 
nightmare scenario for a Soviet army, fighting in difficult territory against a fanatical population. 
Snesarev's activities at the Staff Academy meanwhile overlapped with the opening of a faculty of Oriental 
languages for Russian staff offieers and students of the Foreign Ministry. One of the first entrants to this 
course, who enrolled to study the Persian, Hindustani and Arabic languages in addition to his normal 
military studies, still recalled the inspiring inaugural address given by Snesarev at the opening of this 
institute decades later: 
'I am myself' hc said 'going to conduct thc course in the military 
geography of Sinkiang, Tibet, Pamir, northwest India, Baluchistan, 
Afghanistan and Persia, whose roads I have travelled many times on foot. 
1 have lived with the native peoples in these countries and spoken their 
languages. I shall tell you all you need to know about these countries as 
Soviet Geneml Staff officers and diplomats. ,78 
This witness, who after service in Turkestan against the basmachi later transferred to the diplomatic corps, 
noted the enormous impact that the oriental institute under Snesarev's guidance played in building up the 
Soviet Union's cadres in Asia. Within five years, he estimated, more than three-quarters of the Soviet 
diplomatic and consular corps in the Near and Middle East were his fellow-graduates, including the 
77 Prof. A Snesarev, Vvedenie v voennuiu geografiiu (Moscow: Tipolitografiia Voennoi Akademii R K. K. 
A 1924) & General A E. Snesarev, Afganistan (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdate}'stvo 1921). For the 
British, the threat of a Russian invasion of Afghanistan remained real throughout the inter-war period. See: 
Milan Hanner, 'The Soviet Threat to Afghanistan and India, 1938-1940.' MAS 15 (2, 1981) pp.287-309. 
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Russian ambassadors to Persia and Japan and the Russian minister in Arabia, not to mention 'a score of 
young generals who later served as advisers to Chiang Kai-Shek or as military attaches in the countries of 
Asia. ,79 Measured by any scale therefore, Snesarcv's role in preparing the Soviet Union to tackle the 
problems of military vostokovedenie that he had already witnessed and experienced under the Tsars was 
immense. 
Snesarev spent mueh of the 1920s engaged on his life's work, a multi-volume study ofIndia. This 
enterprise, of which only the first part was ever printed in Snesarev's lifetime, he stated in a foreword he 
intended for use by students both of the Orientalist Institute and of the Eastern Faculty of the General 
Staff's Military Academy, indicating that even here he saw an overlap between general academic concerns 
and those of military science.80 Arrested in 1930 like so many other voenspetsy on unsubstantiated charges, 
he was released in 1934 without rehabilitation and with his health ruined, to die in 1937.81 Whilst the 
tradition of military vostokovedenie developed in the Tsarist period may have undergone some surface 
adjustment in the Soviet era therefore, its traditions and challenges alongside its actual practitioners 
remained an important element in the development of Soviet military thought up until at least 1937. The 
very framework of analysis meanwhile- the application of geographical and ethnographic knowledge to 
state~ntred political goals, the rigid institutionalization of science- remained the same. Moreover, 
dilemmas of regionalization versus centralization became, if anything, even more painful, puticularly 
during the time of the purges that engulfed Snesarev. For the Soviet army therefore, here as in so much 
else, the legacy of the Tsarist Imperial General staff in the field of oriental studies was destined to remain 
not a matter of nostalgia but of necessity. 
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Putnam's sons 1945) p.85. 
79 Ibid pp.86-7. 
80 Prof. A E. Snesarev, Indiia (Strana i narod) Vypusk 1. Fizicheskaia Indiia (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo 
Instituta Vostokovedeniia 1926). The second half of this enormous work was recently published 
posthumously: A E Snesarev, Etnograficheskaia Indiia (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "NAUKA" Glavnaia 
Redaktsiia Vostochnoi Litemtury 1981). 
81 On the voenspetsy in general, those officers who transferred directly from the Tsarist to the Soviet armed 
forces, the definitive work is: A G. Kavtaradze, Voennye spetsiaJisty na sluzhbe Respubliki Sovetov /917-
/920gg. (Moscow: Izdaterstvo "NAUKA" 1988) 
BmLIOGRAPHY. 
ARCHIVE RESOURCES: Rossiiskii Gosudantvennyi Voenno-istoricbeskii 
arkbiv, Moscow 
The following fondy were used at the RGVIA in Moscow: 
F. 20 1 Maksheev, A 1. 
F.400 Asiatic Department, Genernl Staff 1866-1918 
F.401 Military-Scientific Committee 
F.402 Committee for Prepuing Data to Mobilize Forces, 1875-1879 
Committee to Mobilize Forces, 1880-1903 
F. 431 Great Britain, 1706-1912 (Collection Military-Scientific Archive) 
F.444 Arabia and Syria 
F.44S Afghanistan 
F .446 Persia 
F.447 China 
F.450 Turkey 
F.451 Japan 
F.483 Central Asia 
F.544 Nikolaevskaia Academy, General Staff 
F.846 Military-Scientific Committee (VUA) 
F.1396 Turkestan Military District Staff 1866-1918 
F.1425 Trans-Caspian Military District Staff 
F.1450 Siberian Military District Staff 
F.I468 Irkutsk Military District Staff 
F.1558 Priamur Military District Staff 
F.1837 Odessa Military District Staff 
F.2000 Main Over-Quartennaster General, GUGSh, 1906-1917. 
237 
Published sources 
Obzor deiatel 'nosti Voennogo Ministerstva v Tsarstvovanie lmperatora Aleksandra III 1881-1894. (St. 
Petersburg: Gosudarstvennaia Tipografiia 1903) 
Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossisskoi Imperii. Second Series. (St. Petersburg. 1830-84). 
Polozhenie ob izuchenii ofitserami vostochnykh iazykov s prilozheniem rukovodaiashchikh ukazanii i 
programm. (St. Petersburg: Izdan. V. Berezovskii 1912) 
Skalon, D. A (ed.) Stoletie voennogo ministerstva, 1802-1902. 13 volumes in 56 parts. (St. Petersburg, 
1902-1914). 
Voenno-istoricheskaia kommissia glavnogo shtabaRusslw-Iaponskaia Voina 1904-1905gg .. T. 1-9 (St. 
Petersburg: Tipografiia AS. Suvorina 1910) 
Vooruzhennyia Sily Kitaia (po dannym k 1 Ianvariia 1909 goda) Izdanie Glavnogo Upravleniia 
General 'nogo Shtaba (po chasti 3-go Ober-Kvartirmeistera). (St. Petersburg: Voennaia 
Tipografiia (v izdanii Glavnogo Shtaba) 1909) 
2. Encyclopedias, merence works. 
Barraclough. G. (ed.) The Times Atlas of World History. (London: Times Books Ltd 1979) 
Brockhaus and Efron, Entsiklopedicheskii slovar '. 86 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1890-1907) 
Glinka, G. V. (ed.)Aziatskaia Rossiia. T.I-3 (St. Petersburg: Izdanie Pereselencheskogo upmvleniia 
glavnogo upravleniia Zemleustroistva i zemledeleniia 1914) 
238 
Jones, David R (ed.) The Military-Naval Encyclopedia of Russia and the Soviet Union. Seven, incomplete 
vols. (Gulf Breeze, Florida: Academic International Press, 1978-97) 
Sinor, D. (ed.) The Cambridge History of Early Inner Asia. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1990) 
Spisok general 'nogo shtaba (St.Petersburg: Voennaia Tipografiia 1897-1914) 
Velichko, K I. and others (eds.) Voennaia Entsiklopediia. T.X, XIII, XVIII (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia T-
va. 1.0. Sytina 1912, 1913, 1915) 
Zaionchkovskii, P. A (ed.) Istoriia dorevolutsionnoi Rossii v dnevnikakh i vospominnakh. Five volumes in 
12 parts. (Moscow, 1976-1989) 
___ ., (ed.) Spravochnik po istorii dorevolutsionnoi Rossii 2nd Ed. (Moscow: Kniga, 1978). 
3. Memoi~ diaries, lette~ contemporary biographies 
Babkov, I. F.vospominaniia 0 moei sluzhbe v Zapadnoi Sibiri 1859-1875g. Razgranichenie s zapadnym 
Kitaem 1869g. (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia V. F. Kirshbauma 1912) 
Barmine, Alexander One Who Survived The Life Story of a Russian under the Soviets. (New York: G.P. 
Putnam's sons 1945) 
Barsukov, I. (ed.) GrafNikolai Nikolaevich' Murav 'ev-Amurskii. Po ego pis 'mam', ofttsial 'nym 
dokumentam " razskazam sovremennikov i pechatnym istochnikam ' (Materialy dlia biografti). 
(Moscow: Sinodaln'naia Tipografiia 1891) 
Blaramberg, I. F. Vospominaniia. (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "NAUKA" Glavnaia Redaktsiia Vostochnoi 
Literatury 1978) 
239 
Danilov, General Ill. N. Rossiia v mirovoi voine, 19J4-1915gg. (Berlin: Knigoizdatel'stvo "Slovo" 1924) 
Dubrovin, N. F. Nikolai Mikhailavich Przheval'skU. (StPetersburg: Voennaia Tipografiia (v zdaniia 
Glavnogo Shtaba) 1890) 
Grulev', M. V. Zapiski generala-evreia. (Paris: no pub. 1930) 
Kalmykow [Kalmykov], A D. Memoirs of a Russian Diplomat. Outposts of the Empire, /893-1917. (New 
Haven & London: Yale University Press 1971) 
Miliutin, D. A Vospominaniia General-Fel'dmarshala Grafa Dmitriia Alekseevicha Miliutina 1860-1862. 
Edited by L. G. Zakbarov (Moscow: Rossiskii fond kultury studiia "TRITE" Nikity Mikhailova 
"Rossiiskii Archiv" 1999) 
Miliutin, D. A Dnevnik DA.Miliutina. Edited by P.A Zaionchkovskii 4 vols. (Moscow: Gosudarstvennaia 
ordena Lenina biblioteka SSSR 1947-50) 
Miliutin, D. A. Vospominaniia. Tomsk, 1919. Memoir Series No. 28 (Newtonville, Mass.: Oriental 
Research Partners 1979) 
Polivanov, A A Iz dnevnikov i vospominanii po dolzhnosti voennogo ministra i ego pomoshchika, 1907-
1916g. Edited by A.M. Zaionchkovskii. (Moscow: Voen.Tipografiia Shtaba R K. K. A 1924) 
Polovtsoff [Polovtsov], General P. A Glory and Downfall. Reminiscences of a Russian General Staff 
Officer. (London: G.BeIl and Sons Ltd. 1935) 
Rediger, Aleksandr Istoriia Moei Zhizni. Vospominaniia Voennogo Ministra. 2 vols. (Moscow: "Kanon-
Press-Ts" "Kuchkovo Pole" 1999) 
Rieber, A (ed) The Politics of Autocracy: Letters of Alexander II to Prince Bariatinskii 1857-64. (Paris: 
Mouton & Co. 1966) 
Rosen, Baron R. R. Forty Years of Diplomacy. 2 vols. (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1922) 
Samoilo, A A Dve Zhizni. (Moscow: Voennoe izdatel'stvo Ministerstva Oborony soiuza SSR 1958) 
Shaposhnikov, B. M.vospominaniia * Voenno-nauchnye trudy. (Moscow: Voenizdat 1974) 
Sukhomlinov, V. A Vospominaniia. (Berlin: Russkoe Universal'noe Izdatel'stvo 1924) 
Tcharykow [Charykov], N.V. Glimpses of High Politics. Through War and Peace 1855 *1929. (London: 
George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1931) 
Veniukov, M. I. Iz vospominaniia. 3 vols. (Amsterdam: no pub. 1895-1901) 
Zisserman, A. L. Fel'dmarshal' kniazAleksandr Ivanovich Bariatinskii, 1815-1879. T.I-3 (Moscow: 
Universitetskaia tipografiia 1890) 
4. Other published primary sources, contemporary military writings 
'A.-.' 'Znaem Ii my VostokT NV 12485 (1910): 2-3 
A. S-. 'Stranitsa iz istorii nashei politiki v srednei azii.' VE 3 (1908): 685-98. 
240 
Alikhanov-Avarsky, M. 'Zakaspiyskiye vospominania 1881-1885.' VE 9, 10 (1910): 73-125, 445-494 
Arsen'ev, V. K. Kratkii voenno-geograjicheskii i voenno-statisticheskii ocherk Ussuriiskogo /(raia. 1901-
1911. (Khabarovsk: Tipografiia 8htaba Priamurskogo voennogo okruga 1912) 
Artamonov, L. K. Persiia, kak nash protivnik v zakavkaz 'i. Soobshcheniia, proiznesennyia v sobranii 
ojitserov General'nogo Shtaba Kavkazskogo voennogo okruga. (Tillis: Pechatano po prikazaniiu 
Ego Siatel'stva Komanduiushchogo voiskami Kavkazskogo voennogo okruga 1889) 
_____ ~. Po Afganistanu. Geratskaia Provintsiia (Geratskii Teatr). Opytvoenno-statisticheskogo 
issledovaniia (Askhabad: Tipografiia Shtaba Zakaspiiskoi Oblasti 1895) 
Aver'ianov, Sht. Kapitan & 8hkinskii, Polkovnik Ia.F. Otchet 0 poezdke po severnomu Aderbeidzhanu 
Polkovnika Shkinskogo i KapitanaAver'ianova v kontse 1899 goda. (Tillis: Tipografiia 8htaba 
Kavkazskogo voennogo okruga 1900) 
Aver'ianov, Gen Sht. Kapitan Kurdy v voinakh Rossii s Persiei i Turtsiei v techenie XIX stoletiia. 
Sovremennoe politicheskoe polozhenie Turetskikh, Persidskikh i Russkikh Kurdov. (Tillis: 
Tipografiia Shtaba Kavkazskogo voennogo okruga 1900) 
'B. G.' 'K voprosu 0 rasprostranenii v Rossii znaniia vostochnykh iazykov.' VA 5 (1910): 138-41. 
Badmaev, P. A. Rossiia i Kitai. (St Petersburg: Tipografiia A 8. 8uvorina 1905) 
Batorskii, LlColonel 'Proekt ekspeditsii v Indiiu, predlozhennykh' Napoleonom Bonaparte imperatoram 
Pavlu i Aleksandru I v 1800 i v 1807-1808 godakh.' SGTSMA XXIII (1886): 1-104 
Butakov, G. Sh. Podpolkovnik 'Obzor voin' vedennykh evropeoskami protiv Kitaia s 1840-42, 1856-58, 
1859 i 1860gg.' SGT8MA VIII (1884): 1-253. 
Dal'nii Vostok GIavnoe Uprav1enie General'nogo Shtaba 9 vo1s. (81. Petersburg: A. Benke 1911) 
Dav1etshin, A. A AOtchet Shtabs-Kapitana Davletshina 0 komandirovke v Khidzhaz. (8t Petersburg: 
Voennaia Tipografiia (v zdanii Glavnogo Shtaba) 1899) 
Dubrovin, N. F. Istoriia voiny i vladychestva russkikh na Kavkaze. T.I-6. (S1. Petersburg: Tipografiia 
Departament Ude10vl V. A Berezovskogol I. N. Skhorokhodova 1871-86) 
Dukhovskoi, 8. M 'Vsepoddanneishii doklad Turkestanskogo general-gubematora General ot infanterii 
Dukhovskogo: Islam v Turkestane.' (Tashkent: no pub. 1899). 
'E. U.' , 'Stepnaia voina v Turkestanskom krae' VS 7 (1880): 69-95. 
Evdokimov, L. V. 'Panislamizm' i pantiurkizm. Egida Turtsii.' VS 12 (1911): 85-112 
Fedorov, GSh Podpolkovnik 'Kratkii voenno-statisticheskii obzor' Diiskago kraia.' Dobavlenie k sbornik 
materialov poAzii No.7 (1902): 79- 161. 
_____ --'-. Voenno-statisticheskoe opisanie TurkestansI«Jgo voennago okruga. Chzhungarsko-
Semirechenskii prigranichnyi raion. '(Tashkent: Tipografiia Shtaba Turkestanskago Voennago 
Okruga 1910) 
Filippov, Major-Gen. Strategicheskoe opisanie Bosfora. (St. Petersburg: Voennaia Tipogmfiia v zdanii 
Glavnogo Shtaba 1886) 
Galkin, A. 'Iskhak'-khan' i Afganskaia smuta v 1888 godu.' VS 4 (1889): 362-390. 
_____ ---!.. 'Ocherk sostoianiia vooruzhennykh sil' Kitaia v sopredel 'nykh s Rossieiu oblastakh' 
Chzhungarii i Vostochnogo Turkestana 1887g.' SGTSMA XXXV (1888): 1-157. 
241 
Geins, A. K 'Ovosstanii musul'manskogo naseleniia iii Duganei v Zapadnom Kitae.' VS 8 (1866): 185-
208. 
Glinoetskii, N. P. Istoriia Russkogo General'nogo Shtaba. T.I-2 (St. Petersburg: Voennaia Tipografiia 
1883,1894) 
_____ ~. Istoricheskii Ocherk Nikolaevskoi Akademii General'nogo Shtaba. (S1. Petersburg: 
Tipografiia shtaba voisk' gvardii i Peterburgskogo voennogo okruga 1882) 
_____ ~. 'Sluzhba general'nago shtaba pri kavkazskikh voiskakh s 1832 po 1853.' VS 7-8-9 
(1888): 38-66, 249-266, 30-60. 
Greene, F. V. The Russian Army and its campaigns in Turkey in 1877-1878. Second Edition (London: 
w. H. Allen & Co. 1880) 
Grodekov, Polkovnik 'Poezdka Gen.-Sht. Polkovnika Grodekova iz Samarkanda cherez Gemt' v' 
Afganistan' (v 1878 godu).' SGTSMA V (1883): 58-107. 
_____ ~, General-Maior 'Zapiska G.-Sh. General' -Maiura Grodekova 0 putiakh' iz 
Zakaspiiskago Kraia na Gerat' (30 Maia 1882 goda).' SGTSMA V (1883): 108-119. 
_____ ~. Voina v Turkmenii. T.I-4 (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia V. S. Balasheva 1883-4). 
Istoricheskii Ocherk deiatel'nosti Korpusa Voennykh Topografov. 1822-1872. (St. Petersburg: Izd 
Glavnogo Shtaba 1872) 
Ivanenko, V. N. Grazhdanskoe uprav/enie Zakavkaz 'em ot prisoedineniia Gruzii do namestnichestvo 
Velikogo Kniazia Mikhaila Nikolaevskaia. Istoricheskii ocherk (Tiflis: Tipogmfiia Kantselerii 
Glavnonachal'stvuiushchogo grazhdanskoiu chast'iu na Kavkaze, Loris-Melikovskaia ulitsia, dom 
kazennyi. 190 1) 
Ivanin, M. I. 0 voennom iskustve i zavoevaniiakh' Mongol-Tatar i Sredne-Anatskikh narodov pri Chingis-
khane i Tamerlone. (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia Tovarishchestva "obshchestvennaia pol'za" 1875) 
_____ ~. Opisanie nmniago pokhodv Khivu 1839-/840. (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia 
Tovarishchestva "obshchestvennaia pol'za" 1874) 
Kaufmanskii sbornik izdannyi v pamiat' 25 let', istekshikh so dnia smerti pokoritelia i ustroitelia 
Turkestanskago /erma General-ad'iutanta KP. fon-Kaufmana I-go. (Moscow: Tipo-litografiia T-
va I.N.Kushnerev 1910) 
Khakovskii, Poruchik 'Opyt' izucheniia voin' Bogdan Kbmel'nitskogo. Sostoianie voennogo iskusstva v 
Krymskikh Tatar' i Zaporozhtsev. Pervyi pokhod' Bogdan Kbmd'nitskogo do pribytiia ego pod 
Beluiu tserlrov.' In: Sbornik sochinenii ojitserov Nikolaevskoi akademii General'nogo Shtaba Kn. 
2 (S1. Petersburg: Vtipografiia V.Golovina 1863) pp. 57-163. 
242 
Khol'msen, Major-General & Gudim'-Levkovich', Colonel. Turtsiia (Chast' 11) Priboslorskii rmon '. 
Sekretnoe dopolnenie k 'Materialam k voenno-geograficheskomu opisan;;u. ' (St.Petersburg: Tipo-
litografiia 'Svet' 1912) 
Kishmishev, Lt. Gen.Q. Pokhody Nadir Shakha v Gerat, Kandagar, Indiyu i sobytie v Persii posle ego 
smerti. (Tillis: Voenno-Istoricheskaia chast' po shtabu Kavkazskogo Voennogo Okruga 1889) 
Kornilov, Lt.-Col. Kashgariia iii vostochnyi Turkestan '. Opytvoenno-statisticheskago opisaniia. 
(Tashkent: Tipografiia Shtaba Turkestanskogo Voennogo Okruga 1903) 
Kostenko, L. F. Sredniaia Aziia i vodvorenie v nei russkoi grazhdanstvennosti. (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia 
V. Bezobrazova i komp. 1871) 
_____ ~. Turkestanskii krai. Opyt voenno-statisticheskago obozreniia Turkestanskago voennago 
okruga. T.I-3 (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia i khromolitografiia A. Transhchelia 1880) 
_____ -'. Puteshestvie v Severnuiu Afriku. (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia i khromolitografiia A. 
Transhchelia 1876) 
_____ -'. 'Chzhungariia. Voenno-statisticheskii ocherk General'nogo Shtaba Polkovnika L. F. 
Kostenko.' SGTSMA XXVIII (1887): 1-318. 
'Kratkii Ocherk sovremennago polozheniia v zapadnom' Kitae (Kashgarii i Chzhungarii) k 20 Dekabria 
1900.' Dobavlenie k sborn;k materialov poAzi; NO.7 (1902): 53-
Kravtsov, I. S. 'Kavkaz i ego voenachal'niki: N. N. Murav'ev, kn. A. I. Bariatinskii i N. I. Evdomikov.' RS 
50 (1886): 563-592 
Kuropatkin. A. N. & Lindsay, Capt. A. B. (trans.) The Russian Army and the Japanese War. (London: John 
Murray 1909) 
Kuropatkin. A. N. Alzheriia. (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia Y.A.Poletiki 1877) 
_____ ....:.. Zavoevanie Turkmenii. Pokhodv Akhal-Teke v 1880-1881gg. s ocherkom' voennykh 
deistvii v Sredne; Azii s 1839 po 1876. (St. Petersburg: no pub. 1899) 
_____ --'. Russo-Kitaiskii Vopros (St. Petersburg: Tip. T-va.A. S. Suvorin-"Novoe Vremia" 1913) 
_____ -'-. Turcomania and the Turcomans. (R. Michell. trans. from 'the Russian military journal, 
9&10 of 1879') (Great Britain: War Office1880) 
_____ -'. 'Zapiska ob obozakh Gen.-Sh. General' -maiura Kuropatkina dlia voisk Turkestanskogo 
voennogo okruga.' SGTSMA V (1883): 120-15l. 
_____ -'-. & Gowan, R E. (trans.) Kashgaria [Eastern or Chinese Turldstanj. Historical and 
Geographical Sketch olthe Country; its military strength, industries and trade. (Calcutta: 
Thacker, Spink & Co. 1882) 
_____ --'. Zadachi Russkoi Armii. 3 Vols. (S1. Petersburg: Sklad V. A Berezovskogo, 
Kommissionera voenno-uchebuykh zavedenii 1910) 
Kushelev, Iu. Mongo!iia i Mongol 'sid; vopros. (St. Petersburg: Russlada Skoropechatnaia 1912) 
_____ -'-. 'Otchet ° poezdke s voenno-nauchnoiu tsel'iu v Mongoliiu.' SGTSMA LXXXVI 
(1913): 284-374. 
243 
Levitov, I. S. Zheltorossiia kak bufornaia koloniia (St. Petersburg: Tipographia inzh. G. A Vernshteina 
1905) 
Levitskii, M. N. (ed.) V trushchobakh Man 'chzhurii i nashikh vostochnykh okrain. ' Sbornik ocherkov, 
raskazov i vospominanii Voennykh Topografov. (Odessa: Tipo-litografiia Shtaba Okruga 1910) 
Logofet, D. F. 'Zavoevanie Srednei Azii.' in: Istoriia Russkoi armii i flota vol. 12 (Moscow: Tipografiia 
Russkogo Tovarishchestvo "Obozrenie" 1913) pp. 61-114. 
Maksheev, A I. Puteshestviia po Kirgizskim Stepiam i Turkestanskomu Kraiu. (St. Petersburg: Voennaia 
Tipografiia (v zdanii Glavnogo Shtaba) 1896) 
_____ ~. Stepnye Pokhody. (/z No. 19-9o i 20-go "Russkogo Invalida" 1856). (St. Petersburg: 
Voennaia Tipografiia 1856). 
_____ ~. Istoricheskii Obzor Turkestana i nastupatel 'nogo dvizheniia v nei russkikh. (St. 
Petersburg: Voennaia Tipografiia (v zdanii Glavnogo shtaba) 1890) 
_____ ~. 'Prebyvanie v Vemom i vstrecha Kaufmana (Iz chetvertogo puteshestviia v 1867 A. I. 
Maksheev).' Soobshch. N. A Maksheeva RS T.153 Kn.3 (1913): 644-49. 
Mannergeim, Polkovnik Baron 'Predvaritel'nyi otchet 0 poedzke, predpriniatoi po Vysochaishemu 
poveleniu cherez Kitaiskii Turkestan i severnyia provintsii Kitaia v gorod Pekin', v 1906-7, i 8 
gg.' SGTSMA LXXXI (1909). 
Matveev, Polkovnik 'Poezdka genera1'nogo shtaba polkovnika Matveeva po Bukharskim' i Avganskim' 
vladeniiam' v fevrale 1877g.' SGTSMA V (1883): 1-57. 
'N. Sh.' 'General Vel'iaminov i ego znachenie dlia istorii kavkazskoi voiny' KS 7 (1883): 1-155. 
Nazarov, G. Sht. Polkovnik 'Materialy dlia voenno-statisticheskogo obzor Priamurskogo voennogo okruga 
i Man' chzhurii.' SGTSMA XXXI (1888): 1-345. 
Nedzvetskii, V. 'Voennyia Reformy v Kitai.' VS 12 (1886): 191-208. 
Novitskii, Polkovnik V. F. 'Voenno-geograficheskii obzor' raiona Vostochnoi Mongolii, obsledovannogo v 
1906g. ekspeditsiei Gen. Sht Polk. V. F. Novitskogo' SGTSMA LXXXII (1909): 1-133. 
_____ ~. Voenno-Geograficheskii OcherkAfganskoe Teatravoennykh deisMi s podrobnym' 
obzorom ' operatsionnykh 'putei, vedushchikh ' cherez Afganistan. '(St. Petersburg: Voennaia 
Tipografiia (v zdanii Glavnogo Shtaba) 19lO) 
Pantusov, N. N. Svedeniia 0 kul'dzhinskom raione za 1871-1877 gody. (Kazan: V universitetskoe tipografii 
1881) 
Pevtsov, M. 'Ofitserskie kursy vostochnykh' iazykov' pri aziatskom departamente ministerstva 
inostrannykh' del' i ikh vospitanniki. (Kratkii ocherk').' VS 2 (1902): 185-199 
Potto, V. '0 8tepnykh' pokhodakh' (Publichnyia lektsii, chitannyia pri Orenburgskom' iunkerskom' 
uchilishche, v. 1872).' VS 4-5-6-7 (1873): 229-266, 5-36, 209-236, 33-62. 
Pozdneev, D. Kriticheskaia zametka 0 knige polkovnik D. v.Putiata 'Kitai '. (8t. Petersburg: Tipografiia V. 
S. Valasbeva i Ko. 1895) 
244 
_____ -'-. (cd.), Opisanie Man 'chzhurii (s karloi) soslavleno v kanlseliarii ministra finansov. T.l-
2 (St. Petersburg: Tipografria Iu. N. Erlikh 1897) 
Przbeval'skii, N. M 'Kak puteshestvovat' po Tsentral'noi Azii.' SGfSMA XXXII (1888): 145-163 
_____ --'. '0 vozmozhnoi voine s Kitaem' SGTSMA I (1883): 293-306. 
Putiata, GenSht. Polkovnik 'Kitai: Geografieheskie ocherlc. Naselenie. Gosudarstvennyi budzhet v 
vneshnaia torgovlia. Vooruzhennyia sily. Russko-Kitaiskaia granitsa.' SGTSMA LIX (1895): 1-
265. 
_____ -'-. 'Otehet 0 poezdke po Man' ehzhurii eherez Inkou, Mukden, Girin, Dalin, Ashikho, 
Paiensu, San'-Sin', Ningutu, Khunchun' vo Vladivostok' 1888g.' SGTSMAXXXVITI (1889): 1-
120. 
_____ -'-. 'Vooruzhennyia sily Kitaia i printsipy voennogo iskusstva v tolkovanii drevnikh 
kitaiskikh polkovod:tsev. Beregovaia oborona Kantona 1886 goda. Zametki ° porte Artur. 
Svedeniia 0 Kitaiskikh voiskakh v Khunchune 1888.' SGTSMA XXXIX (1889): 1-171. 
Ragoza, Podpolkovnik (GS) Kratkii ocherk zania!iia Amurskogo Kraia i razvitiia boevykh' sil' 
Priamurskogo voennogo okruga. (Khabarovsk: Tipografiia Shtaba Priamurskogo Voennogo 
Okruga 1891) 
'Reorganizatsii vos'mi-znamennykh' voisk' (Pa-Tsi).' SGTSMA LXXXV (1912): 89-152. 
Rittikh, P. A Avganskii Vopros' (voenno-geograficheskii i politicheskii etiudy). (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia 
Shtaba Voisk Gvardii i Peterburgskago Voennago Okruga 1905) 
Romanovskii, D. I. Kavkaz' i Kavkazskaia voina. Publichnyia lektsii chitannyia v zale passazha v 1860 
god (St. Petersburg: Tipografii Tovarishehestvo "Obshehestvennaia pol'za" 1860) 
_____ -'-. 'General Fel'dmarsbal kniaz Aleksandr Ivanovich Bariatinskii i Kavkazskaia voina. 
1815-1879' RS :xxx (1881): 249-318. 
_____ -'-. Zametki po Sredne-Aziatskomu voprosu. (St. Petersburg: Tipografii Tovarishchestvo 
"Obshchestvennaia pol'za" 1868) 
____ ---0. 'Kn. M. S. Vorontsovi Kn. A I. Bariatinskii.' RS4 (1881): 908-11 
Romanovskii, N. 'Iaponskaia Amilia v 1911godu.' v.s' 3-5 (1911): 119-130, 104-108. 
Sbomik materialov po voprosu ob izuchenii tuzemnykh iazykov sluzhavshchimi po voenno-narodnomu 
upravleniiu Turkestanskogo Kraia. (I'ashkent: Tipografiia Shtaba Turkestanskogo Voennogo 
Okruga 1906) 
Serebrennikov, A G. (ed.) Sbornik materialov dlia istorii zavoevaniia Turkestanskogo krai. (I'ashkent: 
Tipografiia Shtaba Turkestanskogo Voennogo Okruga 1908-1915) T.I-I0. 
Shchetinina, G.-M '0 sovremennom sostoianii vooruzhennykh- sil' Kitaia v Tarbagataiskoi i IDiskoi 
oblastiakh.' SGTSMA XXIV (1886): 1-129. 
Shemanskii, A D. 'Zavoevanie Srednei Azii. ' in: /storiia Russkoi armii i flota vol. 12 (Moscow: 
Tipografiia Russkogo Tovarishchestvo "Obozrenie" 1913) pp. 115-195. 
245 
_____ ...!.. Boi na Kushke i ego 25-Jetnii iubiJei. (St. Petersburg: Izdan. Berezovskii Komissioner 
voenno-uchebnykh' zavedenii 1910) 
Shneur, G. Sh. Polkovnik 'Ukrepleniia v ust'iakh reki Peikho (rekognostirovka proizvedennaia G. Sh. 
Polkovnik Shneuram i Leitenantom Brandtom v 1884g).' SGTSMAXIV (1885): 142-152. 
Shulyngin, Praporoshchik: 'Zapiska 0 Kitae Praporoshchika 2 Vostochnogo Sibirskogo Strelkovogo 
bataliona Shulyngina.' SGTSMA VII (1884): 114-123. 
Sistematicheskii KataJog' bibJioteki GJavnogo Shtaba. (StPetersburg: Tipografiia Golike, Nevskii No. 106, 
1879) 
Snesarev, A. E. Severo-Indiiskii Teatr (Voenno-Geograficheskoe Opisanie). (Tashkent: Tipografiia Shtaba 
Turkestanskogo Voennogo Okruga 1903) 
_____ ~. Indiia leak gJavnyi faktor v sredne-aziatskom vopros '. (StPetersburg: Tipografiia A S. 
Suvorin 1906) 
_____ ....:..Afganistan. (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo 1921). 
_____ ....:.. Vvedenie v voennuiu geografiiu. (Moscow: Tipolitografiia Voennoi Akademii R K. K. 
A. 1924) 
_____ ....:.. Indiia (Strana i narod). Vypusk l. Fizicheskaia Indiia (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Instituta 
Vostokovedeniia 1926). 
Sobolev, L. N. Stranitsa iz istorii vostochnogo voprosa. AngJo-Afganskaia raspria (ocherk voiny 1879-
1880). (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia 'Russkaia Skoropechatnia' 1885) 
____ ---'-. 'Pokhody v Indiiu' VS 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 1, 5, 7, 8, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 (1886-1888): 30-56, 205-
228,30-53, 185-206,41-58, 195-212,50-60,30-50,27-39, 179-91,29-48,223-42,24-44,234-56, 
23-38. 
_____ ....:.. Vozmozhen-li pokhod Russkikh v Indiiu? (Moscow: Tipografiia Okruzhnago Shtaba 
1901) 
_____ ....:.. Rossiia i Angliia na Dal'nem Vostoke. Istoricheskaia spravlca ko dniu otkrytiia 
Kaspiisko-Samarkandskoi zhelemoi dorogi J5-go Maia 1888 goda. (St Petersburg: Tipografiia V. 
S. Balasheva 1888). 
_____ ....:.. 'K noveishei istorii Bolgarii.' RS 51, 52 (1886): 703-752, 475-484. 
'Svedeniia 0 peremenakh v vooruzhenykh si1 Kitai za 1882-1883g. (Iz Jahresberichte uber die 
Veranderungen und Forschritte im Militarwesen, LobeU1883)' SGfSMA XII (1884): 286-89. 
Syrtlanov, R A 'Materialy po Zapadnomy Kitaiu, sobrannye R. A Syrtlanovym' vo vremia ego poedzdki 
iz Urumchi na Altai v 1909 godu.' SGTSMA LXXXVI (1913): 53-113. 
Terent'ev, M A Istoriia zavoevanie Srednei Azii s kortami i planami. T.I-4. (St Petersburg: Tipografiia 
V.V. Komarova 1906) 
Trotskii, Gen.-A£lj. V. N. Opsanie Khivinskogo pokhoda 1873 goda po materialam osoboi komissii 
uchrezhdennoi totchas posle pokhoda, pod predsedatel 'sOOm byvshogo nachaJ 'nilca polevogo 
shtaba. (StPetersburg: Tipografiia vysochaishe utvenhdennogo Tovarishchestva 
"Obshchestvennaia Pol'za" Bol'shaia Pod'iacheskaia 1898) 
V. G-n., 'Ovvedenii nareznago oruzhiia v Kavkazskoi Armii.' VS6 (1859): 171-176 
Vel'iaminov, A A 'Sposob uskorit' pokorenie gortsev (Memoriia general-leitenant Vel'iaminov, 
predstavlennaiav 1828-mgody).' KS 7 (1883): 67-77. 
246 
Veniukov, M. 1. '0 sovremennom sostoianii voennykh' sil' i sredstv' laponii i Kitaia po dannym' 1869-
1870 godov.' VS 8,9 (1871): 223-257, 105-138. 
____ ----'. 'Zametki 0 stepnykh' pokhodakh v Srednei Azii.' VS 16 (1860): 269-298. 
_____ ~. 'Obshchii obzor' postepennogo rasshireniia russkikh' predelov' v Azii i sposobov' 
oborony ikh.' VS 2 (1872): 195-228. 
_____ ~. 'Materialy dlia voennogo obozreniia ruskkikh granits v Azii.' VS 4, 6, 7, 9, 10 (1872): 
215-42,253-60, 5-32, 5-24, 171-206 
_____ ....:.. 's dorogi po Turtsii (iz pisem puteshestvennika) (s katoiu Bosfora).' VS 8 (1874): 365-
393. 
_____ ~. Opyt Voennogo Obozreniia Russkikh' Granits' v Azii. Vypusk.. I. (St. Petersburg: 
Tipografiia V.Bezobrazov i Komp.1873) 
5. Unpublished manuscripts and theses 
Bilof, E. 'The Imperial Russian General Staff and China in the Far East, 1880-1888. A Study of the 
Operations of the General Staff.' Syracuse University, New York, Doctoral Dissertation 1974 
Brooks, E. Willis 'D. A Miliutin: Life and Activity to 1856.' Stanford University, Doctoral Dissertation 
1970 
Crean, E. M 'The Governor-Generalship of Turkestan under K. P. von Kaufman, 1867-1882.' Yale 
Doctoral Dissertation 1970 
Koot, 1. T. 'The Asiatic Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry and the Foundation of Policy toward 
the Non-Western World, 1881-1895.' Harvard University Doctoral Dissertation. 1980 
Persson. Gudron 'The Russian Army and Foreign Wars 1859-1871.' London School of Economics and 
Political Science Doctoral Dissertation. 1999 
Ritchie, G. B. 'The Asiatic Department During the Reign of Alexander II, 1855-1881.' Columbia 
University, New York Doctoral Dissertation, 1975 
Ryzhenkov, M. R. 'Rol' voennogo vedomstva Rossii v razvitii otechestvennogo vostokovedeniia v XIX-
nachale xx. vv. (Opyt istochnikovedcheskogo issledovaniia dokumentov Tsentral'nogo 
gosudarstvennogo voenno-istoricheskogo arkbiva SSSR).' Dissertatsiia na soiskanie uchenoi 
stepeni kandidata istoricheskikh nauk. Moscow: Institut Vostokovedeniia Akademiia Nauk SSSR, 
1990 
Semenova, N. I. 'Zavoevanie Afgantsami levoberezh'ia Amu-Dar'j v 30-80-ykh g.g. XIX veka.' 
Dissertatsiia na soiskanie uchenoi stepeni kandidata istoricheskii nauk. Moscow: Institut 
Vostokovedeniia Akademii Nauka SSSR 1951 
247 
Van der Oye, David Schimmelpenninck '''Ex Oriente Lux." Ideologies of Empire and Russia's Far East, 
1895-1904.' Yale Doctoral Dissertation 1997 
6. Secondary literature 
Abdullaev, M. A Obshchestvenno-politicheskaia mysl' v Dagestan v nachale XXv. (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo 
"NAUKA" Glavnaia Redaktsiia Vostochnoi Literatury 1987) 
Adamec, Ludwig W. Afghanistan, 1900-1923: A Diplomatic History (Berkeley: University of California 
Press 1%7) 
Agadzhanov, S. G. & Trepavlov, V.V. (eds.) Natsional'nye okrainy Rossiiskoi Imperii. Stanovlenie i 
razvitie sistemy upravleniia (Moscow: "Slavianskii dialog" 1997) 
Airapetov, O.R Zabytaia kar'era "Russkogo Mol 'tke " Nikolai Nikolaevich Obruchev (1830-1904) 
(St.Petersburg: Izdatel'stvo "Aleteiia" 1998) 
Akashi, Motojiro Rakka ryusui. Colonel Akashi 's Report on His Secret Cooporation with the Russian 
Revolutionary Parties during the Russo-Japanese War. Selected chapters translated by 1naba 
Chiharu and edited by Olavi K..FaJt andAntti Kujala (Helsinki: SHS 1988) 
Aldanov, M. 'Po N. Durnovo, Prophet of War and Revolution.'RR 2 (1942): 31-45 
Alekseev, M. Voennaia Razvedka Rossii ot Riurika do Nikolaia lIT.I-2 (Moscow: Izdatel'skii dom 
"Russkaia razvedka" 1998) 
_____ ~. Leksika Russkoi Razvedki (lstoricheskii Obzor) (Moscow: "Mezhdunarodnye 
otnosheniia" 1996) 
Alksnis, Ia. Ia 'Nachal'nyi period voiny (Stat'ia Pervaia)' VIR 9 (1929): 3-22 
Allen, W. E. D. & Murata£( P. Caucasian Battlefields. A History of the Wars on the Turco-Caucasian 
Border, 1828-1921 (USA: Cambridge University PresslThe Battery Press 1953/1999) 
Allworth, E. (ed.) Central Asia 130 Years of Russian Dominance A Historical Overview (Third Edition 
USA: Duke University Press 1994) 
Anderson, M S. The Eastem Question 1774-1923 (London: Macmillan 1966) 
Andrew, C. & Noakes, J. (eds.) Intelligence and Intemational Relations 1900-1945 (Exeter: University of 
Exeter 1987) 
Anisimov, Evgenii V. & Alexander, John T. (trans.) The Reforms of Peter the Great. Progress Through 
Coercion in Russia (Armonk, NY: M.E.Sharpe 1993) 
Arutiunian, AS. Kavkazskii Front, 1914-19J7gg. (Erevan: " Aiastan" 1971) 
Austin, Greg & Muraviev, Alexey D. The Armed Forces of Russia in Asia (London & New York: I. B. 
Tauris Publishers 2(00) 
248 
Babakhodzhaev, M.A'Vooruzhennye si1y Mganistana i voennye preobrazovaniia Emira Abdurrakhmana' 
in: Pikulin, M G. (ed.) Ocherki po novoi istorii Afganistana (fashkent: Izdatel'stvo "FAN" 
Uzbeksoi SSR 1966) pp.44-116. 
Baddeley, John F. The Russian Conquest of the Caucasus (With a new foreword by Moshe Gammer) 
(London: Curzon Press 1999) 
Balabushevich, V. V. & Kotovsky, Grigory C. (eds.) Andrei Evgen 'evich Snesarev. Zhizn ' i nauchnaia 
deiatel 'nost (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "NAUKA" Glavnaia Redaktsiia Vostochnoi Litemtury 1977) 
Barrett, Thomas M. 'Lines of Uncertainty: The Frontiers of the North Caucasus.' SR 54 (3,1995): 578-60 
_____ . 'The Remaking of the Lion of Dagestan: Shamil in Captivity.' RR 53 (1994): 353-366. 
______ . At the Edge of Empire. The Terek Cossacks and the North Caucasus Frontier, 1700-
1860 (USA: Westview Press 1999) 
BartoI'd, V.V. Sochineniia II, chast' 1 & IX (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "NAUKA" G1avnaia Redaktsiia 
Vostochnoi Literatury 1963, 1977) 
Baskhanov, M. K. 'Vostochnyi Turkestan: Zagadki Voennoi Istorii' in: Problemy Voennoi Istorii Narodov 
Vostoka (Biulletin' Kommissii po voennoi istorii narodov vostoka) Vypusk I (Moscow: 
Izdatel'stvo "NAUKA" G1avnaia Redaktsiia Vostochnoi Litemtury 1988) 
Bassin, Mark Imperial Visions. Nationalist Imagination and Geographical Expansion in the Russian Far 
East, 1840-1865 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1999) 
_____ ........ 'Russia between Europe and Asia: the ideological construction of geographical space.' 
SR 50 0,1991): 1-17. 
Batunsky, Mark 'Islam and Russian Culture in the First Half of the 19th Century' CAS 9 (4 ,1990): 1-27 
____ --'-. 'Racism in Russian Islamology: Agafangel Krimsky' CAS 4 (1992): 75-84 
Baumann. Dr. Robert F. Russian-Soviet Unconventional Wars in the Caucasus, Central Asia and 
Afghanistan (Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas: Leavenworth Papers No. 201993) 
______ . 'Technology versus the Moral Element: Emerging Views in the Russian Officer Corps, 
1870-1904' in: McKean, Robert B. (ed) New Perspectives in Modern Russian History (London: 
Macmillan 1992) pp.43-65. 
_____ ~. 'Subject Nationalities in the Military Service ofImperial Russia: The Case of the 
Bashkirs.' SR 46 (3-4, 1987): 489-502. 
Bayly, C.A 'Knowing the Country: Empire and Information in India.' MAS 27 (I, 1993): 3-43 
Becker, S. Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia-Khiva and Bukhara (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press 1968) 
____ --=-. 'The Muslim East in Nineteenth-Century Russian Popular Historiography' CAS 5 (3/4, 
1986): 25-47 
Bellamy, C. The Evolution of Modern Land Warfare. Theory and Practice (London: Routledge 1990) 
249 
_____ --"-. 'Heirs of Genghis Khan: The Influence of the Tartar-Mongols on the Imperial Russian 
and Soviet Armies.' RUSI 128 (1983): 52-60 
Belov, E. A 'Tibetskaia politika Rossii (l900-1914gg.)' VO 3 (1994): 99-109. 
____ ~. 'Russko-Kitaiskii spor v 1911-1912 gg. po voprosu peresmotra Peterburgskogo 
dogovora 1881g. (po russkim arkhivnym dokumentam)' VO 5 (1993): 143-154. 
_____ --"-. 'Problema uriankhaiskogo kraia v russko-kitaisko-mongol'skikh otnosheniiakh (1911-
1914), VO 1 (1995): 56-66. 
Bendrikov, K. E. Ocherki po istorii obrazovaniia v Turkestane (1865-1924 gody) (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo 
Akademii Pedagogicheskikh Nauk RSFSR 1960) 
Berg, L. S. Ocherk istorii russkoi geograficheskoe nauki (vplot do 1923 goda) (Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo 
Akademii Nauk SSSR 1929) 
Beskrovnyi, L. G. Russkaia armiia i j10t v XIX veke. Voenno-ekonomicheskii potentsial Rossii (Moscow: 
Izdatel'stvo "NAUKA" 1973) 
_____ ~. Armiia i j10t Rossii v nachale XXv.Ocherki voenno-ekonomicheskogo potentsiala 
(Moscow: "NAUKA"1986) 
Bestuzhev, I. V. Bor'ba v Rossii po voprosam vneshnei politiki 1906-1910 (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo 
Akademii Nauk SSSR 1%1) 
Bliev, M. M. & Degoev, V.V. Kavkazskaia Voina (Moscow: "Roset" 1994) 
Bolsover, G. H. 'David Urquhart and the Eastem Question, 1833-37' JMH8 (1936): 444-467 
Bradley, 1. Guns for the Tsar. American Technology and the Small Arms Industry in Nineteenth-Century 
Russia (DeKalb, lllinois: Northern Illinois University Press 1990) 
Brooks, E. Willis. 'Nicholas I as Reformer: Russian Attemtn to Conquer the Caucasus, 1825-1855' in: 
Nation and Ideology: Essays in honour of Wayne S. Vucinich (New York: Columbia University 
Press 1981) pp.227-263 
Brower, Daniel 'Russian Roads to Mecca: Religious Tolerance and Muslim Pilgrimage in the Russian 
Empire' SR 55 (3, 1996): 567-85. 
_____ --"-. 'Imperial Russia and its Orient: The Renown of Nikolai Przhevalsky' RR 53 (3,1994): 
367-381. 
_____ ~. & Lazzerini, E. 1. (008.) Russia 's Orient. Imperial Borderlands and Peoples, 1700-1917 
(Indiana: Indiana University Press 1997) 
Broxup, Marie Bennigsen & Avtorkbanov, A (eds.) The North Caucasus Barrier. The Russian Advance 
towards the Muslim World (London: Hurst & Company 1992) 
Burbank, 1. & Ransel, D. L. (008.) Imperial Russia. New Historiesfor the Empire (Indiana: Indiana 
University Press 1998) 
Callwell, C. E. Small Wars. A Tactical Textbookfor Imperial Soldiers (London: Greenhill Books 
1906/1990). 
Chemukha, V. G. 'Imperator Aleksandr II i fel'dmarshal kniaz' A I. Bariatinskii' in: Fursenko, A A 
(ed.), Rossiia v XIX-XX w.Sbornik statei k 70-Ietiiu so dnia rozhdeniia Rafaila Sholomovicha 
Ganelina (StPetersburg: Izdatel'stvo "Dmitri BuJanin" 1998) pp.11O-118. 
250 
Chiharu, Inaba 'Franco-Russian Intelligence Collaboration against Japan during the Russo-Japanese War, 
1904-05' JSEES 19 (1998): 1-23 
Christian, DavidA History of Russia. Central Asia and Mongolia. Volume 1: Inner Eurasiafrom 
Prehistory to the Mongol Empire (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1998) 
Chu, Wen-Djang The Moslem Rebellion in Northwest China 1862-1878. A Study of Government Minority 
Poljcy (Paris: Mouton & Co. The Hague 1966) 
Cimbala, Stephen 1. 'Steering Through Rapids: Russian Mobilization and World War I.' The Journal of 
Slavic Military Studies 9 (2, 1996): 376-398. 
Clay, Catherine B. 'Russian Ethnographers in the Service of Empire, 1856-1862' SR 54 (1,1995): 45-62 
Clubb, O. Edmund China and Russia. The "Great Game" (New York & London: Columbia University 
Press 1971) 
Cohn, Bernard S. Colonialism and Its Forms of Knowledge. The British in India (NJ: Princeton University 
Press 1996) 
Conrad, Joseph Nostromo (Kent: Wordsworth Editions Ltd. 1996) 
Coox, Alvin D. Nomonhan. Japan Against Russia, 1939. (California: Stanford Press 1990) 
Curzon, G. N. Russia in Central Asia (London: Longmans, Green & Co. 1889) 
Danilov, 0. Iu 'Russko-Iaponskaia voina i angliiskaia ugroza s iuga.' VO 6 (2000): 26-35 
Dantsig, B. M. B/izhnii Vostok v Russkoi nauke i literature (Dooktiabr'skii period) (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo 
"NAUKA" 1973) 
Derevianko, I. V. 'Russkaia agentumaiarazvedka v 1902-1905gg.' VIZh 5 (1989): 76-78 
Derevianko, I. v., Pavlov, D. B. & Petrov, S. A Tainy Russko-Iaponskoi Voiny (Moscow: Jzdatel'skaia 
gruppa "Progress": "Progress-Akaderoiia" 1993) 
Dobychina, E. V. 'Razvedka Rossii 0 Iaponskom voennom vliianii v Kitae na rubezhe XIX-XX vekov.' VI 
10 (1999): 127-31 
Donnelly, Alton S. The Russian Conquest of Bas hid ria 1552-1740. A Case Study in Imperialism (New 
Haven & London: Yale University.Press 1968) 
____ --'-. 'Peter the Great and Central Asia' CSP 17 (1975): 202-17 
Dowler, Wayne Classroom and Empire. The Politics o/Schooling Russia's Eastern Nationalities, 1860-
1917 (London & Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press 2(01) 
Dubrovskaia, D. V. 'I1iiskii krizis v russko-kitaiskikh otnosheniiakh.' VO 5 (1994): 51-63. 
Dudnik, V. & Smirnov, D. 'Vsiazhizn'-nauke.' VIZh 2 (1965): 47-57. 
Edgerton, Robert B. Warriors of the Rising Sun. A History of the Japanese Military. (N.Y. & London: 
W.W.Norton & Company 1997) 
Edney, Matthew H. Mapping An Empire. The Geographical Construction of British India, 1765-1843. 
(USA: University of Chicago Press 1997) 
Edwards, H. Sutherland Russian Projects Against India. From the Czar Peter to General Skobeleff 
(London: Remington & Co. Publishers 1885) 
Erickson, J. & Feucbtwanger, E. 1. (eds.) Soviet Military Power and Performance. (London: Macmillan 
Press Ltd. 1979) 
251 
Evans, John L. (trans., ed.) Mission of N. P. Ignat 'ev to Khiva and Bukhara in 1858. (Newtonville, Mass: 
Oriental Research Partners 1984) 
Evtukhov, C., Gasparov, G., Ospovat, A & Von Hagen, M (eds.) Kazan, Moscow, St. Petersburg: 
Multiple Faces of the Russian Empire (Moscow: o.G.I. 1997) 
Ewing, T. E. Between the Hammer and the Anvil? Chinese and Russian Policies in Outer Mongolia, 1911-
1921. (Indiana University Uralic and Altaic Series Vo1.l38 Bloomington: Research Institute for 
Inner Asian Studies 1980) 
Fedchenko, A Puteshestvie v Turkestan. (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo geograficbeskoi 
literatury 1950) 
Fisher, Alan 'Emigration of Muslims from the Russian Empire After the Crimean War.' JGO 35 (1987): 
356-371. 
Foucault, Michel Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. (New York: Random House 1977) 
Frechtling, Louise E. 'Anglo-RussianRivaiIy inEastem Turkestan, 1863-1881' JRCAS 26 (3,1939): 471-
89 
Fuller, William C. Strategy and Power in Russia 1600-1914. (New York: The Free Press 1992) 
_____ ~. Civil-Military Conflict in Imperial Russia 1881-1914. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press 1985) 
Gadzhiev, A Petr Karlovich Uslar- vydaiushchiisia kavkazoved. (Mak:hachkala: Dagestanskoe Ucbebno-
Pedagogicbeskoe izdatel' stvo 1966) 
Galili, Z. (ed.) Rossiia i PervaiaMirovaia Voina (Materialy mezhdunarodnogo nauchnogo kollokviuma). 
(St.Petersburg: Izdatel'stvo "Dmitri Bulanin" 1999) 
Gammer, Moshe Muslim Resistance to the Tsar: Shamil and the Conquest ofChechnia and Daghestan. 
(London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd. 1994) 
_____ ~. 'Prince Bariatinskii: The Conqueror of the Eastern Caucasus.' CAS 13 (2, 1994): 237-
247. 
____ ----'. 'Gosudarstvo Shamilia' VO 2 (1993): 37-47. 
_____ ..:.... 'Vorontsov's 1845 Expedition against Shamil: A British Report.' CAS 4 (4, 1985): 13-
33. 
Gankovskii, Ill. V. (ed.)Rossiia i Afganistan. (Moscow: Nauka. Glavnaia Redakstiia Vostochnoi Literatury 
1989) 
_____ ~. (ed) Istoriia vooruzhenykh silAfganistana 1747-1977. (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo 
"NAUKA" Glavnaia Redaktsiia Vostochnoi Literatury 1985) 
252 
Gareev, Genernl Makhmut If War Comes Tomo"ow? The Contours of Future Armed Conflict. (London: 
Frank Cass & Co. Ltd. 1998) 
Gatrell. P. Govemment, industry and rearmament in Russia, 1900-1914. The last argument of tsarism. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1994) 
Geyer, D. Russian Imperialism. The Interaction of Domestic and Foreign Policy, 1860-1914. (Leamington 
Spa.: Berg Publishers Ltd. 1987) 
Gilensen, V. M "'Osinye Gnezda" pod konsul'skoi kryshei.' VIZh 5 (1997): 49-59 
_____ ~. 'Razgrombasmacheskikhbazv Afganistane.' VIZh 1 (2000): 31-41. 
Glantz, LTC David August Storm: Soviet Tactical and Operational Combat in Manchuria, 1945. (Ft. 
Leavenworth, Kansas: Leavenworth Papers No.8 1985) 
Glubb, Lt. -Genernl 1. B. The Great Arab Conquests. (London: Hodder & Stoughton 1963) 
Glushchenko, E. Geroi Imperii. Portrety rossiiskikh kolonial'nykh deiatelei. (Moscow: Izdatel'skii dom 
"XXI vek-Soglasie" 2(01) 
Glushkov, V.V. & Sharavin, A A Na karte General'nogo Shtaba-Man 'chzhuriia. (Moscow: Institut 
politicheskogo i voennogo analiza 2(00) 
Golovin, GenernI N. N. Plan voiny. Iz istorii kampanii 1914 goda na russkom fronte. (Paris: Izdanie 
glavnogo pravleniia zarubezhnogo soiuza nlsskikb voennykh invalidov 1936) 
Gordin, Iakob Kavkaz: zemlia i krov' Rossiia v kavkazskoi voine XIX veka. (St.Petersburg: Zhumal 
"Zvezda" 2(00) 
Grekov, B. D. & lakobovskii, A Iu. Zolotaia Orda i ee padenie. (MoscowlLeningrad: Izdatel'stvo 
Akademii Nauk SSSR 1950) 
Grigortsevich, S. S. DaI'nevostochnaia politika imperialistichesldkh derzhav v 1906-1917gg. (fomsk: 
Izdatel'stvo Tomskogo universiteta 1965) 
Grozdetskii, N. A, Fedchina, V. N., Azat'ian, A A & DoDtsov, Z. N. Russkie geograficheskie 
issledovaniia kavkaza i srednei ani vXIX-nachaie XXv. (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "NAUKA" 1964) 
Gubakhanova, R A 'K voprosu ob organizatsii upravleniia Dagestanom vo vtoroi polovine XIX v.' In: 
Gadzhiev, V.G. (ed) Iz istorii dorevoliutsionnogo Dagestana (Sbomik nauchnykh trudov). 
(Makbachka1a: Dagestanskii Filial AN SSSR 1976) 1'1'.103-125 
Gurnilev, L. N. DrevniaiaRus' i Velikaia step' (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Mysl'" 1989) 
Handel, Michael I. Masters of War. Classical Strategic Thought. Third Revised and Expanded Edition 
(London: Frank Cass 2(01) 
Harrison, E. J. Peace or War East of Baikal? (Yokohama: Kelly & Walsh Ltd. 1910) 
Hauner, Milan What is Asia To Us? Russia's Asian Heartland Yesterday and Today. (Boston: Unwin 
Hyman 1990) 
_____ -=-. 'Central Asian Geopolitics in the Last Hundred Years: A Critical Survey from 
Gorchakov to Gorbachev' CAS 8 (1,1989): 1-20. 
253 
____ ----'-. 'The Soviet Threat to Afghanistan and India, 1938-1940.' M4S 15 (2, 1981): 287-309. 
Henze, Paul B. 'Circassia in the Nineteenth Century: The Futile Fight for Freedom' in: Lemercier-
Quelquejay, Chantal, Vinstein, Gilles, & Wimbush, S.E. (eds.) Turco-Tatar Past. Soviet Present. 
(Paris: Editions Peeters and Editions de I 'Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales 1986) 
pp.243-273. 
Henze, Paul B. 'Fire and Sword in the Caucasus: The 19th -Century Resistance of the North Caucasian 
Mountaineers.' C4S 2 (1, 1983): 5-44. 
_____ -". 'The great game in Kashgaria: British and Russian missions to Yakub Bey' CAS 8 (2, 
1989): 61-95 
Hirsch, Francine 'The Soviet Union as a WoIk-In-Progress: Ethnographers and the Category Nationality in 
the 1926, 1937 and 1939 Censuses.' SR 56 (2, 1997): 251-278 
Hittle, 1. D. The Military Staff. Its History and Development. (Connecticut: Greenwood Press 1944/1975) 
Hogben, W. Murray 'British Civil-Military Relations on the North-West Frontier of India' in Preston, A 
& Dennis, P. (eds.) Swords and Covenants. Essays in Honour of the Centennial of the Royal 
Military College of Canada, 1876-1976 (Canada: Rowman & Littlefield 1976) 
Hokanson, Katya 'Literary Imperialism, Narodnost' and Pushkin' s Invention of the Caucasus.' RR. 53 
(1994): 336-352 
Hsu, Immanuel C. Y. The Iii Crisis. A Study of Sino-Russian Diplomacy 1871-1881. (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press 1965) 
Il'iasova, A (ed.) Prisoedinenie Turkmenii k Rossii (Sbornik arkhivnykh dokumentov). (Ashkhabad: 
Izdatel'stvo Akademii Nauk Turlanenskoi SSR 1960) 
Iskandarov, B. I. Iz istorii Bukharskogo emirata (vostochnaia Bukhara i zapadnyi Pamir v kontse XIX 
veka). (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Vostochnoi Literatury 1958) 
_____ -". Gindukush vo vtoroi polovine XIX v. (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "NAUKA" Glavnaia 
Redaktsiia Vostochnoi Litemtury 1968) 
Iskhakov, G. M. Etnograficheskoe izuchenie uigurov vostochnogo Turkl!stana russkimi puteshestvennikami 
vtoroi poloviny XIX veka. (Alma-Ata: Izdatel'stvo "NAUKA" 1975) 
Ispahani, Mahnaz Z. Roads and Rivals. The Politics of Access in the Borderlands of Asia. (London: I. B. 
Tauris & Co., Ltd. 1989) 
Ivanov, A I. 'Vosstanie v Chechne v 1877g.' Istoricheskie Zap;ski 10 (1941): 280-294. 
_____ -". 'Natsional 'no-osvoboditel'noe dvizhenie v Chechne i Dagestane v 6O-70-kh gg. XIXv.' 
Istoricheskie Zapiski 12 (1941): 165-199. 
Jelavich, Charles & BaIbara (eds.), Russia and the East. 1876-1880. The Russo-Turkish War and the 
Kuldja Crisis as seen through the letters of A. G. Jomini to N. K. Giers. (London: E J Brill 1966) 
Jersild, Austin Lee 'Faith, Custom, and Ritual in the Borderlands: Orthodoxy, Islam, and the "Small 
Peoples" of the Middle Volga and the North Caucasus.' RR 59 (2000): 512-529. 
254 
_____ ...:.. 'Who was Shamil? Russian Colonial Rule and Sufi Islam in the North Caucasus, 1859-
1917.' C4S 14 (2,1995): 205-223 
_____ ...:.. 'Imperial Russification: Dagestani mountaineers in Russian exile, 1877-83.' CAS 19 (1, 
2000): 5-16. 
Juntunen, Alpo 'The influence of railway construction in Mongolia: the shift from Chinese to 
Russian/Soviet protection.' JTH 12 (2, 1991): 169-186. 
Kabanov, N. K. V. K.Arsen'ev. Puteshestvenniki naturalist 1872-1930. (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo 
Moskovskogo Obshchestva Ispytateli prirody 1947) 
Kadnikov, V. S. 'Iz Istorii Kul'dzbinskogo Voprosa.' IV 124 (1911): 893-909 
Kagan, Frederick W. The Military Reforms of Nicholas 1. The Origins of the Modern Russian Army 
(London: Macmillan 1999) 
Kapitsa, M. S. 'Vostokovedenie kale rossiiskaia nauka.' VO 1, (1994): 5-10. 
Kappeler, Andreas & Calyton, Alfred (trans.) The Russian Empire: A Multiethnic History. (England: 
Pearson Education Ltd. 200 1). 
Karamov, la. A 'Granitsa s Afganistanom v kontse XIX-nachale XXv. v voenno-sttategicheskikh pJanakh 
Rossii.' VMU 5 (1999): SO-59. 
Karpat, Kemal H. 'The hirja from Russia and the Balkans: the process of self-definition in the late Ottoman 
state.' in: Eickelman, Dale F. & Piscatori, 1. (eds.) Muslim Travellers. Pilgrimage. migration. and 
the religious imagination. (London: Routledge 1990) pp.131-152. 
_____ --=-. 'Yakub Bey's relations with the Ottoman sultans: a reinterpretation.' CMRS XXXII (1, 
1991): 17-32 
Kas'ianov, AM (ed.) Pogranichnaia politika Rossiiskoi Federatsii. (Moscow: Federal'naia pogranichnaia 
sluzhba Rossiiskoi Federatsii 1998) 
Kavtaradze, A G. 'Iz istorii russkogo general'nogo shtaba.' VIZh 12 (1971): 75-80, 7 (1972): 87-92 
____ --=.. 'Iz istorii russkogo general'nogo shtaba (l909-iiul' 1914gg).' VIZh 12 (1974): 80-86 
_____ ...:.. Voennye spetsialisty na s/uzhbe Respub/iki Sovetov 1917-1920gg. (Moscow: 
Izdatel'stvo "NAUKA" 1988) 
Kazemzadeh, Firuz Russia and Britain in Persia 1864-J 914. A Study in Imperialism. (NY: Yale University 
Press 1968) 
Keep, John L. Soldiers of the Tsar. Army and Society in Russia 1462-1874. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 1985) 
Kersnovskii, A A Istoriia Russkoi arm;;. T.I-4 (Moscow: "Golos" 1992-94) 
Khalfin, N. A (ed.) Formirovanie gumanistiche.sidkh traditsii otechestvennogo vostokovedeniia. (Moscow: 
Izdatel'stvo "NAUKA" Glavnaia Reda1ctsiia Vostochnoi Literatury 1984) 
_____ --=-. Tri Russkie missii. 1z istorii vneshnei politiki Rossii na Srednem Vostoke vo vtoroi 
polovine 60-kh godov XIX veka. (Tashkent: Izdatel'stvo SAGU 1956) 
_____ ...:.. 'The Rising ofishaqKhan in Southern Turkestan (1888)'C4R VI (3, 1958): 253-64 
_____ ...:.. Prisoedinenie Srednei Azii kRossii (60-9O-e godyXIXv.). (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo 
"NAUKA" Glavnaia Redaktsiia Vostochnoi Literatury 1965) 
255 
_____ ...:.. (ed.) Bukhara i Afganistan v nachale 80-x godov XIX veka. (lhuma/y komandirovok G. 
A. Arendarenko). (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "NAUKA" Glavnaia Redaktsiia Vostochnoi Literatury 
1974) 
_____ --=-. 'Indian Missions in Russia in the Late Nineteenth Century and British Historiography 
ofintemational Relations in Asia.' MAS 21 (4, 1987): 639-646. 
_____ ....:.. & Shastitko, P. M (eds.) Rossiia i 1ndiia (Moscow: Glavnaia Redaktsiia Vostochnoi 
Literatury 1986) 
Khariukov, L. N. Anglo-Russkoe Sopemichestvo v Tsentral 'noi Azii i Ismailizm. (Moscow: Moskovskogo 
universiteta 1995) 
Khashaev, Kh. M (ed.) Feodal'nye otnosheniiav Dages/ane XIX-nachaloXXv. Arkhivnye materia/y. 
(Moscow: Glavnaia Redakstiia Vostochnoi Literatury 1969) 
Khashimbekov, Kh. Uzbeki SevemogoAfganistana (Moscow: RAN Institut Vostokovedeniia 1994). 
Khvostov, V. 'ProektzakhvataBosforav 1896g.' KA 47-48(1931): 50-70 
_____ ....:.. 'Problemy zakhvata Bosfora v 9O-kh godakh XIX veka.' 1M 10 (1930): 100-129. 
Khodarkovsky, Michael 'Of Christianity, Enlightenment, and Colonialism: Russia in the North Caucasus, 
1550-1800.' JMH71 (1999): 394-430 
_____ ....:.. 'Taming the "Wild Steppe": Muscovy's Southern Frontier, 1480-1600.' Russian 
HistorylHistoire Russe 26 (3, 1999): 241-97 
_____ ...:.. Where Two Worlds Met. The Russian State and the Kalmyk Nomads, 1600-1771. (Ithaca 
& London: Cornell University Press 1992) 
Kim, G. F. & Shastitko, P.M. (eds.) Istoriia Otechestvennogo Vostokovedeniia do seredinyXIXvelul. 
(Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "NAUKA" Glavnaia Redaktsiia Vostochnoi Literatury 1990) 
Kiniapina. N. S., Bliev, M. M. & Degoev, V. V. Kavkaz i Srednaia Aziia vo vneshnei politike Rossii. 
Vtoraia polovinaXVIII- 8O-e gody XIX v. (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Moskovskogo Universiteta 1984) 
Kiniapina, N. S. 'Administrativnaia politika tsarizma na Kavkaze i v Srednei Azii v XIX veke.' VI 4 
(1983): 35-47. 
_____ ...:.. 'Sredniaia Aziia v planakh i deistviiakh Rossii v 6O-80-e gody XIX veka.' In: 
Tikhvinskii, S. L. (ed.) Rossiia i strany blizhnego zarubezh 'ia: Istoriia i Sovremennost' (Moscow: 
IRI RAN 1995) pp.127-141. 
Kinnel, Podpolkovnik N. S. " ... Iaponskie prachki i parkikmakhery otkryli ... mnogo magazinov s tsel'iu 
konspiratsii shPonskoi deiatel'nosti." VIZh 3 (2001): 54-59. 
Klimovicb. L. Islam v tsarskoi Rossii. Ocherki (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Antireligioznoe izdatel'stvo 
1936) 
256 
Knight, Nathaniel 'Grigor'ev in Orenburg, 1851-1862: Russian Orientalism in the Service ofEmpireT SR 
59 (1, 2(00): 74-100. 
Kolesnikov, A A & Kharatishvili, G. S. (005.) Russkie Puteshestvenniki vAfganistan (XIXvek). 
(Dushanbe: Izdatel'stvo "Danish" 1988) 
Kononov, A N. Istoriia izucheniia tiurkskikh iazykov v Rossii. Dooktiabr'skii Period (Leningrad: 
Akademiia "NAUK." SSSR 1982) 
_____ -'-. Bibliograficheskii slovar' otechestvennykh tiurkologov. Dooktiabr 'skU period 
(Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "NAUKA" Glavnaia Redaktsiia Vostochnoi Litemtura 1989) 
Komeev, v.v. 'Upravlenie Turlrestanskim kraem: real'nost' i "pmvovye mechtaniia" (60-e gody XIXv.-
fevral' 1917 goda).' 1i12 (2001): 56-70 
Koskikallio, P. & Lehmuskallio, A (005.) C.GMannerheim in Centra/Asia 1906-1908. (Helsinki: National 
Board of Antiquities 1999) 
Kotkin, S. & Wolff, D. (005.) Rediscovering Russia in Asia. Siberia and the Russian Far East. (Armonk, 
NY: M.E.Sharpe 1995) 
Kozhekina, M. T. '''Dlia Anglii .. nesomnenno vygodnee ... imet' sosedom velikuiu derzhavnuiu Rossiiu" 
razvedyvatel'noi missii general-Ieitenanta N.S.Ermolova v Indiiu v 1911 godu.' Ii1Zh 4 (2000): 3-
11 
Kozhukovskaia, A A (ed.) Istoriia Otechestvennogo Vostokovedeniia s serediny XIX veka do 1917 goda. 
(Moscow: Izdatel'skaia firm "Vostochnaia Litemtura" 1997) 
Kozlov, P. K. Russkii Puteshestvennik v Tsentral'noi Azii. Izbrannye trudy k sto/etiiu so dnia rozhdeniia 
(1863-1963). (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Akademii Nauk SSSR 1963) 
Krausse, A Russia in Asia. A Record and a Study. (London: Curzon Press 1900) 
Kulikova, A M Vostokovedenie v rossiiskikh zakonodate/ 'nykh aktakh (konets XIi1Iv-1917g.). (St. 
Petersburg: Tsentr "Peterburgskoe Vostokovedenie" 1993) 
Kuropatkin, AN. 'Razvedyvatel'naia missiia v Turtsiu' Ii1Zh 4 (1995): 68-77 
Lambert, Andrew D. The Crimean War. British grand strategy, 1853-56. (Manchester & New York: 
Manchester University Press 1990) 
Landa, R. G. Islam v istorii Rossii. (Moscow: Izdatel'skaia Firma "Vostochnaia Literatura" RAN 1995) 
Langer, William L. The Diplomacy of Imperialism 1890-1902. V.I-2 (New York & London: Alfred A 
Knopf 1935) 
Lantzeff, George V. & Pierce, Richard A Eastward to Empire: Exploration and Conquest on the Russian 
Open Frontier to 1750. (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press 1973) 
Lapidus, Ira M A History of Islamic Societies. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1988) 
Lattimore, Owen Studies in Frontier History. Collected Papers 1928-1958. (London: Oxford University 
Press 1962) 
Layton. Susan Russian Literature and Empire. Conquest of the Caucasus from Pushkin to Tolstoy. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1994) 
Lederer, Ivo 1. (ed.) Russian Foreign Policy. Essays in HistOrical Perspective. (New Haven & London: 
Yale University Press 1962) 
LeDonne, John P. The Russian Empire and the World, 1700-1917. The Geopolitics of Expansion and 
Containment. (New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press 1997) 
Lee,1. L. 'The Ancient Supremacy' Bukhara, Afghanistan and the Battlefor Balkh, 1731-1901. (Leiden 
New York: EJ.Brill Borders 1996) 
Lee, Robert H. G. The Manchurian Frontier in Ch 'ing History. (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University 
Press 1970) 
Lensen. G. The Russian Push Toward Japan: Russo-Japanese Relations, 1697-1875. (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press 1959) 
Leonidov, L. 'Vasilii Fedorovich Novitskii (k l00-lettsiu so dnia rozbdeniia).' VIZh 3 (1969): 77-85 
Lieven. Dominic Empire. The Russian Empire and its Rivals. (London: John Murray 2(00) 
_____ -'-. Russia and the Origins of the First World War. (London: Macmillan 1983) 
Lincoln, W. Bruce Peter Petrovich Semenov-Tian-Shanskii. The Life of a Russian Geographer. Russian 
Biography Series NO.8 (Newtonville, Mass.: Oriental Research Partners 1980) 
257 
_____ --'-. The Conquest of a Continent. Siberia and the Russians. (London: Jonathan Cape 1993) 
_____ -'-. In the Vanguard of Reform. Russia's Enlightened Bureaucrats 1825-1861. (DeKalb: 
Northern lllinois University Press 1982) 
Litvinov, Petr Petrovich Gosudarstvo i Islam v Russkom Turkestane (1865-1917). (Elets: Epetskii 
gosudarstvenny pedagogicheskii institut 1998) 
Liubovskii, M. K. & Degtiarev, A. (ed.) Obzor istorii russkoi kolonizatsii. (Moscow: Moskovskogo 
Universiteta 1996) 
Lobanov-Rostovsky, Prince A. 'The Shadow of India in Russian History.' History XIV (1930): 217-228. 
_____ -'-. Russia and Asia. (New York: The Macmillan Company 1933) 
Lobyntseva, M. A. 'K voprosu 0 sozdanii Aziatskogo departamenta Ministerstva inostrannykh del Rossii. ' 
in: Kuznetsova, N. A (ed.)Iran (Sbornik statei) (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "NAUKA" Glavnaia 
Redaktsiia Vostochnoi Litemtury 1971) 
Lukoianov, I. V. 'Vostochnaia politika Rossii i P. A Badmaev.' VI 4 (2001): 111-126. 
Lunin, B. V. Sredniaia Aziia v dorevoliutsionnom i sovetskom vostokovedenii. (fasbkent: Izdatel'stvo 
"NAUKA" UzbeksJroi SSR 1965) 
Luntinen. Pertti French Information on the Russian War Plans 1880-1914. (Helsinki: SHS 1984) 
Lyons, Captain Gervais Afghanistan: The Buffer State. Great Britain and Russia in Central Asia. (Madras-
London: Higginbotham & Co. -Luzac & Co. 1910) 
MacGahan, 1. A. Campaigning on the Oxus and the Fall of KJliva. Fourth Edition (London: Low, Marston. 
Searle & Rivington 1876) 
MacKenzie, D. The lion o/Tashkent. The Career o/General M G. Cherniaev. (Athens: University of 
Georgia Press 1974) 
258 
_____ --'-. 'Expmsion in Central Asia: St Petersburgvs. the Turkestan Generals, 1863-1866.' CSS 
III, (1969): 286 - 31l. 
____ ~. 'Turkestan's Significance to Russia 1850-1917.' RR 33 (1974): 167-188. 
Makarov, I. S. 'Fonnirovanie tsentral'nykh organov upravleniia voennoi razvedk.oi rossiiskoi imperii 
(posledniaia tret' XIX-nachalo XXv.).' in: Rossiia v mirovom politicheskom protsesse. Materialy 
vtoroi mezhdunarodnoi nauchno-teoreticheskoi konferentsii. (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Rossiiskogo 
universiteta druzhby narodov 1997) pp.56-59. 
Malik. H. (00.) Central Asia. Its Strategic Importance and Future Prospects. (London: Macmillan Press 
Ltd. 1994) 
Mal'kov, Y. L. (00.) Pervaia mirovaia voina. PrologXXveka. (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "NAUKA" 1998) 
Malozemoff, A Russian Far Eastern Policy, 1881-1904 with special emphasis on the causes o/the Russo-
Japanese War. (Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of Califomia Press 1958) 
Mannerheim, C. G. E. & LewenhaUJt, Count Eric (trans.) The Memoirs o/Marshal Mannerheim. (New 
York: E P Dutton & Compmy, Inc. 1954) 
Manz, Beatrice Forbes 'Central Asian Uprisings in the Nineteenth Century: Fergana under the Russians. ' 
RR 46, (1987): 261-28l. 
Marinov, V. A Rossiia i/aponiia pered pervoi mirovoi voinoi (1905-1914 gody). Ocherki istorii 
otnoshenii. (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "NAUKA" Glavnaia Redaktsiia Vostocbnoi LiteratuIy 1974) 
Marks, Steven G. Road to Power. The Trans-Siberian Railroad and the Colonization 0/ Asian Russia 1850-
1917. (London: I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd. 1991) 
_____ --'-. 'The Burden of the Far East: the Amur Railroad Question in Russia, 1906-1916.' SS 1 
(I, 1993/94): 9-28. 
Martin, Geoffrey 1. & James, Preston E. All Possible Worlds. A History o/Geographical Ideas. Third 
Edition (USA: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1993) 
Marvin, Charles The Eye-Witness Account o/the Disastrous Russian Campaign against the Akhal Tekke 
Turcomans. (London: W. H Allen & Co. 1880) 
_____ ....:.. The Russian Advance on India. Conversations with SkobelejJ, Ignatieff and other 
distinguished Russian generals and statesmen on the Central Asian Question. (London: Sampson, 
Low & Co. 1882) 
Maslova, O. V. (Compiler) Obzor russkikh puteshestvii i ekspeditsii v sredniuiu aziiu. Materialy k istorii 
izucheniia srednei azii. Chast'I. 1715-1856. Chast'II. 1856-1869 (Tashkent: Izdatel'stvo SAGU 
1955-56) 
Maslovskii, E.Y. Mirovaia Voina na Kavkazskomjronte 1914-1917g. Strategicheskii Ocherk' (Paris: 
Knigoizdatel'stvo 'Vozrozhdenje' 1933) 
259 
May, Ernest R (ed.) Knowing One's Enemies. Intelligence Assessment Before the Two World Wars. (NJ: 
Princeton University Press 1984) 
Mayzel, M. Generals and Revolutionaries. The Russian General Staff during the Revolution: A Study in the 
Transformation of a Military Elite. (Osnabruck: Bibilio Verlag 1979) 
McDonald, David MacLaren United Government and Foreign Policy in Russia, 1900-1914. (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press 1992) 
McKenzie, Kennit E. 'Chokan Valikhanov: Kazakh Princeling and Scholar.' CAS 8 (3,1989): 1-30 
McNeal, Robert H. Tsar and Cossack, 1855-1914. (Oxford: Macmillan Press Ltd. 1987) 
Melikov, V.A Strategicheskoe razvertyvanie (po opytu pervoi imperialisticheskoi voiny 1914-1918gg. i 
grazhdanskoi voinyv SSSR) Tom I. Pervaia Imperia/isticheskaia Voina 1914-1918gg. (Moscow: 
Gosudarstvennoe voennoe izdatel'stvo Narkomata Oborony soiuza SSR 1939) 
Menning, Bruce W. Bayonets before Bullets. The Imperial Russian Army, 1861-1914. (USA: Indiana 
University Press 1992) 
Mennon, R, Fedorov, YE. & Nadia, G. (eds.) Russia, the Caucasus and Central Asia. The 21st Century 
Security Environment. (Armonk, NY & London, England: M.E.Sharpe 1999) 
Moreman, T. A The Army in India and the Development of Frontier Warfare, 1849-1947. (London: 
Macmillan Press Ltd. 1998) 
Morris, Peter 'The Russians in Central Asia, 1870-1887' SEER 53, no.l33 (1975): 521-538 
Narbaev, N. B. Rossiia i Evraziia: problemy gosudarstvennosti. Vtoraia polovinaXIX-nachaloXX veka. 
(Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "NAUKA"1997) 
Narochnitskii. A L. (ed.) IsJoriia narodov Severnogo Kavkaza s drevneishikh vremen do kontsaXVIIIv. 
(Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka" 1988) 
_____ -'. (ed.) Istoriia narodov Severnogo Kavkaza konets XVI1Iv.-19J7g. (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo 
"Nauka" 1988) 
Nastenko, I. A (ed.) Sbornik Russkogo 1storicheskogo Obshchestva 2 (150) Rossiia i Severnyi Kavkaz. 
(Moscow: Russkaia Panorama 2(00) 
Nebrenchin, Podpolkovnik S. M 'Musul'manskaia Vostok i Russkaia Armiia' VIZh 4, 5 (1995): 37-42, 
36-39. 
Nekrasov, George North ofGailipoli. The Black Sea Fleet at War, 1914-1917. (New York: Columbia 
University Press 1992) 
Oglezneva, T. N. Russkoe Geograficheskoe Obshchestvo: izuchenie narodov severo-vostokaAzii, 1845-
1917. (Novosibirsk: Nauk 1994) 
Ogurtsov, S. A Mikhail Vasi/'evich Pevtsov. Geograf-puteshestvennik. (Omsk: Omskoe Knizhnoe 
izdatel'stvo 1960) 
'o.K.', Skobeleff and the Slavonic Cause. (London: Longmans Green & Co. 1883) 
Olcott. M B. The Kazakhs. (Stanford, California: Hoover Press 1987) 
Os'kin, G. 'Vozniknovenie i razvitie sbJZbby geneml'nogo shtaba v russkoi armii.' VIZh 3 (1969): 91-97 
260 
Ovchinnikova. T. N. P.K.Kozlov-Issledovatel' Tsentrai'noi Azii. (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "NAUKA" 1964) 
Paine, S. C. M. Imperial Rivals. China, Russia and Their Disputed Frontier. (Armonk, N.Y. & London, 
England: ME.Sharpe. 1996) 
Pavlenko, Podpolkovnik S. B. (ed.), "Poslednii oplot vlasti Emira ... vziat shturmom." VIZh 1 (1998): 34-6. 
Peters, F.E. The Hajj. The Muslim Pilgrimage to Mecca and the Holy Places. (NJ: Princeton University 
Press 1994) 
Petrusheva. L. 'Diktator Kryma. Ocherle 0 generale Slashcheve, sostavlenyi v 1929g. generalom 
Aver'ianovym po vospominaniam polkovnika VF.Frolova i kapitan AA fon-Dreiera 
(Publikatsiia L. Petrusheva). ' in: Neizvestnaia Rossiia XX vek 1lI (Moscow: "Istoricheskoe 
nasledie" 1993): 85-106. 
Petrovich, M. B. The Emergence of Russian Pan-Slavism, 1856-1870. (NY: Columbia University Press 
1956) 
Petrushevskii, I. P. (ed.) Kolonial'naia politika rossiskogo tsarizma v Azerbaidzhane v 20-60-kh gg. XIX v. 
T.I-2 (Moscow-Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo Akademii Nauk SSSR 1936) 
Pierce, R. Russian Central Asia, 1867-1917: A Study in Colonial Rule. (Berkeley, California: University of 
California Press 1960) 
Pisarev, Iu. A 'Rossiia i Turtsiia nakanune pervoi mirovoi voiny.' VI 12 (1986): 27-39 
Plekhanov, A M '"Protivupostavit' sil'neishii oplot ... pokusheniam inozemtsev .. " 0 perselenicheskoi 
politike Rossii v XIX veke.' VIZh 2 (1997): 66-71. 
Pokrovskii, M. N. Diplomatiia i voiny tsarskoi rossii v XIX stoletii. (London: Overseas Publications 
Interchange 1991) 
Pokrovskii, N. I. Kavkazskie Voiny i Imamate Shamilia. (Moscow: Rosspen 2000) 
Popov, A 'OtBosforakTikhomuokeanu.' 1M3 (37,1934): 3-28. 
____ ~. 'Tsarskaia Rossiia i Mongoliia v 1913-1914gg.' KA 37 (1929): 3-68 
____ ----'. 'Angliiskaia Politib v Indii i Russko-Indiiskie otnosheniia v 1897-1905gg.' KA 19 
(1926): 53-63. 
____ ~. 'Dal'nevostochnaia-politib tsarizma v 1894-1901 godakh.' 1M 11 (51, 1935): 38-57. 
____ ~. 'Turetskaia revoliutsiia 1908-1909 gg. 'KA 43 (1930): 3-54. 
____ ---'. 'Turetskaia revoliutsiia 1908-1909 gg. 'KA 44 (1931): 3-39. 
____ ----'. 'Turetskaiarevoliutsiia 1908-1909 gg. 'KA 45 (1931): 27-52. 
_____ --=.. & Pokrovskii, M (eds.) 'Tsarskaia diplomatiia 0 zadachakh Rossii na Vostoke v 
1900g.' KA 5 (1926): 3-29. 
Popov, Polkovnik V. V. 'Voiny na Kavkaze i zapadnoevropeiskie 'tsivilizatory'.' VIZh 4 (1997): 60-70 
_____ --=.. 'Imperator Aleksandr D: .... delo polnogo zavoevaniia Kavkaza blizko uzhe k 
okonchaniiu.'" VlZh 6 (1995): 71-77 
Popplewell, Richard J. Intelligence and Imperial Defence: British Intelligence and the Defence of the 
Indian Empire 1904-1924. (London: Frank Cass 1995) 
261 
Powell, Ralph L. The Rise of Chinese Military Power 1895-1912. (New York &. London: Kennikat Press 
1955) 
Preston, Adrian 'Sir Charles MacGregor and the Defence ofIndia, 1857-1887.' HJ XII (1969): 58-n 
Primakov, E. M. (ed.), Ocherki istorii Rossiskoi vneshnei razvedka. (Tom I) (Moscow: "Mezhdunarodnye 
Obtosheniia" 1996) 
Quested, R. K. I. 'Matey' Imperialists? The Tsarlst Russians in Manchuria 1895-1917. (Hong Kong: 
University of Hong Kong Press 1982) 
RaefT, Marc Michael Speran9cy Statesman of Imperial Russia. (The Hague: Martinus NijhotT 1957) 
____ ~. 'In the Imperial Manner' in: Raeff, Marc (ed.) Catherine the Greal. A Profile. (New 
York: Hill&. Wang 1972)pp.197-200 
____ ~. 'Panerns of Russian Imperial Policy toward the Nationalities. ' in Allworth, E. (ed.) 
Soviet Nationality Problems (New York: Columbia University Press 1971) pp.22-42 
Ragsdale, H. (ed.) 1mperial Russian Foreign Policy. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1993) 
Ralston, David B.lmporting the European Army. The Introduction of European Military Techniques and 
1nstitutions into the Extra-European World, 1600-1914. (Chicago &. Londoo: The University of 
Chicago Press 1990) 
Rayfield. D. The Dream of Lhasa. The Life ofNikolay Przheval9cy (1839-88). Explorer of Central Asia. 
(London: Paul Elek 1976) 
Reisner, I. 'Anglo-Rnsskaia konventsiia 1907g. i razdel Afganistana. (Po materialam sekretnogo arkhiva 
byvsbegoM.I.D.).' KA 10 (1925):~. 
Rhinelander, L. H. 'Russia's Imperial Policy: The Administration of the Caucasus in the First Half of the 
Nineteenth Century: CSP 17, 2-3 (1975): 218-235. 
_____ ...,. Prince Michael Vorontsov. VIceroy to the Tsar. (Montreal: McGiU-Queen's University 
Press 1990) 
Riasanovsky, N. V. 'The emergence of Ewasianism ' CSS 4 (1967): 39-72. 
Rich, David A 'Imperialism, Reform and Strategy: Russian Military Statistics. 1840-1880.' SEER 74 (4, 
1996): 621-639 
_____ -!. The Tsar's Colonels. Professionalism, Strategy and Subversion in Late Imperial Russia. 
(Ountridge, Mass &. London: Harvard University Press 1998) 
Rieber, Alfred 1. 'Russian I~ism: Popular, Emblematic, Ambiguous.' RR. S3 (1994): 331-335 
Rogers, Greg 'An examination of historians' explanations for the Mongol withdrawal from East Central 
Europe: EEQ XXX (1,1996): 3-26 
R.ogger, Halls 'The SkobcIev PbeDomcDon: the Hero and his Worship.' OSP IX (1976): 46-78 
Romaoov, B. A &. Jones, Susan Wilbur (trans.) Russia in Manchuria (1892-1906). (Michigan: Ann AIbor 
1952) 
Romodin, V. A 'Iz istcrii izucheniia afgantsev i Afganistana v Rossii.' in: Ocherki po islori; Russkogo 
Vostokovedeniia (Moe;cow: lz.daIel'stvo Akademii Nauk SSSR 1953) pp.I48-184. 
Rostovskii. S. 'Tsarskaia Rossiia i Sin' -Tszian v XIX-XX vekakh.' 1M 3 (55, 1936): 26-53. 
Rostunov. I. I. Russkii front pervoi mirovoi voilry. (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "NAUKA" 1976) 
Rozman. G., NoS()\!, M.G .. & Watanabe, K. (eds.) Russia and E."'ast Asia. The 21st Century Security 
f.nvironment. (Armonk. NY & London, England: M.E.Sharpe 1999) 
Rywkin. M (cd) Russian Colonial Expansion to 1917. (London: Mansell Publishing Ltd. 1988) 
RYLhenkOV. M. R. & Smilianskaia. I. M Siriia, Livan i Palestina v opisaniakh rossiiskikh 
puteshestvennikov, konsul'skikh i voennykh obzorakh pervoi poloviny XIX veka. (Moscow: 
Izdatel'stvo «NAUKA» Glavnaia Redaktsi.ia Vostochnoi Literatury 1991) 
262 
Ryzhenkov. M. R. 'Dokumenty Rossiiskogo gosudarstvennogo voenno-istoricheskogo arkhiva po istorii 
Korei i Russko-Koreiskikh otnoshenii v XIX-nacbale XXv.' VO 2 (2000): 26-31. 
Sahni. Kalpana Crucifying the Orient. Russian Orientalism and the Colonization of Caucasus and Central 
Asi a. (1baiJand: White Orchid Press 1997) 
Said. Edward Orientalism. Western Conceptions of the Orient. (London: Penguin Books 1978/1995) 
Sakharov, A N. (cd) Istorlia vneshnei poIitiki Rossii. T.2 Konets XIX-nachalo XX veka (Ot russko-
frantsuzskogo soiuza do Oktiabr's/wi revoliutsii). (Moscow: "Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia" 
1997) 
Salonikes. M. l. 'Indiiskii patriot v Rossii.' VI9 (1999): 143-149. 
Samuelson. Lennart Pionsfor Stalin's War Machine. Tukhachevskii and Military-Economic Planning, 
/925-194/. (London: Macmillan Press Ltd. 2(00) 
Saray, M. T1te Turkmens in the Age of Imperialism. (Ankara: Turkish Historical Printing House Society 
1989) 
Schwab. Raymond The Oriental Renaissance. Europe's Rediscovery of India and the East /680-1880. 
(NY: Columbia University Press 1984) 
Segal, Gerald Defending Clrina. (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1985) 
Semennikov, v. P. Za bJiSOllfi tsDI'iZ1M: arkhiv nbetskago vracha Badmaeva. (Leningrad: Gos. Izd-stvo 
1925) 
____ --'. (cd) 'Pis'ma ll.Voromsov-Dashkova Nikolaiu Romanovu (1905-1915gg.).' KA 26 
(1928): 97-126. 
Semenov (Tian-Shanskii), P. P. (cd) ll10rlia poluvekovoi deiatel'nosti imperatorskogo russkogo 
geograjicheskogo obsltcltestva. 1845-1895. (StPetersburg: Tipografii V.Bezobrazova i Komp. 
1896) (3 voIs.) 
Sergcev, E. Iu. cl UJunian. N. A Ne podJezhit' oglasheniiu. Voennye Agenty Rossiiskoi Imperii v Evrope i 
no boIkanakJL 1900-1914gg. (Moscow: IVI RAN 1999) 
Sergcev,o. I. Kazachestvo no rwssktNIt dol'nem vostoke vXVJI-XIXvv. (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "NAUKA" 
1983) 
Shastitko. P. M (cd) Russko-Intiiskie Otnosheniia v XIX v. SbomikArkhivykh documenlov i malerialov. 
(Moscow: Izdatd'skaia firma "Vosaochnaia literatura" RAN 1997) 
263 
_____ ~. It Zagorodnikova.. T. N. (eds.) Russko-lmiiskie Otnosheniia v 1900-1917gg. Sbornik 
Arkhivnykh docJImentov i maleria/ov. (Moscow: Izdatel'skaia finna "Vostochnaia Literatura" 
RAN 1999) 
Shatokhina.. L. V. 'Politika Rossii na Sev~Zapadnom Kavkaze v 30-60-e gody XIXv.' VMU 3 (2000): 3-
26 
Shatsillo, K. F. Ot Portsmutskogo mira k pervoi mirovoi voiny. Generaly i politka. (Moscow: Rosspen 
2(00) 
Shaumian. Tatiana nbel. The Greal Game and Tsarist Russia. (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2(00) 
Sheffy, Yip British Military Intelligence in the Palestine Campaign 1914-1918. (London: Frank Cass 
1998) 
Shelukbin. A Iu. 'Razvedyvatel'nye organy v strukture vysshego voennogo upravleniia rossiislroi imperii 
nacbaJa XX veO (1906-1914gg.)' VMU 3 (1996): 17-31. 
Sheremeto V. l. 8osfor. Rossiia i Turtsiia v epokhu pervoi mirovoi voiny. Po materia/am rIIsskoi voennoi 
razwdki. (Moscow: Tekhnologicbeskaia sbkola biznesa 1995) 
Shirokorad. A B. R~Ture,gae voilo/ 1676-1918gg. (MoscowlMinsk: "Kharvest-Act" 2(00) 
Sbteinberg,E. 'Andizhanskoevosstanie 1898g' KA 3(88,1938): 123-181 
Siegelbaum. Lewis H. 'Another 'Yellow Peril': Chinese Migrants in the Russian Far East and the Russian 
Reaction before 1917: MAS 12 (2, 1978): 307-330 
Sivkov, K. V:O pnektakh oIroncbaniia Kavkazskoi voiny v seredine XIXv.'lstoriia ~ 3 (1958): 192-
194 
Skachkov, P. A. Ocherla istoni russIcogo kitaevedeniia. (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "NAUKA" Glavnaia 
RMaktsiia Vostochnoi Literatury 1977) 
Skal'kovskii, K. A. Sovremennaia Rossii. Ocherld nashei gOSlldarstvennoi i obshchestvennoi zhizni. T.I-2 
(St.Petenburg: Tipografiia A S. Suvorina 1890) 
Skritskii. N. V. 'Naprasno gortsy zbdali Torok.' v/Zh 4 (1995): 46-51 
Slezkine. Yuri Arctic Mi17'Of'S. Russia and the Small Peoples of the North. (Ithaca It London: Comell 
University Press 1994) 
Smimov. N. A Ocherld istorii izucheniia Islama v SSSR. (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Akademii Nauk SSSR 
1954) 
_____ ~. Polililca Rossii na Kavlcaze v XVI-XIX vekakh. (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo sotsial'no-
ekonomicbeskoi literaIury 1958) 
Snellins John Buddhism in Russia. The Story of Agvan Dorzhiev. Lhasa's emissary to the Tsar. 
(Shaftesbury: Element Boob Ltd. 1993) 
Snesarev, A E. Etnograficheslcaia India. (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "NAUKA" GIavnaia Redaktsiia 
Vostoclmoi Litc:ratury 1981) 
____ ----<. 'Russkii vostok Uk zadacha laaevednogo izucheniia.' VO 3 (1993): 95-107. 
Sncsarev, E. A 'Ancfti Evgen' evich Soesarev.' NAA 4 (1986): 117-122 
264 
Sobo1ev3.. T. A Tainopis' v islorii Rossii. (/storiia kriplograjicheskoi sluzhhy Rossii XV/lJ- nachale XX v.). 
(Moscow: "Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia" 1994) 
SopIenkov. S. V. Doroga v Arzrum: rossiiskaia obshchestvennaia mysl' 0 Vostoke (pervaia polovina XiX 
veka). (Moscow: Izdatel'skaia finna "Vostochnaia Literatura" RAN 2(00) 
Spring. Derek W. 'Russian Imperialism in Asia in 1914.' CMRSXX (1979): 305-322. 
Starapuu. Ia. T. 'Kavkazskii Vopros vo VLgliadakh i deiatel'nosti D. A Miliutina.' VMU 3 (1998): 71-89. 
Stephan. John J. The Russian Far East. A History. (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press 1994) 
_____ -". 'The Crimean War in the Far East. ' MAS III (3, 1969): 257-277 
Stone. Norman The Eastern Front 1914-1917. (London: Hodder & Staugbton 1975) 
Strong. John W. 'The Ignat'ev Mission to Kbiw andBukbara in 1858.' CSP 17,2-3 (1975): 236-259 
Sumner. B. H. Tsordomand Imperialism in the Far East andMiddie East, 1880-1914. (USA: Archon 
Books 1968) 
Swietochowski. Tadeusz Russian Azerbaijan, 1905-1920. The Shaping of National Identity in a Muslim 
lommunity. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1985) 
Tang. Peter S. H. Russian and Soviet Policy in Manchuria and Outer Mongolia. 1911-1931. (Durham NC: 
Duke Uni\'ersity Press 1959) 
Tikhornirov. M. N. Prisoedinenie Merva k Rossii. (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Vostochnoi Literatury 1960) 
Tokarev, S. A Istoriia Russkoi emograjii. (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "NAUKA" 1966) 
To1macheva. Marina 'The early Russian exploration and mapping of the Chinese frontier.' CMR 4111 
(2000): 41-36 
Trubetzko}', N. S. The Legacy ofGenghis Khan and Other Essays on Russia's Identity. (USA: Ann Arbor 
1991) 
Tsybikov. Izhrannie mill v dvukJJ tomakh. (Novosibirsk: "NAUKA" Sibirskoe otdelenie 1991), 
T5---O\". Akhmed 'Rnsckaia biurolaatiia i Ka\'Iarzskie gortsy. 'VE 9 (1909): 298-315. 
Utley. Robert M. Frontie1'SlMn in Blw. The United States Army and the Indian, /848-/865. (Lincoln & 
London: University of Nebraska Press 1967) 
Van Ocr Oye, David Scbimmclpenninck 'Russia's ambi\'alent response to the Boxers.' CMR 4111 (2000): 
57-78 
_____ ~. 'Russian Military lnldIiJCDCe on the Manchurian Front. 1904-05,' Intelligence and 
National Security XI (I, 1996): 22-31 
Van Dyke, Cart Russi", Imperial Military Doctrine and Education, /832-/914. (USA: Greenwood Press 
1990) 
Vasil'ev. D. V. 'Orpnizatsiia i funk1sionirovane glavnogo upnwleniia v Turkestanskom general-
gubematorstve (1865-1884 g.).' VMU 3 (1999): 48~1 
Velycbenko, Stqlben ·Idemitics. Loyalties and Service in Imperial Russia: Who Administered the 
Borderlands?' RR 54 (1995): 188-208 
Vipsin, A A. 'I.P.MinIe\' i russkaia politika na vostoke v 8O-e gody XIX v. 'vo 3 (1993): 108-124. 
Vinkov~·. Ilya 'Classical Eurasianism and its Legacy.' Canadian-American Slavonic Studies 43 (2, 
2000): 125-39 
265 
Von Hagen. Mark Soldiers in the Proletarian Dictatorship. The Red Army and the Soviet Socialist State. 
/9/7-/930. (Ithaca &. London: Cornell University Press 1990) 
Von Laue, Theodore H. Sergei Wine and the Industrialization of Russia. (N.Y. &. London: Columbia 
University Press 1973) 
Vorontsov-Dashkov. Graf 'Vsepoddanneisbai zapiska po upravleniiu Kavkazskim kraem general-ad'iutant 
grafa VOroDuova-Dashkova.' Roana 1-2 (2000): 149-151 
Voskressenskii. A. D. Diplomaticheskaia istoriia russko-ldtaiskogo Sankt-Peterburgskogo dogovora /88/ 
goda. (Moscow: Pamiatniki isaorK:beskoi mysii 1995) 
Vucinich. Wayne S. (ed.) Russia and Asia. Essays on the Influence of Russia on the Asian Peoples. 
(Stanford California: Hoover Institution Press 1972) 
Waller. Derek The Pundits. British Exploration of Tibet and Central Asia. (Kentucky: University of 
Kentucky Press 1990) 
Walsh. Warren B. 'The Imperial Russian General Staff and India: A Footnote to Diplomatic History.' RR 
1612 (1957): 53-58 
Weiner. Amir .\laking Sense of War. The Second World War and the Fate of the Bolshevik Revolution. 
(Princeton &. Oxford: Princeton University Press 200 1) 
Westwood. J. N. RJ4ssia Against Japan. 1904-05. A New Look at the Russo-Japanese War. (London: 
Macmillan Press Ltd 1986) 
Wheeler. G. 'The Russian Presence in Central Asia' CSP 17,2-3 (1975): 189-200. 
Whittaker, Cynthia H. 'The lnq:Bct of the Oriental Renaissance in Russia: The Case of Sergej Uvarov. 'JGO 
26 (1978): 503-524 
WhitlOCk.. Michael 'ErmoIov: Proconsul of the Caucasus.' RR 18 (1, 1959): 53~. 
Williams, Brian GIyn 'Hirja and forced migration from nineteenth-<:entury Russia to the Ottoman Empire. 
A critical analysis of the Great Tatar emigration of 1860-1861.' CMR 4111 (2000): 79-108. 
Williams, D. S. M. 'Native Courts in Tsarist Central Asia.' CAR XIV (1,1966): 6-19. 
Wolff. David To the Harbin Station. The Liberal Alternative in Russian Manchuria, 1898-1914. 
(California: Stanford University Press 19(9) 
Yaroshe\'Sk:i, Dov B. 'Imperial SUategy in the Kirgbiz Steppe in the Eighteenth Century.' JGO 39 (2, 
1991): 221-224. 
Zagorodnikova. T. N. cl KoIesnikov. A A (cds.) Snesarevskie Chten;;a 96. (Dusbanbe: Izdatel'stvo 
~Danisb" 1997) 
Zaionc:hkO\'Skii, A. M. PodgOlovka Rossi; k Mirovoi V'oine (plany voiny). (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe 
Voennoe l.zdIdd '5M) 1926) 
Zaioncbkovsk..ii. P. A. V~nnyRefomryJ~70godov v Rossii. (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Moskovskogo 
UnM:rsitaa 19S2) 
Zakher, Ia. M. 'Koostanlinopl' i prolivy.' KA 6 (1923): 48-76 
____ ----'."Konstantinopl' i prolivy.' KA 7(1924): 32-54 
Zelkina., Anna In Quest for God and Freedom. The Silfi Response to the Russian Advance in the North 
CQllcasus. (London: Hurst & Company 2(00) 
Zenkovsky, Serge A Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvant University Press 
1960) 
_____ -'. 'Kulturkampfin pre-revolutionary Centtal Asia.' ASEER XIV (1955): 15-41 
266 
Zhilin. P. A (00.) Russkoia "Oennaia MysJ' Konets XIX-nachalo XX V. (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "NAUKA" 
1982) 
Zolotarev, Vladimir J Oennaia Bezopasnost . Otechestva (Istoriko-pravovoe issledovanie). (Moscow: 
Kanan-Press 1998) 
Zolotarev. V. A (00.) Istoriia voennoi straJegii Rossii. (Moscow: Kuchkovo Pole Poligrafresursy 2(00) 
267 
APPENDICES. 
, 
\ -
\ I"!e , ~ 
\ 
Inner Moo - lia 
, 
1- 1I<.nlanoJ, ""ler ponp/lr" \ 
- - - Ru ..,..Ch.~ bonier lYe " 
RIC ..,..J."""".e p.ut.uon I .... I Q()7 • i Dolonnur 
Ru",>-J panac pan •• "", 101'1< 191~ I \. ~ -I·r, 
K Ig n :"'.' .~" ...... -. '"", .. ~~:~\ "':' -I ..... I •••• 
G ... ,. M.n hihli 
•• : Provin 
ash~ n1 
0.:1 • 
,.--
I 
I 
.. 
\ -
~ i 
I '" 
\ . 
I ' 
.. 
.. 
I , 
I 
I 
~laril imc 
Pro\inll: 
fh hClund..!('\> I M,q 
II. huund>'Y I 
1'1'<';(,11' \ 1.111 'oloan ho .. kr 
T~fl.Hll·' L- _____ _ 
lfa,OI • 
..\ 
c s 
Map I, Gt'Jlcrol geo phic I 'cherne 
:---
· ~ 
Text cut off in original 
